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CHAPTER 1
11'JTRODUCTION
1. 1 Problem Statement
Failure detection and accommodation has become a critical
concern as the conlplexitj- of modern systems has increased. In
the general sense a failure is any change which reduces a system's
effectiveness. This change may take the form of a component failure,
a variation in a system parameter, or a variation in the operating
environment. In many instances it is pass ible to determ ine a
priori a set of changes which have a reasonable probability of occurring
and to design the system to insure that the changes cannot cause a
severe degradation of Rystem performance. Frequently this can be
done without determining whether or not a system change does in
fact occur, Desens itization of the system in this manner is an
integral part of effective system design.
There remains an important class of applications for which
satisfactory system behavior requires explicit detection of a failure
as an antecedent to corrective action. F'ailure detection problems
of this nature are best described as event detection problems. The
event may be either a sudden or a gradual failure. but it is character-
ized by the fact that it results in the degradation of the system's
performance below some threshold value. The detection of such
events and identification of the associated failures in an on-line
bas is is the central issu.e of this thes is. Attention is restricted
to systems which can adequately be described as time invariant
or piece-wise time invariant linear stochastic systems.
For a particular application, a failure detection algorithm
tailored to that application may afford significant advantages over
more generally applicable approaches. As systems increase in
complexity and subtlety, however, the effort involved in designing
9
and implementing such schemes may become prohibitive. The intention
of this thee is is to develop a general capability for detecting failures
in complex dynam ic syst~m8 which effects a reasonable comprom lee
between ease of implementation, simplicity of operation, and efficiency
of performance. PartiCtllar attention is given to maxim iz ing the
number of events which can be monitored by a single detection sjstem
and minilnizing the probability of an incorrect or ambiguous decision.
1. 2 BaC?kground
The greatest effort in failure detection has been related to the
problem of detecting a failure in one of a set of m identical components.
If the components are driven by the same input, then in the determ inistic
case failure detection requires only that the system outputs be measured
and compared with a reference output. If a measurement deviates
sufficiently from the reference.. it is assumed that either the component
or its accompanying sensor has failed. The reference output is generally
taken to be a weighted average of the output of the m sensors.
This comparison procedure has become known as voting or
the majority rule law for failure detection. It is characterized by three
restrictions:
(1) under nominal conditions the sensor outputs must be
algebraically related ..
(2) the detection law cannot discriminate between the failure
of a system component and the failure of the sensor which
measures the component's output, and
(3) the detection law is memoryless and therefore may ex-
perience difficulty in detecting "softlt failures.
Because of the lack of memory, 'voting cannot detect a failure 11ntil
the appropriate output differs from the reference by an amount greater
than a preset threshold. When a failure has been detected.. it is still
~ecessary to determine whic~ element of the component-sensor pair
has failed. In the event of m- 1 failures. voting will not specify which
components have failed. Sy~tems which utilize voting for failure
10
detection are commonly at least triply-redundant in order to minimize
the occurrence of such ambiguous decis iOflS.
Voting has been employed with cons iderable success in the
stochastic case for inertial navigation systems by Gilmore and McKern
(1970), Pejsa (1971), and Ephgrave (1969). In these instances the gyro
measurements are of sufficient accuracy that the memoryless feature
of voting presents no great difficulties in detecting "hard" gyro failures.
For HsaftH failures, more detailed analysis is required. A useful
comparison of several procedures for implementing a voting algorithm
in the stochastic case is presented by Potter and Deckert (1972).
If a failure mode is sufficiently soft to make memoryless voting
ineffective, an alternative is to cons ider a weighted time average of
the measurement errors as a means of reducing the error variances
and hence the threshold. Chien (1972) used a sequential probability
ratio test (SPR T) to develop a minimum time detection algorithm for
the gyro bias problem. His work represents one of the few examples
found in the literature which utiliz~ a voting algorithm with. memory
for failure detection.
More recently, attempts have been made to develop failure
detection algorithms which utilize a model of the system dynam ics
in order to detect and identify component failures. The simplest
of these algorithms use a Kalman filter to monitor the system performance
and then make a detection decision based upon the whiteness of the
Kalman filter residuals. The WSSR algorithm proposed by Willsky
et al (1974) is an example of this approach. Although simple residual-
based algorithms may yield effective failure detection.. they generally
possess a limited capability for failure identification.
The first algorithms to offer effective failure detection and
identification for dynamic systems were based upon likelihood ratio
concepts discussed by Van Trees (1968) among others. These algorithms
have the advantage that they are optimal in a statistical sense for
stochas~ic systems, but they frequently are computationally unweildy.
Laniotis (1971) is an example of Borne of the early development efforts.
The Generalized Likelihood Ratio test (GLR) first investigated by
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McCauley and Denlinger (1973) and later generalized by Willsky arld
Jones (1974), solved the computational problem without significantly
degrad ing the fa~lure detection and identification optimality of the
likelihood ratio approach. The primary disadvantage of GLR, as well
as of all likelihood ratio- based algorithms, is that it requires specific
models of all pass ible failure modes to be formulated for each system
component, and a detection test must be performed for each failure
mode. For many applications, a list of precise failure modes cannot
be formulated.
A variety of different approaches to the failure detection problem
have appeared in the recent literature. The Bayesian test of Sanyal
and Shen (1973) and the ellipsoid overlap test of Kerr (1974) are two
examples. In general, these tests riclve performed well for their
appl ieations •
The major analytic contribution to failure detection in linear
systems is due to Beard (1971). The approach used by Beard is similal'
to that used in state estimation theory and linear observer theory in
that it utilizes a model of the nominal system dynamics to predict
the system output. In the absence of failures, modeling errors, and
system disturbances, the state of this reference model is identical
to the state of the system. Assum ing the system me~surements
are perfect, the reference model also predicts the system.output
exactly. If a failure has occurred, however, the reference model
output differs from the system output. Beard showed that this output
error can be used to modify the state of the reference model in such
a manner that the output error generated by certain system failures
possesses spatial characteristics which make the failures readily
identifiable.
A very important aspect of Beard's approach is that the ability
to identify the failure of a system component is independent of the
manner in which the component fails as long as the failure alters the
system to a sufficient degree. This is in contrast to the performance
of likelihood ratio tests. Also, in contrast to the voting law performance,
the approach provides a capability for discriminating between sensor
12
failures arid changes in the syst~m dynamics; and it does not require
parlallel systenl redundancy. A failure detection system can 118ually
be designed to detect and i.dentify failurefJ in a number of system
components. Beard was abla to p.rove fL sufficient condition which
a set of failures must satisfy to bf~ de,te,~table by a single failure
detection system. He did not pr'ove a necelJsary condition and he did
not consider the stochasti~ detection probler.1. The set of failures
detectable by a s;.ngle filter [nay be s ignific1J.ntly larger than the
8 et s pee ified b)- l=leard IS suffic iency cond it. inn.
The a'?proach used by B~ard bear~ a marked resemblance to
output decQupling. Probienls of this type have received cons iderable
attention. i\mong the literature are Falb and Wolovich (1967), Gilbert
(1969), and Wonham and Morae (1970). The latter paper demonstrated
the utility of geometric cOL~epts as an aid in resolving difficult
systems problems. Through consideration of the structure of a linear
operator in an n-dimensional vector space, Worham and Morse were
able to obtain simple proofs in an intuitive manner for the properties
of the general decouplLng probl~m~ The derivations of detection
properties in this thee is are ill a s im iIar vein.
1. 3 Summary of Thesis
The subject of this thesis is a restatement and subsequent
completion of the failure detection problem as posed by Beard.
Beard applied matrix algebra principles to prove the essential pro-
perties of his failJlre detection theory. Although this constructive
approach rest11ted in a set of useful design algorithms, it required
the introduction of computational techniques which de- emphas ized the
basic principles of observability and controllability upon which state
space theory is founded. The approach taken in this thesis is to
express the failure detection problem in a geometric context in which
it is possible to distinguish between properties of the system which are
computationally expedient and those which define the problem. From
this vantage point the derivation of failure detection theory can be
sirnpllfied considerably and the relationship of the results to other
13
concepts in systems theory can be more clearly understood. Special
properties can be proved and used where it is clear that they afford
computational advantages.
The fundamental geometric property underlying detection theory
is that the state space of the linear, time invariant system (A, B, C)
can be partitioned into subspaces through the use of appropriate
output feedback. Each control element through the appropriate column
of B can control~a particular subspace of the state space. This is the
controllability subspace associated with that control. Wonham and
Morse (1970) were able to simplify the output decoupling problem
by defining a controllability subspace for each control element.
Similarly, each sensor through the appropriate row of C may observe
unambiguously a particular subspace of the state space. This is the
observability subspace associated with that sensor. The rederivation
of failure detection theory undertaken here is based upon a general
definition of the observability subspace for a particl11ar sensor.
The structure of thts thesis is a consequence of two goals. The
first is to present the elements of a useful theory in a clear and complete
manner in the hope of spurring further research; the second is to make
the theory accessible to readers not well versed in the nuances of
linear m2.ps in an n-dimensional vector space. The approach to the
failure detection problem is motivated in Section 2. 1. The remainder
of Chapter 2 is devoted to a survey of mat:lematical techniques. The
structure of the detection problem is investigated aXiomatically in
Section 3. 1. The bulk of the theoretical cons iderations are contained
in the remainder of Chapter 3. The results are summarized informally
{n Chapter 4 and a natural canonical form for the detection problem
is presented. It is intended that a reader without a strong grasp
of vector space properties should be able to develop a reasonable
comprehension of the content of this thesis from Section 2. 1, Section
3. 1, Section 3. 2. 1, and Chapter 4 along with the subsequent results
on stochastic systems. Some familiarity with the mathematical
techniques of Chapter 2 would be useful.
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An extension of the deterministic theory developed in Chapter 3
to stochastic systems is undertaken in Chapter 5. The major difficulty
presented by stochastic systems is that it is necessary to develop a
procedure for discriminating between Otltput errors due to stochastic
sources and those due to a combination of stochastic sources and a
system failure. Failure detection theory differs from estimation
theory in that the primary concern is not to minimize the difference
between the system and reference model outputs, but to enhance this
difference in such a manner that failures are easy to identify. Never-
theless, a failure detection system is a state estimator. Algorithms
for maximizing the state estimation capability of failure detection
systems are developed in Chapter 5.
The theory developed in this thes is allows a considerable amount
of freedom in selecting the set of failures which a failure detection
system is des igned to detect. The manner in which this freedom
can be used to design a failure detection system for a stochastic
system with discrete measurements is illustrated by a detailed design
probleln in Chapter 6. The validity of the design procedure is verified
by simulation results analyzed in that chapter.
A brief summary of the important results in the thes is is
presented in Chapter 7. Recommendations for future work are also
discussed.
I
CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
The proposed solution of the failure detection problem is based
upon the reference model approach used in observer theory and state
estimat ion theoryo The dynamic relationship between the reference
Inodel and the unfailed sY8tem is reviewed in Section 2. 1. The change
in this relationship due to a system fa ilure is used to motivate a defini-
tion of failure detectability a.nd the constraints which this definition im-
poses on the selection of the feedback matrix in the reference model.
Failure detection theory is developed in Chapter 3 from these determin-
istic cons iderations. but the theory can also be applied to stochastic sys-
tems to provide a combined failure detection and state estimation capa-
bility. Section 2. 2 reviews the relevant concepts from state estimation
theory.
The geometric ·tools used in this research are not new, but their
use has been limited. The classic work by Gantmacher (1959) has been
widely referenced in the literature and is gradually being introduced' on
the classroom level. The relevant concepts of Chapter 7 of Gan tnlacher
are summarized in Section 2. 3. The geometric approach permits some
useful variations on observability to be introduced. The standard test
of observability is compared in Section 2. 4 to a more geometric inter-
pretation. Some useful results on eigenvalue assignment using output
feedback and on equivalent system representations are also presented.
2. 1 Motivation - Deterministic
The motivation for the reference model approach to failure detection
is begun in this section. Attention is restricted to deterministic systems
which are lipear a.nd time invariant in their unfailed states. Such sys-
tems can be completely characterized by an inputI output relatifJnship be-
tween a control vector u(t) and a measurement vector y(t); however, the
16
state space representation of the systenls requires the additional defini-
tion of a state vector x(t):
.
x(t) • A x(t) + B u(t)
y(t) • C x(t)
: x(O) given
(2. 1. 1)
The vectors u(t), x(t), and yet) are p- d imens ional, n- d imens ional, and
m-dimensional respectively pA.nd A, B, and C are constant coefficient
matrices of dimension n x n, n X p, and m X n. Neither the state vector
x(t) nor the triad of matrices (A, B, C) is uniquely defined for a given
system. The relationship between the various equivalent choices of
(A, B, C) is discussed in Section 2.4.
Unless C is invertible, the output vector yet) at an.y given time
does not contain sufficient information to determine x(t). Unfortunately,
feedback control laws often require explicit knowledge of x(t). The
standard procedure used in both observer theory and stochastic estima-
tion theory is to approximate x(t) by the state vector x
m
(t) of a reference
model (Figure 2. 1). The two approaches define different criteria for
choosing a feedback matrix D. 1 The principal concern of failure detec-
tion theory' is to ·combine this state estimation capability with a failure
detection capability. The constraint placed on the choice of D is that the
output error yet) - Ym (t) must contain system failure infol'mation in a
format which can be readily interpreted. Subject to this constraint, the
freedom to choose D for state estimation purposes is maximized.
. The reference model approach is based upon the assumption that
the triad (A , B , C ) accurately describes the inputf output relation-
m m m
ship of the system being modeled as long as the system has not failed.
Since this requires that (A, B, C) and (A I B ,e) be equivalent
m m m
representations of the system (Section 2. 4), no generality 18 lost if
(Am' BmJ em) is replaced in the reference model by (A, B, C). The
system equations for the reference model are then similar to (2. 1. 1)
except for the presence of the output error feedback term:
1 Observer theory is somewhat more general in that it does not require
an n-dimensional reference model. See Section 3. 6.
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Am
xm (t)
STATE ESTIMATE
8m f em Ym (t)
u(t)
CONTROL
o
SYSTEM I------------'~-___. y(t)
OUTPUT
Figure 2. 1 General reference model implementation for state
estirrJation and! or failure detection.
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X
m
(t) • AX
m
(t) + B u(t) + D(y(t)- y m (t»
(2. 1. 2)
Y (t) = C x (t)
m m
An alternate representation is to replace y (t) in the differential equation
m
byex (t):
m
X (t) = (A- DC)x (t) + Bu(t) + Dy(t)
m m
Y (t) :t ex (t)
m m
Xm(O) given
(2. 1. 3)
Both (2. 1. 2) and (2. 1. 3) become identical to (2~ 1. 1) if Ym (t) equals y(t).
The accuracy with which the reference model approach estimates
x(t) can be determined in terms of the error equations:
£(t) = x(t) - x (t)
m·
(2. 1. 4)
£ '(t) = y(t) - Y (t)
m
In the absence of a failure, (t) satisfies a differential equation similar
to (2. 1. 3):
(t) :II (A-DC)£(t)
('(t) = C (t)
(0) given
(2. 1. 5)
For the reference model to be an asymptotically stable state estimator,
it is necessary that D be chosen such that all the eigenvalues of A-DC
have negative real parts. This is the principal criteriail by which observ-
er theory defines an acceptable feedback matrix D. Failure detection
theory guarantees the ability to satisfy this criterion by providing almost
complete freedom to choose the eigenvalues of A- DC. The rationale for
applying this freedom comes primarily from the stochastic considerations
introduced in Section 2. 2.
In the event of a failure or the change of a system parameter, the
trrad (A, B, C) upon which the reference model is based no longer des-
cribes the failed system dynamics and xm(t) is not necessarily a good
approximation of x(t). A general failure model for a linear. time invari-
ant system is developed in Section 4. 1. The model represents x(t) and
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y(t) in the failed system as a function of (A, B, C) and a series of addi-
tive vector components:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) +f1n 1(t) + f 2n2(t) +.•.
y(t) :I: Cx(t) + e
mlne 1(t) + e m2nc2 (t) + ••.
x(O) given
(2. 1. 6)
The scalar coefficients n 1(t), n2 (t) ••• and ncl (t), nc2 (t) ••• are general-
ly functions of x(t) and u(t), but they may be arbitrary time functions.
e
mi is the i
th
unit vector in the m-dirrensional output space, but f 1, f 2
may- be any n-dimensional vectors. The usefulness of the theory
developed in this thesis is predicated on the fact that system failures can
frequently be modeled using (2. 1. 6) with a single additive term. The two
failure raodels of most interest are referred to in what follows as the
controller failure model:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + f 1n 1(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
and the sensor failure model:
x(O) given
(2. 1. 7)
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + e .n. (t)
ml Cl
(2. 1. 8)
The labels given (2. 1. 7) and (2. 1. 8) can be partially justified by
an example. The satellite orbital manuevering system analyzed in
Section 4. 3 is characterized by:
c = [:
o
o
o
1 :]
B =
0 1 0 0
3w2 0 0 2w
A =
0 0 0 1
0 -2w 0 0
0 0 0
0
- sin" sini' (2. 1. 9)
0 0 0
1 cosy cosy
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I
where y(t)~ x(t), and u(t) are 2-, 4-, and 3-dimensional vectors respec-
tively:
(2. 1. 10)
(2. 1. 12)
(2. 1. 14)
u(t) =
·0
o
o
1
rX
1
(t)-
x2(t)
I
x3(t)
x4(t)
=
x(t) =
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
-1 0 0
(2.1.11)
0 0 0
0 -siny sin')!
0 0 0
0 cosi' cosy
eminci(t) :II e218 1 :::I 8 1 [:]
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= [:::::]
B + AB =
An off-failure of the first control element must be modeled such that
u1(t) does not affect x(t). One poss ibility is to define a new control
matrix B + L\B:
An equivalent failure model is (2. 1. 7) with:
Similar-ly, an off-failure of the first sensor requires that y 1(t) be zero.
Rather than defiIie liC such that the first row of C + /1C is zero, (2. 1. 8)
can be used with:
eminci(t) = -e21x 1(t) :::I - [:] x 1(t) (2.1.13)
A bias of magnitude 8 1 in that sensor can also be modeled using (2. 1. 8)
with:
-
Tbeee example~ are typical of the manner in which control element
failures and serlsor failures can be modeled using (2. 1. 7) and (2.1.8)
respectively; however, (2.1. 7) call also frequently be used to model
system failures involving a change in A. Section 4. 1 provides an algo-
rithm for modeling failures· using (2.1.6) or, where possible, (2.1.7)
or (2. 1. 8).
The behavior of the errors (t) and £ 'et) after a system failure can
be determined in terms of £(t) at the time of the failure, (2. 1. 2), and
the appropriate failure model. Because of their importance, attention
is restricted to the controller and the sensor failure models. With the
failure occurring at to' the errors corresponding to (2. Ie 7) and (2. 1. 8)
are respectively:
and:
£(t) = (A- DC )£(t) + f 1n 1(t)
£ 'et) = C£(t)
(2. 1. 15)
(2. 1. 16)
£(t) = (A-DC)(t) - dinci(t)
('(t) = C(t) + eminci(t) t ~ to
where d. is the ith column of the feedback matrix D. Because of their
1
importance in defining the properties of a failure detection system,
vectors which appear in the differential equation for £(t) similarly to
f 1 and d i above are referred to as event vectors. Even with a zero
initial condition, £(t) aa defined in (2.1. 15) or (2.1.16) is driven by a
forcing function and is in general non- zero for t ~ to.
The central issue of failure detection theory is how to choose the
feedback matrix D such that the component of IE '(t) generated by a fail-
ure::can readily be associated with that failure. This associatIon is not
a function of the manner in which the failure occurs, but of the dynamic
relationship between the failed element and the remainder of the system.
With respect to the controller and sensor failure models, the association
is a function of the event vectors f t and d. and of e .(t); but it is inde-
- 1 fil
pendent of the time functions n1(t) and nci(t). To see the importance of
the independence from n 1(t) and n .(t). consider the control elementCl
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failure modeled by (2. 1. 12). If the control element fails in some man-
ner other than an off-failure, n 1(t) is some time function other than
- u(t). The 8 ingle property which characterizes all pass ible failure
modee; for the first control element is that, except for a possible scale
factor, the controller failure model must use the event vector f 1 defined
in (2. 1. 12). Similarly, n .(t) in the sensor failure model for the first
Cl
sensor may be xl(t), s l' or some other time function; but the vector em i
must be 2 21 - As a consequence, the first column of D is the event
vector associated with any failure of the first sensor.
The basis for the theory developed in this thesis is best illustrated
in terms of the controller failure model (2. 1. 7) and the corresponding
error equations (2. 1. 15). The term fIn! (t) appears in (2. 1. 15) in the
same manner as the control Bu(t) appears in (2. 1. 1) and is the only
driving term for £(t). The time functions £(t) and £ '(t) satisfy:
t
£(t) = e(A-DCHt-tO) (to) + Se (A-DC)(t-l") f ln
l
('r)dT
to (2. 1. 17)
For a given D, (t) describes a trajectory in the n-dimensional state
space which is a function of dtO),the event vector ft' and n 1(t). The
output error £ '(t) describes a corresponding trajectory in the output
space. As a conceptualization aid, a pair of hypothetical trajectories
is shown in Figure 2. 2a for the case where:
Cf l ~ 0
£(t" =0
(2. 1. 18)
The p~incipal feature of these trajectories which is independent of n l (t)
is 'that «(t) must be contained in!.the controllable subspace of fI' i. e. in
the subspace spanned by the columns of W (Ogata (1967»:
[ 2 n- 1 ]W = f 1 (A-DC)fl (A-DC) f l ••• (A-DC) f 1 (2. 1. 19)
The output error f:/(t) is similarly constrained to the subspace spanned
by the columns of ew.
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STATE ERROR
TRAJECTORY
~ OUTPUT ERROR
TRAJECTORY
..
E71
Figure 2. 2a Hypothetical state estimation error (left) and output
~stimation error (right) for a controller failure
when the feedback matrix D is chosen arbitrarily.
STATE ERROR
TRAJECTORY
~1
Cf1
OUTPUT ERROR
TRAJECTORY
Figure 2.2b Hypothetical state estimation error (left) and output
estimation error (right) for a controller failure
when D is a detection filter.
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The freedom to choose D provides an ability to alter Wand CW
to make the output error generated by f 1n1(t) eas ily recognizable. The
Detection Theorem in Section 3. 2 p.roves that D can be required to
satisfy:
I~
rkCW = 1 (2. 1. 20)
while maintaining the: freedom to ass ign the eigenvalues of A- DC. In
order to discriminate between the general feedback matrix and one re-
quired to satisfy (2. 1. 20) for som~ f l' the latter is r1jferred to as a
detection filter for that f 1. Figure 2. 2b illustrates f.lypotr.letical errOl'
trajectories corresponding to those in Figure 2. 2a except that D is a
detection filter. Subject to certain restrictions discussed in Section
3. 1. the fact that £ '(t) is constrained to the output direction Cf t allows
the error to be uniquely associated with the event vector f 1 and hence
with the failure modeled by fln l (t). Jf the association is not 11nique,
Section 3. 2 provides a mechanism for determining the set of failures
which can produce the same output err.or trajectory. It also proves that
choosing D to be a detection filter for f 1 minimizes the number of fail-
ures in this set. The case where Cf1 is zero is readily accommodated
in Chapter 3.
The existence of de:tection filters can be illustrated using the con-
trol element failure modeled by (2. 1. 12). As an example of the co~­
trollable subspace of f 1 when D is not a detection filter for f l' assume
D is zero:
fo 0 2w 0
0 2w 0 -2w33W = [f (A-DC)!l (A-DC)2f1 (it-DC) f ].:111 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 2 0-4w
(2. 1. 21)
As long as w is not zero. it follows that:
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rkW = 4
rk CW = rk[~ o
1
2w Ol = 2
o oj
(2. 1. 22)
The rank of CW means that the output estimation error due to a failure
in the first c.ontrol element describes some unspecified trajectory in the
two-dimensional output space. By contrast, if D is a detection filter for
f 1 such atJ:
0 2w
D 0 0 (2. 1. 23)=
0 0
0 -4w2
then W satisfies:
0 0 0
:1[f l (A-DC)f l (A-DC)2fl (A-DC)3fl ] • 0 21~ 0W = (2. 1. 24)0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
-J
The lower dimension of W results in a lower dimension for CW:
rk W = 2
rk CW = rk [~ o
1
o
o ~J = 1 (2. 1. 25)
.The reference model based on the detection filter for f 1 constrains the
output error generated by (2. 1. 12) to the single direction:
C (A- DC )f1 . =[ ~ ] (2. 1. 26)
As is shown in Section 4. 3, only a failure of the first control element
can generate a unidirectional output error along C(A-DC)f1 for this sys-
tem. The appearance of Eluch an output error is sufficient evidence to
conClude that the first control element has failed.
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The existence of a D which constrains the failure- generated output
error to a single direction is [l1aranteed only if the failure can be
modeled by the controller failul'e model. If the sensor failure model is
used, the dinci(t) term in (2. 1. 16) appears to make (2. 1. 20) a circuitous
argument, but Section 4. 1 develops an algorithm which resplves the d if-
ficulty. Even with (2. 1. 20) satisfied, however, the presence of the
eminci(t) term in the E" '(t) equation means that in general the output error
generated by a sensor failure can only be constrained to a two- d imens lon-
al plane. Although this implies that the output error generated by a
sensor failure ie more difficult for a failure detection system to analyze
than that generated by a controller failure, it also implies that failure
detection theory provides a mechanism for diaf"inguishing between the
failure of a control element and the failure of a sensor which measures
that control element's output. This capability is in marked contrast to
the performance of the majority-rule voting law discussed in Chapter 1.
Detection of failures modeled by the sensor failure model or the general
failure model is considered in detail in Section 4. 1.
The discussion in this subsection can be summarized in terms of
a formal definition of the failure detection approach used in this thesis.
Because of its simplicity, the definition is stated in terms of the con-
troller failure model. Section 4. 1 extends the definition, as well as the
results of Chapter 3, to the general failure model:
Definition 2. 1. 1 Given the inhomogeneous error equations:
£(t) = (A-DC)£(t)+f1n1(t)
E" '(t) = C(t)
£(0) = 0
the failure associated with the event vector f 1 is detectable if and
only if:
i) the output genere.ted by f 1fit (t) maintains a fixed direction in
the output space. and .
ii) the eigenvalues of A-DC aan be specified almost arbitrarily
by the proper choice of the detection filter D.
AlmoAt arbitrarily implies only that the n eigenvalues of A- DC need not
be assignable as a single set of n eigenvalues. The algorithms developed
in Chapter 3 partition the reference model into a 'number of subsystems.
The eigenvalues of each subsystem can be ass igned arbitrarily. The
only constraint is that if a complex eigenvalue is associated with a
particular subsystem, its complex conjugate must be also. The ability
to assign the eigenvalues of A-DC almost arbitrarily is the greatest
degree of freed~m in choosing D which can be guaranteed if D is re-
quired to satisfy i) for a number of different event vectors, i. e. if
the failure detection system is required to detect and identify several
different failures.
\
2. 2 Motivation - Stochastic
The failure detection theory developed in Chapter 3 is based
upon a deterministic system model. The theory is equally valid for
stochastic systems. The principal difference is that the state es-
timation error equations corresponding to (2. 1. 5) are not homo-
geneous for a stochastic system. It is shown in this' section that in
the unfailed system the error equations are driven by the stochastic
sources. From a failure detection vantage point, the main concern
. is the problem of differentiating between the output error produced
by a failure and the output error produced by the stochastic sources.
If the failure detection system (reference model) is to be used for
state estimation also. it is necessary to insure that a detection filter
is selected-. which provides the necessary estimation accuracy.
Both of these problems are discussed in detail in Chapter b. This
section states the optimal state estimation problem in a format
which is appl£cable to the des ign of a failure detection system.
Early research in optimal 'state estimation was within the
framework of class ical control theory. Wiener 80Ived the minimurn
mean-squared error estimation problem in steady state for stationary
disturbances and a time invariant system (see Truxal (1955).
The Weiner filter is a free configuration design. Newton, Gould.
and Kaiser (1957) solved the simi'ler problem of optimizing a set
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of free parameters in an otherwise fixed configuration. These
results were derived in the frequency domain using integral transform
techniques. The general time varying problem with nonstationary
statistics was solved by Kalman (1960) in the time domain. Kalman's
solution is equivalent to Wiener's for the restricted problem solved
by Wiener. In failure detection theory both the frequency domain
approach and the time domain approach can be used to advantage.
The basic mathematics for the two optimization procedures is
summarized in this section.
The standard linear disturbance model is assumed for the
stochastic system. The system is driven by an nl-dimensional
vector random process 11 1(t) and the measurements are corrupted
by an ml-dimensional vector" random process 'Tl2 (t):
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Gl 'Tl l (t)
yet) = Cx(t) + G2 112 (t) (2. 2. 1)
G1 and G2 are n X n l and m X m l matrices respectively which may
be time dependent. The random processes are white and have zero
means, but they are not necessarily independent:
E[T\!(t)] = 0
L
E['Tl1(t) 11 l ('T)T] =
E['Tl2(t) 'Tl2('T)T] 111
E[ 'Tl l (t) 112 (1') T J =
E 6(t- T)
n 1
E 6(t- T)
m 1
Gl2 6(t-'T) (2. 2. 2)
En! and E
ml
are n l X n l and m l X m l identity matrices respectively
and 6(t- T) is the unit impulse.
In the absence of a system failure the error equations for the
reference model are no longer homogeneous. Equation (2. 1. 5)
becomes:
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£(t) = (A-DC) dt) + Gl111 (t) - DG2 11 2 (t)
(/(t) = C(t) + 0211 2(t)
£ (O)given
(2. 2. 3)
The state estimation error is a ze ro mean stochastic process with
a covariance matrix:
'It
P(t) = E[ (t) (t) ]
which satisfies the matrix Riccati equation (Jazwinski (1970»):
• T T TT TTpet) = (A-DC) P(t)+P(tHA-DC) + Gl Gl + DG2G 2 D -Gl Gl2 G 2 D -
T TDG2Gl2 Gl : P(D) given (2. 2. 4)
Equation (2. 2. 4) is valid for an arbitrary choice of the feedback
matrix D. If the eigenvalues of A- DC have negative real parts and
if Gl, Gl2, and G 2 are constant, the steady state solution P 00 exists
and satisfies:
T T T TT TT(A-DC) P 00+P=(A-DC) +Gl Gl +DG2G2 D- Gt G12 G2 D -DG2G12 Gl =0
(2. 2. 5)
As long as G1 is not zero, P is real. symmetric, and positiveco ",
semi-definite. The solution of (2 r 2. 5) must generally be found
through numerical integration of (2. 2. 4).
The Kalman approach involves a free choice of D to minim ize
the variance of the state estimate generated by the reference model.
The optimal choice of D is denoted here by K
n
(t). For the continuous
system. Kn (t) satisfies:
(2. 2. 6)
A reference model based on KD(t) is referred to as a minimum
variance state estimator. The covariance matrix for the minimum
3Q
variance state estimator satisfies (2. 2. 4) with Kn(t) substituted for
D, or alternatively:
P(t) = AP(t)+P(t)AT+ G1 G'[ - (P(t)C T+ G1 G12GlHG2G2Tf l(CP(t)+
T TG2G12 G1 ): P(O) given (2. 2. 7)
The steady state Kalman filter KDoo is found by substituting the steady
state solution of (2. 2. 7) into (2. 2. 6).
If D is constrained to be a detection filter, it is not in general
the steady state solution of (2. 2. 6). As a consequence, a failure
detection system does not generate state estimates which are as
accurate as those generated by a minimum variance state estimator.
It is possible, however, to perform a constrained optimization of
a detection filter us ing the Kalman approach. It is shown in Section
4. 4 that the detection filter for a set of m failures (m is the rank of
C) can be expressed as a fixed configuration with a maximum set of
n free parameters--these parameters uniquely determine the n
eigenvalues of A-DC. With the aid of a coordinate transformation
which places the r.eference model in a convenient canonical form,
Section 5. 1. 2 uses the Kalman approach to develop an algorithm for
optimizing th~se n parameters.
The parameter optimization procedure of Newton, Gould,
and Kaiser does not perform a global minimization of the variance
of the state estimates generated by the reference model. Instead,
it minimizes a scalar function of the steady state variance of the
output estimate CX
m
(t). The error associated with this estimate is
C (t) in (2. 2. 3) rather than ( I (t). The steady state covariance of
Cx (t) is CP C T where P satisfies (2. 2. 5), but the parameter·m CD Q)
optimization techn41lie requires that a closed-form solution of CP C T
- =
be found using frequency domain techniques. With zero initial
conditions, the Laplace transform for C(t) can be found from
(2. 2. 3):
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Since 'Tl 1(t) and 'Tl 2 (t) are zero mean. white gaussian random processes.
their matrix power spectral de~18ities are identity matrices:
~Tl2(s) = Em}
~Tl1'Tl2(s) = G12 (2. 2. 9)
If the system has stationary statistics, then Gl , G12 , and G2 areI
constant and the power spectra,} density for C£(s) can be determined
from (2. 2. 8) and (2. 2. 9) to be the matrix:
C~/s)cT = C(EnS- A+DCf 1(G1G;+DG2G2TDT_ Gt G12G2TDT_
DG2G1i G1T ) <-Ens-AT+cTDTf1c T (2.2.10)
The steady state output error covariance CP C T can then be expressed
0)
in terms of the inverse transform of CeI» (s)e T:
£
..
(2. 2. 11)Cp C T = 1
co ~
jtD
SC~(s) CTds
- jco
This expression for CP C T is of limited usefulness if
C(Ens-A+DCr 1 and the inver~e transform (2. 2. 11) cannot be readily
computed. The transformation to the canonical form introduced in
Section 4. 4 permits C(E s-A+DCf 1 to be determined by inspection.
n
The elements of the inverse transform can be determined from tables
as polynomials in the n degrees of freedom remaining inthe choice
I
of the detection filter. To determine the optimal detection filter-
state estimator, it8i.s necessary to use these n free parameters
to minimize a set of m scalar polynomials defined from CP C T by
a)
the coordinate transformation. In a large number of cases the poly-
nomials are of sufficiently low order to allow a direct minimization
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without recursive techniques. If the failure detection system is designed
for m failures, the detection filter- state estimator produced by the
parameter optimization technique is identical to that yielded by the
Kalman approach for systems with stationary statistics and continuous
measurements. If fewer than m failures are to be monitored, however,
the approaches yield different detection filter- state estimators.
2. 3 Vector Space Concepts
The trad itional approach for study ing the properties of the system
(A, B, C) has been to use matrix algebra techniques. Unfortunately,
derivations obtained in this manner are frequently tedious. Often the
desired result is arrived at by the construction of a coordinate
transformation which places the matrix in a particular canonical
form. The advantage of such an approach is that it is constructive;
the disadvantage is that intuitive insight into the nature of the solution
is often minimized by the indirectness of the approach.
The difficulty with matrix analysis is that it is always necessary
to discriminate between properties which are indigenous to the system
and those which are a function of a particular basis. The former
properties are referred to as invariant properties and are identical
. for all possible n-dimensional realizations of the system (A, B, C).
A useful method for dealing directly with those invariant properties
is in terms of a linear operator in an n-dimensional vector space.
The axiomatic definition of a vector space immediately separates
the invariant properties from those which depend upon the choice
of a particular bas is.
The general nature of a linear vector space and of a linear
operator defined in that space are reviewed in Section 2. 3. 1. Only
those properties which are applicable to this thesis are mentioned.
A more complete and formal development is found in Gantmacher
(1959) or Halmos (1958). In Section 2. 3. 2 the structure of a linear
operator in an n-dimensional vector space is considered~ b.. brief
interpretation of Section 2. 3. 2 in a matrix context is given in
Section 2. 3. 3.
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2. 3. 1 General Properties of a Vector Space
The axiomatic definition of a vector space is stated in terms of
a set of field axioms. In essence these formalize the intuitive notion
that vector addition is associative and commutative and that scalar
multiplication is associative and distributive. The sum of two elements
of the vector space is require~ to be an element of the vector space
and the produc-e of a scalar with an element of the space must be
contained in the space. In what follows the scalar is restricted to
the field of real numbers. The axioms also defirte the zero vector ¢
and the identity scalar 1.
An n-dimensional vector space is denoted by 8°. A sub8pa~e R
of "n is denoted by R c &0. The sum of any two vectors in R must be
contained in R and the product of any scalar with a vector in R must
be contained in R. The dimens ion of R is denoted by d(R) and is defined
to be the largest number of li.nearly independent vectors in R. A
basis for Ie is any set of k linearly independent vectors ~l • •• ~kE R
where k = d(R)o A set of vectors ~ { ••• ~;,ER with t ~ k is said to
span R if a subset of k vectors from ~1/ • •• ~.t can be found which is
a basis for R.
Let J and R be subspaces with bases PI" • • Pt and ~i· · "~k
respectively. The union of J and R is denoted by "UR· and is the
subspace spanned by p10 • • pt' ~1··" ~k· Even though Pl· • " Pt and
~1. • •~ are sets of linearly independent vectors, the vectors in the
compos ite set Pl0 0 • P.e ~ ••• (k are not necessarily linearly independent;
therefore:
d (.P UR ) ~ d (.') + d~ ) (2. 3. 1)
The direct sum of J and R is denoted by J ff) I( and is reserved to
designate the union of J andR when the vectors in the composite set
Pt. o 0 Pt' (t••• ~k are known to be linearly independent. The set
Ploo.Pt' (r •. ~ is a basis for'/(9R and:
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(2.3.2)
Any subspaceR c which satisfies:
(2. 3. 3)
is a complemen!. of R. The definition of a direct sum requires:
cdW ) = n-k (2. 3. 4)
A complement of a subspace is not unique, but a complement with
unique properties is -defined below.
A Dormed vector space has an inner product defined over it.
It is sufficient to restrict attention to the Euclidean norm (inner
product):
(2. 3. 5)
where ~, p E &n and the components ~i' Pi' i = 10 •• n, are defined
for some arbitrary coordinate system. The value of the inner
product is independent of thE' coordinate system. Two vectors
( , pare orthogonal if their inner product is zero. The orthogonal
complement of a subspace R c &n is a subspace Rl. composed of all -
vectors orthogonal to every vector in R:
(2. 3. 6)
The principal interest in the orthogonal compleme'nt in this
thea is is that it provides a meqhanism for determ ining the intersection
of two subspaces. The intersection of -' and R is denoted by.l n R
and is composed of every vector in tI which is also in R. A basis
for J n R generally cannot be defined as a subset of p 1· • • Pt or
(to 0 0 tko Computational algorithms for a basis of .In R are usually
based on the orthogonal complements of Rand tI and the relationship:
(2. 3. 7)
For every n x n nlatrix A, there is a unique linear operator defined
in tfn. The linear operator is denoted by the boldface symbol A.
The linear operator Ais a map of 8n into 8 n• This map is generally
A nn E ""n A·'denoted by : 8 -t ~ • For every vector ~ ~, aS80clates a
n
vector p E8 :
p = ~
For every operator Athere corresponds a class of similar matrices--
the class of matrices similar to A, i. e. related to A by a coordinate
transformation. A is the unique operator associated with that class.
For a given b"asis (coordinate system), Acorresponds to a unique
n x n matrix which is an element of the s im ilarity class. Aand the
elements of the similarity class are assumed to be defined over the
field of real numbers.
If Rc 8n , the image of R under A is the smallest subspace
R' c &n such that for every ~ E R there exists a E'E R' which satisfies:
~ I = A~
•
(2. 3. 9)
The image of R under Ais frequently denoted by AR and the relation-
ship of R' to R is denoted by:
R' = AR (2. 3. 10)
If C:/1 ~8m and D:"m - &n, the composition map DC :On - &n is well
defined as is the difference map A-DC :8n ... an. The null space of A
is denoted by '!l.(A> and is defined as the largest subspace of an
whose image under A is the zero space ¢.
2. 3. 2 Structure of a Linear Operator
The structure of a linear operator A in,jn is evidenced by the
manner in which it maps subspaces of &n into each other and by the
manner in which it maps 8ubspaces into the zero space. Two
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important concepts in this regard are those of annihilating poly-
nomials and invariant subspaces.
Let I E &n be chosen arbitr~lrily and form the sequence
(~,A(,A,2~ ••• ) • Since <in is finite dimensional, there exists some
srnallest integer v ~ n such that the vec/;ors ~, A~••• Av- 1~ are·
Ilnearly independent, but that AV ~ is a linear combination of the first
IJ vectors in the sequence:
v-I
I
i= 0
(2~3.11)
If the polynom ial l/J ( .) is def ined :
V-I
I/J ( A) = Av - I 01 i Ai
i= 0
it follows from (2. 3. 11) that:
(2. 3. 12)
(2. 3. 13)
The polynomial ap(.) is defined to be the r..._inimal annihilating poly-
nomial of (with respect to A. Any polynomial ~(.) such that
(2. 3. 14)
is an annihilating polynom ial for~. The justification for calling
1/)(.) the minimal anr,'.ihilating polynomial1(or just minimal poly-
nomial) of ~ is obvious: I/J(.) is clearly the polynomial of lowest
order which aldlihilates~. It can also be shown that ajJ(.) is a factor
of every annihilating polynomial of ~: hence the minimal polynomial
is unique.
A minimal polynomial can be defined for a subspace. '1'(e)
is a minimal polynomial for R if it is the lowest order polynomial
1The qualifier IIwith respect toll is often omitted when the appropriate
operator is well understood.
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which annihilates every vector in R. A constructive solution for
'1'(.) is to choose an arbitrary basis ~1 •• 0 ~k for R and determine
the respective minimal polyn'omlals IPI(o) •• otbk(o) of the basis
vectors. 'f(.) is then the least common multiple of tb 1(. ). 0 0IPk(0 ).
It follows that the minimal polynom ial of a subspace is divis ible
by the minimal polynomial of every vector in that subspace.
A subspace Rc an is defined to be invariant with respect to
A if its image satisfies AR c R. In other words, a subspace is
invariant with respect to A if it contains its own image under A.
Clearly lin is invariant with respect to A. For ~n example of another
invariant subspace, consider the v-dimensional subspace J1~ for
which the set of linearly independent vectors t. At. 0 0 • A 1 ~ from
(2. 3. 11) is a basis o If this basis is denoted by e 1•• 0 ep' then it is
apparent that k i EJ1~ for all i = 1. 0 • po Therefore. the image under
A of every vector p E J1~ is contained in J1~ and J1~ is invariant. A
subspace for which a basis can be generated by the sequence
~, A~•••• Av-1 ~ is a cyclic- invariant subspace and the vector ~ is
referred to as the generator of that subspace. The generator for
a particular subspace is not unique; e+ A~ may also be a generator
for J1~. It is apparent that every vector p E lin generates some invariant
subspace of ern. The opposite is not true; not every invariant subspace
of (l has a generator.
Every invariant subspace has associated with it a minimal
polynomial 'Y (.). The roots of the polynomial are the eigenvalues
of Aassociated with that subspace. The solution in Chapter 3 is based
upon the construction of an operator A-DC which has a specified
set of invariant 8ubspaces and for wtlich the eigenvalues of A-DC
associated with these subspaces assume preassigned values.
A concept which plays an important role in the latter part of
Chapter 3 is that of congruent vectors. The vectors ~, p E&n are
defined to be congruent (modulo R) if their difference is an element
of R, i. e. (- pER. Notational1y, congl"uence is specified by:
( £! P (mod R)
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(2. 3. 15)
It follows trivially that congruence is reflexive and symmetric.
It is also transitive since (2.3. 15) and:
together imply:
p :s X (mod R)
E := X (mod R)
(2. 3. 16)
(2. 3. 17)
Similarly, congruent vectors multiplied by a constant are congruent:
a~ E ap (mod R) (2. 3. 18)
Congruence relationships are also additive, i. e. given (2. 3.15)
and:
then it follows that:
~ I _ P I (mod R)
~ + ~ I == P + p' (mod R)
(2. 3. 19)
(2. 3. 20)
The practical-applications of congruence require R to be invariant.
In this case (2. 3.15) implies:
(2. 3. 21)
for all j.
Congruence is a generalization of equality. The (mod R)
argument can be interpreted as an expansion of the zero space
~ tp include R. All the vector space concepts introduced in this
section can be defined (mod R). The relative minimal polynomial
of a subspace .Ie ern is denoted by 'l'R(·) and satisfies:
(2. 3. 22)
The vectors ~l ••• (k E tI are linearly independent (mod R) if there
exist no (1'1 ••• Ctk such that:
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The d imens ion of sJ (mod R) is written dR(aI) and satisfies:
:3imimrly. the subspace J is invariant (mod R) if:
AsJ c J (mod R)
(2. 3__ 24)
(2. 3. 25)
This section is concluded with a brief discussion of factor
spaces. Factor spaces are of minor importance to this thesis.
TIley are used in several instances to suggest a prop~r generalization
of a concept. A thorough understand ing of the following is not a
necessary pI'erequis ite for Chapter 3.
Let ~ be an arbitrary vector in the subspace tI and let the
~:C
class ~ be defined as the collection of all v~ctor8 in til which are
congruent (mod R) to~. For every vector p E j there is a corres-
"", :& ,'..
ponding class P"'. Given ~ 1 and p"'. (2. 3.20) suggests thCi.t ~~b!.trary
elem~nts of the two claases can be added and the set of all such
* ':~comb~nations is a class ()f vectors (denoted by ~ + p ) whose elements
are congruent (mod R) to ~ + p. Similarly, multiplication by a scalar
...1, .... t;
can be defined and denoted by Ci ~~l'. There is a zero class 91'1' composed
of R and it follows that:
(2. 3. 26)
From the above it is·xlear that a vector space J'" can be
:=:~ =::<
defined whose elements are the classes ~ • p • ••• The vector
* .
space J is referred to as the factor space of tI with respect to R.
If d(R) = fiR and d(al) = fIsJ' then:
*IJ =~
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(2. 3. 27)
The operator AIcan be defined on 1/>/". If R is invariant. the image
':< ~:( ::( ~:(A( is a class in J for all ~ E J. The factor space is a vector
space in every sense and any property defined in this section can be
,'e
defined on J' through consideration of (2.3.15) - (2.3.27).
2. 3. 3 Matrix Equivalent on Linear Operator Properties
The essential difference between a matrix and a linear operator
is that a linear operator is defined without appending a basis to the
vector space. For every property of linear operators thera is an
equivalent property of matrices. This equivalence insures that the
results of Chapter 3 can be converted into matrix algorithms;.· It
also allows for the poss ibility of following the derivations in (:hapter 3
on an informal basis. The illa.trix properties summarized b(~low
are sufficient for both purposes. Gantmacher (1959). Hildebrand
(1965), and Wonham and Morse (1971) are references for this
subsection.
The matrix theory equivalent to linear operator properties can
be illustrated in terms of A: &0 ... &D, the subspace R c 8n, and the
image of R under A:
R' = AR (2. 3. 28)
If R has a basis ~1••• ~k' let R be the matrix whose columns are the
vectors ~1••• ~k expressed in the appropriate coordinate system.
By convention, R is denoted by:
(2. 3. 29)
The range space of R is the matrix equivalent of the subspace R.
Similarly, if the vectors ~1... ~~ E R' satisfy:
(! = A~·1 1 i = 1••• k (2. 3. 30)
then R' can be defined as the matrix whose columns are the vectors
~1. ··~k expressed in the same coordinate system:
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(2. 3. 31)
For this coordinate system, (2.3.28) and (2.3. 30) imply that the
linear operator Acorrespo~ds to a n X n matrix A which
satisfies:
HI = AR (2. 3. 32)
Just as R' is the image of R under A~ the range space of R / can be
defined as the range space of R under 1\.
Matrices such as Rand R I are useful for express ing the relation-
ship between two 8ubspaces in lnatrix form. Let J c dn be all arbi-
trary subspace with a basis p 1" • " P.t and let the matrix S be defined
in terms of PI" " " P.t" If J satisfies J c 1(. the range space of S is
contained in the range space of R. If.l ¢ R and if the union of J and
R is the direct sum as defined by (2. 3.2), the subspace j ~ R is the
range space of the matrix [S: R]. The subspaces J URand J' n R
are considerably more difficult than rI (B R to define in matrix terms,
but they are of relatively minor importance irA Chapter 3 and their
matrix equivalents are not developed here.
If the state space 8n is partitioned into two disjoint subspaces
j and R:
(2. 3. 33)
the operator A:etn ... tJn can be uniquely defined by four operators
on the partitioned state space:
ARR : R"'I(
ASS: rJ J
~R:R J
ARS : tI"'R (2. 3. 34)
If a matrix A is given in some coordinate system and the matrices
R and S in that coordinate system are defined similarly to (2. 3. 29),
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then the direct sum in (2. 3. 33) guarantees that Rand S can be used
to define a similarity (coordinate) transformation on A:
ARR lARS
I
--- - - - - ,- - - - .. -
ASR ~ Ass
I
(2. 3. 35)
The submatrix ARR is the matrix eq~ivalent of the operator ARR etc.
in precisely the same manner that A (or A) is the matrix equivalent of
A.
The minimal polynomial, of a subspace with respect to A can
be related to the characteristic equation t.(.) of the matrix AE - A.
n
Specifically, if the roots of ~.{.)are distinct, then the minimal
polynl")m ial of an with res'pect to Ais ~ (. ). This follows from the
faet that the minimal polynomial of Sn is defined to be the lowest
order polynomial which satisfies:
v( A) dO = ¢ (2. 3. 36)
In matrix terms, &n corresponds to the identity matrix and (2. 3. 36)
becomes:
(2.3.37)
The Cayle~r-Hamil ton Theorem guarantees that A( • )i8 the lowest
order polynom ial which satisfies (2. 3. 37) if the roots of ~(.) are
distinct; hence V(·) is equal to ~(.). If the roots of ~(.) are not
distinct, the minimal polynomial of an is a divisor of t:,(.). If R
is a subspace of cln, the minimal polynomial of R is a divisor of
both the minimal polynomial of ~n and of ~(.).
The most important concept introduced in Section 2. 3. 2
is' that' of an invariant subspace. The subspace R c ~n is invariant
with respect to Aif the image of R under Ais a subspace of R:
(2. 3. 38)
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TIle matrix equi\ralent is that there must exist a matrix n such that:
AR = Rn (2. 3. 39)
Since the range space of RITis a subspace of the range space of R
for any matrix n. the range space of AR is a subspace of the
range space of Rand (2. 3. 39) is equivalent to (2. 3. 38). It can be
shown that the eigenvalues of n are a subset of the eigenvalues of Ao
If R is not invariant with respect to A.) the matrix equivalent of:
is the matrix equation:
A R= Rn + 88
(2. 3. 40)
(2.3.41)
I
In this case the eigenvalues of n are not a subset of the eigenvalues
of A. If:
it is simple 10 show that n in (2. 3. 39) is ARR in (2. 3. 35) and that
® in (2. 3;41) is related to ASH-
"
2. 4 Observability and Equivalent Realizations
The discussion in Section 2. 1 was stated in terms of the
controlle>,ble subspace W of an event vector f 1. For the moment,
assume that Cf1 is not z~ro. Section 3. 2 demonstrates that as
long as CW is not zero, it is a simple matter to choose a detection
filter D for f 1. A more difficult probletn is to determ ine if the failure
detection system can uniquely associate a unidirectional outpui:
error along the output direction Cf1 with the event vector f 1 and,
hence, wl~h the failure associated with f 1. If it cannot. it is important
to know which additional ,event vectors can generate unidirectional
output errors along Cf1 and whether or not any phys ical1y meaningful
failures are associated with these event vectors. This problem,
as well as the problem of eigenvalue assignability for A-DC, requirees
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a careful definition of several observabillty concepts. The concepts
of this section are stated us ing matrix notation. The analogous
results for linear operators are used in Chapter 3 without further
commento
A system is completely observable (Ogata 1967) on the time
interval to:S: t ~ t 1 if' for every to and some t ll every initial state
x(t O) can be determined from knowledge of the system output for that
time interval. In essence a system is completely observable if
every trans it,ion of the system t s state eventually affects the output.
A number of criteria have been developed for testing observability.
The most generally used for time invariant systems is similar to
the controllability criterion used in Section 2. 1. With M defined as:
C
CA
M =
CA2 (2. 4. 1)
•
CAn- 1
the system (A, B, C) is completely observable if and only if M is
of rank n. If the rank is less, there is a theorem (Brockett (1970»
which says that any initial state x{t O) can be determined from the
system output to within an additive constant vector which lies in
'l(M).
The null space of M is invariant with respect to A--from
an inspection of M, it follows that Lf ~ E 1l(M). then A~ E ll(M). It
is a simple matter to show that no initial condition x(tO) E1l(M)
can ever affect the output of the system (A, B, C). For this reason,
1l(M) is said to be the unobservable space of (A, B, C).
Various definitions of the observable space of (A, B, C) are
found in the li~erature. A simple choice would be the row space of ,.
f ~
M. For the failure detection problem a more general definition
is desirable:
Definition 2. 4. 1 A subspace R is observable for (A. B, C) if:
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An equivalent statement of the definition is:
Definition 2. 4. la Let.;~br: the cyclic invariant subspace generated
by some ~ E R. The subspace R is observable if for every ~ E R:
The first definition clearly implies the second since ~ ~ 1l(M) is
sufficient to insure that.;~ ~ ~(C). The opposite is also true. If
~ E ,?(M), then.p~E '7(C) because 1l(M) is invariant. Therefore if
R is not observable by the first definition. it is not observable by
the second.
The intention of these definitions is to permit partial observa-
bility to be considered in some context other than the row sp~.ce of
M. The row space of M is orthogonal to 1«M); the subspace R ne~~
not be to be observable by Definition 2. 4. 1. As an example of the
use of Definition 2. 4. la. consider the controllable subspace for the
event vector f 1. The controllable subspace is spanned by the vectors
ft' (.A-DC) f l , (A-DC)2 f l ••• and therefore is a cyclic-invariant
subspace. With W given by (2. 1. 19), Definition 2. 4. la states that
the controllable subspace of f 1 is observable as long as the rank
of W is not zero, i. e. II as long as the failure associated with f 1
affects the system output.
The proof of the Detection Theorem is based on a definition
of system observability which is not normally found in the literature.
This definition is useful becallse of the concern of failur~ detection
theory with certain output directions:
Definition 2. 4. 2 Let R be an invariant subspace and .p~ by the
cyclic- invariant subspace generated by some vector ~ E 9 n which
satisfies Cf/. R. The system (A, B, C) is observable (mod R) if for
ever~· such ~ :
An equivalent cond ition is:
(A, B, C) is observable (mod R) if no event vector which is not in
R can generate an output error which is constrained to the output
subspace CR. If D is a detection filter for f 1 and Cf1 is not zero,
Section 3. 2 uses Definition 2. 4. 2 to determine if any event vectors
other than f 1 can generate unid irectional output errors along Cf1.
The material on observability is concluded with two theorems
dealing with output feedback. Since they are not commonly found
in textbooks, they are presented formally. The first due to Wonham
(1967) is stated in his pap~r as a theorem on contr.ollability and state
feedback. The theorem presented here is the dual of Wonham's.
Theorem 2. 4. 1 The system (A, B, C) is observable if and only if
for every choice of a set A of n eigenvalues. there is a matrix D
such that A- DC has A for its set of eigenvalues.
,
The theor~m states nec~ss.i:rcYll but' not sufficient. conditions for a
failure to be detectable acco"rding to Definition j;. 1. 1.
The final theorem concludes that observability is independent
of the choice of output feedback. Since no proof is read ily available
in the literature, a rigorous proof is included.
Theorem 2.4. 2 Let the feedback matrix D be defined arbitrarily.
The system (A-DC, B, C) is observable if and only if (A, B, C·) is
observable.
Proof Define the observability matrix for (A-DC, B, C) similarly
to (2.4. 1):
M =D
C
C(A-DC)
C(A-DC)2
•
•
•
·•
•
C(A-DC)n-l
47
It is sufficient to allow that the unobservable spaces for the two systems
are equal, 1. e. :
a) To prove that 1l(M) c 7l(Mn), let ~ be an arbitrary vector
in71(M). Then C ~ is zero and it follows that:
C(A-DC)~ = CA~
From (2. 4. 1) and the fact that ~ E,,(M), CA~ must also be
zero and:
i) C(A-DC)~ :: 0
Because ~ E ~M) implies ,that C~, CA~, CA~ ••. are all zero,
an expansion of C(A-DC)J( for arbitrary j yields the more
general result:
j = 0, I, 2•••
Therefore, ~ E 'HMO). Because ~ E 'HM) was chosen
arbitrarily, it follows that 7l(M) c 7l(Mn ).
b) Similarly, 'HMO) C ?,HM) since if ~ E ?,HMO )' then C ~ = ¢
and the equality of ii) holds for all ~ E ?HMO).
B)7 i) and ii),
and the theorem is proved.
A system is completely characterized by its input! output
history. If a model of the system dynamics is assumed, that model
is satisfactory only if it can reprodllce that input! output history.
If a mcr.ael is not known or for some reason is not acceptable, the
question becomes one of how to choose a model which does' adequately
describe th~ system behavior. A general theory has been developed
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which defines the equ~valent realizations of (A, B, C) for a given
input/output history (Brockett (1970) and Arbib (1969». Only a
few special results for linear, time- invariant systems are needed
here.
The system models (A, B, C) and 0\. 13, C) are equivalent
realizations of a system if:
This can be expressed in simple matrix form:
cAi B = e AjB j = 1, 2 ••• (2. 4. 2)
Because of the cyclic nature of A and A it is not necessary to
consider any j :2!: max (n, n). Two particular examples of equi.valent
realizations :i.re of continuing interest. If T is a coord inate
-1 -1transformation, (A, B, C) and (T AT, T B, CT) are equivalent.
Also, (A, B, C) and (A,~,~) are equivalent where:
•
A I r B
---... I
C [C : 0 ] A= I B = (2. 4. 3)= ._-----~-I
0 I Al 0I
I
This second example illustrates that system models of
different orders can be equivalent. A good deal of attention has
been devoted to determining the smallest possible dimension for
the state space of a model. The minimal realization is an ob-
servable and controllable system. A non- minimal realization
cannot be bottl observable and controllable.
The minimal realization is of little value in failure detection
theory. The smallest permissible order of the model is prescribed
by the set of failures to be detected and is generally greater than
the minimal order. Once the non- minimal model (A, B, C) is chosen,
the results of Chapter 3 may indicate that complete eigenvalue
assignment is possible only if the state space of the model is
increased from n to n.
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CHAPTER 3
•
FAILURE DETECTION THEORY
The body of failure detection theory is derived in this
chapter. The first step is to complete the motivation for the
definition of detectability and of the vector space techniques.
The basic conGept of a detection space associated with each
event vectol~ is introduced in Section 3. 1~ The detection space
for an event vector f is comprised of the event vectors which
cannot be discerned from f on the basis of output error direction
alone. It is the suffic ient characteristic by which a failure may
be related to the system state space. The axiomatic definition
of the detection space is the bas is for the theoretical results on
detection theory proved in this chapter. The premise is that
of a continuous, linear, time invariant, deterministic system.
The admission of stochastic properties does not alter the results
of this chapter. The poss ibility of modification of the th~ory
for discrete and stochastic systems is discussed in Chapters 4
and 5 respectively.
The bas ic theorem of the detectability of a single failure
is proved in Section 3. 2. The properties of t~""'.e detection space
are derived and algorithms for determinip.g the detection space
and assigning the eigenvalues are presented.
Detection of multiple failures with a single filter is
treated in Section 3. 3. A sufficient condition for a set of
failures to be detectable by a single failure detection system is
proved in Section 3. 3. 1. If the set of failures cannot be detected
by a single failure detection system, Section 3. 3. 3 provides
an algorithm for finding a subset of mutually detectable vectors
from -t:he undetectable set. Unfortunately, the algorithm does
not guarantee that an acceptable number of failures can be included
in this subset. Section 3. 3. 4 provirles a stronger result by
allowing for the poss ibility of adopting a reference model with
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a dimension greater than n. As long as the failures satisfy
a 8 imple relationship, it is shown that a fa.ilure detection system
can be deficed for a set of m failures (m is the rank of C)e
It is proved in Sections 3. 5 arid 3. 6 that this is the largest
number of fallures which can be detected unambiguously by
a stngle failure detection systerrl.
A modified definition of detectability is introduced ill
Section 3. 4. This definition differs from Definition 2. 1. 1 in
that a weaker con.trol over the eigenvalue ass ignment for
A-DC is accepted. The new definition does not require that
the eigenvalues of A-DC be individually assignable, but only
that they be assignable with a multiplicity of one or greater.
The consequence of the change may be a several-fold increase
in the number of failures detectable by a single failure detection
system. Constructive algorithms are de~Jeloped for determining
the increased capability of a filter.
The principal theorems of Section 3~ 2 and Section 3. 3. 3
were proved by Beard (1971) using matrix algebra techniques--
the remailling results are new. The approach and trle d~riva­
tions presented here are radically di.fferent from those of Beard.
Although Beard's derivations are considerably more lengthy,
a reader comfortable with rJ.1atrlx analysis might find them Simpler
to follow. Unfortunately,. the transition from the matrix algebra
approach back to the linear algebra approach upon which the
new results are based would not be trivial.
It is intended that the applications- oriented reader should
be able to use failure detection theory without reading pa.st Section
3. 2. 1. Except for developing the computational algorithms,
the detection problem is abstracted in this chapter to a study
of the properties of an operator A-DC in an n-dimensional space.
The important results are summarized and interpreted in Chapter 4.
J'~ careful reading of the previous chapters and of Sections 3. 1
and 3.2. 1 should suffice .as preparation fo~ following the develop-
ments of this chapter on an intuitive basis without reading the
proofs of the theorems.
3. 1 DAtection Spaces
Section 2.. 1 motivated failure detection theory in terms of
the controllable subspace of the event vector f 1 associated with
a failure. In terms of the vector space notation introdGced in
Section 2. 3, the controllable subspace of f 1 is the vector space
')f span.?ed by the vectors in the sequenc'e ft' (A-DC )f1,( A-DCr"f1. . •• The vector space equivalent of the failure
detection requirement in (2. 1. 20) is for tl,~ output subspace C?f1
to be one- d imens ional :
(3.1.1)
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Although (3.1.1) states a necessary and sufficient condition for
D to be a detection filter for f l' it does not yield an acceptable
algorithm for assigning the eigenvalues of A-DC. In order to
develop such an algorithnl, it is des irable to state the fa:'lure
detection problem in a more general context. The problem is
most conveniently stated in terms of the detection space of f 1
as defined in this section.
The detection space of f 1 has a second application which
further justifies its introduction. It was suggested in Section
2. 1 that certain failures might be indistinguishable on the
bas is of output error direction alone. It is obvious that this
difficulty is related to the difference between the dimension
of the state space and the number of independent sensors in the
system. If only a single sensor exists, no discrimination between
sensor failures can be based upon the output error direction.
If a full set of n linearly independent measurements is available.
it is reasonable to suspect that little (in fact, no) ambiguity
exists. The possible ambiguity is formally defined in Definition
2. 1. 1 in terms of the event vectors f 1 and f 2 associated with
two different failures. The definition is applicable to failures
modeled by either the controller failure model or the sensor
f~ilure model since Section 2. 1 defines event vectors for both
models.
Definition 3. 1. 1 Let f 1 and f 2 be event vectors associated with
failures in a system which is modeled in the unfailed state by the
triad (A, B, C). The event vector f 2 is detection equivalent to f 1 if:
i) every detection filter for f 1 is a detection filter for
f 2, and
ii) the unid irectional output error generated by the
iailure associated with f 2 is in the same o'utput
direction as that associated with f l -
ff f 2 is detection equivalent to f l' a failure detection system
based on output error direction alone cannot discriminate between
failures associated with the two event vectors. It can be shown
that the detection space of f 1 contains all the event vectors
which are detection equivalent to f 1-
The detection space of f 1 is denoted by R1 and is defined
axiomatically in Definition 3. 1. 2 in terms of a set of four
properties which uniquely characterize it. To 8 implify the notation,
the definition assumes that Cf1 is not zero. The modification
of the definition which is necessary if Cf l is zero is discussed
I
later in this section.
Definition 3. 1. 2 Let f 1 be an event vector associated with a failure
in a system which is modeled in the unfailed state by (A, B, C).
Assume that Cf1 is not zero. The detection space for f t is denoted
by I(1 and is the direct sum:
1) I(1 = f 1 fBI(1
where I(IC 6 n is the largest subspace which satisfies the three
conditions:1
ii) n (M) nRl = ¢
iii) 1(1 C 1l( C)
iv) A 1(1 c~\
{The observabliity operator 1l(M) is defined in Section 2. 4.
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The remainder of this section is concerned with a motivation.
of Definition 3. 1. 2 in terms of the controllable subspace of
f 1 and the vectors which are detection equivalent to f 1. Algorithms
for finding RI are based upon Definition 3. 1. 2 and are developed
in Section 3. 2.
Condition i) of Definition 3. 1. 2 insures that f 1 is a vector
\...
in its own detection space. The use of the direct sum operator
"$" in i) rather than the more general union operator "Ul' is
possible because of iii). To see this. assume that 'U II is used in i) and
note that the partition of R1 specified by i) allows CR1 to be expressed:
(3.1. 2)
Because the statement of the definition requires that Cf1
is not zero and iii) defines RI such that CR1 is zero. (3. 1. 2)
becomes:
(3.1. 3)
This distinction between Cf1 and ~1 is sufficient to guarantee
that:
(3. 1.4)
Comparison of (3. 1.4) with ('~. 3. 2) verifies that RI is the direct
sum of f 1 and R1"
Condition ii) is in the form of Definition 2. 4. 1 and defines
RI to be an observable subspace for (A. B. C). The event vector
f I is also an observable subsp:-ce for (A. B. C) by virtue of the
fact that Cfl is not zero. The direct sum of two observa
ble
subspaces does not necessarily satisfy Definition 2. 4. 1. but
it is simple to show that R1 is also an observable subspace for
(A. B. C). Because R I is the direct sum of f 1 and Rp every
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vector «in R 1 can be uniquely represented as a linear combination
of f 1 and some vector ( in R1:
l = O'f f 1 + 0'~ ~ . (3. 1. 5)
If (,\If is zero, then ~ is contained in R1 and the fact that R1 is
observable for (A, B, C) g'uarantees that ~ ~ 7{ (IV1). On the
other hand, if (,\If is not zero, iO and the fact that Cf 1 is not Z'2ro
irllply that:
(3.1. 6)
and again ~ ~ 7l (M). Since these two cases include every vector
in Rl' they imply that:
(3. 1. 7)
and consequently that R1 is an observable subspace for (A, B, C).
With these points established, it is possible to relate
Definition 3. 1. 2 to the failure detection problem. Because iii)
states that CR1 is zero, iv) is equivalent to requiring that R1
satisfy:
(3. 1. 8)
..Assume for the moment that Dis chosen such that:
(3. 1. 9)
for some arbitrary ~f in R l' From (3. 1. 8), (3. 1. 9), and
i) it follows that R1 is an invariant subspace with respect to
A-DC for this choice of Dsince:
(3. 1. 10)
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This fact in turn insures that all of the vectors f l' (A·DC)f l'
( A-DC)2f 1••• are contained in R1. Since these vectors span
the_controllable subspace of f l' it follows that "'1 is a subspace
of R1:
(3.1.11)
Coupled with (3. 1. 3), this implies that "'1 satisfies (3. 1. 1)
and, hence, that D is a detection filter for fl'
It is shown in Section 3. 2 that (3. 1. 9) is equivalent to
(3. 1. 1~as a_means of defining a detection filter for fl. For
every ~f in R1 there is at least one detection filter for f 1 which
satisfies (3. 1. 9) with that ~f. Furthermore, there ~re no detection
filters for f 1 which do not sati~:iy (3. 1. 9) for some ~f in R1• It
follows that if Dis a detection filter for f1' then R1 is invariant.
with respect to A-DC and "'1 is a subspace of R1• The advantage
of (3. 1. 9) over (3. 1. 1) is the relative ease with which the desired
eigenvalues of A-DC can be associated with a particular ff in R1•
The algorithm for selecting Ddeveloped in this chapter is based
upon (3. 1. 9).
The use of R1 to characterize the failure detection problem
also simplifies the task of determining the event vectors which
are detection equivalent to f 1- Let f 2 be an event vector associated
with some failure and let '1'2 denote the contI'ollable subspace
of f2• If Dis a detection filter for f 1 and if f2 is contained inR1' an argument ide~tical to that leading to (3. 1. 11) shows that
"'2 is a subspace of R1 :
"2 c R1 (3 .. 1. 12)
Furthermore, because (3. 1. 7) guarantees that R1 is an observable
subspace, the failure assoc iated with f2 generates a non- zero
output error, i. e. f 2 is not in the unobservable space of C.
It follows from (3. 1. 3) and (3. 1. 12) that D is a detection fi.lter
for f2 and that the output error direction associated with f2 is £'f1:
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(3 0 1. 13)
This is the same output error direction associa~ed with f 1 and
by Definition 3. 1. 1, f 2 is detection equivalent to fl.
It is sllown in Section 3. 2 tllat an event vector cannot be
detection equivalent to f 1 unless it is contained in Rl' Since
(3, 1. 12) and (3. 1. 13) are valid for an arbitrary event vector in
~l' it follows that the detection space of f 1 is comprised of all
the event vectors which are detection equivalent to f 1- In many
instances ~ is zero and f 1 is its OVln detection space. This
corresponds to the case in which nc' event vectors are detection
equivalent to f 1- This case is important because it guarantees
that a failure detection system can uiliquely assoc late a unid irec-
tional error in the direction Cf 1 with the failure associated with
f 1- Although no general rule can be stated. the fact that R1 is
a subspace of 'll (C) implies that R1 is most likely to be :..,,:ero if
m is almost as large as n, i. e. if there are almost as many
independent measurements as there are state variables. If
m equals n, '1 <C) is zero and therefore R1 must be zero. The
case where m equals n is a trivial application of failure detection
theory and is treated in Section 4. 5.
The development of the properties of R1 has been predicated
upon the assumption that {f1 is not zero. For notational con-
venience, the results derived in this chapter are based upon
this assumption, but it is simple to extend them to the more
general case. If Cf l is zero, then:
(3.1. 14)
and 'fl is spanned by the sequence of vectors ft' Ar l' (A-DC )Af l ,
<A-DC )2Afr ... Similarly, if Cft' CArl' •••• CAIL-2 r1 are
all zero, it is poss ible to show that:
(3. 1. 15)
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and that"'1 is spanned by the sequence of vectors fp Af l , .•.AIJ-2 f Aj.L.-lf <A-DC ) A~lf <A-DC)2 AIJ.-I f The output1' 1 J l' 1- · It
sp~ce, C"'l associated with"'l in this case is spanned by the
corresponding sequence ¢, rD ••• rD, Cp., IJ-lf1,C<A-DC )AIJ-Ifl ,
C<A-DC )2AIJ-l f1 •••• The primary importance to failure detection
theory of the zero vectors in the sequence for C'"1 is that it
focusses attention on the output directiOll CAIJ-Ifl rather than Cf l .
This shift of attention can be emphas ized by mod ifying Definition
3. 1. 2:
Definition 3. 1. 2a Let f 1 be an event vector assoc iated with a failure
in a system which is modeled in the unfailed state by (A, B, C)
and assume that IJ. is the smallest integer such that ~AIJ.-1 f t is
not zero. The detection space for f 1 is denoted by R1 and is the
direct sum:
i) R1 = A IJ- If1 E9 R1
where RIc ~ n is the largest subspace which satisfies the
three conditions:
ii) 1(CM)nR1 = ¢
iii) R1 c 71(C)
iv) ARt c R1
It is simple to show that the vectors f p Af1••• AIJ- 2f 1 satisfy
ii) - iv) and are contained in R1- In general, however, they
span only a subspace of R1 and the algorithm developed in
Section 3. 2 must still be used to determine R1 and k\.
The definitions introduced in this section can be illustrated
with the exarnple used in Section 2. 1. When dpecific applications
of failure detection theory are considered, the system is usually
expressed in matrix form. Similarly, for computational purposes,
it is more convenient to deal with detection spaces and detection
filters in a matrix context than in terms of vector spaces and
linear operators. The theory developed in this chapter is based
upon the vector space techniques summarized in Section 2.• 3,
but the final product is a set of matrix algorithms based upon
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Since Cf1 is zero, it is necessary to use Af1 and Definition
3. 1. 2a in order to define the detection space of f 1:
The specific example useel here is an off-failure of the first
control element as modelE~d by the controller failure model
and (2. 1. 12):
(2. 1. 12)
(2. 1. 7)
(3. 1. 16)
o
o
o
1
o
2w
1L0
•
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + f 1 n 1(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
The ~ystem in Section 2. 1 is cha.racter ized by the matrices:
:] A =
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 l=~ 0 0 2C 3w 0 0 2w B= 0 -siny sini'0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 ··2w 0 0
1 cosy cosy
(2. 1. 9)
It is simple to verify that eM1 is not zero. It can be shown
that R1 for this example is a one-dimensional subspace which
is spanned by the vector fl. In the coordinate system on which
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the matrix properties summarized in Section 2. 3. 3. The
application of these algorithms to the example in Section 2. 1
j.8 analyzed in detail in Section 4. 3.
(A, B, C) is based, the detection space R1 of f 1 corresponds
to the range space of the matrix R l :
0 0
2w a
R1 = [Aft R 1]=[Af l f t ] = (3. 1~ 17)1 0
0 1
Although a detoctioll space cannot always be so conveniently
related to its event vector, (3.1.17) illustrates trl~ dynamic
relationship between f 1 and the other event vectors in R1. Assume
that u 1(t) l.S a unit impulse at time to:
(3.1. 18)
With zero initial conditions, the estimation errors generated
by the controller failure can be found from (2. 1. 17):
t
£(t) - - S e(A-DC)(t- T)f
1
6(t
o
)dT
to
E" '(t) = C £(t) (3. 1. 19)
Equation (3. 1. 19) is valid whether or not D is a detection filter
for f 1. The presence of the impulse makes the integral simple
to evaluate:
( (t)
E" '(t) = C£(t) (3. 1. 20)
Because Cf l is zero, (3. 1.20) is precisely the same estimation
error which would result from a failure modeled by:
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X(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) - Af1 nf(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
if the time function nf(t) were the unit step:
{3. 1. 22)
In essence, this is the property defined as de~:ection equiva-
lence in Definition 3. 1. 1. The event vector Af 1 is detection
equivalent to f 1 because the output error given by (3. 1. 20) can
be attributed to a failure modeled by (2. 1.7) and (2. 1. 12), or
by (3. 1. 21) and (3. 1. 22) - - or by some other failure model
based upon a linear combination of f 1 arld .Af1. If (2. 1. 7) and
(3.1.21) are failure models for two different failures, no failure
detection system can distinguish between the output errors
generated by the two failures without specific knowledge of the
poss lble values of n l (t) and nf(t) - - and thls knowledge may~ot
be sufficient to allow a decision to be made. The fact that R1
contains every event vector which is detection equivalent to f 1
insures that the output error direction alone is sufficient
information to distinguish the controller failure modeled b}
(2. 1. 12) from every failure which is not modeled by either
(3. 1. 21) or a linear combination of (2. 1. 7) and (3.1.21).
3. 2 Single Failure Detection
In this section the bas ic result in failure detection theory
is derived: A failure is detectable if and only if the system (A, C)
is observable. This simple result guarantees the ability to
choose D to assign the eigenvalues of A-DC almost arbitrarily
while insuring that the output estimation error due to the failure
is unidirectional. The Detection Theorem is proved in Sectl.on
3. 2. 1 and the properties of the result are discussed. A generalization.
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of the notion of detectability (Definition 2.1.1) is made in
Section 3. 2. 2 to extend trle Detection Theorem to unobservab Ie
reference models. The modification amounts to an acceptance
of the fact that not all of the eigenvalues of an unobservable
reference model can be ass igned by output feedback (Theorem
2. 4.1). Algorithms for determining Rf and assigning the eigen-
values of A-DC are developed in 3. 2. 3. The derivations in
this section are in terms of an arbitrary event vector f and its
detection space Rf~ For convenience it is assumed that C f ':f ¢.
3.2.1 Detection Theorem
The proof of the Detection Theorem is based upon a set
of three lemmas. The first is a general result for linear
operators in a vector space.and has a wel1- known matrix theory
. m
cC'unterpC:t.rt. Given two sets of vectors y 1•.• Yq E cj and
Xl ••• x E cjn. the lemma states a necessary and sufficient condition
q m n
for there to exist an operator D: cB .... cj such that:
x. = D Jr.
1 1
i = 1••• q (3.2. 1)
The lemma does not require Y1'.' Yq to be linearly independent--
if they are, a solution always exists. The proof involves the
construction of two operators which map the q-dimensional
coefficient space cj Q into the vector spaces ~ n and ~m respectively. 1
It adds little to the understanding of detection theory and may be
bypassed.
Lemma 3.2. 1 Let x. E & nand y. E cj m. where i = 1••• q.
1 1
be arbitrarily chosen sets of vectors and define the operators X:
Q n y-Q m~ ... cJ and : tJ ... ~ :
...
y =
I The el~ments of a q-dimensional cpefficient space IJQ are q- tuplets
of coefficients (0'1 P 0'12 ••• O'tq}.
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There exists an operator Dsuch that:
i = 1••• q
if and only if 7l ( y> c 7l (X>. In particular. a solution always
exists if the y. are independent s inee then'll. (Y) = ¢.
1
Proof
Necess ity The operators Xand Yare operators from the
coefficient space .Q into 8 m and 8 n respectively. If aD
which satisfies the hypothesis eXists. then by linearity:
DY Ct = Q'
for all 0' (&Q.
Define a partition of 7l<Y):
such that 'Il' (Y> is a subspace of 7l( X> and that no vector in
'Ii II ( Y) is in?7 (X):
'Il' (y> c 7l (X )
1(" ( y> nn(X> = ¢
If 7l" (Y> is not the null space ¢. then let O'f EcJ Q be an arbitrary
q-tuple in nil (y). Since by definition:
yO'f = ¢
it follows that:
DY a = D¢ = flSf
But by construction O'f f 1l (X> and therefore:
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x Q'f" III
and no satisfactory Dexists_ Therefore a necessary condition
for a satisfactory Dto exist is that 7l" <y) be the null space ¢, i. e. :
Suffic ieney Let 4J be the r- d imens ional subspace spanned
by y 1- . - y and ~ the s-dimensional subspace spanned by xl- _. x .
q X / qClearly 7l<Y)c 7l< ) implies r ~ s. If y'l' Y2 ••• Y; dennte the
first r independent vectors in the set Yl ••• Yq; choose
Cit- •• Ctr such that:
YCt. =
1
/y.
1
i = 1•..• ~
j = r + 1••.. q
A set of coefficients Q' r+ l' ••• Q'q which span 7l <Y) can also be
chosen:
Yex.= ¢ j = r+l, ... q
J
The q q-tuples <1'1' ••• Ct'r' Q'r+ 1' ••• Q'q form a basic for 8 Q•
Since '!l (y> c 7l (X), then:
XO'. = ¢
J
and if the vectors xl ••• x; are defined by:
XQ' · = X ~ i = 1... r1 1
some subset of x 1... x'r must form a bas is for~. The operator
D: cB m ... ~ n is then any solution to the r equations:
If r = m, D is unique.
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i = 1... r
A
The following lemma formalizes the statements made in Section
3.1 concerning the nature of the detection space Rf of an event vector
f. Definition 3.1.2 and a trivial application of Lemma 3.2.1 are
used to prove that there exists an operator Dsuch that Rf is
invariant with respect to A-DC:
(3. 1. 8)
The controllable subspace ')If of f is spanned by f, (A-DC )f,
(A-DC )2 f ••. and by virtue of (3. 1. 8) must be a subspace of
Rf • Equation (3. 1. 3) then guarantees:
(3. 1. 1)
and the output error generated by the failure associated with f
is unid irectional. This satisfies the unid irectionality requirement
of Definition 2. 1. 1.
Lemma 3. 2. 2 There exists a Dsuch that Rf is invariant with
respect to A-DC and' observable for the system (A-DC, C). The
failure associated with f generates unid irectional output along
Cf for (A-De, C).
Proof
Since Cf =f: ¢, Lemma 3. 2. 1 guarantees that for any ~R
there exists a corresponding Dsuch th.at:
DCf= Af + ~R
In particular ~ there exists a satisfactory D for any ~R E R f. For
that D:
i) , cA-DC )f :: - (R E Rf
Condition iii) of Definition 3. 1.2 states tha~t Rr is a subspace of
7l (C.>. Consequently:
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(3. 2. 2)
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ii) ,
Equations i) I and ii) J coupled with cond ition i) of Definition 3. 1. 2
imply that Rf is invariant with respect to A-DC:
rrhis in turn inlplies that:
the failure associated with f generates unidirectional output
errors along Cf.
!
Observability follows fI'om Ttleorem 2. 4. 2 and Definitiorl
2. 4.1. Suppose that Rf is not observable for (A-DC, C) and let
~D E Rf satisfy ~D E 7l (MD ). Then Theorem 2. 4. 2 requires
~D E 7l (M) -- which contrad icts cond ition ii) of Definition 3. 1. 2,
Therefore, Rf is observable for (A-DC, C).
Lemma 3. 2"l 2 satisfies the first cond ition of Definition
2.1.1 -- that a feedback matrix be chosen such that the output
generated by a particular failure is unidirectional. It remains
to show that the eigenvalues of A-DC can be assigned arbitrarily.
Since Rf is inva:--iant for A-DC, there are a set of:
and ARf in condition iv) can be replaced by (A-DC) Rf :
for all j > 0 and the controllable subspace ?If of f is a subspace of
Rf • Since:
eigenvalues of A-DC associated with Rf ; the remaining n- V f
are associated with some arbitrary completion of an. If
d n is partitioned:
(3. 2. 3)
_C
the additional n- Vr eigenvalues are associated with Rf • It
is a simple matter to show that the eigenvalues associated
with Rf can be assigned arbitrarily by proper choice of D;
the question concerns the remaining n-Vf eigenvalues. The
following lemma provides the key to the answer.
Assume for the moment that (A, C) is observable. The
essential implication of Lemma 3. 2. 3 is that if D is chosen
to satisfy Lemma 3. 2. 2 for f. and f' is some arbitrary event
vector not contained in Rf • then the failure associated with
f I cannot generate a unidirectional output error along Cf for
(A-DC. C) -- the output error must have a component along
some direction other than Cf 41 In terms of Definition 3.1.1,
f I is not detection equivaJ.ent to f unless f I is an elenlent of
Rf • The proof of the Detection Theorem demonstrates that
this fact is sufficient to insure eigenvalue assignability.
The first corollary to the Detection Theorem states the above
interpretation of Lemma 3. 2. 3 formally•.
The statement of Lemma 3. 2. 3 employs a more restrictive
definition of observability than the standard definition. The
requirement is a formalization of the discussion above: A
system (A-DC, C) is observable (mod Rf ) if no event vector fl
which is not contained in Rf generates output errors which are
consh4 ained to the output subspace CRf • If .1/ is the controllable
subspace for f " i. e. the space spanned by f '. (A-DC) f:
( A-DC )2f I • ••• Definition 2. 4. 2 states the condition for observa-
bility (mod Rf > as:
(3. 2. 4)
for all f I f Rf. Lemma 3. 2. 3 proves that observability and
observability (mod Rf) are equivalent definitions as long as
Rf is a detection space.
Lemma 3.2.3 Let Dsatisfy Lemma 3.2.2. The system
(A-DC, C) is observable (mod Rf ) if and only if it is observable.
Proof
Necess'ity If (A-DC, C) is not observable, then ?(MD ) =F 15•.
7Z (Mn) is an invariant subspace (Section 2. 4) and it is disjoint
from Rf (condition ii) of Definition 3. 1. 2). Definition 2. 4. 2
clearly implies that (A-DC, C) is not observable (mod Rf)Since:
Sufficiency Assume (A-DC, C) is observable. If (A-DC, C)
is not observable (mod Rf ), the equivalent condition in Definition
2. 4.2 states that there must exist some vector f' ~ Rf such
that J'f' the controllable (invariant) subspace of f' for (A-DC, C),
satisfies:
The fact that Rf is a detection space means that conditions
i) and iii) of Definition 3. 1. 2 can be used to reduce the above
to a disjoint sum:
i) I
Assume that i) I above is satisfied. Now cons ider the union
of ..1'; and Rf :
By construction, ..1'; and Rf are invariant with respect to A-DC
therefore, R/ must be also. Because of i) I above and condition i)
of Definition 3. 1. 2, /P; can be partitioned similarly to Rf :
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i)
where:
iii) Rf C 'l<e)
Since (A- DC I C) is observable, Therem 2. 4. 2 requires (A, C)
to be observable as well and:
ii) Rf n 'l(lVI) = ¢
Finally, since iii) above implies:
< A-DC)Ri = ARr'
the invariance of Rf with respect to A-DC yields
iv) A R' c R If f
Conditions i) - iv) above are identical to cond it ions i) - iv)
of Definition 3. 1. 2. Since Rf is the largest subspace to satisfy
these conditions, it is necessary that .;;c Rf and therefore f' E Rf
for aU';f which satisfy condition i)/. Consequently, (A-DC, C>
is observable (mod Rf >.
Let cS n be partitioned as in (3. 2. 3), but with the additional
constraint on the choice of'R/:
-cd(CRf > = m-l
For an observable (A, C), Lemmas 3. 2. 2 and 3. 2. 3 insure that
there exists a Dsuch that A-DC can be decomposed into two
subsystems--one associated with Rf and the other with Rf
c
-- such
that both systems are observable and the subsystem associated
with Rf is decQupled, i. e. an input command to that subsystem
does not affect the stat~ of the subsystem associated with Rf~
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In matrix terms, if a basis for<$n is specified as Vf linearly
- -cindependent v'ectors from Rf and n- vf from Rf , the matrix
A- DC for that bas is is upper block diagonal:
A/
lI
I A 12II
A-DC I= - - -- T ..... - - -,
A 220 II
c = (3.2. 6)
where A{l is a V f x V f matrix, C 1 is m x Vf etc. 1 The subsystems
(A 'll' C 1) and (A 22' C 2 ) are observable with:
rk C 2 = m - 1 (3. 2. 7)
A{l' is associated withRf and A:b is associ~tedwithR/--f
is a linear combination of the first Vr unit vectors. The zero
off-d iagana! block reflects the fact that Rf is invariant with
respect to A-DC. Along with the fact that the rank of C 1
is unity. it also implies that the failure associated with f
generates unidirectional output errors along Cf. These results
are verified in the proof of Theorem 3. 2. 1.
The partitioning of (A. C) into subsystems is useful for
proving the eigenvalue assignability required by Definition
2. 1. 1. In matrix notation the zero submatrix in (3. 2. 6) implies
that the eigenvalues of A-DC are the sum of those of All and
A 22 0 Theorem 2.4.1 and the Obfjervability of (All' C 1)
and (A 22 , C 2 ) then guarantee that matrices D21 and D22
1The relationship between (3. 2. 6) and the definition of A-DC
in terms of operators on Rf and RfC is outlined in Section 2. 3. 3.
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(n x 1 and n x (m- 1) respectively) exists such that the eigenvalues
of All - 021 C 1 and A22 - 022 C 2 are any desired set. The
proof of the Detection Theorem is completed by showing that
Lemma 3. 2. 1 implies that a matrix D 2 exist such that:
•
All - 02 1C1: A 12
•t
': - - - - - - - - - - - - ,- - - - - - _. - - - - -
o : A 22 - D22 C 2
I
(3.2. 8)
for any choice of D21 and D 22 .
Theorem 3. 2. 1 (Detection Theorem) The failure associated
with the event vector f is detectable if and only if (A, C) is
observable.
Proof
Let D be any operator which satisfies Lemma 3. 2. 2 for
f. A satisfactory Dalways exists. Define a partiti.on of (j n
- - c --cin terms of Rf and some subspace Rf ' where Rf and Rf are
disjoint:
For simplicity choose R~ such that its image CR/ in &m does
not include Cf. Since conditions i) and iii) of Definitioll 3.1.2
imply that:
such a Rfcexists. CRfc is then an (m-1) - dimensional subspace
of crm:
With Jt d€:fined, the partition of cgm is consistent with that of
cI n:
elm = Cf ED ricf
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Since Rf is invariant with respect to A-DC, the op(~rato.r
A-DC is uniquely defined by four operators on the partitions
of ~n, one of which is the null operator:
iv) - -c¢ : Rf '" Rf (¢ is the null operator)
C is uniquely defined by operators from Rf and Rfc onto the
appropriate output 8ubspaces:
Vl-) C - R c... Je2- f f
The subsystem of -A":DC associated with Rf can be denoted by(A~p C 1) and the one associated vi'ith Rf
c by (A 22 , C2 ).
Because of the null operator in iv) the eigenvalues of A-DC
are thp. eigenvalues of A'11 and A'2~.
Let O2 be an ar1:'itrary operator ID 2:~ ... d n defined on
the same partitions as C in v) and vi):
vii)
CiearlyD21 and D22 can be chosen freely. The composite
ope:ator ~~C: .fl4'ft can then be def..iled as a pair of operators
on Rf and Rf :
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Combining ix) and x) with i) - iv) above, Ar( D+D 2) ( is uniquely
\
defined by:
.. )/A' DC RC R- C11 22 - 22 2: f -t f
iv) ,
From iv)' it is apparent that Rf is invariant with respect to A- (D+D 2)(
and that the eigenvalues of A<D+D 2 )C are those of A11 - ~ 1 C1
and A'22-D22 ~.
Let Af and Af
c be sets of vf and n- Vf desired eigenvalues
of A-(D+D2 )C associated with Rf and R/ respectively. Theorem
2. 4. 1 states that there exists operators D21 and D22 such that
theA ;1-D21 C1 and A22 -D 22 C2 have the desired eigenvalues
for all sets Af and ArIc if and only if (All,C l ) and (A 22 ,C 2) are
both observable. By Lemma 3. 2. 2, (A 11' C 1) is always observable.
From the output space associated with C2 by v) and vO, Lemma
3. 2. 3 states that (A 22, C 2) is observable if and only if (A-DC, C)
is observable. If follows that the eigenvalues of A- (D+D 2) C
are ass ignable if and only if (A- DC. C) is observable. Theorem
2. 4. 2 then allows the observability of (A, C) to be substituted
for that of (A- DC, C).
4
The following corollary to the Detection Theorem insures
that if (A, C) is observable no event vector p ~ Rf can produce
an error signal which is unidirectional along Cr. Thus, the
detection space '?f is the space of all event vectors which are
detection equivalent to f- - which is formally stated in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 provides the justification for referring to the
detection space as the sufficient eharacteristic by which a
failure detection problem can be formulated.
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Corollary 1 ...~s8ume Dsatisfies Lemma 3. 2. 2. No vector
p f Rf can produc'J an output for (A-DC, C, which is unidirectional
along Cf if (A, C) is abs ervable.
Proof
The proof is the s\l.fficiency proof for Lemma 3. 2. 3.
Corollary 2 The detection space Rf is isomorphic to the set
(~f} of vectors which are detection equivalent fo f.
Proof
By Corollary 1 and the definition of detection equivalence
(Definition 3. 1. 1). Rf clearly contains every vector of (~f}.
Since Lemma 3. 2. 2 guarantees that Rf j.8 observable -and invariant
with respect to A-DC. every ~ E Rf produces a unidirectional
output along (f for every acceptable D. Thus every vector
of Rf is in (~f} • 11
Only one structural property of detection spaces has been
proved thus far: For every detection space there exists an
operator Dsuch that the space is invariant with respect to
A-DC. It is pass ible to show that in fact the detection space
be,~omes cyclic invariant and that the g~nerator for Rf with
respect to A-DC is not unique 1. It is also poss ible to show that
there exists a unique vector g in Rf such that the vectors g,A Au -1 -g, • • • i g are a basis for Rf • The vector g was defined by
Beard (1971) to be the detection generator for the failure.
associated with the event vector f. The detection generator
is particularly useful in defining computational algorithms
for choosing D. Its existence is proved in Lemma 3. 2. 4. An
algorithm for computing g based upon the proof of Lemma 3. 2. 4
is given in Appendix A.2 •
Lemma 3. 2. 4 Let d(Rf ) = IIf • There exists a unique vector
g E Rf • called the detection generator of Rf • such that:
i) Ak g E Rf k < IIf- 1
--t-C-y-c-l-iC-invariant vector spaces are dls(;UOdeci !n Section 2. 3. 2
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II - 1
il) CA £..g ::: Cf
v -1
The statements l) and it) imply that the vectors g, Ag••• A f g are
a basis for Rf -
Proof
a) Existence
By conditions ii) and iv) of Definition 3. 1. 2, for every
vector ~ in Rf' there is an integer II ~ IIf such that ~ satisfies i)
and ii) of the hypothes is with IIf replaced by II. Define g to be
the vector associated with the largest integer IIg ~ IIf :
iii) Akg E Rf k < IIg-I
iv) CA'"g- Ig = Cf
II - 1
and let Rg be the vector space spanned by g, Ag••• A g g. It is
simple to prove that tJg must equal 1If" Otherwise, there
must exist some largest integer II / > 0 and a vect.:>r g' f Rg
such that:
v) Akg' E "if
vi) CA""- 1g' = Cf
However, the vector:
IJ -v'
vii) g* = g' - A g g
k< 11'-1
also must satisfy g"~ Rg. Conditions iii) and v) clearly imply:
k < II '- 1
But by the construction of gH:
lx) CA'" ,- 1g' = CA'" '- 1g' _ CA IIg- 1g
= Cr - Cf = 0
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Since Rf is observable (Lemma 3. 2. 2) and ex gil ~ Rg for
arbitrary Ct, this contrad lcts the maximality of V '.
b) Uniqueness
The detection generator must be unique. If there existed
a second detection generator, g , then g - g would satisfy:
Ct Ct
Since d (Rr' ~ vf - 1, this would imply that Rf is invariant and
hence unobservable. Rf is observable and therefore gcy = g.
3. 2. 2 Unobser~Table System
Unfortunately from a mathematical vantage point, the
detection problem loses a number of des irable properties if
the rEference model (A, C) upon which the failure detection
system is to be based is not observable. It is not necessary
that the system be observable; only that the a suitable system
model be observable. In practice an observable rn·odel can be
obtained simply by eliminating the unobservable dynamics
from the model. This does not alter the effectiveness of the
failure detectLon system beca~failures in the unobservable
part of a system cannot be detected. If for some reason it is
necessary to des {gn a detection filter for an unobservable system
model, the difficulties mentioned below should be acknowledged.
Although it is not done here, it is possible to show that
if (A, C) is not observable, the detection space as defined in
Definition 3. 1. 2 need not be unique. This shortcoming can
be eliminated in several ways. One is to modify the definition
to insure a unique solution. As an example, it would be necessary
to change condition i) to:
(3. 2. 9)
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where f' is in the orthogonal complement of 7l (M):
f' E 'Z (Ml
f I == f (mod 71 (M))
The required change in condition ii) wC'uld be similar:
(3. 2. 10)
The end result would be to restrict attention to the projection
of Rf onto 1l (M)1.. 12 (M).L is the row space of M and is class Lcally
referred to as the observable space of (A, C). Such a specializa-
tion of the definition of a detection space v/ould not add to the
conceptual understanding of the failure detection problem and
it would not allow any additional results to be obtained. The
conclusions of this subsection demonstrate that when an algorithm
is implemented, it is simple to choose Rf E 12 (M)J. as the detection
space of f' if that seems des irable.
The most algebraically consistent procedure for eliminating
the ambiguity is to replace Definition 3. 1. 2 with a similar
definition in terms of factor spaces. (Factor spaces are
discussed in Section 2. 3. ~~). Although there is no practical
necessity for such a generalization, it is the logical extension
of Section 3/,2. 1. The generalization to factor spaces, is presented
in the rema,inder of this section without rigorous proof.
This material is not necessary to the remainder of the chapter.
-cIf (A, C) is not observable, then Rf can be chosen such that:
(3. 2. 11)
The unobservable space 1l (M) of the system is invariant.
This space and the eigenvalues associated with it constitute
a subsystem which never affects the system output. It is clear
that these eigenvalues can never be altered by output feedback.
If:
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tJ = dm (M»
o
(3. 2. 12)
only n- V eigenvalues of A-DC can be ass igned by chaos ing D.
o
The implication of such free trajectory subsystems is studied
in detail by Davison and Wang (1973).
In the proof of the Detection Theorem it was pointed aut
that the choice of Rf
c is not unique even if (A, C) is observable.
From (3. 2. 9) it is clear that for an unobservable system the
decomposition does not require Rf to be unique. Any R'
which satisfies:
(3. 2. 13)
is invariant (mod 1l (M)) with respect to A-DC if Rf is invariant
with respect to A...DC. As an example, it is possible to choose
Rr'as defined by (3. 2.9) and (3. 2. 10). The importance~f (3. 2. 13)
is that it implies that it is not necessary to determine Rf in order
to solve the failure detection problem. The problem is completely
characterized by any solution of the equation. There are IJf
assign able eigenvalues assoc iated with that R'.
If (A, C) is observable, Rf is isomorphic to the set (€f)
of vectors which are detection equivalent to f. If (A, C) is not
observable, a more general means for characterizing (€f}
is needed. Clearly every €f E"R' for all "R' which saiisfy
(3. 2 0 13) is detection equivalent to f. This suggests that
(€f} can be specified in terms of the factor space of Rf with
respect to '1 (M). The factor space is uniquely specified by
any solution of (3. 2. 13).
In order to state these arguments rigorously it is necessary
to adopt a modified definition of detectability.
Definition 3. 2. 1 The failure associated with. the event vector
f is quasi-detectable if and only if there exists a Dsuch that:
i) The output generated by f n(t). maintains' a fixed
direction in the output space. and
78
il) the n-IJ eigenvalues associated with the observable
o
dynamics of (A- DC. C) can be specified almost arbltrarily
by the proper choice of the detection filter.
The Detection Theorem can be interpreted in terms of this
definition. For ease of comparison with the Detection Theorem,
the proof which follows is based upon some Rf which satisfies
Definition 3. 1. 2. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem
3. 2. 1 and is only sketched here.
Theorem 3. 2. l' (Detection Theorem for Unobservable Systems)
The failure associated with the event vector f is quas i- detectable
if and only if Rf is observable.
Proof
Necessity If Rf is not observable, Rf c'l (M) and condition i)
of Definition 3. 1. 2 is violated.
Sufficiency Let j1 be partitioned:
-cAs, was done in the proof of Theorem 3. 2. 1, choose Rf such
that
CROC = -,Cf f
and dW~) =- m'" 1. The proof is identical to that of Theorem
3. 2. 1 except that to define A-DC uniquely the additional operators
must be giver1:
v) Ao: 'Z (M) "''Z (M)
vi) A02 : Rf
c
... 7«M)
vii) ¢: Rf ... 'Z(M)
viii) ¢: 'Z(M)'" (Rf e Rf c)
Of these operators, only Ao2 can be altered by choice of D2
and this does not alter the eigenvalues associated with Ao•
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It remains only to specify D2 in terms of the desired operators
i) - iv) as in Theorem 3. 2. 1.
Implicit in the proof of Theorem 3. 2. l' is a generalization
of Lemma 3.2.3 to the effect that (A-DC, C) is observable
(mod Rf ED 1l (M» Corollary 1 reflects this fact.
Corollary 1 Let D be chosen such that k'f is invariant. No
vector p f' (Rf E91l (M» can produce an output for (A-DC, C)
which is unidirectional along cr.
Proof
The proof is a generalization of that of Corollary 1 of
Theorem 3. 2. 1 to unobservable sy·stems.
Since every vecto.~ ~ ~ 11 (M) affects the system output,
it is apparent that every vector ~f E(Rr ED 7l (M» either produces
output which is unidirectional along Cf or it produces no output
at all. From the previous comment and Corollary 1, it
follows that the set of event vectors detection equivalent to
f is related to the factor space of Rf with respect to 1l(M).
-* -Corollary 2 Let Rf be the factor spEt.ce of Rf with respect to
'l(M). The set (~f} of vectors which are detection equivalent
to f is the set of vectors which are elements of some equivalence
-* *class in Rf other than ¢ •
Proof
The statement is a formal characterization of all vectors
ft- E ('Z(M) ED Rf ) which satisfy ~f ~ 1l(M). By Corollary 1 and
the invariance of n(M), these are the vectors which are
detection equivalent to f.
In summary, if (A, C) is not observable, the failure
detection problem is altered in three ways:
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i) v of the eigenvalues of A-DC become unass ignable,
o
ii) the detection space is not unique and its function may
be satisfied by an)!' solution of (3. 2. 13), and
iil) the set of events detection equivalent to f is specified
. -)',,-
by the factor space Rf of Rf with respect to ~ (M).
Just as the detection problem for which (A, C) is observable
is completely characterized by the detection space Rf ; when
(A, C) is not observable, the problem is completely specified
.J..
by the V
o
unassignable eigenvalues and the factor space Rf:
The ambiguity of cond ition ii) above is relnoved if it is pass ible
to determine the factor space directly. Alternatively, the rele-
vant property of (3. 2. 13) is that &.ny solution of tile equation
-*uniquely specifies Rf • The choice o.f whether to accept condition
ii) or redefine the detection spaces c,f this chapter as factor
spaces is one of personal tasteo Either approach makes the
subsequent results of this chapter read ily generalizable to
the unobservable case.
If a system is unobse!."vable, the system model can be
made observable by eliminating the unobservable dynamics
from the reference model upon which the failure detection
~
system is based. The detection space R in the reduced n-
. dimensional model can then be determined simply. This is
-*tantamount to dealing directly with the factor space Rf in
the n-dimensional model. All of the algorithms of this
chapter can be applied to the Ii-dimensional model and then
extrapolated to the n-dimensional model. It is assumed in
Sections 3. 2 - 3. 6 tnat such a procedure is followed.
3. 2. 3 Algorithms
In order to utilize detection space"s as a practical procedure
for determining the operator D, it is necessary to define a
generating algorithm for the detection spaces. Two such
algorithms are introduced here. The first demonstrates the
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fundamental relationship of detection spaces to the failure
detection problem by applying Definition 3. 1. 2 to determine
Rf recursively. It is included primarily to emphasize this
relationship. The second algorithm is more circuitous bl.lt
in many respects simpler to implement. It necessitates the
arbitrary choice of a Dwhich makes Rf invariant and suggests
one such choice. An example of the application of the algorithm
is given in Chapter 4. The algorithms assume (A, C) is observable.
If it is not, both converge to" (M) e Rf (although a constraint
on the eigenvalues associated with 7l (M) must be made for the
first algorithm to converge). The discussion in the preceding
subsection guarantees that this is r .·:~icient to fully characterize
the detection problem.
The first algorithm determines Rf through a recurs ive
solution for Rf and then condition i) of Definition 3.1.2:
(3. 2. 14)
Although the algorithm is expressed in terms of A- 1, it ~an
be interpreted in terms of A. The starting point for the
recurs ion is the null space of C:
(3.2.15)
The first iteration determines R(l) by eliminating all vectors
from R-0 ) whose image unqer~, is not contained in R(O) Ea f.
The recursion terminates when R(j) is found for which condition
iv) of Definition 3. 1.2 is satisfied:
(3. 2. 16)
where it is necessary that j ~ n- m. The structure of the
algorithm guarantees that R(j) is the largest subspace of 1l (C)
which satisfies- (3. 2. 16); hence, R(j) is Rf • A variation upon
the algorithm can be implemented even if A-I does not exist.
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but the simplicity of the recursion is masked by the necessity
of having to define inverse operators on restr~.C't~·d subspaces
n
of (j •
Lemma 3. 2. 5 Assume (A, C) is observable and A- 1 exists.
The detection space Rf is given by:
where:
R = R(n-m)
f
d R(n- m) - · f- d · 1 fan is ae lne recurSive y rom:
R(O) = 7l (C)
R(i) - R(i-1) () A- 1 (R(i- 1) e f) i. 1••• n- m
Proof
The sequence R(O), R(l)••• R(n-m) is a decreasing nested
sequen~e since R(i) C R(l-l). This implies d<R(i» s: d(R(l-l».
If dW(i» equals d(R(i- 1», then it follows that R(i) and RO- 1)
ate the same subspace and the sequence becomes repetitive.
Because 7l( C) is (n- m)- dimens ional, the recurs ion therefore
converges in n- m steps or less and:
R(n-m) =R(n-m) n If l(R(n-m) en
i) c A- 1 (R(n- m) en
It can be shown induc.tively that Rf C R(n.. m)• ClearlyJif C R(O). Assume Rf C Rh-l). Conditions iii) and iv) of
Defini~ion 3. 1.2 states that Rf is the.largest subspace of 7lee>
for which:
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A-ISince is unique, this can be stated as:
and then by:
"f C R (i- 1) n A-I (R<i-l) e f)
The expression on the right is R(i) which yields Rf C R (i).
Therefore by induction, Rf C R (n- m). Cond iUons i) and ii)
above are identical relationships. Since R~ is the largest
subspace of 11 <C) to satisfy ii) and Rf C R(n- m), i'~ follows that:
R = R(n-m)
f
Lemma 3. 2. 5 is useful in tllat it demonstrates a straight-
forward and analytically appealing procedure for determining
Rf directly from Definition 3. 1. 2. Unfortunately, implementation
of the algorithm can be computationally prohibitive. No direct
algorithms exist for finding the intersection of two vector spaces.
The standard proced~re involves finding a series of orthogonal
complements. The intersection for the lemma becomes:
{3. 2. 17)
A procedure for determining orthogonal complements is presented
in Appendix A. 1. The union of two subspaces can be found
easily from their bases.
A computationally simpler procedure for determining
Rf can be based upon Lemma 3. 2. 3. The algorithm presented
below is based upon the arbitrary choice of an operator D
which makes Rf invariant for the system (A-DC, C). Once
this is accomplished it is a simple matter to determine Rf
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from the properties of the new system. Lemma 3. 2. 6 delinE!ates
the fundamental requirements for the algorithm and Lemma
3. 2. 6' provides a simple construction. The algorithms determine
Rf as the null space of a matrix. A s~raight-forward algorifhm
for determining this null space is described in Appendix A. ~~.
Lemma 3. 2. 6 Let Df satisfy Lemma 3. 2. 2 and let C' be a.ny
operat(~r such that:
i) C'f = ¢
ii) CI ~ = C~ (mod Cf)
for all ~ ( cin. If (A, C) is observable, Rf is the unobservable
space of the system (A-DrC, C ').
Proof
Let the unobservable space of (A-DrC,C') be denoted by
'HMO). Since R
r
is invariant with respect toA-D f Cand:
it follows that Rf c 'HMO). By Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 2. 1
and condition il) above, it is also obvious that 7l(MO)c Rf •
In matrix notation, Mnis given by:
C'
M' =D
.
C'(A"-D C)n-l
f
(3. 2. 18)
It remains only to determine matrices Of and C ' which satisfy
the lemma. A -very reasonable choice is made below. These
are the matrices used by Beard in his constructive derivation
of Theorem 3. 2. 1.
Lemma 3. 2. 6 I For a given basis, let:
85
and:
C'= [E -Cf[(CnTCfrl(cnTlc
m
where Em is the identity matrix, Then:
=
Proof
Trivial application of Lemma 3. 2. 6.
Lemma 3. 2. 6 I is gratifying in that it provides a straight-
forward algorithm for find ing detection spaces for event vectors:
The detection space is '!HM-b). There is nothing special about
the choice of Df and C' in Lemma 3. 2. 6'. For a particular
application a more convenient choice may suggest itself. Any
Df and C ' which satisfy Lemma 3. 2. 6 determine both g and Rf •
l
Lemma 3. 2. 6 I is included here only to demonstrate that even
in the most complex of systems, there is a simple, constructive
algorithm for determining detection spaces.
-. After Rf has been determined, the remaining' task is to
choose a Dwhich satisfies Definition 2. 1. 1 for f:
i) the failure associated with f must generate unid irectional
output errors for (A-DC, C), and
ii) tile eigenvalues of A~DCmust equal an almost arbitrarily
chosen set.
If the reference model is transformed to the base normal
form developed in Section 4. 4, eigenvalue assignment is trivial.
The algorithm presented in the remainder of this section is of
less practical significance, but it emphasizes the importance
of invariant 8ubspaces in the study of linear operators.
It is simplest to consider assignment of the eigenvalues
associated with Rf first. The detection generator of Rf is
IIr (A. C) is not observable a g (mod 'l(M») and some solution
of (3. 2. 13) are determined.
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useful in this context. The most convenient manner by which
to assign the elgen,,:,alues of A-DC associated with Rf is in terms
of the des ired minimal polynomial (characteristic equation)
'i'd(·) for Rf (Section 2. 3.2):
Vf Vf-l vf-2
'f (A) = A + P A + P f J A + • e. P2 A + P 1d ~ v~l
(3.2.19)
Lemma 3. 2. 7 Let g "be the detection generator for Rf and
(A, C) be vbservable. If 'i'd(·) is the IIf-order desired mir.limal
polynomial for Rf with respect to A-DC, D must satisfy:
II - 1
DCA f g = 'i'd(A)g
Rf is invariant with respect to A-DC for any such n
Proof
If 'i'd(· ) is to be the minimal polynomial for Rf , then
since g E Rf , ·'i'd(· ) must satisfy:
IIf IIf- 1
i) 'i'd<A-DC ) g = (A-DC) g + PVf( A-DC) g + ••• P2 (A-DO g+ Pl g= ¢
II -1
By Lemma 3. 2. 4, the vectors g, Ag, ••• A f g form a basis
for Rfe The lemma also states that:
i i) CA kg = ¢ k < IIf - 1
- II - 1
which implies that g, (A-DC)g ••• (A~DC) f g are the same
bas is for Rf for any choice of D. Equation i) is then equivalent
to requiring Rf to be a cyclic invariant subspace with respect
to A-DC (Section 2. 3. 2).
Because of ii) above, i) has only one non- zero term
involving DC:
II v-I v-I
A fg - DCA f g + p A f g + •• P2 Ag + P1g = ¢
IIf
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This can be reorganized in terms of 'Yd ( A)g:
IJ - 1
'fd<A )g_ DCA f g= ¢
which is the des ired result.
In matrix terms, Lemma 3.2. 7 does not specify a unique
detection filter unless vf = n ~ Theorem 3. 2. 1 asserts that
the remaining freedom is sufficient to assign the remaining
n - vf eigenvalues. One approach for utilizing this freedom
is to define additional event vectors f t •• f k to detect along
with f. If each event vector has its own detection space and if
its eigenvalues can be assigned independently of those associated
with the other detection spaces, the net effect is to increase
the capability of the detection system from monitoring one
failure to monitoring k + 1 failures. This possibility is in-
vestigated in the next section. It is safe to assume that in
general such an increase in capability is desirable and useful.
If f is the only event vector to be detected by A-DC. the
partial observability of the system (A-DC, C ~can be used to
assign the remaining eigenvalues. (Any Dwhich satisfies Lemma
3. 2. 7 also satisfies Lemma ~. 2. 6). Since Rf C n (Mn), the
eigenvalues associated with Rf cannot be altered by output
feedback for (A-DC, C '). A number of algorithms for assigning
the eigenvalues of the observable subsystem can be found in
the literature (see Wonham and Morse (1970), Howze and
Pearson (1970), Brasch and Pearson (1970), and Davison
(1970». The algorithm presented here is based upon the
ideas presented in this section.
Lemma 3. 2. 8 Assume Dhas been chosen such that 'fd (") is
the minimal polynomial of Rf for A-DC. Let. R ' be a V '- order
IThe non-uniqueness of D is discussed in Sections 4. 2. 4 and 4.4.
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detection space for some arbitrarily chosen event vector f'
for (A-DC.C'>. g' be the detection generator for R'. and 'l!d(·)
- C1 I Ibe its desired minimal polyn?mial (mod Rf ) fo~ A-D· -D C I'
If D'satisfies:
then 'fd (. ) is the minimal polynomial of R". for A-DC -D I C' and
'Y 'de· ) is the minimal polynomial of R I (mod Rf ).
Proof
Since Lemma 3. 2. 6 provides:
1M (M ') = R
"D f
it follows that:
and the minimal polynomial of Rf for A-DC-D' C' i.B the s~me
as its minimal polynomial for A-DC c; A generalization of the
proof of Lemma 3. 2. 7 shows that the minimal polynomial
(mod Rf > of R ' is 'Yd(·).
Because (A-DC, C ') is unobservable, Lemma 3. 2. 8 makes
R ' invariant (mod Rf >with respect to A-DC...1)'C'.. It does not
necessarily insure that R' produces unidirectional output.
Although the algorithm requires d( C~ ') = 1, it does not imply
that d(CR ') • 1.
3. 3 Multtiple Failure Detection
In a system with a large number of possible failures to
monitor, it is useful to know the conditions under which more
than one event can be detected by a single detection filter.
The emphas is in this section is upon an abstraction of the
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Detection Tlleorem to the case of r failures where r ~ m.
Attention is restricted to the generation of sufficient conditions
for a set of failures to be detected by a single failure detection
system. It can be shown that these cond itions are also necessary
(Section 3. 5), but the proof is based upon concepts not introduced
until Section 3. 4. Algorithms for testing mutual detectability
are developed in this section, but their application is not
discussed until Section 4. 2. 2.
The basic theorem on mutual detectability is Theorem
3. 3. 1. The theorem states two conditions which together are
sufficient for a set of r failures to be mutually detectable.
The first condition is that the output directions Cf 1 ~.. Cr
r
be linearly independent, where fl ••. f
r
are the event vectors
associated with the failures. The second condition in,rolves
the respective detection ~paces R1 ••• Rr' If Cr1 ••• Cf
r
are not linearly independent and none of the event vectors
are detection equivalent. the failures cannot all be detected
by a single failure detection system. (This statement is not
proved until Section 3. 5). Unfortunately, even when Cf1 ••• CfOr
are linearly independent, the second condition of Theorem 3. 3. 1
need not be satisfied. The phys ical meaning behind the constraint
on R1 ••• R
r
is motivated by an example in Section 3. 3. 2.
If a set of r failures are mutually detectable, the next
step is to implement design algorithms for the failure detection
system. If they are not mutually detectable but Cr1 ••• Cfr
are linearly independent, several options are available c One
of these is to violate Defintion 2. 1. 1 and allow some eigenvallles
of A-DC to be unassignable. Another is to find a subset of the
r failures which can be detected by a single failure detection
system. A third option is to increase the dimens ion of the
reference model in such a manner that all of the failures
can be detected .by a single faUure detection system based
upon the higher dimensional model. The first possibility is
discussed in Section 4. 2. 2. The last two are studied in detail
in Sections 3. 3. 3 and 3. 3. 4 respectively. Complete algorithms
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for constructing mutually detectable sets of failures are developed
in these sections.
Throughout this and subsequent sections, it is assumed
that the reference model (A, C) is observable (the real system
need not be observable). If (A, C) is not observable, the results
~re equally valid as a study of mutually quas i- detectable
ev~nt8 (Section 3.2.2). It is also assumed that Cr. +¢ for
-----------1 --
i = l, ••• r. If this is not true for some f., that f. is simply
1 1 2
replaced by the first element of the sequence f., N., A f .•••
1 1 1
which is not contained in n< C). The validity of this substitution
was discussed in Section 3. 1.
3. 3. 1 Sufficient Conditions for a Mutually Detectable Set
The culmination of this subsection is Theorem 3. 3. 1
on mutual detectability. The definition of mutual detectability
is a generalization of Definition 2. 1. 1 to multiple failures:
Definition 3. 3. 1 Given the inhomogeneous error equations:
= (A-DC) £(t) + f. n.(t)· i = 1 .... r
1 1
/(t) = C(t)
the failures associated with the event vectors fl ••• f
r
are
mutually detectable by a single failure detection system if:
i) The output generated by each of f l nl(t) ••• f r nr(t)
maintains a fixed direction in the output space, and
ii) the eigenvalues 'of A-DC can be specified almost
arbitrarily by the proper choice of D.
Definition 3. 3. 1 does not require any particular -relationship
between the output directlons Cr1 "'" Cir " Certain special
cases can be examined immediately.. however. Assume that the
event vectors f. and f. have the same output direction:
1 J
Cf. = Cf.
1 J
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and f. is a vector in the detection space R. for f.. By Corollary 2J 1 t
of the Detection Theorem, the failures associated with f. and
1
f. are detection equivalent. If one of the failures is constrained
J
. to generate unidirectional output estimation errors along Cf..
1
the second failure is also. A single failure detection system
can always be designed to detect both failures, but the decision
as to which of the failures occurs cannot be ba.sed upon output
error direction alone. On the other hand, if Cf. and Cf. are
_ J 1
equal but f. is not a vector in R. , Corollary 1 of the DetectionJ 1
Theorem asserts that a failure detection system which detects
the failure associated with f. cannot simultaneously detect
1
the one associated with f.. The output error for the second
J
failure cannot be constrained to a single direction.
The results of the previous section are directly generalizable
to a discussion on mutual detectability only in these two instances_
Additional results are developed in this section for the case
where the output directions Cf t ••• Crr are linearly independent.
Except for the possible inclusion of detection equivalent failures,
this limits attention to a maximum of m possible failures.
A consequence of Theorem 3. 5. 1 is that m is an upper limit
unless a modified control over the eigenvalues of A-DC is
accepted. Because of the importance of linearly independent
output directions, the following definition is made:
Definition 3. 3. 2 Let JC 8 n be the subspace spanned by the
event vectors fl ••• f
r
- The vectors fl ••• f
r
are output
separable if:
d( (,1> = r
It is a simple matter to show that output separability is
sufficient to guarantee that a D can be found for which the failures
associated with fl ••• f
r
produce unidirectional output errors.
If the dimens ion of R. is denoted by II.:
1 1
d(R.) = I).
1 1
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i = 1 ••• r (3. 3. 1)
a generalization of Lemma 3.2.7 using Lemma 3.2 0 1 shows that
in addition a total of v;' eigenvalues of A-DC can be almost
arbitrarily assigned by the choice ot Dwhere:
v;' = 1: v·
i= 1, r 1
(3. 3. 2)
Tl1ese fa~ts are proved in Lemma 3. 3. 1. The proof could be
based upon a partition of A-DC as in the Detection Theorem. however,
an approach based upon Lemma 3. 2. 7 is used because of its
simplicity.
Lemma 3.3. 1 If f l ••• f r are output separable, there exists
a D such that the failures associated with f 1 ••• fr generate
unidirectional output errors for the failure detection system
~A-DC.':) and the V.7 eigenvalues of A-DC associated with
R1 ••• Rr are the elements of a desired set A.
Proof
By virtue of Lemma 3. 2. 2. unidirectionality is assured
if Dsatisfies:
i) (A-DC) f. E R. i = 1 ••• r
1 1
A particular Dwhich satisfies these r equations and which
assigns the eigenvalues of A-DC can be found using Lemma
3. 2. 7. Assume 'f (.) ••• 'i' (-) are the des ired minimal
polynomials of A-bc for ther respective detection spaces
- -R1 ••• Rr. The roots of the polynomials must be the elements
of A. If gl- -•• g ar.e the detection generators for R'I'. -.. ..If •r . r
Lemma 3. 2. 7.requires that' the-·r "equations be satisfied:
ii)
11.- 1
DCA L gi = VI. (A) g. i = 1 ••• r1 1
Define the operators Y and X:
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.,.. Since Lemma 3. 2. 4 states:
- -1CAtJi g. = Cr.
t 1
i ~ 1 ••• r
and f 1 ••• f
r
are output separable, it follows that the vectors
V r 1 V -1CA g1 ••• CA r gr are linearly independent and therefore
n(y) = ¢. Lemma 3. 2. 1 then guarantees that a D exists which
satisfies ii). By Lemma 3~ 2. 7, R1 ••• Rr are invariant for
this Dand i) is satisfied also.
If V; equals n, Lemma 3. 3. 1 implies that the r failures
associated with f 1 ••• f
r
are mutually detectable. The failures
can also be mutually detectable if V;' < n as long as sufficient
freedom in the ch 1ice of Dexists to assign the remaining n-v;'
eigenvalues of A..DC. In order to characterize the eigen·value
assignability, a generalization of the concept of a detection
space is necessary.
Definition 3. 3. 3 Let ~ c j1 be spanned by f 1 .•• fr and let
fl ••• f
r
be output separable. The detection space for ~ is
- nthe subspace Rj c: 8 such that:
where R~ iB the largest subspace which satisfies:
ii) ?l<M) nRj = III
iii) R~C 11 ( C,)
iv) AR,rc Rj
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The conditions of Definition 3. 3. 3 are precisely those of
Definition 3. 1. 2 with thrr subspace J substituted for the vector f.
((3 must be in the null space of C and: it must be observable.
The image of R,. under Amust be contained in R:r Recall that
,if Dis chosen such t~ Rf is invariant with respect to A-DC,
every event vector in Rf generates output error13 which are
unidirectional along Cf (Corollary 2 of the Detection Theorem).
Similarly, if Dj is chosen such that Rj is invariant with respect
to A-DjC, every event vector in R3 generates output errors
which are restricted to the hyperplane C.1. The output errors
may be unidirectional, but it is not necessary.
The fact that a D3 which makes R3 invariant exists can
b~ proved in a manner similar to tbat used in Lemma 3. 3. 1.
A different approach can be developed from a straightforward
generalization of Lemma 3. 2. 6 by use of Lemma 3. 2. 1. The
result is analogous to the construction in Lemma 3. 2. 6 I and
is presented in Lemma 3. 3. 2. The proof is a direct consequence
of the generalization of Lemma 3. 2. 6 and is omitted.
Lemma 3. 3. 2 For a given basis let F be the matrix:
and assume rkF :I rkCF = r. Let:
and:
where ~m 'is the identity matrix. If (A, C> is observable, R3
is the unobservable spa~e of (A-Dj €, C;>
R = 11 (M' )3" D
,
Also, R3 is invariant with respect to A-D3 C•
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The detection space R,.. is more that an arbitrary generalization
of Rf • It is a detection space which must be considered along
with R1 ••• Rr when mutual detectability ik' considered. The
relationship of R,.. to R1 ••• Rr is the prime concern of this
section. Before cons idering this relationship, however, it
is necessary to determ~ne the relationship of R1 ••• ~ to
each other. The following lemma demonstl"ates that the union
Rl U R2 U •. " Rr can be properly expressed as the direct sum
- - -R1 e R2 e ... Rr e This property is true only if fl ••. f r are
output separable.
Lem~a 3. 3.! If f l •• " f r are output separable event vectors,
then R1 .•• Rr are mutually distinct, i. e. :
:r d(R.)
1
i= 1, r
Proof
Assume the contrary. This requires that for some
1 s: k s: r there exist ~k E Rk such that:
~k = r Ct. p.
· III1= , r
where p. E R. and the ex. can be chosen such that some Ct. =/: 0
1 1 1 1
for i +k. For this set of 01., define:
1
~k = ~k - Cl'k Pk = i t k (lIi Pi
Clearly since PkE Rk ,·· is still true that ~~E Rk" However,
€k can also be expressed as an element of the union of the
remaining subspa.ces:
i) ~kERIU.".'¥k_lURk+1U••• Rr
IJ -1
Let ~k be the smallest integer such that CA k ~k + ¢.
Since €k E Rk- condition iv) of Definition 3. 1. 2 implies:
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where a is a constant. But from i) above it also follo\vs that there
exists some subset IJ of the integers 1. 2 ••• k- 1. k+ 1•.. r
such that:
#Jr - 1CA k Ek' = ~ a. Cf .
°e I J JJ J
These two conditions are consistent only if Uk is a linear comb~na­
tioD of the vectors Cr. or if~. = 0 for all i 1: k. Since f 1 • C. fJ 1 r
are output separable. Cr1 ••• ef
r
are linearly independent and
therefore Ct. = 0 for all i =I: k. t:J,
l
The simplest relationship to prove be~weenRj and R1 ••• Rr
is that each of R1 ••• Rr is a subspace of RJ • This result
requires little more than a manipulation of Definitions 3. 1. 2
and 3. 3. 3 to obtain. It is stated as Lemma 3. 3. 4 because of
its importance and because of the contrast to Theorem 3. 3. 1.
Lemma 3.3. 4 If f 1 ••• f r are outp~t separable. the individual
detection spaces are subspaces of Rj":
R1 ED R2 EB • •• Rr c Rj"
Proof
The direct sum is a consequence of Lemma 3. 3. 3. From
Definition 3. 1. 2. R1 ••• Rr are observable and in the null space
of C:
ii)
iii)
ll(M) nRi = ¢
R.c'l<C)1
i = 1 ••• r
"Their images under Aare contained in the rcqpective detection
spaces:
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lv) i : 1 ••• r
But slnce fl ••• f
r
are contained in 3, the last statement can
be replaced by:
iv) , i :z 1 ••• r
By Definition 3. 3. 3, R3' is the largest subspace to satisfy iO,
hO, and iv)' above and it necessarily follows that RIC R3"
i = ~ ••• r. Since the definitions require:
R. = R· EB f.1 t 1 i = 1 ••• r
it follows that Ri C Rj' and the lemma is proved.
The four lemmas of this section allow the problem of
mutual detectability of output separable event vectors to be
stated in a solvable format. If the dimension of RJ is denoted
by 11.7:
(3. 3. 3)
a consequence of Lemma 3. 3. 2 is that if R:T is invariant with
respect to A-DC • there are V:T eigenvalues of A-DC associated
with R:r It was proved in conjunction with Lemma 3~ 3. I that the
v; eigenvalues of A-DC associated with RIo 0 0 R
r
can be ass igned
almost arbitrarily. Lemma 3. 3. 4 clearly requires that:
(3. 3. 4)
The proof of Theorem 3. 3. 1 shows that any Dwhich rnakes
RIO •• lef invariant makes R:r invariant. _These.,:;tatements
suggest that it may be difficult to make R1 ••• Rr invariant
and assign all eigenvalues of A-DC almost arbitrarily unless
7)3' equals II';'. i. eo. unless:
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where dW,3"c) =- m-r. A construction similar to that employed
in the proof of Tht!orem 3. 2. 1 shows that the 113 eigenvalues
associated with R.3" and the n- V3" associated with R,3"c can be
assi~ned as two independent groups. If D is chosen such that
Rr . .Rr are invariant as well as R~. Lemma 3.3.1 demonstrates
that only v;' of the 1),3" eigenvalues associatw with R.3" can be assigned.
Therefore Rt ••• Rr are mutually detectable if and only if:
3 e 3. 2 An Example
The analys is in Section 3. 2. 2 ind icated that not all the
eigenvalues of A-DC can be assigned almost arbitrarily
if (A, C) is unobservable. Theorem 3. 3. 1 indicates a second
set of circumstances in which eigenvalue assignment cannot
be complete. Before investigating this problem analytically,
it is useful to ind icate the type of application in which it occurs.
The example presented in this subsection provides a degree
of intuitive motivation for the problem as well as a summary
of the previous subsection.s. The physical system described
below is utilized repeatedly in later sections.
Consider the simple problem of a spinning cylinder in a
viscous fluid. Since there is no restoring force, the differential
,
equation describing the motion is:
;p (t) + ~r cO(t) :I Q'r T(t) : CfJ (0), c,O(O) given (3. 3. 6)
where T(t) is the applied torque (Figure 3. 1). Assume the
rotational angle and the rotational rate of the cylinder are
measured and that these measurements are incorporated into
a first-order feedback law:
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T (t) + Sf T (t ) = - Ci1 ([) (t ) - 0/2 ~ (t) + Ci1 (/) (t) (3. 3. 7)
I m In c
where fPc (t) is the commanded roll angle. The total applied torque
T(t) is the sum of the feedback and the comoland torques. To
simplify the analysi!!, let the total applied torque also be
measured.
One possible state space model for the closed loop system
is:
•
x(t) = A4 x(t) + B 4u(t)
yet) = c 4 x(tj (3. 3. 8)
where:
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0
-f3 0 err 0
C 4 = 0 0 1 0 A4 =
r B =
0 -~ 0 4 0
0 0 0 1 r
O'r
0'1 0 - 0'2 -a Q'lf
(3. 3. 9)
The state vector is:
x(t) =
~m(t)
~ (t)
~ (t)
m
T (t)
(3. 3. 10)
The model (3. 3. 9) is chosen to he nonminimal because the true
• •
rotation rate, cp(t), and the meas'llred rotation rate, <fJ (t),
m
affect the closed loop system response in different manners.
If the rotation rate sensor fails, the system model must
reflect the fact that only the rotation rate feedback to the control
law is affected; the angle feedback remains correct. Considerations
102
involved in chaos ing a reference model for which fa ilures
can be properly modeled are discussed at length in Section 4. 1 0
With (3. 3. 9), both the angle sensor failure and the rotation
rate sensor failure can be modeled using the controller failure
model (2 0 1. 7):
x(t) = A4 x(t) + B 4 u(t) + f 1 n 1(t) : x(O) given
y(t) = C4x(t)
where f 1 for the respective failures is:
1
f 1 f
0
= = = e41cp 0
0
0
f 1 = f •
0
= = e43cp 1
0
(2.1. 7)
(3. 3. 11)
TIle fact that the sensor failures can be modeled us ing the
controller fallure model rather than the more cumbersome
sensor ~ailure model (2.1. 8) is a consequence of using the
closed loop reference model rather than an open loop reference
model. This property is also discussed in Section 4. 1.
In this example. the detection spaces Rand R· are
Cf* C{J
one-dimensional and contain only their respective event
vectors, as can be verified by application of Lemma 3. 3. 6'.
Ii J is spanned by f • f·. it can be shown by application of
tD.: ~
Lemma 3. 3. 2 that R.1 is spanned by the basis (e41 , e42' e 43}.
Therefore "',-> "'; and fep' fei> are not mutually detectable. II D4
is chosen such that f and r· "both generate unid irectional output,
cP C(J
one eigenvalue of A4- D4C4 is unass ignab.i.c. This eigenvalue is
associated with e42 and is equal to - ar for all such D4"
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T'he vectors f , f· are not mutually detectable because of
.~ ~ .
the presence of <,O(t) in the state model. Physically, cp(t) is
not in either detection space because it appears in the derivative
of both <p (t) and <p (t). In terms of event vectors and operator
m m
notation, since:
(3. 3. 12)
for e 4? to be in either R or R· requires one of:~ ~ ~
(3. 3. 13)
(3. 3. 14)
to be true (condition iv) of Definition 3. 1.2). Computation
reveals that A4 e 42 does_not sa~sfy (3. 3. 13); however, it is
contained in th.e union of Rand R· :
<P <(J
A4 e 42 E Rep ff) ReP
Lemma 3. 3. 4 and Definition 3. 3. 3 then imply that e 42 is contained
in R7 • Hence Theorem 3. 3. 1 states that f ,f' are not mutuallycP <(J •
detectable. The problem could be circumvented if tp(t) were
removed from the reference model; but thell it would not be
possible to model the failures properly.
The event vector e 42 is referred to as the .:xcess subspace
of R:r -- it is mapped by A into the union of the component
detection spaces R , R· but is not contained in either of them.
In the following tw~ su~sections the properties of the excess
subspace are studied further.
3. 3. 3 Mutually Detectable Subset of an Undetectable Set
Theorem 3. 3. 1 states that the output separable event
vectors f 1••• f
r
are not mutually detectable by a 8 ingle failure
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detection system if tr~ union of their detection spaces RJ EB ••• R
_ r
~ not eq~l to R3". Since Le~ma 3. 3. 4 requires that the union
R1 EB ••• Rr be a s.ubspace of R~J the theorem recognizes that
R3" may for some reason be larger than R1 $ ••• R. The "excess_ r
space" of R3" results in a set of unass ignable eigenvalues of
A-DC if D is chosen such that R1 ••• Rr are invariant with
respect to A-DC. The initial effort in this subsection is to
develop the structure of R:r more completely than Lemma 3. 3. 4
in order to establish the reason for the unassignable eigenvalues.
With this accomplished. algorithms are devised for choosing
a subset of fl ... f
r
which are mutually detectabl~.
When f 1 ••• f r are not mutually detectable, the_results
of Section!. 3. 1 do not provide a representation of R:r in terms
of R1 ... Rr. Definition 3. 3. 4 supplies such a representation
by formaily defining the excess subspace ROof R:r.
Definition 3. 3. 4 Assume fl ... f are not mutually detectable.
_ r
The excess subspace of R:r is any subspace ROC n C) which
satisfies:
R:r = R1 $ • •• Rr ED R0
The stipulation that RObe in the null space of C is not necessary
to the definition of an excess subspace. Jt is added to simplify
the proofs ill this subsection. The fact that some R0 exists
can be readily demonstrated. Definition 3. 3. 3 requires thn.t:
d( CR.r) = d(C3") = r (3.3.15}
3imilarly. the fact that fl ... f
r
are output separable implies:
d ( C(R1 EB ••• Rr)) = d ( CR"1 E9 • •• CRr) = d (C f 1~. • • Cf r) = r
(3. 3. 16)
Equations (3. 3. 15) and; (3. 3. 16) together with Lemma 3. 3. 4
require that thp.re must exist some ROC 'Z(C) such that:
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(3. 3. 17)
The excess subspace of Rj is not unique. Any subspace
which satisfies (3.3.17) and is in 71 (C) is an excess subspace
for RJ • The majority of the properties of an excess subspace
can be determined without choosing a specific RO• For !nstance,
the dimension of Ra is defined by 1I:r and v;:
(3.3. 18)
It is shown in Lemma 3. 3. 5 that if Di.s chosen such that
R1 •.• Rr are invariant with respect to A-DC. the va eigenvalues
of A-DC associated with RO are the same for any choice of D
or RO. 'These are the eigenvalues which prevent fl· .. f
r
from being mutually detectable. The lemma does not imply
that the unassignable eigenvalues are a subset of the original eigen-
values of A and in general they .are not. They are determ illed by
the system and trle detection spaces.
Lemma 3. 3. 5 Let RObe an excess subspC?ce for R:r and fl' •• f
r
be output separable. If Dis chosen such that R1 ••• R
r
are
invariant with respect to A-Dc' thE: Vo eigenvalues of A-DC
associated with R0 are independent of the choice of D•
Proof
For the operator A-DC, let the relative minimal polynomial
(mod R1 ED ••. Rr ) of RO be denoted by '1'0(·)' From Section 2.3,
the roots of '1'0 (. ) are eigenvalues of A-DC and by definition:
But since RO C 7l( C), it follows that this is equivalent to:
and the eigenvalues of A'!"DC associated with RO are independent of D.
106 ~
Similarly, there can be no subspace R~ of RO whose image under
A is contained in ROand some single detection space Rk :
-D - - -R· =R1EB •• c R· lfi)R-+ 1 EB ••• R l~j~r (3.3.21)J J- J r
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(3.3. 18)
(3.3.19)
(3. 3. 20)
AR' ¢ R'o 0
AR~¢R~$Rk VROCRo
1 ~ k ~ r
Since RO is in 'l( C), but also observable, there can be no
subspace ROof R0 which is invariant with respect to A(or
with respect to A-DC):
I.lemma 3.3. !> permits a study of the mutllal detectability
of f 1 ..• fr to focus on RO• From condition iv) in Definition
3. 3. 3 and from Definition 3. 3. 4, the image of RO under A can
be expressed:
Otherwise, Definition 3. 1. 2 could be used to demonstrate that
ROmust be a subspace of Rk• Equations (3. 3. 18) - (3. 3. 20)
support the intuitive argument made in connection with the example
of Section 3. 3. 2 that RO is related by the operator Ato R1 ••• Rr
in such a mflnner that it cannot be a part of anyone of the detection
spaces}
If RO is chosen arbitrarily to satisfy n~initio~3.3.4,
(3. 3. 18) indicates the relationship of R0 to R1 ••• Rr. There
is one particular choice of RO for which (3.3.18) can be simpli-
fied. This excess subspace is denoted by R
og and its existence
is demonstrated constructively in Lemma 3. 3. 6. The proof
of Lemma 3. 3. 6 proceeds by first considering only the image
of Ro under Ainto R1- and then into R2 , etc. This is accomplished
by defining the subspace:
and considering the image of RO under A (mod R.D ). Obviously,
- -DJRj in (3. 3. 17) can be expressed in terms of Rj
- -D -
= R. (fJ R. e> ROJ J 1 ~ j ~ r (3. 3. 22)
Lemma 3. 3. 6 Let fl ... f
r
be output separable and gl ... gr
be their respective detection generators. There exists a
unique excess subspace R
og of R:r such that:
Proof
Let ~ .•• ~v be an arbitrary basis for RO' Choose some
D - O-such thatR1 ••• Rr are invariant. Clearly since RO C 7/(C):
Consider first the image of RO under A into R1 (mod R1D).
Let lJ i , i = 1 ... tlO be the smallest integers such that the
vectors ( A-DC)Pi ~ have components along Cf t :
i) C(A-DC )IJ.i~i = CA IJ.iei::; G'iCfl (modCR1D ) i = 1. .. Vo
BecauSt R1 ••• Rr (and hence!?:r) are invariant. the image of~i. under A(mod RlD ) is contained inRl EEl.fO for k <IJ. i :
- D(mod R1 ) i = 1 ..• Va
k < IJ,.
1
If J.l i < IJ l' define the new bas is:
A AVt_l -Lemma 3.2.4 guarantees that gI' gl... gl are inR1ct
It follows that ~1 ... (~o are in R,.. and define a new excess
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subspace R~ for RJo If condition i) is applied to the basis of R',
it follows that J.L, '~ /I. since' aL r- t ..
CA #J i l:.' = CI\#J i 1)1- 1 =
"'1 11 ~. - ex. CA g
l l 1 C- D¢ (mod R1 ) i = 1 ••. tJ a
VIJ i <v J
Continue in this manner until an excess subspace RoO) is generated
(. ) (. )
whose bas is vectors ~ 1 1 ...; .1 satisfy:
Vo
iO Ak ~i(j) E R1 eRo(i) (mod RID) k < 1)1
i = 1 · ~. Va
B:.lt gl is the unique vector gl E R1 such that for k < 1) 1 ... 1:
Therefore, the image of ;.(j) under A(mod R1D) must be restricted
to Ra(0 e g 1: 1
-D(mod R1 ) i = 1 ••• V 0
The construction of Rag is completed by continuing the iterati.on
for R2, R::J etc.
To show uniqueness, let RO be an.y excess subspace for
Rjo By Definition 3. 3. 4, Rag and RO must be equivalent (mod
R1 e ... Rr ):
If the two subs paces are not equal, equivalence (mod R1 ED ••• Rr )
implies that there !.!lust exist sam.e vector ~O E RO such that
there exists a ;OgE ROgand ~.1 E R1 e , 0 0 Rr which are both non-
z~ro and for which:
~o = ;0g + ~ ;.1
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For convenience, assume ~.1 E R1- This implies that there
exist some k < VI for which
It then follows that for the same k:
Therefore, ~ violates ii) and R0 cannot satisfy the hypothes is Il
i\ variatton on the constructive proof of Lemm.a 3. 3. 6
can be used to define an ~lgorithm for ROg One such algorithm
is suggested in Append ix A; 3; The utility of ROg is that it
allows the excess subspac~ to be viewed as an entity in itself.
The study of the V.r-dimensional detection space R.r is reduced
to the study of the (VO + r) -dimensional space Rog $ gl EEl ••• gr.
Assume Dis chosen such that I~\ ... R
r
are invariant
with respect to A-DC. Assume that a partition of R
og exists:
(3.3.23)
such that the image of ROgk under Adoes not have a component
along gk:
(3. 3. 24)
If ~gk is the largest subspace which satisfies (3. 3. 23) and
(3. 3. 24). then ~he observability of Rog implies that R~gk
satisfies:
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and that R~gk is observable (mod R~), i. e. every event vector
in R~gk... generates an output error signal which has a component
along Lfk• The d imens ion of R~gk is:
(3.3.26)
cROgk would be a subspace of Rk except that the output error
signal for every event vector in R~gk also has a component
along some direction other than Cfk-- hence the need for the
-D(mod R"k $ fCOgk) argument in (3.3.25).
The importance of R~gk is that it represents the contribution
of fk to the excess subspace of R.7. If fk is removed from fl· .. f rJ
(3. 3. 25) implies that no vector ill R~gk can be in the new excess
subspace because the output error generated by event vectors
in R~gk cannot be constrained to the output space spanned by
Cf1 ••• C f k_ l' Cf k+ 1 ••• (fr' On the other hand. (3. 3. 24)
suggests that the event vectors in ROgk remain in the new excess
subspace since they generate no output component along C f k.
It is proved in Lemma 3.3.7 that the new excess subspace
cons ists only of ROgk. The result of removing fk is that the
dimensioIl of the excess subspace is decreased tOI
(3.3.27)
Given that fl ... f
r
are not mutually detectable, the issue
is to determine a procedure for find ing a subset of fl ... f
r
which are mutually detectable. Two algorithms for accomplishing
this are developec~ in the remainder of this section. The firs t
adhers to the vector space concepts upon which the earlier
results have been based. The resulti.ng algorithm is simple
to obtain, but computationally irlefficient. The second algorithm
is formulated in a matrix algebra context and is the recommended
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algorithm for implementation. Both are similar in that they
restrict attention to the excess subspace Rag and determine
which subset of the event vectors fl ... f
r
can be removed
such that the remaining eVent vectors are mutually detectable.
The algorithms begin by considering the set of event
vectors fl ... f
r
with a single event vector fk removed. If
j k# R.7k# and Ra k for the remaining r- 1 event vectors are
g -
defined similarly to ~ R,., and Rag; it is shown in Lemma 3.3. 7
that:
(3.3.28)
R..rk C RJ"
ROgk C Rj
Ragk CRag
ROgk and Rjk could be computed using the algorithms of
Append ix A.3, but there are computational advantages to develop-
ing algorithms in terms of Rag and R,.. The algorithm developed
in Lemma 3. 3. 7 is iterative and is patterned after Lemma 3. 2. 5.
The iteration begins with an initial excess subspace:
R(O) =R
o Og (3. 3. 29)
and removes all vectors from Rci°,1hose image under Ais not
contained in R~O) $ gl $ • •• gk-l $ gk+ 1 E9 • •• gr. The deleted
vectors are those in R~gk. The remaining space is denoted by
R~) where:
(3. 3. 30)
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The test is then repeated on Rci 1>, etc. until no further vectors
are removed--a maximum of Va cycles. The terminating subspace
in the sequence is R
ogk•
AB with Lern.ma 3. 2. 5., the algorithm of Lemma 3,. 3 0 7 is
A-I A-lbased upon . If does not exist but (A, C) is observable,
it is sufficient to have the inverse operator ~ 1 :8 n .... 7l ( c>
which satisfies:
(3.3.31)
This operator always exists. Implementation of the algorithm
must be along the lines mentioned in Section 3. 2. 3.
Lemma 3.3.7 Assume (A, C) is observable. If .fk is removed
from the set of output separable vectors f 1 ..• f r , ROgk satisfies:
R = R(VO)
Ogk 0
where Rci°) is defined by the recursive relationship:
R(O) = R
o Og
and:
Under 3uitable invertibility cond itions,
«1.
Proof
A-I
· 'Z can be replaced by
Clearly Jk C .d'"which, along vlith Definition 3. 3. 3, implies
that R.1k C R;r By Lemma 3. 3. 6, the image of ROgk under A
satisfies:
The inequality is unchanged if gk is added on the right:
AROgk C ROgk ED gl ED • •• gr
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ROg is the largest subspace of71 (e) which satisfies this relationship.
By the uniqueness of ROg and ROgk' and the fact that R.rk C R.r it follows
that ROgk C Rag. With respect to the iteration, ROgk C R0(0). With
this assertion the proof of Lemma 3.2.5 is directly applicable.
If:
lsj:s=r (3. 3. 32)
the event vectors f 1. • • fk_ l' fk+], •• ~ fr are mutually detectable.
If (3.3. 32) is not satisfied for any 1 s: k ~ r, two or more event
vectors from f 1- .. f
r
m list be removed in order to yield a mutually
detectable set of event vectors. It would be pass ihIe to general-
ize Lemma 3.3.7 to the removal of t event vectors, but a simpler
procedure is to use ROgk and ROgj in a direct manner to determ ine
the new excess subspace if both fk and f. are removed from
.J
f 1. · · fr · If I is the index set composed of the two ind ices k and j,
and RO I denotes the new excess subspace with fk and f. removed,g J
Theorem 3. 3. 2 states that ROgI is the intersection of ROgk and
Rogj :
1 ~ j ~ r
l=!:k~r
(3. 3. 33)
Equation (3. 3. 33) is applicable ~o a general set of t vectors.
The only vectors in ROgI are those which are contained in both
ROgk and Rogj ' i. e. they are the vectors in ROg whose presence
is not affected by the removal of either fk or ff The theorem
suggests that a reasonable algorithm for finding a detectable
subset of f ••.. f is ·to compute RO 1 • _. RO and then remove1 r g gr
the t event vectors for which the generalization of (3. 3. 33)
yields the null space ¢.
Theorem 3. 3. 2 Given the output separable event vectors
fl • •• f
r
, let I be an arbitrary sub$et of the index set
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(1, 2, ••• r). If the vectors fk wit~, k E I are removed from
f f th~ excess subspace ass()clated with the remaining1 • • 0 r'
event vectors is:
Proof
Lemma 3. 3. 6 states that ROgk satisfies:
ARogkCROgk EDg1 ED .•. gk-l €J) gk+l ED •.. gr 1 ~ k ~ r
From the above and the equation defining ROgI' it follows that
R satisfies a similar relations ~lip if the vectors gk' k E I,OgI
are removed from gl e ... gr:
i)
Lemma 3. 3. 7 proves that ROgk C Rog for 1 :5: k ~ r. It follows
that ROgI C Rog• From the discussion preceding Lemma 3. ~~. 7
(also, the omitted portion of the proof of J-..Iemma 3. 3. 7), it
is also true J~hat ROgI i~ the Largest subspace of Rog to satisfy 0.
By Definition 3. 3. 4, the excess subspace of f t ... f with allr
fk, k E I, removed mUF;t satisfy i). A generalization of the
proof of Lemma 3.3. 7 proves that it must also be a subspace
of ROg. Hence, ROgI is the new excess subspace.
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Except for a few minor additions, Theorem 3.3.2 completes
the development of the structure of RJ' and of algorithms for
finding a mutually detectable subset of f 1 ••. fro If RagI is
the zero space ~, the corresponding set of event vectors is
mutually detectable. The remainder of this subsection is
devoted to matrix- based algorithms which are cOlnputationally
simpler than Lemma 3. 3. 5, Lemma 3. 3. 7, and Theorem 3. 3. 2.
The algorithms are essentially those developed by Beard.
The following algorithms could be stated as corollaries of the
previous results and their proofs omitted; however, proofs
are included in an effort to bridge the gap between the constructive
approach to failure detection used by Beard and the abstract
approach which has dominated this chapter. The proofs are
similar to those given by Beard, but emphasize the notation
and nomenclature of this thes is.
Generalization of matrix alg'orithms requires that the
nomenclature developed in Section 2. 3. 3 for the matrix repre-
sentation of a vector space be utilized. If a coordinate system
n - --is adopted for the state space 8, matrices R 1 · •• R
r
, R.r
and R
a
can be chosen such that their column8 form a basis for the
g - --
respective vect'lI' spaces R1 ••• Rr • R:!, Rag. Similarly, the
matrix G can be defined in terms of the vectors gl ••. gr. Tn
the remainder of this chapter, capital letters are used to define
matrices in this manner. When no coordinate system is explicitly
defined, an arbitrarily chosen coordinate system is assumed.
The invariance of the detection space R1 with respect to
A-DC is denoted by:
( A-De)R. c R.
1 1
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(3.3. 34)
The excess subspace Rag of R:r is not invariant with respe(:t to
A-DC, but Lemma 3.3.6 indicates that it satisfies a similar
relationship:
The matrix equivalent to invariance is:
(A-DC)R. = R. A.. i = 1 ••• r
1 t 11
(3.3.35)
(3. 3. 36)
Every column of R. when multiplied by A- DC yields a vector
1
in the range space of R.. The equivalent to (3. 3. 35) is:
1
(3.3.37)
Matrices All ••• A
rr
, n which satisfy these equations are not
difficult to find. If the matrix T has a rank of n:
(3. 3. 38)
All • •• A
rr
, n are the block diagonal sub matrices of the trans-
formed matrix A-DC:
A '" A-IA-DC = T (A-DC) T (3.3.39)
..:'ppendix A. 3 defines algorithms for nand e for the general case.
Equations (3.3. 38) and (3.3.39) are a special case of the trai1S-
formation to base normal form and are discussed further in Section
4. 4. The advantage of that coordinate system is that it is a simple
matter to define invariant subsystems of (A- DC. C) in terms of
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An • •• A
rr
and the appropriate detection space. A subsystem
associated with R Og can be defined in terms of n. and e determines
the manner in which that subsystem interacts with the invariant
subsystems. Because the eigenvalues of a matrix are not altered
by a similarity transformation, these facts suggest that the
eigenvalues of ~l " .. A
rr
must be the roots of the minimal
polynominals of A-DC for R1 ••• Rr and that the eigen'/alues of
n must be the roots of the relative minimal polynomial (mod
Rl E9 ••• Rr) of A-DC for ROg' This last fact. is proved in Lemma 3.3.8.
The lemma is ·the matrix equivalent to Lemma 3. 3. 5.
Lemma 3. 3.8 Let Dbe chos8n such that R1 ••• R
r
are invariant
with respect to A-DC. The relative minimal polynomial 'fOe· )
of R
og for A-DC is the characteristic equation of n where n
is defined by:
A R = R n + G8Og Og
Proof
Equation (3. 3. 35) is a consequence of Lemma 3. 3. 6.
Since the range 15pac~ of R
og is a subspace of nee), the matrix
equivalent of (3. 3. 35) can be replaced by
(A- DC) R ::: R n + G eOg Og -
To emlJhaRize the propertie~ of interest this can be expressed
[-. - 1 1(mod R1 • ••• Rr ) :
lIn matrix notation. "(mod R)" is to be interpreted as "modulo
the range space of R".
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Beca.use R1J ••• R
r
arE' in,rariaJlt, this r(~lation8htp is vali(l for
arbitrary" powers o{ A- uC:
where k ~ O. By definition, the relative minimal polynomial of
ROg satisfies:
and it follows from i) that:
Since 'i'0 (.) iE. ?- VO-order polynomial and n is Vo X vo~ '1'0(·)
is the characteristic equation of TI.
A
Lemma 3. 3. 8 supports: the statement that nand 6J along
with ROg define a subsystem of A- DC. This fact allows the matrix
vers ion of Theorem 3. 3. 2 to oe reduced from cons ideration of
an n-dimensional system to a VO-dimensional system. One
method for accomplishing this reduction is to make the trans-
formation suggested by (3. 3. 38) and (3. 3 0 39) and then restate
-1 -1the theorem in terms of n instead of A • The app~·oa.ch taken
in Theorem 3. 3. 3 is more straightforward in that it procedes
directly from (3. 3. 37) to a golution for the new excess subspace
ROgL when -r, event vectors are removed from fl ••• fro
The product G® in (3. 3. 37) can be expressed:
G@ = L gk 9 k
k= 1, r
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(3. 3. 40)
where 8k is the k
th
row of 8. Equation (3. 3. 40) clearly implies
that each row of e is uniquely associated with the corresponding
column of G and hence the corresponding detection space. The
k th row of 8 determines the manner in which the product ARO
- g
is mapped into the range space of Rk. If ai is some 1)0- d imens lanaI
coeffic ient vector I then RO e. is a vector in the range space ofg 1
R og• If, in addition, Rogei is a vector in R ogk' (3. 3. 37) and (3.3.40)
imply that ek ai must be zero. rTheorem 3. 3. 3 extends this line
of reasoning to determine ROgL• For notational convenience,
it is assumed that the first t event vectors in fl ... f
r
are
removed.
Theorem 3. 3. 3 Given the output separable vectors fl ... f
r
,
assume the first t vectors are removed from the set and let
8~ be the first t rows of 8. The excess subspace ROgL for
the remaining r - t vectors is spanned by the vOL columns
of RogL:
where the columns of the 110 x vOL matrix S span the null space of:
Proof
Let tElL be @ with the first t rows deleted and GL be G
with the first t columns deleted:
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_C
f~l)
(I~ I
.' J.....
=
(8 J--I
G = [G~ . GL ].
Because ROgL is a subspace of Rog' there is a unique V o X vOL
matrix ~ of rank VOL such that R OgL satisfies:
i)
Lemma 3. 3. 6 as interpreted for matrices in (3 g 3. 37) requires
ROgL to satisfy:
for some VOL x VOL matrix IIL- To empha.size the followillg
arguments. this result can be written (mod [Rt+ 1: ... : R
r
1):
The matrix eqUivalent of Lemma 3. 3, 6 for R O (mod
- - - - g
[R.t,+ 1 : ••• : R
r
] ) di.ffers from ii) in that the range space
of (A-DC) R O may contain vectors which have a component ing - -
the range space of R 1 ••• R.t,:
When post- multiplied by a, this equation becomes:
iii)
In order for substitution of i) into iii) to have the general
form of ii). it is necessary that, for all acceptable a, a vOL x VOL
matrix nL exist for which:
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If nL exists, iii) becomes:
iii) ,
Because" is va x VOL and of rank vOL' it always h:ts a left
inverse and such a nL exists. Equt.tion iii) I then places the first
constraint of esince it is necessary for the last term to be zero.
Because gr • • got are linearly independent (LeMma ~\. 3. 3),
rkG~= t and 13 must satisfy:
iv)
If D is chosen such that It.tZ 1••• Rrar:. inv,ariant, (A- DC)2ROgL
is also contained in R OgL (mOd[ Rot+ 1: ... :R r 1). The equivalen~
equation for R
og 13 is (assum ing a satisfies iv»:
and comparison with ii) requires that ~ meet an additional
constraint:
A total of Vo such constraints on ~ can be formulated. They are
equivalent to requiring that ~ be in'Z (MJL). Since ROgL must
be the largest subspace of ROg to satisfy ii), ~ must sp~n
'1 (MOL).
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Theorem 3. 3. 3 is not as useful as Theorem 3.3. 2 in
that it does not allow HOgL to be related to the Rdgk , k= 1, , , r.
which res ult from ren loving the correspond ing' fk fr<.)m f 1· · · f r .
This shortcoming is eliminated by the fol1owi11g two corollaries.
Corollary 1 provides a simple mechanism for finding RO I and~ g~
R O L along with nL and eL , The corollary is particularlyg ,
useful when state space augmentation is considered in Section 3.3.4.
Corollary 1 Given the conditions of Theorem 3~ 3. 3, define
the transformations:
nO = [a: ~ r~ rJ [ ~ : ~ JLL
0 Ge[A: ~]L(Ge)L =
0 R og [ A: 131 LRog =
where the columns of aand fj, span the null space anJ L-OW space
of MOL respectively. If (Ge)~and n~ are partitioned:
l nC 0L
nc I nLO' L
(G®)~ = [G~ e~ A+ GL eL ~: GL (H L ~]
with GLElLa a n x VOL submatrix, nL a VOL x VOL submatrix
etc,. then ROgL and R~gL satisfy:
ARogL = ROgL ~L + GL ElL 13
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where RagL and R~gL can be determ ined from a partioI'l of R~g:
Proof
Rag is not a unique matrix representation for Rag -- R~g
is an equivalent representation. By Theorem 3. 3. 3, Rag ~
is ROgL• Since the columns of 4 are not in '7l (MOL)"' no, vector
in the range space of ROg ~ is in ROgL• It follows that Rg g
can be expressed:
The argument used to, show the existence of nL in Theorem 3. 3. 3
can be generalized to show thtt with n~ and (G@)~ as defined,
(3. 3. 37) can be written for R Og:
i)
The corollary follows from a partition of i). The zero submatrix
in n~ appears because AR
ogL must satisfy ii) from the proof of
Theorem 3. 3. 3. The GL @L ~ term appears in (G @)~ because
q@ can' be ~ltitten:.
and ~ is in the null space of G~ @~. ~
Theore~n 3. 3. 2 provides an algorithm for RO I ...n terms of, g
RO k' k E I~ Corollary 2 provides a similar test based upong .
the eigenvalues of the matrices I'Ik, k E I, obtained by applying
Corollary 1 for' each fk, k E I. The proof is similar to that of
Theorem 3. 3. 2 and is omitted.
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Corollary 2 Let II 1- • _nr be solutions of Corblla~y 1 if the corre-
spond ing f k is ren1.oved from.. f 1- __ f r and let the elements of the sets
A 1. • e A be the eigenvalues of n1. __ n respectively. If the
r '. r
index set I is an arbitrary subset of (1, 2, ..• r} and all f k for
which k E I are removed from f 1.• _f
r
, the eigenvalues ass()c iated
with the excess subspace of the remaining f. with j ~ I are tile
J
elements of:
A = n A
I kEI k
3. 3. 4 State Space Augmentation
There are a number of circumstances in which a change in
the d imens ion of the state s pace of the reference model may make
the failure detection problem simpler_ It was mentioned in
Section 3. 2. 2 that if (A, C) is not observable the computational
requirements in the design of a detection system can be decreased
by accepting a lower order, observable system model. It i.s
assumed here that (A, (~) is observable. The results of this
subsection show that if fl .•• f are output separable, there is
- r AlfIIQ ~
an observable reference model (A, C ) of order n :2: n fo~~ Wllich
they are mutually detectable. l"ollowing ttle convention of this
chapter, the result itl derived first as a general theorem on
linear operators and then restated as a matrix- based algorithm.
The state space augmentation techniques complement the
techniques of Section 3. 3. 3. If f 1••• f
r
are not mutually detectable,
state space augmentatton is an alternative to removing vectors
frcm the set. Cri1teria for choosing between the two approaches
are discussed in Section 4. 2.
Wonham and Morse (1970b) first indicated that certain
systems could be decQupled only if the dimension of the state
space was increased. Their solution to the extended decQupling
problem was based upon geometric arguments similar to those
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used here. Howze and Pearson (1970) among others introduced
a matrix augmentation scheme known as dynamic compensation.
They proved that for the decoupling problem it is sufficient
to add a series of integrators to the system model which are
controllable but not observable. For the failure detection problem
the reverse is true. It is necessary to duplicate the dynamics
associated with a portion of the excess subspace in such a manner
that they are observable but urlcontrollable.
Section 3. 3.2 revealed that for any Rk, RO can be partitionedc g
into a subspace ROgk whose event vectors generate output errors
with a component along Cfk and a subspace ROgk whose event
vectors do not:
(3.3.'23)
The images under Aof these partitions are:
(3.3.25)
ROgk is completely independent of Rk and the presence of fk in
fl ••• f
r
• Con.vers ely, the presence of R~gk inR
og is dependent
upon f k being in fl ••• fr • If f k is removed from fl· •• fr , ROgk
is the new excess subspace (Lemma 3. 3. 7). Section 3. 3. 3
concentrated on the properties of ROgk and an algorithm for finding
a mutually detectable subset of f 1... f
r
* In this subsection atten-
tion is restricted to R~gk because the e~p~asis is upon finding
a higher dimensional ref~encemodel (A, C) for which the pres-
ence or absence of fk in the set fl. 11 • f r no longer affects the
dimension of Rage A prerequisite for this effort is a more
detailed definition of the structure of Athan was required in
Section 3. 3. 3.
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Equations (3.3.23) - (3.3.25) imply that the image of
RQgk under Ahas no component in A\. but tp .... t the image ofRg gk under Adoes. Adopting the linear operator equivalent
of the notation introduced in Corollary 1 ()f Theorem .3. 3. 3,
if a partition of cj n is established in terms of (3.3.23) for some
particular 1 ~ k ~ r:
(3.3. 41)
then Acan be specified iI'i terms of sixteen operators in the
four subspaces of an. Six of these reflect the mappings indicated
in (3 0 3. 23) - (3. 3. 25):
nC c ck ROgk -- ROgk
c c
.... ROgkfi kO ROgk
eC c
(3. 3. 42)
ROgk -f Rk k
ROgk .... ROgk
cROgk ROgk 63 Rk
ROgk R~
The approach used for the state space augmentation is· to enlarge
the state space to an (n+lJ~k) - dimensional state space:
(3. 3. 43)
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,.....,
and to define an operator A on an such that the image of
~n under A is the same as that of an under A. and the image of
IIc ,....., ,.....,~ Ok under A is similar to that of R~gk under A(i. e. under A).
In this al~gmented state space, the detection spaces of f 1- __ fI"V "....." r
;nd,J" may also be augme~ed and are denoted by R 1 ••• Rr and
R.7. The construction of A insures that:
R
k
= R
k
E9 &VcOk
(3. 3. 44)
More importantly, the excess subspace R0 for. R,J" has the des iredindepen~encefrom the presence of fk in f 1~' • fr i. e. R~gk is
zero. Rog then satisfies a relationship similar to that of ROgk
in (3. 3. 25):
where gr • •gk-l' gk+ l' • •gr may be different from the detection
generators for the original reference model. The independence
f'tttJ
of Rag from fk implies th;:t if a subset of fl ••• fr which is
mutually detectable for (A, C:) is found, fk can be added to
that det and the enlarged subset is also mutually detectable.
".,.,
It is not necessarily true that the dimension of R
og is less
~n that_of Rog,~but i~cannot b...= greater. The properties of
Rag and R1.' ., Rk-l' Rk + 1••• Rr are studied in detail following
the lemma.
Lemma 3. 3. 9. Assume (A. C) is observable and let V~k be
the dimension of RCo k for some 1 ~ k s r. There is an obServableAJ,...., g
extension (A, C) of (A, C) onto:
~
n n
cJ = 8
.,tJa,I ~ -' ,....,
such that the eXC(~S8 subspace of R~ for (.l\, C) satisfies:
........,
i. e. R
og is not altered by the removal of fk from fl ••. fro In
addition:
iii)
tv)
Proof
d(R.) ~ d(R.)
J J
j :; k
Let a;n be partitioned into four subspaces:
where .R; is as defined in the proof of Theorem 3. 3. 1. Ais
uniquely defined hy the sixteen operators which can be defined
on the partitions. Of particular interest are:
i)
ii) I
c cek : ROgk ~ Rk
~: R~gk ~ R~gk
If the partion of an is included in the definitioQ of A, twenty-five
operators are necessary to uniquely specify A. This can be
reduced to five by defining operators on larger subspaces when
convenient:
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cv)' ¢ :
IJ Ok -D c eRea ... (Rk EEl Rogk ) EEl ROgk .7
c
vi) J -e~ : lJOk --Ra k
vii) J rr~ :
c
V~kau ....
Ccan readily be defined in terms of Cby the two operators:
viii) 'e: Gn .... ~m
ix) I ¢ :
C as defined in iii) I - ix) Iand
c
IIOkFrom v) / - vii) I, the image of a under A satisfies:
It remains to show that A
satisfy the hypothes is.
x) /
C
""-J IIA 8 Ok c
By construction RO
C
gk is observable (mod R~) for (A. C).
Comparison of i) I and ii)' with vi)' and vii) I then indicates
c c
VOk -D 1I0k8 is observable (mod Rk ) also. Hence cj is observable.IJc
A similar argument proves that Rk 6) fJ Ok is an observable
subspace. Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 2. l··,also implies that
VC VC
no event vector in R.1 EEl fJ Ok which is not also in Rk EEl fJ Ok can
be constrained to generate unidirectional output along Cf.
It then follows that (A.. C) is an observable reference model an.d
~
R3 can be defined by:
xi) I
C
J::i IJOk - ~R" = Rrr..EB .D - R ED R E9 R
'" '" (J) - 1 • •• r Og
and Rk satisfies:
xii) ,
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Therefore iil) is true. Similarly, since it is olJvious that for
all j :; k:
xiii) , R. c R.
J J
it follows that iv) is true and xi) I - xiii)' imply ii).
To prove i), assume first that:
xiv) ,
I""tJ
RO k satisfies (3. 3. 24) with Areplaced by A and is a subspace
of ~Og. Because it) I and vii )' are tdentical and vi) I is ilie
negative of i) I, x) I and (3. 3. 25) imply that there must also
exist a V~k - dimension!:).l subspace:
c
~gk c R~gk ED (/"Ok
whose image under A does not have a component in Rk i. e. an
expression similar to (3.3,,25) is:
~ D -DAROgk C I(ogk
If Rn is defined as the direct sum of ROgk and R~gk:
then the above equations require Rn to be a Vo -dimensional
subspace which satisfies Lemma 3. 3. 6 with gk removed:
,....,
xv)' A Rn C Rn d) gl E9 • •• gk-l E9 gk+ 1 e••• gr
EquP.tions xi): xii) I, and xiv)' require xiii)' to be an equality
and therefore gt· · · gk- l' gk+ 1- • • gr are the detection generators
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i"'ttJ f'tttJ ~
~or R1• •• Rk-l' Rk+ 1. • .Rr. Lemma 3. 3. 6 then implies that
Rag ia the unlque va-d lmenalonal solution 'to' xv)' whiteh requires:
To complete the proof of i) assume that xfv) '-is not satisfied,
i. e. that Rag is smaller than Rage For convenience. let:
110 = d (R ) = d(R ) - 1 = II - 1Og Og 0
Equat;(\~lS xi)' - xiii) I then imply t~at for some j t= k:
"....,
V. = d (R .) = d (R .) + 1 = 11. + 1J . J J J
and a new generator 'g. for that R. must be found. Because RnJ J
is a Vo -dimensional subspace which satisfies both xv)' and:
if follows from Lem.ma 3. 2. 4 that RO must contain gj.- Ro '
can then be partitioned:
xvi) I
where Ro is some arbitrary excess subspace of Rj • Rog whlch
satisfies:
I"'J
ARag CRag $ gl $ ••• gj-l El' gj Q) gj+ 1 $ ••• gk-1 E9gk+ 1 m. ••gr
can be found by applying the construction of Lemma 3. 3. 6 to
Roe Thie argument is generalizable for all d(ROg) ~ d(Rog)
and i) is proved.
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The independence of ROg from the presence of fk in
fl ••• f
r
is in marked contrast to Lemma 3. 3. 6. The fundamental
importance of this change can be seen if tlle pr{)cedure is
repeclted sequentially f()r f l - •• f. If the reference model :tfterr ,...., I'V
the r th application of Lemma 3. 3. 9 is denoted by (A. C). the
"...,
/'tto.,J
corresponding R
og must be completely independent of every
vector in f l - - • f r :
(3_ 3. 46)
Fd F:::j
Lemma 3. 3.9 constrains (A, C), and hence (A, C), to be observable
if the original reference model (A, C) is observable. Because
~ ~
Definition 3. 3. 4 requires RO to be a subspace of 7( ( C) andtItd g
(3. 3. 46) states that ROg is invariant. observability then requires
that:
(3. 3. 47)
It follows that ft" .!F :re mutually detectable for the augmented
reference model (A, C). Theorem 3. 3. 4 provides a rigorous
proof of this result:
rfheorem 3. 3. 4 Assume fl ••• f
r
are output separable, but not
mutually detectable for (A, C). The minimal equivalent repre-
~ '"sentation (A, C) for which f 1- •• f
r
are mutually detectable is of
order:
~ = n + I
k= 1, r
Proof
Let Lemma 3. 3. 9 be applied for f k- The similarity of
xv) I in the proof of Lemma 3. 3. 9 to Lemma 3. 3. 6 suggests that,
as in (3. 3. 23). there is a partition of Rn :
1)
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for WhiCh~. is a v~ .-dimensional subspace of Rn and is theJ J -D
largest such subspace which is observable (mod R- ):
J
""C "-JCARD - c RD - E9 g_J J J
-D(mod R- eRD -) j ~ kJ J
j ~ kii)
If some R., j ~ k, for (A, C) has a greater dimension than R.
J ~ J
for (A, C), i. e. if II. > 11-, the proof of i) in Lemma 3. 3. 9
J J ~
indicates that there are V. - I). independent vectors in RnAJC J J ~ "'c ~C(hence in Rn · ) which are vectors of R·. If R0 1••• R0 areJ~ c J c g ~defined for Rog similarly to ROgl ••• ROgr for Rog; a generaliza-
tion of the argument leading 'm xvi)' implies that V~j' the
dimension of R~ ., must be smaller than v~.. In fact, the
ro ~ J
difference must be equal to IJ. - II.:
J J
V~j = I)~j - [Vj - vj ]
~
IJOk = 0
Equations xi) I - xlii) I of Lemma 3. 3. 9 also lrr_ply that if
.t::JI _ I"'ttJ
d(R.) > d(R.), then d(RO ) must be correspondingly smaller thanJ J g
d(R
og):
- ""."
Vo -.110 = '\ [v.- v.]L J Jj ;i k
It follows from ii) that this difference can be related to the
• ~c """Cdimenslons of I'C"Ogl ••• ROgr :
ii i) I
j~k
If Lemma 3. 3. 9 is applied sequentially to R. and so on, the
tIItf ,.., J
final reference model (A, C, ) after r applications of the lemma
has a dimension: '
---
n =
C I'Ve
n + vOk + VOj + •••
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which from i.ii) can be written as:
iv) F:::; '(n = L.
i= 1, r
But R~ is ~variant since the image under 7\ of Ra must be con-
taineci in R0:
Ft:J ~ F::::J
Because (A, C) is observable, this implies that RO = ¢ and
iv) becomes the desired result.
If f 1- . - f
r
are not mutually detectable for (A, C), Theorem
3. 3. 4 proves that sequential application of Lemma 3_ 3. 9 for
f 1••• f
r
yields a f:-dimens ional reference model for which
f 1- .. f
r
are mutually detectable. The remaining task is to formu-
late algorithms fc)r implementing the results. This requires
Lemma 3. 3. 9 to be restated in a matrix format. The following
two l~mmas estalllish tIle necessary results. l-lemma 3. 3. 10
,..,...,
defines the reference model (A, CJ and Rk"c The matrix relre-
. c IJ Ok IJOk c IJOk -
sentation--of the operators Dk: (j -c (j and -ek : (j - Rk
IJ
depends upon the basis chosen for (j Ok. (Note that the matrix equi-
valent of E{ is the kth row 8k of e). The construction of (A, C) in
Lemma 3. 3. 10 is made trivial by choice of an appr,opriate basis.
Lemma 3. 3. 10 Assume (A, C) is observable and f 1- · - f
r
are
not mutually detectable. If [/). : ~ ] k is the transformation matrix
resulting from the application of Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 3. 3
for f k, a reference model (A, B, C) which satisfies Lemma 3. 3. 9
for f k and is input- output equivalent to (A, B, C) is the (n+ZI~k)­
dimens ional model:
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c = [c: 0] ""'-IA :I
A I - gk8k ~
___ .J _
,
o n C
: l!k
The range space of the matrix Rk is the detection space Rk :
I
Rk : 0
.
~ .. --.. ~,.. ~_.-----
I
o IE e
: VOk
where Evc is the lI~k-dimensional identity matrix.
, 'Ok
Proof
Input- output equivalence follows from (2. 4. 2)- (2. 4. 3).
The most convenient choice of bases is to let <in be spanned by
, [~-~J lI~kthe unit vectors in the columns of 0 and ci by those
o
of • The choice of Rk follows immediately from xii)'
EJbk
of Lemma 3. 3. 9.
From Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 3. 3, R~gk satisfies:
i)
Lemma 3. 3. 9 is concerned only with the operators n~ :R~ k ...
c c c - gRO k and ek : RO k'" Rk and, therefore, only the first and lastg g
terms of the above are important. Let the (n + VOk)X (n + IIOk)
matrix Abe partitioned consistently with the bases for ci n and
c
,I/Ok:
A =
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It is immediately obvious from iii) / and LV) / of Lemma 3. 3. 9
that A11 and A21 must satisfy:
c
V
'l'he matrix vers ion of the image of t$ Ok under A is :
,... "-J
o A 12 E cflOk
=
Because E c is the identity matrix, this can be rewritten in a
IJOk
form similar to i):
0
,.,..,
p~ 12
A = ------_ .. _- =/""oJ
E c E c A 22VOk ~Ok
o
from which it is apparent that Lemma 3. 3. 9 requires:
A,."., nC22 = k
As mentioned in Theorem 3. 3. 4, it may be necessary to
apply Lemma 3. 3. 9 repeatedly to remove the excess subspace
of Rj". Beforel'Jcontinuing to the second iteration it is necessary
to determine R., j ~ k, and RO • These could be .found uS1~ngJ g
Lemmas 3. 2. 6 and 3. 3. 7 respectively, but a computationally'
simpler approach call be based upon (A, C) and the known spaces
Rj • j ~ k. and Rog- An algorithm for Rog is given in Appendix
A.3; Lemma 3. 3. 11 supplies an algorithm for the detection
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spaces Wllich utilizes techniques discussed in Append LX A.2.
Both algorithms require the matrix RD from the proof of Lemma 3.3.9.
kemma 3. 3. 11 If Lemma 3. 3. 10 is applied for fk, a bas is for
R., j ~ k, is the range space of:
J
- .R. I
~ J I
R · = - - - : Ro Z.J I J
o I
where RO is:
,....,
R =D
RC I R
Ogk: Ogk
-----~------IEel
VOk : 0
=
R O IJ : Rog ag I
------- .... -------
E c : 0
vOk :
and the columGs of Z. span the null space of:
J
=
(@k)j [~: ~]k
(@k)j [~: ~]k~
•
•
1
o
(@k)j is @with the kth and jth rows removed and [~: al k and n~
are defined in Corolla~y 1 of Theorem 3, 3. 3.
Proof
,."." """'"
It is simple to show that~ corresponds to RD in :,he......
proof of Lemma 3. 3. 9. Using A from Lemma 3. 3. 10, A Rn is:
c
A R Ogk - gk 9 k A EtJ~k : A R Ogk
I
----------------------j---------
I
I
I,
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Coro]lary 1 of Tlleorell1 3.3.3 can be used to evaluatE' this
matrix. Cancellation of the terms in gk ek Ii yields:
R C ne + R Ogk n~o I R Ogk TI k ( :l<@k [~ : ~]kOgk k IAJ ~ I
A RIi) = -------------- _______ J _________ + - -- --I
E c nC I 0 0vOk k II
The definition of rr~ allows this to be stated as the matrix equiva-
lent of xv)'from Lemma 3.3.9:
,.,.., "'" ~ 0 + [ ~~-o~~ ] [~: ~ ]k
A RC) = RDn k
The definition of R. in terms of Rn Z. is similar to theJ J ~ ~
definition of R O 1 in terms of S. Recall that (A, C) is observable.Itwg< ,.,..,
The image of Rn Zj under A satisfies
[
g.8. + (Gk )· <8k )· ]
. ~~ '" 0 J J J J [ ]
1) A RO Zj = RnR k Zj + -------0-------- L\: ~ kZj
rJ
If the range space of :£(n Zj is to be in the range space of H, an
argument 8 imilar to that used in the proof of Theorem 3. 3 g 3
requires i) to reduce tC):
Since rk(Gk)j = r-2, this requires Zj to satisfy:
· Continuation of this argument for A2 Rn Zr ..
yields the des ired re~ult,
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II -1o
A Rn Zj
3" 4 Output Stationarity
Section 3. 3 guarantees that if the event vectors f 1••• f
m
are output separable, there exists a lowest order state space
auginentation such that f 1- .. f
m
are mutually detectable. One
of the consequences of Theorem 3. 4.1 is that no larger collec-
tion of event vectors can be detecter1 by a single detection filter ~
Proof of this limitation is deferred until Section 3. 5.
Adherence to the principles underlying Definition 2. 1. 1
implies that only m directions in the output space of the system
model can be associated uniquely with potential failures in
the system. The only reasonable manner in which Definition
2. 1. 1 could be relaxed would be to relinquish at least partial
control over the assignability of the eigenvalues of A-DC.
Section 3. 3 supplies no ready indication that this maneuver
would increase the number of failures which could be monitored
by a single detection system. The poss ibilities are stud ied
in detail in this section. As in Section 3. 3, the theory is developed
first in a linear operator context and then in a matrix context.
For a particular Dselected for fl ••• f
m
, there may,.be a set of
'even! vectors"h1!4.il':' h.Jq in addition to f 1.; .. ~f.m w.hildl.:pr1!>dnoe. unidirec-
t ional output. The event veetors fl ••• f m' h1" • " hq are not l'!1 utually
detectable since their output is unidirectional only if Dsatisfies
a set of constraints in addition to those required to make f 1••• f
m
mutually detectable. It is shown in this section that the minimal
cost associated with expanding the set of vectors to fl ••• f
m
,
h1••• hq is a loss of freedom to ass ign the eigenvalues of each
of R1- • •R independently of the remaining detection spaces.- m _
If a set of eigenvalues A 1 is to be associated with Rl' the same
set must be associated with each of R2••• R , i. e. the assignablerrJ.
eigenvalues of A-DC must be given a multiplicity of m. If the
dimensions of R1•• •Rm difft'tI' or if h 1•• " hq are poorly chosen,
some eigenvalues of A-DC may become unassignable•
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Deflliitlon ::04.1 Assuille fl ... f arE' output sl'parable and let n:
---- m )'<
be the clas:~ of operato.'s sue 11 that for' (~very DID I the out put
gene,'ated by each of f 1.. 00 f m with respect to (A- DC, C) is unidirl'ctional.
The Hubspace j can be made. output stationary V\I-iM-l f 1••• f m if
* -therE' exists a D' E D such that the output from every element ~i E s:J
for (A-Ole, C) is unidirectional along C~. (or CA~. if C~. = ¢ etc .. ).
111
()utput stationarity is an attempt to use the last degree of freedom
left in the choice of D--the freedom to choose the eigenvalues of
A-DC -- to obtain failure information about events other than fl o0. f
m
. from the failure detection system. The method may be quite successful.
-*It is possible to determine a class II (actually. an m-dimensional
subspace) of dete~tion spaces which are invariant with respect to
A-DC and such that with each output direction in d m there is a unique
-*detection space in J which produces unidirectional output in that
direction. If a unid irectional error signal £1(t) appears in the detection
system output, it can uniquely be associated with the appropriate
detection space.
rrhe potential value of output stationarity is dependent upon the
-*freedom available to specify J • Unfortunately, this freedom varies
with the individual system. A consequence of Theorem 3. 4. 1 is that
the d~tection spaces correspl>nding to certain event vectors hi cannot
~li
be elementH of J -,' 0 Such events are incompatihle with f 1000f mo
Theorem 3.. 4. 1 offers ~t simple test fc)r compatil)illty.. If tIle event
vectors h10 00hq are ind ivLdually compatible with f 10 0. f m • Lemma
3. 4. 4 provides a test for mutual compatibility. There is no ma:ximum
qumber of event vectors h10• 0h which can be chosen to have their
-* qdetection spaces in J • The number depends strictly upon the nature
of the system and of the potential failures. As a rule- of- thumb,
the more elements hl ••• h specified, the smaller the range of
D D* qacceptable E and the less freedom to ass ign the eigenvalues
of A-DC. Once the hi- _0h are chosen. the remaining elements
-* q
of.l are automatically fixed. In general. the remaining detection
-*spaces in J correspond to physically meaningless failures arld may
be disregarded.
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The systems with m:l 1 and m = n are degenerate with
respect to output stationarity. In the first case R[ ,. an and
output stationarity is meaningless. In the latter R. = f. for
1 1
i· 1••• m and it follows tr ivially that d n can be made output
stationary. This example was used by Beard (1971) co introduce
the Detecti.on Theurem and is summarized in Section 4.-5. In
the following it is assumed that R1•• •Rm may be of arbitrary
d imens ion. Cond itions under which a single detection space
.I can be made output stationary with f 1••. f
m
are determinec:
in Section 3. 4. 1 and generalized to ;; ~~ in Section 3. 4. 3. A
simple example of an application of output stationarity is given
in Section 3. 4. 2.
The conclusions of this section are stated under the as-
sumption that (A, C) is observable and that fl ••• f
m
are not
mutually detectable. The results are equally valid if f l _•• f m are
not mutually detectable and such occurrences are treated as corol-
laries to the principal theorems. It is also poss ible to cons ider
a basic set of events fl ••• f
r
with r < m; however, a full complement
of m event vectors is the most general case. Treatment of
the set ft ••• f
r
follows trivially from the stated theorems.
3. 4. 1 Addition of a Stationary Space to a Detectable Set
. Based upon the importance which detection spaces play
in determining the mutual detectability of a set of event vectors,
it should not come as a surprise that they also assume a
dominant role in the solution of the output stationarity problertl.
The basic problem can still be posed in terms of event vectors.
In design studies the question arises as tq whether or not an
event vector h. can be made output stationary with f l - _• f •1 m
This question can be answered without consideration of detection
spaces; however, the determination of which DeD* make the
failure associated with hi generate unidirectional output for
A..DC requires knowledge of .Ii' the detection space of hi.
Detection spaces are also necessary to determine the elements
of J* (and their corresponding event vectors) which are output
stationary with f t- - _f m when hi is output stationary_
142
Assume that f 1" " "f
m
are mutually detectable and it is
desirable to determine whether or not the vectors h 1" " " hq can
be made output stationary with fl •• <,f
m
• Lemma 3.4.1 states
- ~ 143··
\
The over- riding importance of the detection space is proved
in Lemma :~. 4. Iv The lemma is no more than a restatement of
Corollary 2 of Theorelll 3. 2. 1 in terms of output stationari ty:
If for some BE D*. the failure associated with h. produces
1
unidirectional output along Ch., then so does every p. E J. and
1 1 1
vic.e versa. In this section detection spaces are denoted by both
R. and :l.. R1••• R ar(~ used exclus ively to denote the detection1 1 nn
space for fl ••• f ; J. is the detection space for an arbitrary eventm 1 _
vector h. which is not an element of one of R1••. R • J. and J.1 m 1 1
are defined for h. by Definition 3. 1. 2 just as R. and R. aI\tt
1 1 L
defined for f.. The minimal polynomia18 ()f R. and tI. are
1 1 1
denoted by 'f(.) and T(· ) respectively.
It is important to rlote that the set {p.} where p. E J. is
111
not defined to be output stationary equivalent with hi. The set
{p.} is detection equivalent to h. as vvas proved in Section 3. 2.
1 1
Ouwut stationary -equivalence is defined in Section ~3.• 4. 3 I-as
an operator on detection spaces and is a Pluch brmader concept
than detection equivalence.
Lemlna 3.. 4. 1 Let rJ. be the detection space for an event vector
1
h. and assume both e/. and h. can be made output stationar~lwith
1 _* 1* 1 ~~
ft ••. f • If D. andD. are the subclasses aiD for whichm . 1 1
tJ i and hi respectively are output stationary with f 1. " · f
m
• then:
~ = It1 1
Proof
Since h. E J .• it necessarily follows that D~ c D~'c" By
1 1 1 1
Corollary 2 of Theorem 3. 2. 1 every p. E ~. is detection equivalent
* .1 1 _* *_*
to h.o Therefore, every DE D. satlsfies DE D. and D. c D.•
1 1 1 1 1
Along with the prior inequality, this result completes the proof.
A
tnat an equivalent test is to determine whether or not the
respective detection spaces J 1" " "Jq can be made output stationary
with f 1- - • f
m
; however, the lemma does not suggest a procedure
for implementing the test. Theorem 3. 4. 1 provides necessary
. -*
and sufficient cond itions which J. must satisfy in order for D.I
1 1
to be nonempty. The prescribed test is simple to implement,
but fr,Jm the statement of the theorem it is clear that in general
there are many vectors and subspaces which cannot be made
output stationary with f l - • _f m - The theorem should properly
be stated in terms of index sets on {l,2, __ • m}. As in previous
sections, if any of Cfl """ Cfm f Chi are zero, they can be
replaced by the first nonzero element of the sequence CArl'
CA 2f1 " •• etc.
Theo~em 3. 4. 1 Assume f l - • _f m are mutllally detectable, tJi
is the detection space for the event vector hi' and f 1" • " f t
is the smallest subset of f 1- • - f
m
such that:
Then -'. (and h.) can be made o·utput stationary with f l - • _f if11m
and only' if •
for the same Ct 1••• Ct'r' where ~i is a scaling factor for hi.
Proof
Necessity Assume rte = 0 for some 1 :s: j :s: t. The hypo·..
J
thea is then implies that the output direction:
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't'-,
C.Ji = L Q'k CRk
k+j
is as:-;ociated wittl;l. (artd h.).
1 1
- --From Lenlll1a 3.2.2. forR1" .• Rt
to be invariant requires that DE D,~, satisfy:
k = 1••• t
Choose p. E J. such that p. may be expressed:
1 1 1
~
Pi = 2.. 6k ~
k= I • .t
where ~k E Rk, k= 1••• t, and ~k:/= O. Then since R. is observable_ _ . J
and R1••• R-t are invariant. there is some smallest integer IJ. j
such that:
J-L.(A-DC) J p.
1
IJ..
= <A-DC ) J ~. +. •. = a. Cf. + •.•
J J J
...1...
"l'"
for some 6." 0 and for all De D • But since Ct. = 0, this is aJ _ J _
second output direction associated with r/. and therefore gP. cannot
1 1
be made output stationary with f 1- •. f
m
• By Lemma 3. 4. I,
then h. cannot be made output stationary with flG •• f 0
1 m
Sufficiency Assume DE D* is to be chosen such that
tI. is invariant with respect to A-DC. From the hypothesis.
1
hi can be expressed uniquely by:
..I,
......
where ~hi E R1 EEl. • • Rt c n(c>. If DED can·:be. clrr.osen stich that:
i)
.
<A-DC> a. h. = tD·1 1 ",,1
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(mod J.)
1
(3.4.1)
( A-DC) f k = ~k k= 1••• t
where ~hi E R1 E9 ° _. Rt C 1l( C) and the Q'1· ° ° Q't are all nonzero.
The vector ~hi was not present when the Detection Theorem was
derived in Section 3. 2. It is present in (3. 4. 1) because Definition
3. 4. 1 along with Lemma 3. 4. 1, requires that tI. be made1
invariant for A-DC only under the additional constraint that
((1- .. (( also be invariant. Thus tI. must be an invariant
m 1
subspace which is contained in the direct sum of the invariant
subspaces R1- ° .!(to The vector ~hi (mod ali) in essence defines
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The proof of Theorem 3, 4. 1 stipulates that if "'i is to be
made output stationary with fl ... f , h. must be expressible
m 1
in the form:
But since hiR , ~wli E R1 ED • •• Rt and the Q'1· • • ext are nonzero,
a solution is guaranteed and tI. can be made output statiorta'ry with
1
f r ° • f t.
for all Ek E Rk• To satisfy i), these ~1. • • ~t must be solutions
of:
Clearly hiRE R1 Ea••• R~.: Theorem 3. 3. 1 insures that a D
exists such that:
where (wli E J i , then Lemma 3. 2. 2 states that wi i is invariant
with respect to A-DC, and therefore is output stationary with
f r .. f m • To specify this Ddefine:
the relationship (If J. to the component subspaces R1•. •R • It1 In
is shown in Section 3. 4. 3 that ~hi and:
(mod J.)
1
(3.4.2)
are tIle critical factors in determining the mutual Outl)ut sta-
tionarity of an arhitrary set of subs paces ./1" · . ..:1q with f 1" · · fm •
Before studying the implications of Theorem 3. 4. 1, it is in-
structive to define the test in matrix terms. The test defined
in Corollary 1 reverses the test in Theorem 3. 4 g 1 in that it
first finds the nonzero Q'l ••• O'.t, in the expression for Chi' and
then (letermines whether or not J. is contained in the direct
1
sum of the corresponding detection spaceso The discussions
in Section 2. 3. 3 verify that Corollary 1 is the matrix equivalent
of Theorem 3. 4. 1.
Corollary I Assume fl •• • f t are the smallest subset of fl·· .fm
such that:
has a solution where:
c
Ci =L
The event vector h. can be made output stationary with fl •.• f1 m
if and only if there is a solution to:
~c ...... - S
n L .:. - i
where:
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and R I ••• R.(/ 8 i are matrix equivalents of the appropriate
detection space S. If a :=: exists, it satisfies:
If fl ... f
m
are output separable. but not mutually detectable,
Theorem 3. 4. 1 must be modified. The modifications include a
change in the test of Qr"t plus a test on h iR which was not required
before. Corollary 2 summarizes the general case.
c
Corollary 2 Assume fl ... f are output separable. Let R..rL
em c
be the detection s pace of j L where j L is s panned by f 1· • • f tJ
and let f 1••• f.t be the smallest subset of f 1••• f m such that:
Then rI. can be made output 8tationU',y.~th fl ..• f if and
1 m
only if:
Proof
The additional constraint on h iR is necessary to insure
that ii) in the proof of Theorem 3. 4. 1 has a solution for which
R1- • - Rt 8..re invar iant.
Lemma 3. 4. 1 and Theorem 3. 4. 1 permit some simple
observatiotlS on the poss ibility of making more thal1. one event
vector output stationary with f 18 •• f m- If."i is the detection
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s pace for two d liferent (~vent vectors h. an(l h 0' i. e. if h. and
1 J 1
h,i arc' detection ('quivalnnt, Lemma 3. 4. 1 states that making
h. output stationar·y wi1.lt fl ••• f results ill both h. ancl h. blaing
1 . n1 1 J
output stati()nary with f 1- - _ f
m
_ The follovJing c()rollary introduces
mutuell output stationarity for the special case where detection
spaces ;;to .. Jq,are contained in the appropriate uniqn U Rk, k= 1••• q,
kEl.
1
and the index sets 1 ':1.' • 0 rare 'non- inifjers.ecting.. For this example
- q~ ••.• J q are clearly nonintel'actlve alld ¢an be',conslder~dseparately.
The gen-eral result is'derived in Section 3. 4. 3.
Corollary 3 Assume f l " •• f m are mutually detectable and define
the index sets I. to be the smallest sets such that:
L
~cU Rk
"kEI.
1
i = 1•• _q
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If each of ali can be made output stationary with f 1- _• f
m
, then
the set of stlbspaces ;j.• •• J can be made ()utput stationary with
1 q
ft···fmi!:
I. n I. = f6
1 J
for all i ~ j.
Proof
Application of Theorem 3. 4. 1 for ind ividual t/.•
1
If tI. can be made output 8tational~Ywith fIG •• f J the
1 m
effect on the assignability of the n eigenvalues associated with
A-DC must be determined. As a prerequisite, it is necessary
to develop the relationship of 0'1 to R1•••Rm more fully. Lemma
3. 4. 2 provides the necessary result. If VJ is the dimension of
-'-, then:
!.
k:l 1••• t (3. 4.3)
In fact, J i has Vel-dimensional projections P1 •••Pt onto the
respective Rr · .~. The interpretation of Pl . . .f>t is that for
every vector Pj E J i, there are unique vectors ~k E P k C Rk,
k = 1••• -t, such that Pj is a linear combination of (1· • • ~k:
(3. 4. 4)
(3. 4. 5)-D(mod Rk ) k = 1••• .t
As discussed in Sections 2. 3. 2 and 2. 3. 3" projections can be
defined in terms of equivalent subspaces. Thus P1. • • P.t are
defined by:
where R~iS as defined in Section 3. 3. 3:
(3. 3. 21)
Lemma 3. 4. 2 Assume f r .. f.t satisfy Theorem 3. 4. 1 for J i.
Then every p. E tI. has a unique decomposition:J 1
p. = ~ .. + ••• ~. eJ 1J ~J
where (k e ERk, k = 1. _. t. If P1- •• P form a basis for J., thenJ vJ 2
the corresponding vectors ~k1' ••• ~kV~ form a basis for Pk, where
Pk is the V.idimensional subspace defined by:
k = 1..• t
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Proof
By implication. (~very vector Pj E;}j must satisfy a rC'lation-
ship similar to that of hi to fl ••• f t in Thl'llrem 3.4.1. If CPj:f ¢,
then:
where 0'1 ••. O'.t are the same as for hi' but the scale factor Sj
may he diffeIte-nt. This relationship iml11ies that their exist
vector's ~kj E Rk Ruch that:
i) p. = ~1· + •.• ~,.J J 1.tJ
and that all of ~1· ••• ~t· are nonzero. The uniqueness of
.1 J
~ lj •.• ~tj is a consequence of Lemma 3. 3. 3.
If Cp. = ¢. let IJ be the smallest integer such that CA IJ p. :f ¢.
J J
Theoreln 3. 4. 1 then re(luires:
Since Dcan be chosen such that R1 ••• Rm are invariant with
respect to J\-DC the output separability of fl' .. f m plus the fact
that 0'1 ••• O'..f... are nonzero requires p ~ to have a representation
J
similar to i) with (kj E Rk, i. e. C~kj ::~. Uniqueness is again
guaranteed by Lemma 3. 3. 3.
Assume the above procedure has been applied for a basis
PI. • • P of .I.. By definition the vectors sets ~kl··· ~k span~ 1 ~
the respective Pk for k = 1••• .t. It remains only to show that
tb~ vectors «kl••• ~k in each set are linearly independent and
_ IJ
Jhence that Pk is 71.1_ -drmensional. Assume that ~kl·· • ~k71 aretI
not linearly independent f<.)r some k ~ t and that ~kl is a lillear
combination at ~k2·· • ~klJ1/
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ii)
Now define piE J. as a similar linear combination of Pl ••• P E :7.:
1 v~ 1
If p I is expressed as a sum of vectors ~ I" ""~t in Rl' • "R,r.,' then
H) and Hi) imply that ~1 is zero, i. e. p I does not have a component
in R1. This contradicts the argument attendant with i) which
in turn "implies that ~kl cannot satisfy it). An extens ion of this
reasoning completes the proof that f\ ...P~ are V",-dimensional. ~
With Lemma 3. 4. 2, the effect of o"J.tput stationarity on
eigenvalue assignment can be determined. If:
c _ \
VZL - L 11k
k= I, t
(3. 4. 6)
and fl' • • f
m
are mutually detectable, . it is obvious that the
n-V~L eigenvalues not associated withR1•• •R~ can still be
assigned almost arbitrarily. The assignability of the remaining
vJL eigenvalues is summarized in Theorem 3. 4. 2. The effect
of making'"i output stationary with f l' •• f
m
is that ~. V'" eigen-
values associated with R1 E9 • •• R~ can be ass igned. rr-he ~s-
slgnment allows onlYlt,J distinct eigenvalues, 'each of which" must
have multiplic tty: .,.
A consequence of Lemma 3. 4. 2 is that IIJ ~ Ilk for k = 1••• t
afl..d thus VJ $ min (Vk' k = 1••• t). If ~i is to be made output
stationary with fl ••• f
m
• this suggests two design procedures.
The first is that fl ••• fmbe chosen such that their detection spaces
are of approximately~equal dimension and the second is that hi
be chosen such that its detection space is as large as possible.
To the extent that this can be accomplished, the number of
unass ignable eigenvalues can be minimized.
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Theorem 3.4.2 AssumeJi satisfies Theorem 3.4.1 forR1.••R,f/
If tI. is made output stationary with f1" •• f
m
, the 1ItI eigenvalues
of A-DC associated with J. can be assigned almost arbitrarily.
l
The eigenvalues of A-DC!ssociated with each of R1•• •Rt consist
of the 11tI associated with J i plus 11,1 - 11tI eigenvalues which are
independent of the choice of D ED_
Proof
Let A~ be the desired set of 1/II eigenvalues associated
with :i.. By the Detection Theorem, Dcan be chosen using Lemma
1
3. 2. 7 such that J. is invariant and the eigenvalues of A-DC
1
associated with J. are the elements of A ou The choice of D isl ~_
not unique. If gaP is the detection generator for'"i' the net
effect of Lemma 3. 2. 7 is to define some vector ~ .,. E :l. and
~1 1
require D to satisfy:
i) (A-DC) 13.h. = -13· Y(A)g,+ s.Ab.. = ~".
1 1 1 tlF 1 1 art
where the roots of the minimal polynomial Y (. ) are t11e elements
of Ar/. The first requirement is to show that i) leaves sufficient
freedom in the chQice of Dto insure that De D';', i. e. that;li
can }-le made output stationary with f l - • _f • But i) <tbove isnl
identical to i) in Theorem 3. 4. 1 and the same argument used
in Theorem 3. 4. 1 verifies that a satisfactory' Dexists.
With Dspecified by i), it remains to determine the
eigenvalues of ~-DC associated with R1"' 0 .Rt. Denote the
relative minimal polynomial (mod R~) of ..Ii by YDli(o ):
-D(mod Rk ) k= 1. •• t
Since the projections Pl" ".f>t are defined by:
ii) k = 1.". t
-D(mod Rk )
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iii) k = 1..• t
Y
D1
(. ) ••• YD-t(. ) are also divisors of Y(· ) (Section 2. 3. 2).
In fact, because Pr . .p tare 11.cI-dimens:'onal subspaces, .
Y
D1
(. ) ••• Yn-t(. ) must equal Y(· ) and therefore:
k = 1... t
It follows that the lI.cIeigenvalues of A-DC associated with each
of P r • • f?-t are those in A.r Because Pk c Rk , they are also
1I.c1 of the eigenvalues associated with each of R1" • .R-t.
\
To determine the remaining Vk-V.cI eigenvalues of A-DC
associated with Rk, k = 1••• -t. define the partitions:
where P~ c,? (D. Equation iii) implies that each of R1" • .R-t
is an invariant subspace. The operator A-DC on Rk is there-
fore specified by the four operators:
1)' A~ "'k ... pk
.. )' A . c ... pC
11 P J': P'k k
UO'~: pC ... Pkk
iv) I
-
P ... pC
k k
The eigenvalues of A-DC associated with Rk are those of Apk and
A·PIt• Those of ~are the solution of YDk(· ) and by the previous
reasoning are the eleme~ts of A",. Since P~ c 'Z (C), those of
.ARk are independent of the choice of DEll *.
154
There are two sets of algorithms to be supplied for Tlleorem
3. 4. 2: Algorithms for ass ietii1g the IIJ eigenvalues ill ArJ and
algol"ithrns for determining the l~nassignable eigenvalues of
A-DC if:l. is made output stationary with f l ') •• f • I-Jemma 3. 2. 7l m
and tlle construction used in the proof of ~rheorem 3. 4. 1 satisfy
the filst requirement. This alg'orithm is l)resented in rnatr ix
form in Corollary 1. The basis for the c()rollary is the matrix
counterpart of equivalent subspaces.
Corollary 1 Assume h. satisfies Theoreln 3. 4 0 1. Then h.1 l
is output stationary with fl ••• fro and each element of AJ is
an eigenvallle of A- DC ()f multiplicity t if J) is a solution to
the t linear equations:
1 -c,T -c - 1[ \" I(A-DC) f k = Oik (PR)k (R L R L ) - ~i Y(A)gJ + L Q/jMj I k:J: L ... .t
j= l,t
R~ is specified by the detection spaces ot' fl ••• f.t,=
and (PR)k is R~ with all but the kth submatrix set equal to zero.
Pro()f
Lemlna 3. 2. 7 an<i the matrix equivalent of i) in The()rem
.
3. 4. 1 require:
i) (A-DC) ~.11.::: -~. Y(A)go +~. A h. \;I ~-D.l.1 1 1 ~., 1 1 ..
where a.h. can be expressed as:
1 1
and eh . satisfies C ~h. = O. Substituting into i) above:1 . 1
(A-DC) (Q/lf1 + •• oG'.t, f.t, + (hi) = -~i Y(A)g./ A(Ql1f l +·· ·QI,fft+~hi)
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which becomes:
ii) (A- DC) (Q11f 1 +••• Q'.tf ,f.):11 - ~ i yeA) g" + I Cij Afj
j =1, t
Invariance of ,~\ ••• 1(.t adds the requirement that (A-DC) fk
must be in the range space of Rk for k = 1••• .t. This decouples
ii) into a set of t linear equations:
where ~k is 1/Q1k times the projection of the right hand side
of ii) into the range ~pace of Rk- t k is th~f'~N·:.
Theorem 3. 4. 1 guarantees that a solution for D exists.
The second algorithm required for Theorem 3. 4. 2 is for
the unass ignable eigenvalues of A- DC resulting from application
of Corollary 1. Let 'IIk(· ) be the minimal polynomial of Rk with
respect to A-DC:
k = 1••• t (3. 4. 7)
The unassignable eigenvalues of A-DC associated with Rk are
the roots of "k(· ) which are not also roots of Y(·), i. e. they
are the roots of the quotient 'f(. )t£(.). If y(.) is expressed:
(3. 4. 8)
then the coefficients ~kl _•• Pkll are the components of the
coefficient vector.§k: k
.... ---
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where Pk is the solution to:
tJkWp ::; - (A-DC) gk k
and W is the controllability m'Mrix of gk:
(3.4.4)
W= (3. 4. 10)
3. 4. 2 An Example
rrhe simplest examples of the usefulness of output stationarity
are to be found in systems with parallel redundancy. For discussion
purposes it is assumed that the redundant components are dynami-
cally equivalent and that they have inputs which are measured.
The performance level for the components is assumed to be a
function of both system parameters (e. g. temperature or input
commands) and parameters unique to the individual components
(e. g. time constants or jet thrust levels). The theory developed
in Section 3. 3. 3 p(~rmits a failure detection system for parameters
of the latter type to be des igned. The results of Section 3. 4. 1
permit a single failure detection system to be designed for both
types of failures.
Consider a modification of the spinning cylinder example
developed in Section 3. 3 0 2. The cylinder dynamics remain the
same:
f.;(t) + ~r ~t) = Ct
r
T(t) •cp(O), <D(O) given (3-,4.11)
but the applied torque is the sum of the torque from two independent
control surfaces:
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T(t) = T 1(t) + T 2(t) (3. 4~ 12)
Each of the control surfaces is driven by the same control law as before:
T1(t) + $l T l(t) a-Cil~m(t) ~ Q'2<Pm (t) + O'];c6c(t)
T2(t) + $2 T 2(t) =--alfPm(t) - Ql2~m(t) + cr1<Ob(t)
(3. 4. IS)
Besides~(t) and <is(t), the feedback torques T 1(t) and T 2(t) are measured.
but they are not used in the control law. The measurements of T 1(t)
and T2 (t) are used only for the failure detection algorithm. A block
diagram for this system is given in Figure 3.2.
The system model differs from that developed in Section 3. 3. 2
only in the inclusion of an additional measurement and state component:
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 -~ 0 Q'r cvrrC s = 0 0 0 1 0 A5 = 0 -e 0 Q'r Q'rr
0 0 0 0 1
-Q'l 0 -Ql2
- ~.1 0
-Q'l 0 -0'2 0 -a2
r 0
~ 0
B = 0 (3. 4. 14)5
0'1
0'1
Th~ state vector is:
CP m (t)
•~(t)
x(t) = ¢m(t) (3. 4.. 15)
In the previous example, failures in the roll and roll rate sensors were
discussed. In this example, failures of the control law and the control
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surfaces are analyzed. It is assum~~d that the torque sensors cannot
fail.
The control surface failures can clearly be modeled using the
controller failure model:
x(t) = ASx(t) + BSu(t) + f In(t) : x(O) given (2, 1. 7)
y(t) = C 5x(t)
where f 1 is:
0
0
f 1 = fTt = 0 = e 54
1
0
(3. 4. 16)
f 1 f T2
~l
= = 0 :: e 55
0
1
for failures in the respective control surfaces. A 'failure of the control
law can be modeled as a chaIl;ge in either of the gains ~l and ~2. These
changes can also be modeled 'using the controller failure model with:
o
o
o
1
1
(3. 4, 17)
If either ~l or ~2 changes, both T 1(t) and T 2(t) differ from their nominal
values by the same amount, Thus a control1aw failure has the same
effect on the closed loop system and its measured out~uts as simulta-
neous. identical failures in the control surfaces,
The event vectors fTl' f T2, f c are not output separable since:
rkC 5[fTl f T2 fc·~ -= 2
16Q
(3. 4. 18)
As a consequence, a railur(~ detection system for the three failures can-
not be designed using Secti()n 3. 3. 4 -- in fact, it is proved in Section 3.5
that f T1 , f T2 , f c are not mutually detectable. However, the two event
vectors f rr1 I f T2 , are output separable since:
Each event vector is its own detection space. RTl and RT2 respectively,
and it follows from 'Theorem 3. 3. 1 that f T1 , f T2 are mutually detect-
able.
A single failure detection system can be designed for f T1 , f T2 ,
f
c
only if output stationarity is used. Th'e evpnt vector f
c
is its own
detection space, whieh is denoted by;}. Fr()lu (3.4.16) and (3.4.17)
c
it follows that:
since f
c
is a linear combination of f T ! and f T2 - It also follows that:
and Theorem 3" 4. 1 verifies that f can be made output stationary with
c
fTl' f T2 • If this is (lone, a failure in the first control surface causes
a unidirectional error along CSfT1 in the reference model output.
Similarly, a failure in the second control surface generates an error
along C 5 fT2 " and a change in the control law generates an error along
C 5f c • The only restriction which Theorem 3" 4. 2 places on the eigen-
value assignment for AS-DeS is that the eigenvalue associated withR 1
must be identical to the eigenvalue associated with RT2. Since J
c
'
R.T1 , and R T2 all have the same dimension, no unassignable eigenvalues
are introduced 0
This simple example illustrates the basic utility of output station-
arity. If f
c
is not made output stationary with f T1 , f T2 and a control
law change occurs, the failure results in output errors along l)oth
C 5f Tl and CSf T2 which do not have any apparent correlation. With the
two eigenvalues of A 5-DC 5 constrained to be equal, however, the errors
along CSfT1 and C Sf T2 are correlated to the extent that the resultant '
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output error is unidirectional along C 5f c • If the probability of simul-
taneous, identical control surface failures is small, a unidirectional
output error along C Sf T1 is sufficient information to conclude that a
control law change has occurred rather than two control surface
failures_
3. 4. 3 Add ition of a Stationary Class to a Detectable Set
If each of aP1- __ aPq can be ma.de output stationary with fl ••• fm •
it does not necessarily follow that ;71 ••• aPq can be made mutually output
stationary with fl •.• f
m
• The study 0~ mutual output stationarity can be
undertaken at three levels. The simplest level was summarized in
Corollary 3 of Theorem 3. 4. 1. If 11••• Iq E {1. 2 _•• m} ar e the
smallest index sets such that:
J. c U Rk
l kE I·t
i = 1 ••• q (3. 4. 22)
the corollary asserts that all •• • Jq can be made mutually output station-
aryt.~if the index sets are all non- intersecting:
I. n I. = ¢
1 J Vi ~ j (3. 4. 23)
The second level of difficulty occurs if the index sets are identical:
I. • I.1 J (3. 4. 24)
In this case, Theorem 3. 4. 3 proves that the test for mutual output
stationarity with f l - •• f m need be applied for only one subspace from
the s.et J1• • •J. If theE'e are .t indicia! elements in 1. , ;}. defines aq 1 L
class J.* of detection spaces·(actually, an t-dimensional subspace of
1
detection spaces) which are always mutually output stationary with
ft ••• f when rI. is output stationary with fl ••• f • If til- _.;} can bem 1 m q
made output stationary with f t - •• f m • it is shown that all of ;}1" •• j'q
must be elements of :1.*I for any i ~ q. The- output associated with each
_ 1 I
element of tI.* has a unique direction in the ,(,-dimensional subspace of
1
8
m
spanned by k~Ii Crk•
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An extension of the above is if some IJ ~-. q exists such that
T. c I
1 I.L
i = 1... q (3.4.35)
Technically, it is necessary to use Theorem >,_ 4. 4 in this instance, but
the difficulty is one ()f defitlitions rather than theory. T11eorenl 3.4. 3
can again be applied, but only for J and the corres pond ing -; ':: g Where-
- - -it lJ - IJ
as J l' •• J q may be:-elements of _J • .it is: not true:.that ttl is an-- element of
the various :Jt for i t- p.. p. IJ.
As the size of the ind ex set I. increases, the d imens ion of the
1
class 0'.* increases. In the general case wllere 11- . 0 I are irltersecting1 _ q
but independent, the class J"* must be defined on the index set:
L~ = U I.
-W · 1 11= , q
(3. 4. 26)
(
If none of the individual index sets is equal to 11, it is necessary to
define an event vector h... and its detection space Jc/ on U Rk- If-}( ,. k E lit
J1•• • J ean be made mutually output stationary -- that is, if J;/ exists--q -
Lemma 3. 4. 4 provides an algorithm for finding RI" and the corollary to
Theoren) 3. 4. 4 then yields RI,l.
The first two levels ()f mut~al output stationarity are simple ex-
tellS ions of the argurnents ()f Section 3. 4. 1. rrhe algebra preceding
Theorenl 3. 4. 4 is c()nsiderably more involve<l and execution of Lemma
3. 4. 4 is nontrivial.
Before c()nsidering the general output stationarity probl(~m, it is
necessary to find a convenient means for char'acteriz ing :J.':J'Ic. 1'he
. 1
el(~ments of J. '!.~ are related by a coord inate transformation. In order to
1
exploit this property, it is useful to construct a bas is for J.. TIle bas is
1
can be arbitrarily chosen for;;' and once it is used to define the normal
1
subspace J. o for J.*, it can be dropped. The different elements of J.)~
1 1 1
need not have related bases.
Definition 3. 4. 2 Assume J. satisfies Theorem 3. 4. 1 and h. satisfies:
1 1
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Choose a basis Pt ••• PII.I for "pi. The basis vectors have a unique repre-
sentation:
where (kj E Rk- - k E Ii. Define the vectors:
The subspace 111\° spanned by PI 0 ••• PVJ
o is the normal subsp~ce associ-
ated with ;i.•
1
The normal subspace -;.0 clearly has the same dimension as tJI.;
1 1
for every vector in ali' Definition 3.4.2 uniquely defines a corresponding
_0 _
vector in ali- The effect of the normalization is that the subspace "'i is
"rotated" in (jn until a subspace -;.0 is found for which there exists a
1
vector h. o which satisfies:
1
~.h.O = I f k + (hi1 1
kEI.
1
and:
htR :r A~ht
(3. 4. 27)
(3. 4. 28)
The important 'distinction between h.o and h. is that the Cik' kEI ... do not
1 1 1
appear in the representatior.t of h. o given in (3. 4. 27). The construction
1 .
used in Definition 3. 4. 2 suggest that the simplest procedure for deter-
mining hi is to find coefficients 1J1· • ·lJvJ such that:
h·~ - \"· - L IJ. p.
1 "J J
j= 1, IJJ
ht is then specified by:
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(3. 4. 29)
11.0 =) 11 • P ..0
1 ~"'J J
j-:: 1, VII
(3 .. 4. 30)
(3.4.31)
o
an(l ~h. and hi~ follow fronl expressing (3. 4. :~O) in the form of (3.4.27).
~ 1 Ul.. ..
The output direction associated with :1.° is:
1
~i Chi = I Cfk
kEl.
t
It is a simple matter to show that J. o is the detection space for h.o --
l L
Lemma 3. 4. 3 provides the proof.
Lemma ~. 4. 3 Let J. o be the normal subspace of :J. and h.o E ;j.o car-
l L 1 1
respond to h. E 7.. rrhen;j. 0 is the detection space for h.o •
1 1 1 t
Proof
Choose the basis of :J. in Definition 3.4.2 as h., P2 ••• P'J whereL l vJ
P2. • • Pv,.l' E n<e ). Since this requires that the corresponding vectors
(k2 ••• !;kv ' k E Ii' are elements of 12< C), it follows that P2° ••• Pv,;o E
1l< C) and co~ditions i) and iii) of Definition 3. 1. 2 apply for ;}.O.
1
Conditions ii) and iv) are guaranteed by the one- to- one relationship
between .It and "Jt . ~
J.o has no intrinsically useful properties except that it provides a
1
useful benchmark for comparing two detection spaces. If;}. is output
1
stationary with f l - •. f , it is proved in Theorem 3. 4. 3 that;}. 0 is alsom 1
output stationary with fl ••. f • Therefore, it is .possible to determine
m
whether or not J1••. J q can be made mutually output stationary with
fl .•• f
m
by investigating the properties of the respective normal sub-
spaces;;1° ... ;7;. Definition 3. 4. 3 is the first step in this effort. The
definition restricts attention to the case where (3. 2. 24) is satisfied, i. e.
the index sets [1 ••• Iq for "1••• ;}q are equal. A generalization of
Definition 3. 4. 3 is considered later.
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Definition 3. 4. 3 The d.etection spaces J. and J. are output stationary
1 J
equivalent if their norm:al 8ubspaces "'.0 and ,}.o are equal.
l J
It has not yet beerl shown that output stationary equivalence is
tantamount to mutual Olltput stationar ity - - T·heorem· .a~. 4~ 3 pnovldes the
necessary result. For the special case where 11 "". Iq are identical
index sets, Theorem 3_ 4. 3 defines a necessary and sufficient condition
for air" .Jq to be mutu.ally output stationary with f 1""" f m "
Theorem 3. 4. 3 Let r:I.* be the class of detection spaces which are Qut-
1
put stationary equivalent to tI.. The elements of :l.* are mutually outp"clt
1 1 .
stationary with f 1""" f m if and only if .Ii is output stationary with f1"". f m "
Proof
A consequencf~ of the proof of Theorem 3. 4. 1 is that tI. cannot be
1
output stationary with f 1••• f
m
unless ther3 exists vectors (k E Rk, k Eli'
such that h. satisfif~S:
l
i) <A-DC )ai'hi = Lak~k + h iR = ~tli
kEI.
1
where (sl. E Jli - E$ut the construction used in Definition 3. 4. 2 guarantees1 _
that a constraint which is identical to i) is to require ~k E Rk to satisfy:
it) <A-DC )l3 iht = I (k + hiR = ViO
kEI.
l
where (alloE J. o '0 It follows that J. o can be output stationary with fl ••• f
t 1 . m
if and only if wi. is output stationary with f l - •• f • Hence detection1 m
spaces in J.* CE&.n be output stationary with f t - •• f if and only if J. is1 nn 1
output utationar·y with f 1- • • f m • ~
The claSt3 -;.* is the bonus gained if J. is made output stationary
l 1
with fl_ •• f _ For every ,e.-tuple {a'k}' k E 1. 1, there is an event vector
m - ~
h. and detecticln space J. SllCh that:
J J
1 Strictly speaking, it is necessary to require a'k ~ O. This restriction
is remove,l later when ~Definition 3. 4. 3 is generalized.
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(3 4.32)C~i h/ LQ'kCfk
l~ EI.
1
and such that tlle cOl'I'esponding normal subspace J." satisfies I )efinition
.1
3. 4. 3:
J.. 0 = J.o
l ] (3.4. 33)
Indeed, for every (Q'k), k E Ii' the reverse of the constructi.on utilized
in Definifion 3.4.2 c:l.n be "used to determine ;;. from ~o. Theorem
. . J l
3. 4. 3 guarantees that: all such detection spaces are output stationary
, ----
wit.h fl ••. f if J. is output stationary with ftg ~ • f 0 Equation (3.4.32)
__ m_ 1 111
anci Defil1ition 3.4. 3 \lerif~y that each element (If ;;.':~ is associated with
1
a unique output direction in 8 m • If a nllmber of event vectors h~J.ve
detection spaces whi(~h are elements of J.*, output stationarity can in-
L
cr(~ase tIle number of failures monitored by Dconsiderably from the
original ~et fl •.• fm~
Theorem 3. 4. :~ is th(~ only result on mutual output stationarity
which is necesHary if the index sets 11.•• Iq corresponding to ""I ..• J q
are equal. Before continuing to the general case, it is convenient to
solidify the result b~y provi.ding a matrix equivalent to the construction
prescribed in Ilefinition 3 0 4. 2. For notational convenience, Definition
3. 4. 2'restricts attention to the case where I .. is {1, 2 .•. .t}.
l
Definition 3. 4. 2 I Assume J. can be made output stationary with
. l
f 1- - • f
m
and that:=: is a solution to Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 4. 1. The
matrix 8.° c·orrespoIlc:ling tC) the normal subspace of J. satisfies:
L 1
-S'.O - T nC -,
-l - inL~
0, _1_ E'J
I '.... Cl'2 v 2
I
I ~
0- - - - . :. 0
where T. is:
l
T. =
1
1 E
~ 111 0-- - -"--0•I
I
I
o
l
and E Vk are Ilk-dimensional identity 111atrices.
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The remainder of this ,section is concerned with mutual output
stationarity in the general case where II ••• Iq do not satisfy (3. 4. 23)
or (3. 4.24), If \- is then defined by:
U I·
· 1 1l= , q
(3. 4. 26)
a g~neralization of Theorem 3. 4. 3 requires that a normal subspace
;;,/ be defined on the corresponding Rk , k E ~ and that:J,; then be com-
pared with .call°... ;} ° in order to determine mutual output stationarity.
q -
Unfortunately, the computation of .caI"o is not easy unless ~ is equal to
s orne I , 1:s: 1J :!:: q.
IJ
It is assumed in what follows that there exist no subsets I and~
u
I of [1, 2••• q} and-. (1, 2.' •• m} respectively such that:
m
U ;}.o C U Rk
.EI 1 kEI1 U m
and:
U Jio c U Rk·~I k~I1 U m
(3. 4. 34)
(3. 4.. 35)
If such a partition exists, Corollary 3 of Theorem 3" 4. 1 asserts that
the detection filter design problem can be di.ssected into two independ-
ent output stationarity probl~n1s. The following results can then be
applied to each problem separately. Consideration of two independent
subsets of;}l 0 ••• .caIq° increases the flexibility in eigenvalue assignment
and Inay render some otherwise unassignable eigenvalues assignable.
For the normal Bubspaces J10 ••• ;; 0, Definition 3. 4. 2 defines. q
event vectors h l
o
••• hq° and (3. 4. 27) in turn defines vectors ~hl°... (hqo.
Lemma 3. 4. 4 states that J:l°... ;}q° can be mutually output stationary
with ft ••• fm if and only if (hlo ••• (hqO satisfy a particular equivalence
relationship. If this equivalence relationship is satisfied, it is then a
straightforward matter to define J"0 •
Lemma 3. 4. 4 Let I. be the smallest index sets such that:
1
.caIio c U Rk i = 1••• qkE I.
1
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and aSSllme that eacll of ;; LC) • , • .:1
4
° can be nlade output stationary with
fl .• • fro' Thel\.J1°... .:IqO can be made mutually output stationary wi.th
f 1". • fro if and ()nly if ther(~ exists some vec1()r ~o E R1 En ••• Rlll such
th.l.t:
~ 0 = G__o
c;hi - --aw i = 1•.• q
Proof
Sufficiency Let D~:: be the class of operators such that I~\. ··Rm
are invariant with respect to A-DC . Given that ~o exists, choose
DE D,-te such that:
k = 10 •• m
where ~kE'?k and:
ii) t + t = - A;_ ~o .. _ tL _0
-=:'1 ". •• 'im ~ -"R
Clearly I'ltR E h.\ E9 ••• Rr . For this choice of D, the imagt.~s of hI°...
hOunder A-DC arf~:q
iii) ( A-DC )I'ih io = (A-DC) I f k + ( A-DC )(ht
k E I.
1
i = 1... q
=
\L ~k + A~ht
kE I.
t
i ~= 1." .. q(mod
From iO and the fact that RI •• • Rm are disjoint, it follows that;I ~k and AEyJ are equivalent vectors:
kEl.
t
The equivalence argument clearly can be expanded to include ;}.o:
l
iv) I Ek == - At.,,/
kE I.
I
(mod -;.0
1
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But by the hypothesis, ~_ 0 and ~ .0 are equivalent (mod.~o U "ik ).
_ _ -,: hi .: . 1 ~~ I
Since R1•• • Rm are invariant, the images A~o and AEhio " ," i
are also equi~,alent if ).0 in the modul·o argument is replaced by l.o:
1 1
v) (mod J. O
1
i = 1••• q
Congruence is transitive so that iv) and v) together imply:
L~k == - A~hio
kE I.
t
i. = 1••• q
However, by construction neither of the above terms }:las a projection
onto LJ ~k and the congruence argument can be modified:
k~I.
1
Substitution into iii) then yields:
i = 1••• q
( A-DC )~.h.O == ¢
1 1
(modJ.O)
1
i = 1••• q
By Lemma 3.2.2, this is sufficient to guarantee that;'io •• orJq
O are
invariant and therefore are output stationary with f l' •• f
m
•
Necessity For every DED*, i) and ii) above defin.e a unique set of
vectors ~1••• ~m and a unique ~o. Assume that for f.~veryD E D':< and
the associated ~o there is some integer IrA ~ q such thqt:
By the same argument leading to vi):
A~ ° 1= \' ~
..~ ~ L ~k
kE IIJ
Substitution of the above into iii) then yields:
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ann therdore;.} 0 is not outpu1 stationary willI fl' .. f
m
• Sinc,' the pro-
ced'tr'e (xhaustt D:':... ;11 0 •.. :lqO cannot be m;,de mutuall,'-: outPllt sta-
tic)nar'y \'Jith f l ,· •• fm.
IJemma ~1. 4. 3 states a necessary and Stlfficient conctitiol1 which
:l]:) •• II;} 0 (and therefore :J1••• J) must satisfy in areIer for irlutllal(I q'
output sfationarity with fl' •. f
m
to be possible. If ~o exists and it is
know, tIle sufficiency proof of the lemma furnishes an algorithm for
determiJ1ing a satisfactory D. The lemma d()es not give any indication
of the number of eigenvalues e,f A·-DC whicll cal1 [)e alnlost arbitrarily
ass igrled, however 0 The answer to this problem requires tllat a new
subspac{~ ;},/ be determined. With h,l definecl by:
(3 •.4. 36)
J~O is dofined to be t.he detection space for h';.
Sillce ~o E l J Rk. comparison with (3.4.27) verifies that thek~I,I
definition of 11/ is identical to that of hI°... hqo • Lemma 3. 4. 3 also
requireH that hU
O and ht be equivalent:
= 1••• q~ h.o !! h'!l/O
1 L 1¥
(mod;/. U Rk)
1 k ~ I.
1
Theorem 3. 4. 4 establishes the fundamental nature of ;}"°: ;;1 0 ••• .lq°
are mutually output stationar~with fl •.• f
m
if and only if .l,/ is output
stationary with ft ••. f
m
• QrlCe J,/ is found~ thi s reduces the mutual
output stationarity problenl to cons ideratio4 elf output stationarity of a
sillg1e sttbspace -- and this problem was treated fully in Secti()n 3. 4. 1~
The proof of Theorem 3. 4. 4 utilizes the fact that partitions of the form
outlined in (3. 4. 34) and (3. 4. 35) have already been used to define small-
er sets than J I - _.Jq where possible.
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Proof
i = 1••• q(mod rJ.
1i)
Assume J"o is not invariant, Then_Co~olluy~1Im;·'Fheor.etJ113:'-2;.1~ insures
that there must exist some smallest integer I..L such tb;\t:
Necess ity Given that aP10 ••• rJq° are invariant. Lemma 3. 4. 4
and the definition of ~o require:
i) (A-DC) I f k = - A1.,/
kE~
( A-DC H\-o = ¢
But i) ab')ve is identical to i) and ii) in the proof of Lemma 3. 4. 4"
Therefore• .Jt.. ";}q° are invariant for this D and;}l°. ".;}q° (and
therefore aP1" •• aPq ) are output stationary with f 1" • • fm •
iO C (A-DC )1l~O = I Cf k
kElu
since this implies that:
Sufficiency If "J,/ can be made output stationary with fl.·. f m •
Theorem 3. 4. 2 states that the eigenvalues of A-DC associated with
aP,/ can be assigned almost arbitrarily. In particular. the proof of
Theorem 3. 4. 2 verifies that Dcan be chosen such that:
Theorem 3. 4. 4 The subspaces aP1•.. ;;;q C U ~ are mutually output
k E TJ(
stationary with fl ••• f
m
if and only if ;),/ is output stationary with fl· • • f m "
U ~k)
k~ I.
1
. To prove that J"o is invariant it is sufficient to show:
where the non- empty set] satisfies I ~ T_ ~_ Since R1••. Rare in-· II U -w: m
variant :tnd h- _0 E l.J Rk' it f()llows that I c T_ - l!~quations i) and i i)
-x k(I" U ¥
tOJ.~ether imply that:
iiO C( .I\-DC }IJ ~l bi": L (fk
kEI n I.
U 1
Since 7 1" ••• ';q are invariant, iii) therefore requires that each of II ••. Iq
satisfy pither I n I. = ¢ or I. c I _ But by assumption (see (3~ 4. 34) and
u 1 L U
(3 .. 4. 35)) this is pos~ ible only if I = IlQt" or I :: ¢. In eit.her case, this
U R tl
contradiets the assumptions associated with i i). It follows that ~"o is
output stationary wi1h fl. • "f
m
• ~
Theorem 3. 4. 4 is the ir.amediate goal which had been sought. The'
mutual ()utput stationarity problem for f l - .. f has been reduced to aIn
simple output stationarity problem for J"o where J"o E U Rk o A
k r: IW
complete set of algorithm'3 for the single 8ul)space problem were
developed in Section 3. 4. 1. To fully appreciate the importance of J,/ '
it is conv'enient to introduce an extended definition of outpU\~ stationary
equivalence in contrast to Definition 3. 4. 3. The new definition provides
the bas is for tIle promised generalization of rrheorem 3. 4. 3.
Definition 3. 4. 4 Let ;',,/ be the detection space for ~o, where tv° is
defined hy Lemma 3" 4. 4 and (3. 4. 36). A Rubspace;} E U Rk is
w kE lw
extended output stationary equivalent to ';,,0 if its normal subspace J
w
0
satisfies:
;l°ctl°
" w
Clearly Definition 3 e 4. 4 is a generalization of Definitioll 3. 4. 3.
The essl~ntial difference is that it is not necessary for 7 1.• • J q to be
contained in the sanle I. in order for them to be extended output station-
1
ary equivalente All that is required is that it must be poss ible to
define t/uo for them s inee that is eq1 ivalent to the CfJngruence constraint
of the df!finition. If J satisfies Definition 3" 4. 4, ;} 0 could ~)e added to
w w
the set ;;1 0 ••• ;}q0 in Lemma 3. 4. 4 and the same ~o could be found.
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If;; is not extended output stationary equivalent to " ../0, then if J ·0
w ~ w
were added to the set .J
1
o •• • .Jq
0
, no solution ~o would exist. The
following corollary completes the theory of this section.
Corollary 1 Let J,,>:c be the clase of detection spaces which are ex-
tended output stationary equivalent to ;}"o. The elements of ..l.,/< are
mutually output stationary with fl •.. f
m
if and only if ;}"O is output
stationary with f 1. • • f m •
Proof
Sufficiency is given by the sufficiency proof of Theorem 3.4.4;
necessity follows since J"o E .J,,*.
3. 5 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for a Detectable Set
The following theorem belongs properl~' in Section 3. 3, It is pre-
sented here because its proof requires consideration of output station-
arity as defined in Section 3. 4. One of the weaknesses of detection theory
to this point is that it has dealt in sufficient conditions for mutual de-
tectability, but has not established a necessary and sufficient condition.
Beard derived sufficient conditions for a set of event vectors to be
mutually detectable for an n-dimension system model if they are output
separable (Theorem 3.3.1). Theorem 3.3. 4 carries the argument a
step further by demonstrating that all output separable sets of event
vectors can be made mutually detectable by means of state space aug-
mentation. The final step in the progress ion is provided by Theorem
~. 5. 1: A set of event vectors can be made .~ut~~11X.~~~~~ta~l~ ~ith
state space augmentatiun if and only if they are output separable. Al-
though the proof is straightforward, it could not be accomplished with-
out the introduction of output stationarity and the additional insight into
the structure of linear operators that it provides.
Theorem 3. 5. 1 and the results of Section 3. 6 on linear observers
provide the first definitive statement that the capability of a single
detection filter for monitoring failures in a system (A, C) with m :s; n
is limited. If a system has m independent sensors. the output errors
174
generated by each of m output separab~~ event vectors f 1••• f m can be
made unidirectional along the respective Cf I ... Cfm for the (pOSBiblY
augmented) system (A-DC, C) with complete freedom: in assif-,111ing
the eigenvailies of A-DC, but tIllS is the rnaximunl number of such
events. The detection spaces R1•• • 'Rm are fixed by the choice of
fl·· .fm • If by chance there is an additional event vector ~f contained
in some Rk , I s k s m, it also produces a unidirectional output error
along f k, but it is not possible to discriminate between the failures
correspond ing to ~f and f k on the bas is of output error direction
information alone.
The only possibility for increasing the nUlnber of failures which
can be monitored by a single detection filter is to accept a less
stri::lgent definition of detectability than Definition 2. 1. 1. Definition
3.4.1 for output stationarity provides a mechanism for constraining tl~e
output produced by f 1•.• f
m
to be unid irectional along C f 1.• · C f m
respectively, and for associating with every other direction Chi in the
output space an event vector h. E Rl EB ••• R such that h. generates1 m 1
unidirectional output along Ch. for A-DC. The event vectors h. can-
t 1
not be chosen arbitrarily, but subject to certain restrictions stated in
Section 3. 4, a set of event vectors hI •.• hq correspond ing to meaningful
failures in (A., C) may be chosen. The cost of defining a failure detec~
Hon system for f 1••• f
m
• hI ••• hq is a partial sacrifice of the ability to
ass ig~ the eigenvalues of A-DC.
The pI'oof of Theorem 3. 5. 1 requires a res ult that was alluded to
in Section 3.3, but never stated. Lemma 3.5.1 is a generalization of
Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 2. 1 for the detection space RJ' as defined in
Definition 3. 3.3. For generality, the lemma is stated for f 1" • • f
r
where r s: m.
Lemma 3. 5. 1 Let 3' be spanned by f 1••• f
r
and assume f 1. " • f
r
are out-
put separable. If (A,C) is observable and D is chosen such that R..7 is
invariant, no vector ~ ~R; ca~ produce 'an output for the system
(A-DC, C) which is restr·icted to C3.
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Proof
Lemma 3. 2. 1 and an extended vers ion of Lemma 3. 2. 2 guarantee
that D can be chosen such that ~:J is invariant. A proof identical to
that of Lemma 3. 2. 3 shows that (A-DC, C) is observable (mod ~:J) if
and only if (A, C) is observable. ~he proof of Lemma 3. 5. 1 is then
identical to that of Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 2. 1 with the above fact
replacing Lemma 3. 2. 3.
~
Theorem 3. 5. 1 is restricted to the case where no two of fl.••• f
r
are detection equivalent. This is the general case s inee if f. and f.
are detection equivalent, then Ri = Rj and only one of f i, f. n~ed be]
included in the set of event vectors.. J
Theorem 3. 5. 1 Assume no two event vectors in f 1••• f
r
are detection
equivalent. The vectors fl ••• f
r
can be made mutually detectable with
state sps1ce augmentation if and only if they are output separable.
Proof
Sufficiency Direct consequence of Theorem 3. 3. 4.
Necessity Let3 be spanned by f l - •• f r and assume d(.1) =
P <:: r. Choose p vectors frc)m the set which are output separable. For
convenience let them be fl ••• f. Also, let J"c be the space spanned byp P
fl ••• f and let R:Jc be the detection space of r. Augment the stateP p P
space if necessary so that f 1- _(. f are mutually detectable. Two cases
. P
need be cons idered.
i) Assume fk~R.1c for some p< k :s: r. For every D such that
fl ••• fp generate unidirfctional output errors along the respective
Cf 1. •• Up' the output error generated by f k can only be constrained
to the output space spanned:'y the vectors in the sequence Cfk,
C( A-DC )fk••• By construction, .C fk E C.1c• But Lemma 3. 5. 1
requires that there exist some integer p. such that C( A~DC )#J.rk ~ CJ";
and ther '3fore f k cannot be constrained to generate unidirectional output
errors. Therefore f 1••• fp' fk are not mutually detectable.
ii) If all f k for p< k ~ r satisfy fk E R$c, then since no two of f 1••• f r
are detection equivalen" for each fk there \hust be some minimal index set
Ik E{l••• p} with two or mora elements such that fk e U 1(•• By Theorem176 jEIk J
3. 4. 2, the output errors produced by ft ••• fp' fk can be constrained to
the reRpective cirectlonR (fl" .. Cf. Cfk only if 80m£, of the eigt'n-
- p
values associated with ~t ••• Rp have a multiplicity equal to the number
of elements in Ik • Therefore Definition 2. 1. 1 cannot be satisfied for
f 1••• f p ' f k for any p < k ~ r.
Since the dimension of the augmented state space may l)e chosen
arbitrarily subject to the Ininimal dimension of Theorem 3. 3.4, i) and
it) imply sufficiency.
3. 6 Failure Detection Theory and Linear Observers
The purpose of a linear f.)bserver is to reconstruct the state of a
system from a partial measurement of the state by utilizing prior
knowledge of the dynamics of the system. In instances in which the
· measurements are corrupted by disturbances, the observer may assume
the role of a state estimator which is optimal in some statistical sense.
_~ general survey of observer theory is provided by Luenberger (1964
and 1971) and specific interpretations are discussed in Wonh2.m (1970),
I ..eondes and Nov~k (1972), and Tse (1973) among others.
Any state estimator is an observer; which implies that the failure
detection system presented in this thesis is an observer. The interest
in observers with regard to failure detection theory is due to the d iffi-
culties involved with detection spaces. If m = n, every event vector is
its own detection space and it is shown in Section 4. 5 that failure detec-
tion theory is simplified tremendously. There is an intuitive argulnent
suggesting that if an observer were used to reconstruct the system
s tate, the recons tructed state vector could be used as an n- d imens ional
pseudo- measurement and the simplified theory of Section 4.5 could be
applied. The argument is specious. as a careful examination of
1"heorem 3. 5. 1 would show. Nonetheless, it is i tlstructive to cons ider
the pass ibility in detail.
Onlya. cursory review of linear observer theory is necessar.y
as preparation for Theorem 3. u. 1. The basic premise of observer
theory is fhat there exists a system (F, G, H):
z(t) = F z(t) + G yet) + TB u(t)
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(3. 6. 1)
for which z(t) is a constant linear transformation of x(t):
z(t) = T x(t) : given z(O) = Tx(O) (3.6.2)
The choice of T is not unique; however, it must satisfy:
rk I-;-J = n (3.6.3)
Wi th T specified as a solution of (3. 6. 3), F and G are any solutions of:
T A - F T = GC
It is then possible to choose H at1d K from:
= E
n
(3~ 6. 5)
where E is the n x n identi ty matrix. Wi. th these cons traints on
. n
(F, G, B') and K, the state estimate supplied by the observer is:
i(t) :I: H z (t) + K y(t) (3. 6. 6)
There is a certain amount of des ign freedom in the choice of an
observer. The minimal I)rder solution of (3.6.3) requires T to be a
(n- m) X n matrix. There are correspond ing solutions of (3. 6. 4) for
both F (n- m)x(n- m) and G (n- m) x m. These solutions are not unique
in that sufficient freedom remains to allow the eigenvalues of F to be
freely chosen. If T is minimal order, the corresponding system
(F, G, H) coupled with K is a minimal- order observer for (A, B .. C).
The proposed detection system configuration is indi~ated in
. Figure 3. 3. The failure detection system does not see the output from
the system directly, but rather the reconstructed state vector x(t).
It ie assumed that the observer has no failure modes so that any
A
aberration in x(t) is due to a change in y(t) plus the generated error
from passing yet) through (F, G, H). For convenience, it is assumed
that the observer is mtnimal order. The system- observer model is
then represented by the triple (AO' BO' CO):
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(3. 6. 7)
This is the system model upon which the failure dete~tion system must
operate.
Just as detection spaces were defined for (A. C) by Definition
3. 1. 2. they can be defined in the augmented state space for (AO' CO),
The following lemma demonstrates a trivial but useful relationship
bet'Neen the two.
2n-mLemma 3. 6. 1 Let the system model (AO' CO) be d,efined on (j =
cln E9 &n-m with A 0 specified by:
i) A : 8n -t &n
ii) GC : 8n ... cin- m
iii) F n-m n-m:& .... 8
iv) ¢ : &n-m .... &0
and Co specified by:
v) KC : cjn ... 8m
vi) H : &n-m .... cjn-m
Proof
Since the observer is minimal order, d( H8n- m) = n- m and
7l( Co) C cln• The des ired result follows from Definition 3. 1. 2 since
R0 = R0 E9 f 0 and ROe 7{( CO)·
If the system model is as defined in Lemma 3. 6. 1, all event
v~ctors associated with the system are constrained to a:n• If no failures
can occur in the observer, all event vectors for the system- observer
combination are contained in ern. Theorem 3. 6. 1 verifies that the
\ .
observer does not increase the number of failures associated with
(A, C) which can be monitored by a 8 ingle failure detection system.
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The0rem 3. 6.1 I ..et f 1.•• f
r
be a set of event v('ctors for (A. C) and
flO••. f
r
0 be the corresponding set for (AO• CO), The properties llf:
i) output SelJarability
ii:)- mutual detectahility (with state space augmentation)
iii) mutual stationarity
are true of flO ••• f
r
0 with respect to (AO' CO) only if the corresponding
properties are true of f 1•• _f
r
witl1 respect to (A, C).
Proof
i) Clearly if J and J 0 are spallned respectively by f 1- " • fr and
f10••• frO• thend(CcT)~d( CQ'cTO)sinced( C0.70 ):Z d( KC:J). Therefore,
output separability of flO ••• f
r
0 implies output separability of f 1· · • fro
ii) Assume state space augmentation has heen used if llecessary.
By Theorenl 3. 5. 1. mutual detectability of flO - • • f
r
0 implies output
separability of flO ••• fr O. From i) and Theorem 3. 5. 1 again, f I" • • fr
are mutually detectable o
iii) Suppose flO••• f
rO and fl ••• f r are mutually detectable with
respect to (AO' CO) and (A, C) respectively and let h l and hI 0 be add i-
tiona! event vectors similar to fl ••• f
r
and flO••• f
rO• If flO·· .ftO
is the smallest subset of flO. • • f r 0 such that .710 c A\ 0 EB • •• 7(t 0'
Theorem 3. 4. 1 requires that:
with 0'10••• O'tO nonzero if flO is to be output stationary with flO·· • frO.
By the argument used in i), this im.plies:
~1 ChI = 0'1 Cf 1 + • 04 0' t Cf.t
with 0' 1••• O'.t nonzero. From Lem rna 3. 5. 1 it follows that ..71c R1 $ ••• R.t.
and h l can b~ made output stationary with fl. • • fro
I:J.
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A failure detection system based upon (AO' CO) as a system
model does prec lsely what it is des igned to do. If a ays tern fa ilure
occurs which would affect z(t), the detection system senses the failure
and predicts the effect it would have on z(t). The predicted change is
then added to YmO(t) (which is now n- d imens lonal) to insure that the
error i~l the estimate:
(3. 6. 8)
remains unidirectional. The cascaded observer does not hinder failure
detection operations, but it does not help them.
182
CHAPTER,4
DETE(~TION FILr.rER DI~SI(iN -- DF~TERl\IINIS1'ICSYSTENJS
The presentation of failure detection tlH~ory has been wi1.llin the
context ()f a general theoretical development u The motivation for the
propose(} solution was given in Chapter 2 in terms of an abstraction
of the properties of a general reference model (A, B, C). In Chapter 3
a general solution to the failure detection problem was derived from
a study ()f linear operators. In the present chapter the results of
C llapter 3 are translated into an orderly des ign procedure. The d is-
ClISS ions are lim ited to deternl inistic systenlS; cons ideration of
stochastic systems is deferred until Chapter 5. An understanding of
Cllapter 3 is not necessary to use the des ign procedure outlined in
th is chapter .. but a ~omprehens ion of the ideas introducEd in Sections
2.1 and 3. 1 is tnandatory.
Tlle theory of Chapt(~r 3 states the failure detection properties
of a system explicitly as a function of the reference model (A, B, C)
and the set of event vectors assoc iated with the pass ible failures in
the system. The choice of the reference model has a profound effect
upon the flexibility of the failure detection system. To a' certain
extent this sensitivity is negated by the results of Section 3.3.4
which provide a constructive lneans for improving the reference
model; however, the modeling of failures still requires an acceptable
initial choice of a reference model. With all acceptable reference
model. the general failure model developed in Section 4 g 1 permits
the event vector (or vectors) associated with any system failure to
be determined. A number of important factors in chaos ing the
reference model and in modeling failures are discussed and illustrated
in Section 4. 1 0
The formal presentation of the des ign procedure LS made in
Section 4. 2 for the general case of a partially lneasurable state vector.
The procedure is applied in Section 4. 3 to the des ign of a failure
detection system.
183
An important canonical form for the failure detection problem
ie introduced in Section 4. 4. For a system stated in this form many
of the computations required in the design procedure are trivial.
Also, once a detection filter is selected, the closed loop system
model is decQupled into a set of subsystems with one potential failure
associated with each subsystem. rrhis canonical form is the basis
of the analysis of stochastic systems in Chapter 5. Examples of
the canonical form a.re given in Section .4. 5 for the degenerate case
of a fully measurable state vector and in Chapter 6 for the general ca.se.
The analytical results of Chapter 3 are for a continuous,
time invariant system with continuous measurements. The theory is
equally valid for discrete systems. It can also be used to design a
detection filter for continuous system with discrete measurements,
but the failure detection system performance is a function of the
sampling interval for the measurements. Ttlese resultE:, along with
limited observations on time-varying systems, are discussed in
Section 4. 6.
The intent of this chapter is to present a reasonable procedure
for designing a failure detection system. The discussion of design
considerations is more informal than that of Chapter 3. Even when
referring to particular theorems of Chapter 3, results are stated
in the more familiar matrix notation. Attention is restricted to the
design of a single failure detection system. If the number of failures
to be monitored is large, two or more failure detection systems may
be required. The material of thiE section can be applied to the design
of each of the detection filters. The detection law required to inter-
pret the output of multiple failure detection systems is developed in
Section 5. 3.
4. 1 Modeling
Modeling is cons idered in two contexts in this section --
the choice of the reference model for the system in the nominal case
and a characterization of the system in the event of a failure. The
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mocleling problems are discussed in the reverse of the order in
which th~.y would norlnally I>e consillered. Tilp general fn.ilure rnodel
is fleveloped in Secti()n 4. 1. 1 and illus~rated l).y the spinning cyl inder
example in Section 4. 1. 2. The concepts intr()(luced in thpse sections
perm it some specific comOlents on choos ing a reference model to
be made in Section 4. 1. 3.
4. 1. 1 General Failure Model
The intention of this subsection is to generalize the intuitively
motivated failure models presented in Section 2. 1. It is a simple
matter to model a failure in terms of event vectors, but the emphasis
is on techniques for reducing a failure model with multiple event
vectors to the form of either a controller failure model (2. 1. 7)
or a sensor failure model (2. 1. 8). As mentioned in Section 2. 1,
the usefulness of failure detecf.. ion theory rests upon the fact that
failures other than controller failures and sensor failures can fre-
quently be modeled by. one of these two special failure t!lodels.
This subsection presents a general algorithm for modelir g system
failures in the desired form.
T1?e simplest failures to des ign failure detection systems
for are control element failures. The system in the unfailed case
satisfies:
x(t) = AJ~(t) + Btl(t)
y(t) :II: Cx(t)
x(O) given (4. 1. 1)
where u(t), x(t) and y(t) are p-dimensional, n-dimensional and
m-dimensional vectors resp~ctively. The relationship of u(t) to
B is clearer if (4.1.1) is re-written in summation form:
x(t) :I Ax(t) + '\ b.u. (t) : x(O) givenL 1 1
i= 1, p
(4. 1. 2)
where b. is the ith column of Band u.(t) is the ith component
1 1
of u·(t). Each term b. u. (t) constitutes a control channel for the
1 1
system. The p components of u(t) are commands issued to the
185
p control elements of the system; the columns of B describe
the man~er in which an excitation of the control elements
affects the system state.
If a failure occurs in the i th control channel, that failure
must result i:l a change in the b.u.(t) term in (4.1.2). The general
1 1
failure model for the failure is:
x(t) :: Ax(t) +
yet) = Cx(t)
\[b. u. (t) + Ab. u(t) + b.A u. (t)] : x(O) givenLJ 1 1 L 1 1
i= 1. P
(4. 1. 3)
The AU. (t) term reflects the fact that the control command received
1
by the control element may diffe~~ from the intended command. As
an example, if the failure results in no input command being received
by the i th control element, the failure can be modeled by:
~u.(t) = -u.(t)
1 1
~b. = 0
1
(4. 1. 4)
When ~t!.(t) is a function of u.(t) the failure is defined to be contraI-
l 1
dependent; otherwise, it is control- independent. As examples of tp.e
latter, if a control element receives a noisy command, ~u.(t) may
1
be a random process; if the control element receives a biased command,
Au.(t) may be a constant, etc. The event vector associ.ated with any
1
failure which can be modeled by .6.u.(t)b. is simply b .•
1 1 - 1
The ~b.(t) term in (4.1.3) is neciessary for modeling failures
l
in which the control element no longer responds properly to a
received command. In this case, Ab. (t) is the event vector. It is
1
important to note that t\b.(t) can be time-varying and henc'~ that
1 I
B(t) in the failed system can be time-varying. Failure detecti0I?-
theory requires the system to be time invariant in the unfailed state,
but requires neither time invariance nor linearity in the failed system.
An important special case, however. is when ~bi(t) is used to
indicate a change in the effectiveness of the control element:
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L\l).(t) = k(t)}).
1 1
(4. 1.5)
If k(t) is -]. (4.1.5) is used 10 mc)del a c"ntrol ('hann(~l whi('h is
completely inoperative, i. e. the ith control is liCIt applied. Othet'
values of k(t) indicate a change in the gain in th(' ith control channel.
Most contr()l channel failures can be modeled using (4.1.5) and s()me
~u.(t):
1
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + b i (k(t)u i (t) + 6ui (t»: x(O) given
y(t) = Cx(t)
b. is the event vector for all such failures.
l
(4.1.6)
There are certain component failures which are class ically
thought of as control element failures, but which cannot be modeled
by (4. 1. 3). An example is a change in the time constant of a
hydraulic actuator. Such failures must technically be n10deled as
system dynamics changes since they involve a change in at least
one coefficient of the state matrix A. The example in Section 4. 1. 2
suggests that in most cases such failures mcxles can be modeled
in terms of a single event vector, and that the event vector is
frequently the same as the appropriate column of B.
The next failure model to be considered is the model for a
system dynamics change. There are two types of dynamics changes
to be considf~red -- those that involve changes in the state matrix A
and those which do not. Restricting attention for the moment to
changrs in A, the general failure model is:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + AAx{t): x(O) given
yet) = Cx(t) (4. 1. 7)
If a failure can be mcxleled as a change in only the a ..th element of A
'. lJ
it is simple to show that (4. 1. 7) reduces to:
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y(t)
= .A.x(t) + Bu(t) + e .~a .. (t) x. (t)
n1 1J J
= Cx(t)
xeD) given (4. 1.8)
where e . is the ith unit vector in the state space. Failures
01
modeled by (4. 1. 8) require only the single event vector e . and
nt
therefore are modeled in the same manner as the control element
failures in (4. 1. 6). The change in the time constant of a hydraulic
actuator mentioned earlier is an example of a failure which can
be modeled by (4. 1. 8).
There are two additional instances in which a change in A
can be modeled with a single event vector. The first is if on~y the
elements of the ith row of A change. Phys ically. this corresponds
to the case where the derivative of the ith state variable is altered
by the failure. Equation (4. 1. 7) then reduces to:
~(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + e .( '\ li a .. (t) x.(t)) : x(O)given
n1 L tJ J
j= 1. n
(4. 1. 9)
y(t) z Cx(t)
As was the case with (4.1. 8) the event vector associated with this
failure is e .• If only a single column of A changes, and if the
01
elements of the non- zero column of AA are constant (or at least
have a constant ratio), the event vector can be defined:
f. = \ e. ~a ..J L nl 1J
i= 1, n
and the failure model is:
(4. 1. 10)
x(t) = Ax(t) + f. x .(t)
J J
x(O) given (4.1.11)
yet) = Cx(t)
This corresponds to the case where the derivatives of several
state variables change in similar manners. Failures for which
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(4.1.9) ;tnd (4.1.11) are sllital)le models arE' illu.strated in
Section 4.1.2.
Fc)r an arbitra.ry /iI\J (4.1.7) can be e;\pressed:
i(t) = Ax(t·) + Bu(t) + ~2 (e. '\- ~a .. (t) J{ .(t))
-' n1 L 1J I
i=l,n j=l,n
yet) :; Cx{t)
xeD) given
(4. 1. 12)
From the preceding paragraph, it is clear tllat (4. 1. 12) does not
necessarily imply that the failure model requires n event vectors.
If ~A is constant, and:
rk ~.A = t (4. 1. 13)
the manipulations illustrated by (4. 1. 9) - (4 g 1. 11) can be usecl
to express the failure model in terms of t event vectors o If
~A is time-varying, (4. 1. 13) defines a lower lim it on the number
of event vectors necessary to model the failure. The upper limit
is defined by the nun1ber of non- zero rows in AA.
In the developlnent of failure detection theory in Chapter 3,
it became clear that it is clifficult to detect a large number of
event vectors with a 8ingl(-~ detection filter. Added to this is the
problem th:3.t for arhitrary ~A. the output error signal cannot be
constrained to a sin1-{le direction, but to a hyperplane with a
d imens ion poss ibly equal to the number of event vectors in the
failure model. Understandably, such error signals are more
difficult to associate with their sources. These cons iderations
suggest that a failure detection system may not provide a satis-
factory failure detection capability for such failures.
The discussion to this point has concentrated upon dynamics
changes which are described by changes in A o There is an
i:rlportant class of failures which are best described as dynamics
changes., but which are independent of both A and the value of
x(t). As an example~ a change in the ith com ponent of x(t) can
be modeled by:
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x(t) • Ax(t) + Bu(t) + e . v(t) : x(O) given
nt
yet) = Cx(t) (4. 1. 14)
where 1J (t) is an arbitrary time function of tl1e jump and e . is the
nt
event vector o Such failures are referred to as state- indept.~ndent
dynamics changes. The presence of a single event vector implies
that the state-independent dynamics change in (4.1. 14) is modeled
by the controller failure model (2. 1. 7).
The final failure model to be cons idered is that for a sensor
failure. As was the case with dynamics changes. sensor failur~s
can be divided into two categories -- those which are a function
of the state vector and those which are not. The former include
failures in which the functional ~elationshipbetween the state and
the ser180r output changes. A failure of this type can be modeled
by:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)
yet) = (C+ /}.C (t» x(t)
xeD) given (4. 1. 15)
Ii the failure is in the ith sensor, only the ith row of .6C(t) is
non-zero and (&. 1. 15) reduces to:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) : x(O) given
yet) = Cx(t) + e . ('\ A c..(t) x.(t»)
ml L lJ J
j= 1, n
(4. 1. 16)
Scale fa~tor changes and hard sensor failures are the most common
examples of sensor failures which can be modeled by (4. 1. 16).
The failure model for .a state- independent sensor failure
requires a single additive term in the QutPt..t equat;un. A failure
of this type in the ith sensor can be modeled by:
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x(t) = Ax(t) + Bll(t) : xeD) given (4. 1. 17)
.y(t) = Cx(1) + e . n . (t)
nil <:1
wttere n . (t) is some time ('unction. Sensor l> iases and ra.ndonl drifts(. l
are typical failures which can be rnodeled by (4. 1. 17). An impo!:tant
differen~~e between sensor failure models anf]_ previous failure .models
is that tl1ere are no event vectors in (4.1.16) and (4.1.17) -- the
---_._----,--- -- -- '--_.-
vector e· . appears in the output equation rather than the state
rnl
equation g This difference requires sensor failures to be handled
differently from other failures.
The failure models developed in this section are all of the
form:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + f. n. (t) : x(O) given
1 1
(4. 1. 18)
y(t) = Cx(t) + e . n . (t)
ml Cl
where for notational convenience only a single event vector is
included in the state equation. The additive terms for the various
failure types are summarized in Table 4. 1. The event vectors
associated with sensor failures in Table 4. 1 have not been discussed
yet. They are colurnns of the detection filter D and are a consequence
of the additive terms in the output equations in (4. 1. 15) - (4. 1. 18).
The failure detection system is based upon a reference model
which has the same general structure as a linear observer. The
reference model dynamics are defined by:
X (t) = Ax (t) + Bu(t) + D(y(t) - Y (t»): x(O) given
D1 m m
~ (t) = ex (t)
m m
With the state estimation error and output estimation error
defined:
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(2. 1. 2)
((t) = x(t) - x (t)
m
( , (t) = yet) - y (t)
m (2. 1. 4)
--
Additive term Additive term Event Description
tn in vector
state equation output equation
General failure model 'i "let) eml nclCt) f l , ... d l (4, 1~ 18)
Control-dependent 6b( u(t) I 0 \ £\b l (4, I, 3), (4. 1.6)
Controller (allure b l £\Ul(t) 0 b i (4. 1.3), (4. 1.6)
C!1ntrol- independent b l "tet) 0 hi (4, 1. 3)
Controller fallure
Slatc-cJl'pcnucnl llynnm lca c
nl ~ 8lj(U xj{t) 0 e nl (4. I, 7) - (4. I, 12)
change
State- independent dynamics II (t) e
nL C enl (4, 1. 14)
change
State- dependent 0 eml L\clj~t) ,xj(t) -d. (4. 1. 15), (4. 1. 16)l
sensor fallure
State-independent 0 em1 nCt) -d l (4.1.17)
.on.or failure
the error equations for the failure .detection system estimates after
a control element failure or dynamics change have a similar form to
that of the appropriate failure m~del:
The error equations corresponding to failure of the ith sensor are
different from the sensor failure model in that they are driven by an
event vect~r:
Table 4. 1 General catalog of system failure types
(2. 1. 15) .
(2. 1. 16)(0) given
(0) given
(A-DC) £(t) - d. n .(t)
1 Cl
£(t) = (A-DC) (t) + f. n.(t)
1 1
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£(t) =
('(t) = c£ (t)
£'(t) = C( (t) + e ,nc.(t)
ml 1
TIle alg()rithm~ dev(\Loped i.n Chapter 3 use tl,p event vecf-()rs ill the
error eCfuation~ to ('hose ]). Since the event vector' in (2. 1. If))
is a coilimn of D, this resillts in a circular cll"gum0nt. In ord(~r" to
eljminate this <iifficlllty, it. is necessary to r(~place (2.1.16) with
error equations in which d. does not appear explicitly.
1
Let f be any vector which satisfies:
e . = Cf
mL
(4. 1. 19)
and consider tile consequences of requiring I) in (2.1.16) to be a
detectioll filter for f 0 The discuss ion in Section 3 0 1 (and Lemma
3. 2. 2) nlotivated the fact that D must then satisfy an equation of
the forn}:
(A-DC) f = ~f (4. 1. 20)
where F,f is some vector in the detection space of f. With (4. 1. 19),
(4. 1. 20) can be solved explicitly for d.:
t
d i = M - ~f (4. 1. 21)
It is apparent from (4. 1. 21) that requiri.ng the failure detection
system to detect the lIfailure" associated witll f results in the
ith colman of D being fixed and (2. 1. 16) no longer implies a cir-
cula~ argument. It .is thell poss ible to requi I'e the remaining
columns of D to det(~ct a second "failure" associated with
d. n .(t), i. e. with (Af - ~f) n .(t). To emphasize this requirement,
1 Cl Cl
(2. 1. 16) can be replaced by an error equation with two event vectors:
(t) = (A-DC) £(t) + (Ai - ~f) n .(t) + f
CL
£ '(t) = C( (t)
(4. 1. 22)
Equation (4. 1. 22) associates the event vector ·p.air (f. Af- ~f)
with a failure of the ith sensor (see Section 4. 1. 2 for an example).
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Two points with regard to (4. 1. 22) deserve further comment.
The !lr.§1 is that utilization of two event vectors to eharacter ize
a sensor failure in general implies that the output estimation error
generated by a sensor failure cannot be constrained to a single
output direction. If Cf and C(M-~f) are not colinear and if
C(Af" ~f) is not zero, the output error ~an only be constrained to
the plane spanned by Cf and C (Af - ~f). This non- unid irectionality
of output errors generated by sensor failures is a general property
of linear observers and was not brought about by the definition
of f in (4. 1. 19).
The second point is that the only constraint on f is that it
satisfy (4. 1" 19) and the only constraint on ~f is that it be in the
detection space of f. Frequently, an f can be chos.en which is an
event vector for a control element failure or a dynamics change.
When such an f eXists, a failure detection system designed for
(f, M - ~f} can detect and isolate both the particular compon'2'nt
failur~ associated with f and a failure of the senso~. The component
. . . '.. - .
faililre generates an output error which is unid irectional along
Cf; the sensor failure generates an output error which is constrained
to the plane spanned by Cf and C (M - t
r
). Failure detection
algorithms such as' the majority rule voting law cannot discriminate
between such failures.
The last difficulty with sensor failures concerns sensors
which are linearly dependent. If rkC < m, the output of some
sensor is a linear combination of the output of the remaining
sensors. This fact intnoduces a certain ambiguity in determining
sensor failures. As an example. if two sensors are identical,
it is imposs ible to determ ine from the failure detection system
output which of them has failed. The remedy involves an increase
in the dimension of the state model.
Assume rkC = m-2 and the last two sensors are linearly
dependent upon the first m- 2 sensors. Denote by C 2 the
m-
matrix formed from the first m- 2 rows of C and let the last
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two rows of C be eland c respectively. If the failure
m- m
detection system is designed for the reference model (A, B, C:)
where:
A = - - - - - -- t - -- - B - - - - -=0-------0 I 0 0 0- -- -0
0------0 0 0 0--- - -0
0 0
, I
II I
a I(~
m-2 0
C = ... - ~ ... .-, - - ~c
m-l 1 0
c 0 1
m
A
I 0 0
I
t
I I
o 0
B
(4. 1. 23)
then, assuming the initial conditions on the last two elements of
the augmented state vector x (t) are zero, (A, B, C) is input-
output equivalent to (A, B, C). Since the rows of C are linearly
independent, no ambiguity in sensor failure detection for (A, B, C)
exists. A detection filter 5 can be chosen to assign all n+2
eigenvalues of A- DC and all event vectors can be defined on the
enlarged state space, etc. The intuitive meaning of (4. 1. 23)
is that, even though the aclded state vector components are always
zero, their presenc(~ allows the failure detection system to use
the last two elements in the state estimate x (t) to determine
m
which sensor has failed. [f one of the last two sensors fails, the
correspond ing added component to x (t) becomes non- zero.
m
Equation (4. Ie 23) is obviously generalizable to as many
dimensions as necessary. The trick of adding observable but
uncontrollable dynamics to the reference model suggests that
the problem with detecting failures in linearly dependent sensors
is more algebriac than physical a A e im ilar state space augmen-
tation was used in Section 3. 3. 4 to make unassignable eigen-
values of A-DC assignable.
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4. 1. 2 An Example
The spinning cylinder example of Section 3. 3. 2 can be
used to illustrate the comments on modeling in the previous
subsection. For convenience, the bas ic mathematics of the
problem are restated.
The problem is one 0f controlling the spin of a cylinder
in a viscous medium. The dynamic response of the cylinder
to an externally applied torque is given by:
m·(t) + e ~(t) = O! T(t): 4'(0), I~(O) givenr r "'t" (4.1. 24)
where T(t) is the applied torque. The torquing device is first-
order and described by:
.
T (t) + ef T(t) = 0'1 cp c (t) + Tf(t) T(O) given (4. 1. 25)
,
where tfJ
c
(t) is the c(j~nnH'.nded roll angle and T f(t) is a feedback
torque to improve the system response. It is assumed that the
rotational angle and the rot~tional rate of the cylinder are measured
as cp (t) and cP, (t) respectively. The control law is given by:
m m
(4. 1. 26)
As in Section 3. 3. 2, it is assumed that the applied torque T(t)
is measured. A block diagram for this system is given in
Figure 3. 1.
The open loop dynamics of the system do not include the
feedback law (4. 1. 26) and can be described by the state vector:
0(t)
•x (t) = (,0 (t)
o
T{t)
and the triad (A , B , C ).
o 0 o·
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1 o 0 o 1 o o
c = 0
( )
1 o A = 0 -s ct
orr
() o 1 o o
-a f
E(luation (4.1.27) is an acceptable model UP(>ll which to design a
failure detectic)n system. The failures of possible interest are
failures in:
i) the attitude sensor
ii) ~he rate sensor
ii i) the torquing device
iv) the torque Ineasuring device
Since the control law is not included in the model, failures in
the controller cannot be detected. Only the first two failures
are discussed here. The complete failure detection system is
cons idered in Section 4. 5.
Assume for the moment that the sensor failures may be hard
failures only. The relevant failure model is the state-del'Jendent
failure model of (4.1.15):
X (t) = A x (t) + B u (t)
o 0 0 0 0
(4. 1. 15 )
Y (t) = C x (t) + !J. C x (t)
o 0 0 0 0
The attitude and rate sensor failures can be described by choosing
AC such that the appropriate sensor output becomes zero, i. e. :
o
-1
/1 C x (t) = 0
o 0
o
for an attitude sensor .failure and: .
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o 0
o 0 X
o
(t) = -e31rp(t)
o 0
(4. 1. 28)
o o o
4 C x (t) =o 0
o o o
for a rate sensor failure. In accordance with (2. 1. 16) (see Section
4. 1. 1), if ( (t) and (' (t) denote the state estimation error anda a
output estimation error generated by the attitude sensor failure,
the error equations are:
i (t) = (A -DC) £ (t) + d 1 c.o(t)a 0 0 a .
£ I (t) = C £ (t) - e31 rp(t)a. 0 a (4.1.30)
Similarly, if £ (t) and (/(t) are the corresponding estimationr r
errors generated by the rate sensor failure, then the error
equations are~
( (t) = <A -DC ) E (t) + d2 eP(t): (r(O):I: 0rOo r
('(t) = C £ (t) - e 32 <p<t)r 0 r (4. 1. 31)
where d
1
and d2 above are the first and second columns of D
respectively.
The design algorithms developed in Chapter 3 do not permit
columns of D to appear in the error state equations in the same
manner as event vectors. An algorithm for replacing (4. 1. 30)
and (4. 1. 31) with equbralent error equations without d 1 and d2
was detailed in Section 4. 1. 1. Consider (4. 1. 30) as an example.
The first step is to define an event vector fa such that:
e31 = C f, 0 a (4. 1. 32)
i. e. the output direction associated with fa must be e31• Since
C is the identity matrix, the unique solution is:o
(4. 1. 33)
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Jf D is required to be a detection filter for fa' (4. 1.21) states
that d] is:
ell = A f + Q' f
o a a a
w.here U' can be ch()sen arbitrarily (f is its own detection
a a
Rpace).
(4. 1. 34)
With (4. 1.34), the explicit appearance ()f d 1 in (4.1 0 30) is
(~liminclted and, since A f is zero, the output error generated
oa
})y the attitude sensor failure is:
£(t) = (A -D C ) £ (t) + Ct tp(t) f : £ (0) = 0
o 0 a a a a
(~(t) = Co «t) - e31 0(·t)
(4.1. 35)
But D was required to be a detection filter for fa' and e31 is
the output direction associated with f ; therefore, e' (t) is
a a
unidirectional. For failure detection purposes the additive term
in the output equati on is redundant - - an equivalent set of equations
is:
( (t) = (A - DC ) ( (t) + Q' <.O{t) f : f (0) = 0
a 0 0 a a· a a
£' (t) = C f: (t)
a 0
(4. 1. 36)
f is the event vector associated with an attitude sensor failure
a
and (4. 1. 36) is the equation which must be used with the algorithms
in Chapter 3.
The attitude sensor failure is a special case in that D can
be chosen such that the output error in (4. 1. 36) (hence in (4. 1. 35)
and (4. 1. 30» is unidirectional. In general, the output error
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for a sensor failure can only be constrained to be planar. Consider
(4. 1. 31) and the rate sensor failure. The algorithm from Section
4. 1. 1 again requires that an event vector f be found such that:
r
and again there is a unique solution. If D is required to be
a detection filter for f
r
• however. d 2 is the sum of two linearly
independent vectors:
d 2 = A f + Ci for rr
= (4.1. 38)
where rt is arbitrary. .With d2 satisfying (4. 1. 38), a set of equations
equivalent to (4. 1. 31) for failure detection purposes is:
( (t) = (A - DC) ( (t) + <p(t) A f + <p(t) ~ f :
roo r or r
(r(O) = 0
( I (t) = C ( (t)
r 0 r
(4. 1. 39)
In contrast to (4. 1. 36), (4. 1. 39) has two event vectors. It
is always true that the choice of d2 leaves sufficient freedom in
the choice of D to insure that the output error from (4. 1~ 39)
is planar, but in thls case it is not possible to choose D such
that the output error is unid irectional. Hence, the output error
generated by a rate sensor failure can only be constrained to
.,
a two-dimensional plane~
The notation adopted in. this chapter is that sensor failures
are associated with a pair of event vectors. Thus the rate sensor
, .
failure is associated with the pair {f , A f } and the attitude
r 0 r *
~ensor failure is associated with the pair (fa' O}. These event ,
For convenience, a and Ct are chosen to be zero; however, any
value is acceptable. a~he choice of Ct and a affects the direction
of the event vectors, but not the outpftt directions associated with
the failure.
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vectors are independent of the manner in which the sensor fails.
If a failure mode other than the hard failure modeled by (4. 1. 28)
and (4. 1. 29) were assumed, the only difference in (4. 1. 30) -
(4.1. 39) would be in the time functions which multiply the different
vectors.
The preceeding discussion on sensor failures is pertinent
only if an opEn loop reference rnodel is the bas is for the failure
detection system. If a sensor output is used in the control loop,
then the sensor's function in th.e closed loop is that of a (iynamic
element. If the failure detection system is then based u~ton the
closed loop reference model, ct single event vector is associated
with the sensor failure and D ca.n be chosen such that the sensor
failure generates a unidirectiona.l output error. This feature
can be demonstrated using the spinning cylinder example.
The closed loop reference mO\iel is the model analyzed in
Section 3. 3. 2, which includes the eontrol law (4. 1. 26). The
state vector is:
cp (t)
m.
x (t) =
c
e;, (t)
•
cp (t)
rn
T(t)
and the 8y~tem model is:
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
C 0 0 1 0 A
c
1 -~ 0 Ci B 0= = r r =c c
0 0 0 1 0
- ~ 0 Qfr 0r
-CY 1 0 -a2 -~f at
(4. 1. 40)
21)1
The control law is algebraic, but it is still necessary to increase
the dimension of the system model to four. Since the measured
•attitude <Pm (t) and rate cP m (t) are used in the control law, these
measurements are included in the state vector. (The first two
rows of C
c
no longer correspond to failures in the sensors. )
•It is also necessary to include the true rotation rate <p (t) in
the state vector in order to properly model <Pm (t) after a rate
sensor failure. The true attitude cp(t) can be om itted 8 inee it
has no dynamic effect on the other state variables.
A failure detection system for (A Be) can be designed
c' c' c
for the failures i) - iv) mentioned earlier plus:
v) a failure in the controller
As discussed in Section 3. 3. 2, the attitude and rate ~ensor
failures are not mutually detectable for this model since there
is an unassignable eigenvalue of A -D C associated with
c c c
<p(t). Means for c·ompensating for this fact by a further increase
in the dimension of the model are discussed in Section 4.2.
For present purposes, it is convenient to assume that the
unassignable eigenvalue is acceptable and to iJnore it.
Although the closed loop model can detect failures in both
the torquing device and the control1aw, these failures are detection
equivalent, i. e. it is not possible to discern between them on
the basis of output error direction alone (Definition 3. 1. 1).
The same difficulty is encountered in attempting to determine
whether a controller failure is due to a change in the attitude
feedback gain Qf 1 or the rate feedback gain Ci2- A general control
law failure can be modeled as a change in the last row of A:
0 0 0 0
AA 0 0 0 0 (4. 1. 41)=
0 ·0 0 0
4°1 0 4~2 0
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By comparison with the state-dependent dynamics change model
in (4. 1. 9), the failure can be modeled by a single event vector
e 44 and the error equations become:
E-c(t) = (Ac-DCc ) (c(t) + e44 (a0l 1c,om(t) + .6012 ~m(t)):
(c(O) = 0
£' (t) = C £ (t)
c c c
The output di.rection associated with the failure is:
(4. 1. 42)
(4. 1.43)
Since ACt} and ~.Ct'2 have the same event vector in (4.1. 42),
output error direction alone is not sufficient to determine
whether ~Cil' ACi2 , or both cause the failure. If a torquing
device failure is modeled by AS f and ~CicJ the event vector is
also e44 and the output error for this failure is also along e 33 •
The correlation techniques of Section 5. 4 suggest one procedure
for discrim inating among ~Q'l' ~r:t2J and torquing device failures.
An attitude sensor failure can be modeled in the closed
loop case as a change in any or all of the elements of the first
row of A
c
• Similarly the third row corresponds to a rate sensor
failure. Suitable state-dependent failure models can be based
on:
~al1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~A = tJA =a 0 0 0 0 r Aa330 +a -(ir r
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4. 1. 44)
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'l'he event vectors are e41 and e43 respectively and the error
equations are:
and:
"( I (t) = C £ (t)
a c a
(4. 1. 45)
(t) = (A -DC ) £ (t) + e43(Aa33:a (t) + ~ ~(t) - O! T(t»: £ (0) = 0
r c c r ·m r r r
('.(t) = C ( (t)
r c r (4. 1. 46)
In both cases AA has been chosen such that the driving terms for
CPm (t) and tP
m
(t) are canceled and, if Aall and ba33 are negative,
that 'Pm (t) and ~m(.~) after the failure decay to zero. Each failure
model required on·~ a single event vector and it follows that a
detection filter can be chosen such that the sensor failures
produce unidirectional output--along e 31 and e 32 respectively.
The same event vectors and output directions would have been
obtained if (4. 1. 14) had been used to model the sensor failures
as biases.
The torque sensor is not used in the control law and an output
error signal due to its failure can only be constrained to a plane.
This distinction between measurements incorporated in the control
law and measurements not incorporated in the control law is a
general property of closed loop reference models. The implication
of this to the design of a faiJure detection system is discussed
further in Section 4. 1. 3.
4. 1. 3 General Modeling Considerations
The choice of an acceptable referen.ce mOdel (A, B, C)
for the failure detection system involves an element of judgement
on the part of the designer. It was pointed out in Section 3. 2. 2
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that no advantage is to be gained from accepting an unobservable
model. A detection filter can be des igned for an unobservable
model and the resulting filter will perform precisely as if it
had been designed for a lower dimensional, observable reference
model. The cost of an unobservable model is an increase in both
the computation required in the des ign of the detection filter and
in,"the computation necessary to use the model in real-time. Even
if the state estimate produced by the failure detection system is
to be used in the control law for the system, no useful information
can be gathered from the unobservable dynam ics of the model.
If the reference model becomes unobservable because of a sensor
failure in the system .. the model may still be used. Otherwise..
the reference model should be observable.
The des igner has cons iderable freedom in chaos ing the manner
in which a failure is to be modeled. Every mathematical model
is an approximation of reality. The choice of the reference
model dictates to a certain extent the manner in which a failure
can be modeled. If the model is too precise, more event vectors
may be required to model the failure of a component than if a
less precise model were used. It is generally true that a reference
model in which only the principal effects of the failure are noticed
provides adequate failure detection without requiring excessive
computation.
The most bas ic modeling decis ion the des igner has to
make- - the choice between modeling the open loop or closed
loop dynamics-- has a major effect upon the structure of the
failure detection problem. Implementations in both the open
loop and closed loop cases are illustrated in Figure 4. 1. One
advantage of us ing an open loop model is that the state estimate
x (t) produced by the failure detection system can be used by
m
the controller in the feedback control law. This possibility is
indicated in Figure 4e la. Application of a failure detection system
in this context is discussed in Chapter 5.
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u(t)r------I CONTROLLER -.----....
x",(t)
ym(t)
u(t) OPEN LOOP
SYSTEM
y(t)
Figure 4. la Implementation of a failure detection system to
monitor failures in the open loop system x (t)
can be used in the control law. m
f x", (t) .Ym (t)
y(t)CLOSED LOOP· ...... A--__..
-SYSTEivi
Figure 4. Ib Implementation of a failure detection system to
monitor failures in the closed loop system.
Failures in both the plant and the controller -can
be monitored.
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Aside from the state estimator possibilities for an open
loop reference model, there are a number of failure detection
advantages and disadvantages to be considered in choosing the
reference model. In general, three advantages can be gained
if the closed loop reference model is substituted for the open
loop model:
i) failures in the control law can be detected ..
ii) for sensors whose output is used in the control1aw,
the output error signals generated by a failure can
be made unid irectional, and
iii) for a set of sensors which are not linearly independent
but whose output is used in the control law, a failure
can be associated unambiguously with tIle appropriate
sensor.
The last two items ~re in marked contrast to the open loop case,
although with an increase in the order of the open loop model
failures in linearly dependent sensors can be detected unambigollsly
for that case also.
Along with these advantages of a closed loop reference model,
there are also two disadvantages:
i) the closed loop model may be of higher dimension than
the open loop model, and
ii) failures which are mutually detectable for an open loop
model may not be mutually detectable for a closed loop
model.
The increase in dimension may occur even if the control law in
the controller is algebraic rather than dynamic. The loss of
mutual detectability is caused by the possible introduction of
unassignable eigenvalues for Ac-DcC
c
• All of these factors
were illustrated in Section 4. 1. 2.
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4. 2 Filter Des ign Procedure
The general des 19n problem for a detection filter is outlined
1n this section. Thls section and Section 4. 4 on base normal forn~
present a reasonable procedure for designing a failure detection
system based upon Chapter 3. Many of the design algorithms
presented in this section are trivial if the system is expressed
in base normal canonical form. In particular. a detection filter
for a set of r < m event vectors can be chosen by inspection.
The design algorithms are illustrated for a satellite orbit pertur-
bation problem in Section 4. 3. The base normal canonical form
is used exclusively in Chapters 5 and 6.
In the algorithms to follow. it is assumed that the reference
model (A, B, C) is observable. As discussed in Sections 3.2.2
and 4. 1, there is no advantage in having an unobservable model.
If an unobservable model is used. Sections 3. 2. 2 and 3. 2. 3
should be used to reinterpret the following algorithms.
Many of the statements of this section concern the event
vectors f t - - - f r • h t - _. hq• It is implicitly assumed that if
somej:f. is zero. f. is replaced by the first element of M .•2 1 1 21
A f i ... for which the corresponding element of CMi• CA f i ... is
non- zero. A s im ilar procedure is assumed for h... Whenever
. 1
event vectors are used, ft is understood that this substitution is
made where necessary.
4. 2. 1 Detection Spaces
The first step in the design procedure is to determine
acc~ptable event vectors for the failures of interest and then
find their detection'.~paces. The remarks of Section 4. 1. 1
concerning the replacement of columns of D by equivalent sets
of event vectors are applicable. Before the des ign procedure
is completed, pairs of ev~nt vectors cr. M - CfL where Cf
is in the detection space of f. s·hould be associated with all
sensor failures, or means for uniquely determining the
20~
appropriate columns of D before D is completely specified
should be developed. In general it is des irable to determ ine
the detection spaces for failures with wel1- defined event
vectors before considering an improvement in the sensor
failure model. This permits a judicious choice of ~f in the set
U, Af + tfL
Assume fl ••• f are a set of event vectors for a set ofs .
s failures of interest. Assume also that a failure in the ith
sensor is to be monitored. Placing the sensor failure in the
form of (4.1. 22) requires an f which satisfies (4.1.19). In
order of preference, the procedures for accomplishing this are:
i) If any of ft ••• f
s
satisfy:
let:
e · = Cfkmt
f = f k
k E (I, 2 ••• s}
and define the event vector set (f, Af}. This set is the set
of event vectors necessary for (4. 1. 22).
ii) If ft ••• f t are a subset of ft ••• fs and a linear combination
of f t and ft satisfies:
then define the set {f1" •• ft' d i}. This option is discussed f'.lI'ther
below. ..
iii) Find any f which satisfies:
e . = Cf
ml
and define the set (f, Afl.
209
Option ii) above differs from the algorithm suggested in Section
4. 1.1 in that d. need not be eliminated. If a detection filter is chosen
1
~hich_detects fl ••• f.t and the eigenvalues of A-DC associated with
R1. • •R.t are asstgned us Lng Section 4.2. 4, d i is uniquely defined. If
sufficient freedom remains in the choice of D to detect d., then the
1
sensor failure can be detected along with the failures for f 1••• f t and
it produces output in the output space defined bye. and Cd .•
fit 1
In i) and iii) above Af can be replaced by M- ~f where ~f is an
arbitrary element of Rf" If Af is contained in Rf , the sensor error can
be made unidirectional and only f need be considered. Tl1e three
steps are presented in order of the efficiency with which they utilize
the des ign freedom in the choice of D. Since iii) requiret3 two new
event vectors to be defined, it is obviously the least efficient. Option
ii) is the most difficult to implement, iii) is the eas iest. Option l)
should always be exam ined first.
Starting from an initial set of event vectors f 1- • - f
s
' application
of i) - iii) produces a larger set fl ••• fp • As indicated, some of the
event vectors in the set must be cons idered in pairs for the des ign
algorithm. If a sensor failure is characterized by the pair of event
vectors {f, Af}. it is of no value to design a detection filter for only
one event vector· of the pair. In the following subsections, this paired
dependency is not explicitly denoted, but it must be r·ecognized in
the des ign process.
Conceptually. detection spaces are simple to determine. If
an event vector f. satisfies Cf. ~ 0 and if Df and C I are chosen as1 1
suggested in Lemm"a 3. 2. 6 ':
Dr = Af. [ (Cf.)T Cf.r 1 (Cf.)T
1 1 1 1
c' (4. 2. 1)
T~~nRi is the vi-dimensional unobservable space of the system
(A-DfC. C '). 'the principal difference between C ' and C is that the
"output direction Cfi has been excised from the output space
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e'f. = 0
L
(4.2.2)
(4.2.3)
(4.2.4)C R. = 0
. 1
R. = [f.: R.]
1 1 1
i) If R. is II.- dimensional, g .•
__ 1 1 1
R., and
L v.- 2
ii) The vectors gi' A~••• ALgi are in the null space of C.
and the range space of R. is R. as defined in Definition 3.1.2, i. e. , R.
11
is in the null space of C:
A computational algorithm for R. is given in Appendix A.2. The
1
algorithm determines a n x II. matrix R. whose range space is R. where
1 1
I). is the d imens ion of R.. The matrix is partitioned:
1 1
If Cf. is zero~ it should be replaced by the fi~st element of Af.,
2 1 L
A f .•••• for which the corresponding eM., CA2f .••• is non-zero.
1 L L
of C'; a similar relationship holds for Df and the image of f i under
A-Dr c:
The algorithm in Appendix A.2 is less direct than it could be because
it determ ines several other quantities needed for des igning a detection
filter.
In assigning the eigenvalues of A-DC, or in defining the trans-
formation to base normal canonical fornl, the detection generator·
g. for 7(. is useful. The detection generator is defined in Lemnla 3. 2. 4.
1 1
It possesses two important properties:
IJ.- 1
Ag.••• A L g. form a bas is for
1 1
Since f. is in R., i) implies that constants p .1 ••• p. exist such that:
1 1 1 LV.
1
11.- 1
f. ~ p. A L g. + ••• P-2Ag. + P.l g. (4.2.5)
1 LIJ: 1 1 4 1 1 1
1
Appendix A. 3 provides an algorithm for g. similar to that used for "R.•
l 1
4. 2. 2 Multiple Event Detection
Once a set of event vectors fl ••• f has been chosen, the next
. . p
step in the design of a fa~lure detection system is to determine the
subsets of flo 0 0 f p which can be detected with a single detection filter.
The Detection Theorem (Theo~em 3. 2. 1) guarantees that a detection
filter for a single event vector can always be found; the matrix Df
is an ~cceptable choice of D. Unfortunately the analys is involved
in finding subsets of fl o 0 0 fp for which a detection filter exists is
more difficult. Section 3. 3 provides a complete set of algorithms
for this purpose.
Consider a subset flo.of
r
of flo .ofp and define the matrix:
. (4. 2. 6)
The subspace 3 is spanned by flo 0 • frO The vectors flo 0 0 f
r
are
defined to be ~utput separable (Definition 3. 3. 2) if:
rkF = rkCF (4. 2. 7)
Lemma 3. 3. 1 proves output separability is sufficient to guarantee
that D can be chosen such that the failures associated with fl. • · f
r
generate unid irectional output errors - - an acceptable choice of D
is 0.7 as given belowo Tbe difficulty is that the definition of
mutual detectability (Definition 3. 3. 1) requires that a D exist such
that:
i) the output errors generated by the failures ~4s8ociatedwith
f l - - • fare unid irectional, andr I
ii) the eigenvalues of A-DC can be specified almost arbitrarily
by the proper choice of D.
Output separability is not sufficient to guarantee that both conditions
i) and ii) above can be satisfied.
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(4.2.8)
The determination of a sufficient condition for mutual detecta-
bility requires a generalization of the concept of detection spaces.
If J is the range space of F I Definition ;3. 3. 3 defines a detection
space R,.. for J". R:r is similar to the ordinary detection spaces dis-
cussed in Section 4. 2. 1 except that the single vector f is replaced
by the space"'. In essence R,..defines the group detection properties
of f 1••• f
r
- - this interpretation is motivated in the example in
Section 3.3.2. It can be found in the same manner as R1•• oRr. If
D,.. and C I are defined:
D,.. 2: AF[ (CF)TCFr 1(C'F)T
Cfr = [Em - CF[ (CF)T C£i'r 1(CF)TJ C
then Lemma 3. 3. 2 states that R:r is the unobservable space of the system
(A-D,..C. C I). The algorithm in Appendix A. 2 determines R:r as-~the
range space of a matrix RF . The matrices RF and RF are defined
similarly to R i and R i :
(4. 2,- 9)
The algorithm suggests that R:r be computed first and then R10 0 0 R
r
be determined from RJ instead of 7l(C)GlF.
The important feature of R,.. is that it contains each of R10 0 oRr
as well as their direct sum (Lemma 3. 3. 4):
In matrix terms. this implies that:
rk RF ~ rk [R l : • 0 0 : RrJ
= rk [F: H l : ••• : HrJ
213
(4. 2. 10)
(4. 2. 11)
---------------------------------------~-
and th$).t the range space of RF contains the range spaces of all of
R 1. • • Rr • The difficulties involved with detecting f r .. f r with a
single detection filter concern the inequalities in (4. 2. 10) and (4. 2. 11).
Theorem 3. 3. 1 states that a necessary an,) sufficient cond ition for
f 1- • • f
r
to be mutually detectable is for (4. 2. 10) (and therefore (4. 2. 11»)
to be an equality.
If (4. 2. 10) is an equality, the remainder of t'nis subsectio!l is
not needed. Assuming (A,'C) is observable, a detection filter can
be chosen for fl ••• f
r
and all n eigenvalues of A-DC can be assigned
using the techniques of Section 4.2.4 or Section 4.4. If (4.2. 10)
is not an equaiity, Lemma 3. 3. 1 guarantees that a D can still be
chosen for which each failure associated wit1:1 one of fl. r • f
r
produces
a unidirectional output error. but some of the eigenvalues of A- DC
cannot be assigned. If 110 is defined:
110 = rk RF - I
i= 1, r
rk R.
1
v.
1
(4. 2. 12)
i= 1, r
a total of 110 of the eigenvalues of A-DC have a fixed value which
cannot be altered ~Lemmas 3. 3. 5 and 3. 3. 8).
Lemma 3.3.6 constructs a 110 -dimensional sUbspaceR~g-­
called the excess SUbspace of Rj . - - such that:
(4. 2. 13)
If D is chosen such that each of f l - _• f r l~enerate a unidirectional
output error I the un.ass ignable eigenvalues of A- DC are the eigenvalues
associated with ROg. .A ppendix d. 3 provides an algorithm for
determining these eigenvalues. A matrix R Og is constructed whose
range space is ROg. With G defined in terms of the detection generators
for R1•• .~r~
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(4. 2. 14)
a 110 X 110 matrix n and a r X 110 matrix @.'are constructed in Appendix
A. 3 such that:
(4. 2. 15)
The unaS8 ignable eigenvalues of A- DC are the eigenvalues of n
(Lemma 3. 3. 8).
Once the excess subspace of Rj" and the unassignable eigenvalues
of A- DC have been determ ined, three OptiOllS are available to the
designer:
i) choose a D for which each of f 1••• f
r
generate unid irectional
output errors and accept the 110 unassignable eigenvalues
of A-DC,
ii) find a subset of f 1- _• f
r
for which their are no unase ignable
eigenvalues of A- DC, or
iii) increase the dimension of the reference model to Pr in such a
~ FtJ ~
manner that all the eigenvalues of A- DC are assignable.
The choice between these options obviously depends upon the acceptability
of the eigenvalues of n as eigenvalues of A- DC. If either of the last
two options is chosen, Sections 3. 3. 3 and 3. 3. 4 respectively provide
a complete analytical basis for the two algorithms discussed in the
remainder of this subsection.
C·ons ider the problem of removing event vectors from f 1- • • f
r
first. The Detection Theorem (Theorem 3. 2. 1) guarantees that
anyone vector of f 1" " "fr is detectable" Therefore, as vectors are
removed from the set f l " " • f r , the number of unassignable eigenvalues
of A- DC should decrease. It is pass ible to remove one or more
vectors from f l "" .fr , find a new R3' for the remaining vectors, check
for mutual detectability, etc. The problem is that if r is large, the
computation required to ultimately obtain a Inutually detectable subset
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of f 1- • O' f
r
may be prohibitive. Theorem 3. 3. 3 and its corollaries
present a more efficient algorithm.
If the first t vectors of ft ••• f
r
are removed, Theorem 3. 3. 3
defines a matrix MOL:
(4. 2. 16)
where S~ is the first L rows of S in (4. 2. 15). Corolla~y 1 of Theorem
3. 3. 3 then defines a "0 X V6 transformation matrix [A: $ ] L where
the V oL columns of ~ span the null space of MOLand the VO-VOL columns
of A span the royr space of MOL - - Appendix A.1 provides an algorithm
which yields [£1.: Ia.] L' Both 0 and fbg for the original r event vectors
can then be transformed:
. -1 .
= [A: ~] L 0 [~: a]L :I
nC : 0L I
I
f
-------r-----·
C f
0LO I DL (4. 2. 17)
where nL is VOL X VOL' ROgL is n x VOL etc. Corollary 1 of Theorem
3. 3. 3 states that the excess subspace for ft + l' •• f r is the range space
of fbgL. If D is chosen such that each of f t + l' •• f
r
generates a uni-
directional output error, the unass ignable eigenvalues of A- DC are the
VOL eigenvalues of nL • Since the eigenvalues of a matrix are not
changed by a similarity transformation, the VOL eigenvalues of
fiL must be a subset of the Vo eigenvalues of 11-. Clearly the theorem
is applicable to the removal of t arbitrarily chosen event vectors
from ft ••• f
r
if s~ is chosen to be the appropriate rows of S.
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Although (4.2.16) and (4.2.17) are computationally more efficient
than determining R,- f~r the event vectors f-t,+ l' •• f
r
and then finding ROgL
and UL directly, CorGl1ary 2 of Theorem 3. 3. 3 perm its a much greater
savings. The procedure is to apply Theorem 3.3. 3 and Corollary 1
by first elim inating only f 1 from f 1... f
r
, and then only f 2 from f 1· · · f r
and so on for r iterations. This yields a set of r equations similar to
(4. 2. 15):
(4. 2. 18)
where Gk is G with the k
th ~olumn deleted. Ek is ® with the kth row
deleted. the range space of ROgk is the excess subspace after fk is
removed from fl ... f
r
, and the eigenvalues of nk are the corresponding
unassignable eigenvalues of A-DC. If any R Ogk is zero. the r-l
event vectors f 1- · · fk_ l' fk+ 1. · · f r are mutually detectable.
With the r solutions from (4. 2. 18). let A1••• Ar be the sets of
eigenvalues for the corresponding fi 1_.. nr . If any arbitrary subset
of fl' •• f
r
is removed from fl' • "f
r
• Corollary 2 states that the un-
assignable eigenvalues of A-DC associated with the ~emaining event
vectors can be determined from the intersections of t'be appropriate
set of A1... A
r
. As an example, if both f 1 and f 2 are removed fronl
f 1- . · fr , the unass ignable eigenvalues of A- DC aS80C tated with f 3- · - f r
are the intersection of A1 and A2 ~
If AI is the empty set, then f 3... f r are mutually detectable; if not.
otller combinations can be tried. Corollary 2 of Theorem 3. 3. 3
generalizes this simple test to all possible subsets of fl. · · f
r
.
The intersections prescribed by Corollary 2 of Theorem 3. 3. 3
are trivial to evaluate once nl' " • fir and then At" •• A
r
have been
determined from (4. 2. 18) using Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 3. 3 and
Appendix A.3. It then becomes a simple matter to determine all
possible mutually detectable subsets of fl ... f
r
. As an alternative,
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it is possible to determine larger subsets of fl ••• f
r
which are not
mutually detectable, but for which the corresponding unassignable
eigenvalues of A-DC are acceptable. This amounts to a compromise
between options i) and ii) mentioned earlier. In some applications,
either of these alternatives yields a subset of fl ••• f
r
which is
smaller than desired, or which contains only one of a pair of event
vectors associated with a sensor failure. In such cases option iii)
can be utilized to yield a larger set of mutually detectable event vectors
than option ii).
An unfortunate feature of failure detection theory is that the
mutual detectability of certain failures is a function of the choice of
the reference model upon which the failure detection system is to
be based. This model dependence is shared by other aspects of systems
theory -- most notably, by output decQupling theory (Wonham and
Morse (1970B) and Howze and Pearson (1970). .Just as dynamic
compensation was developed to eliminate model-dependency in the
output decQupling problem, the state space augmentation techniques
developed in Section 3" 3. 4 eliminate model-dependency in the mutual
detectability problem. The power of state space augmentation is
summarized in Theorem 3. 5. 1: The vectors f 1••• f
r
c~n be. made
mutually detectable with state space augments.~on if and only if they
are output separable. Since the rank of C is m, this guarantees that
m appropriately chosen failures' can be detected with a single failure
detection system. The cost is that the reference model upon which
the failure detection system iZ3 based may have a larger d imens ion
than the original reference model.
Consider (4. 2. 18) again. If:
rkn = rkDk (4. 2. 20)
then removing fk from fl. _• fr does not alter the mutual detectability
of fl- • .f
r
-- there are still 110 unassignable eigenvalues of A-DC
associated with the remaining r-l event vectors. Corollary 2 of
Theorem 3. 3. 3 implies that (4. 2. 20) is sufficient to guarantee
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that fk can be in every mutually detectable subset of f 1.•. fre Lemma
3. 3. 10 constructs a reference model from (A, B, C) such that (4. 2. 20)
is satisfied for fk and the new reference model:
A
- gk Ak a B
~ [c : 0] J1"ooJ IC = A :: - .- - - -- - - 1- - - - - - - - _. B = (4.2.21)
0 nC 0k
where gk is the kth column of G, ak is the kth row of @, and IJ and
n~ are the appropriate terms in (4. 2. 17) if Theorem 3. 3. 3 is evaluated
for fk and the original reference model (A, B, C). The new reference
model (X, i3, C) is input- output equivalent to the original reference
model. If Theorem 3. 3. 3 were then evaluated for fk and the newI'Ve
reference model, nk would be zero and
as desired.
rkfik =rk n (4. 2. 22)
Lemma 3. 3. 10 can be applied sequentially for the event vectors
in the set fl ••• f
r
until a reference model (~. ~, ~) is finally obtained
for which f 1... f
r
are mutually detectable. Regardless of the order in
\yhtch the state space augmentations are undertaken, Theorem 3~ 3. 4
states that the final reference model will have a d imens ion of~
~ = n + I (Vo - rk Ok) - 110
k= I, r
= n + I rk O~ - 110
k= 1, r
(4. 2. 23)
where V o is the rank of n. After each application of Lemma 3.3. 10,
f"'tJ
it is necessary to determine the excess subspace Rog and the detection
spaces for fl ••• f
r
for the new reference model. Lemmas 3. 3. 10
and 3. 3. 11, and Appendix A.3, provide algorithms which are
computationally more efficient than returning to Appendix P:l..2.
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In certain applications, state space augmentation may result
t=::1
in a large n for the final reference model. This shortcoming is
partially compensated for by the fact that the reference model can
be decoupled into a set of r smaller reference models, the sum of whose
".,.,
dimensions is n(Section 4. 4). If this still yields an unacceptable
computational burden, some trade- off between opiions i) - iii) must
be accepted.
4. 2. 3 Output Stationarity
The analysis of the preceding subsection begins with an output
separable subset f 1••• f
r
of event vectors for which a detection filter
may be chosen. The algorithm in Section 4. 2. 2 may have increased
the dimension of the reference model and it may have subsequently
removed vectors from f 1- - _f
r
• For notational convenience, however,
the final reference mOQel and set of event vectors are still denoted
by (A, B, C) and flo 0 • f
r
respectivelyo It is not necessary that flo • 0 f
r
be mutually detectable. The vectors of f
r
+ 1000f p which are not output
separable with f 1- _• f
r
are denoted by hI ••• h ir! this subsection and
- -q
their detection spaces are denoted by 0110 0001qO
Even if unassignable eigenvalues of A-DC are acceptable. the
results on mut1.lal detectabillty provide for a maximum of rk C
failures to be detected by a single failure detection systerrl. Output
stationarity (Definition.3. 4.1) seeks to determine whether or not
particular choices of D can be found which increase this number •
.
In the context· of tht! previous subsection, it was determined that
f 1• 00fr is the largest subset of f 10 • 0fp for which a failure detection
sys.tem based on mutual detectability can be found. Output stationarity
considers the problem of trying to find a D such that each of ft" 0 • f
r
, hi
gen~rates a unidirectional output error. where h. is one of h 1 ••• h1 - q
defined above. The cost of using output stationarity to increase the
number of failures which can be detected by a single failure detection
system is that certain eig~nvalues of A- DC may have to be ass igned
a multiplicity greater than one... The advantage of this approach,
however. is that it may significantly increase the number of failures
which can be detect~ by a single failure detection system.
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By definition, f l - _• f , h. are not output separable. Sincer 1
f 1- • • f are output separable, this implies that Ch. is a linearr 1
combination Cft ""•efr. Assume that f t "" •ft are the smallest
I subset of f t" •• f
r
such that:
has a solution where:
e· Ch.L L (4. 2. 24)
(4. 2. 25)
and O'to 0 00't are a ,set of non- zero coefficients" If f 1" " • ftare
mutually detectable, Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 4. 1 guarantees that
h. can be made output stationary with fl. _• f if there exists a
1 r
solution to:
(4. 2. 26)
where:
(4. 2. 27)
and where~. correspor:ds to J. in the same manner that R. corresponds
_ 1 1 1
to R.:
1
s. = [h. : s.l
1 1 1·
If any solution to (4. 2. 26) exists, one solution is:
(4. 2. 28)
(4. 2. 29)
Corollary 2 of Theorem 3.4. 1 presents a similar test for the case
where f to 0 0 f t are not mutually detectable.
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If h. can be made output stationary with f l - .. f , the next questionL r
concerns an algorithm for selecting D and whether or not the eigenvalues
of A-DC can still be chosen almost arbitrarily_ If:
= rk S.
1
(4. 2. 30)
Theorem 3. 4. 2 asserts that a set of J)iI eigenvalues A
al can be
chosen arbitrarily and that a D can be found for which:
i) h. is output stationary with fl ... f for A-DC, and
1 r
il) V.I of the eigenvalues of A-DC associated with each of
R1. • •itt are the elements of Ail •
The constraint on the choices of D is that t eigenvalues of A-DC must
be equal to every element in Ail. The eigenvalues of A-DC associated
with the remaining detection spaces Rt + 1•• •Rr remain freely assignable.
If Vk > Vat for some k :s: t. however. the J)k-VtI additional eigenvalues
associated with the corresponding Rk are unassignable. An algorithm
for choosing D is presented in Section 4. 2. 4.
The major difficulty with output stationarity is the possible
introduction of unassignable eigenvalues of A-DC. For a large number
of applications such 6,8 the satellite example in Section 4. 3 or the
spinning cylinder example in Section 4.1.2, the VI ••• Vt are equal
and no unassignable eigenvalues are produced. If J) l' •• J) t are not
equal, however, unassignable eigenvalues of A-DC are a necessary
by-product of output stationarity. 1 An algorithm for determining the
unassignable eigenvalues is presented in Section 4. 2. 4. If the eigenvalues
are unacceptable. nothing can be done except remo'\re the output sta-
tionarity constraint on h ..
1
Equations (4. 2. 24) and (4. 2. 26) can be applied to each of hI ••• hq
to determine which can be made output stationary with f1" .• f
r
• If
some h. cannot, it should be eliminated from the set. It is then
J
possible to consider the mutual output stationarity of the remaining
lIt is possible to define eircumstances under wfti,cb-a.utp.Qt staUonarity
ain~,rodl1u.~ls .\Wlss ~gnab.l.~...igenv:~1.u~s of A- DC -~v:.~Q. if ~~-?Yk. k E I •re eq CIt. '.' ,
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elemeni:s of the set_ For notational convenience, it is assumed here
that each of hi ••• hq can be made output stationary with fl ••• f r •
Unli.ke the mutual detectability problem, the4\e is no limit to
the number event vectors which can be made mutually output stationary
with f 1••. f
r
-- but the fact that each of two event vectors can be
made individually output stationary with f 1- • _f
r
does not necessarily
imply that they can be made mutually output stationary with f l - • - f r -
Section 3. 4 provides a series of tests for determining mutual output
stationarity. Assume h. and h. are two elements of hI •• _h. The
1 J q
simplest test concerns the subsets of ef l .•. efr which are necessary
tB construct Ch. and Ch~ similarly to (4. 2. 24). If I. is the smallest
1 J. 1
index set such that Ch. is a linear combination of Cfk , k ~ I .• and I.1 1 J
is a corresponding index set for h., then. Corollary 3 of Theorem
J
3. 4. 1 states that h., h. can be made mutually output stationary with1 . J
fl ••• f r if:
I.nr.=o
1 J
(4. 2. 31)
This is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for mutual output
stationarity.
The remaining tests are based upon the construction of normal
subspaces. If:=: is the solution of (4.2.29) .. the normal subspace
J"i of '" is defined in Definit~on 3. 4. 2 / to be the range space of the
n x IJtI matrix:
(4.2.32)
where T. is a normalizing matrix defined in terms of the coefficients
1
(l/l •• • (l/t in (4. 2. 25):
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-.....
(4.2.33)
~- - - - - - - - - - - -0
' ..... " :
J
,
I
--0
........ _1 E J
Qft lit
..!...E
0'1 VI
0-"
r
•I
I - ...
0- -------- -- -~ : '-~ 0
T .. ~
1
EV1··~ E
Vt
are VC··.vt-dimensional identity matrices where vI· •• v
ot
are the ranks of R I ••• R-t, respectively. The normal event vector hie
is the first column of S~:
1
SO = [h?: S~ ]
ill
(4.2. 34)
Assume normal subspaces 7 "and J~ have been determined for
_ _ 1 J
tI. and'/. respectively. If the index sets I. and I. are equal:
1 J 1 J
I. = I.
1.: J (4. 2. 35)
a necessary and sufficient condition for h. and h. to be made mutually
_ 1 _ J
output stationary with fl ••• f is that,J? and j? be identical (Theorem
r _ 1_ J
3. 4. 3), i. e. the range spaces of S? and Se must be equal. A necessary
1
and sufficient condition for this is that S? and S~ have the same d imen-
1 J
s ions and that there be a solution K to:
S? K = S~
1 J (4. 2. 36)
If (4. 2. 35) is not satisfied, Lemma 3. 4. 3 and Theorem 3. 4. 4 define
a general, but considerably more difficult. test for mutual output
stationarity.
The difficulty with mutual output stationarity is that the algebra
necessary to find a mutually output stationary subset of hI- •• hq may be
rewarded in the design algorithm for D by a set of unassignable and
unacceptable eigenvalues of A- DC. There is no fail- safe r-ule for
avoiding this problem, but several rules-of-thumb are helpful.
In the order in which they shouJd be applied:
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t
b
i) discard any hi for which the dimensions 1J k of the detection
spaces Rk, k E Ii' are not nearly equal,
iO discard any hi for which vJ is much less than the minimum
Vk, k E Ii' and
iii) do not try to make h., h. mutually output stationary with
1 J ~_
fl ••• f unless the dimensions of'/. and oJ. ;:l.re approximately
r l J
equal or unless 14. 2. 31) applies.
These rules do not eliminate the possibility of unacceptable eigenvalues
of A-DC occurring, but they do minimize the proba'bility by minimizing
the number of unassignable eigenvalues resulting from application
of Theorem 3. 4. 2.
4.2.4 Eigenvalue Assignment
If the reference model is expressed in base no~rmal form
(Section 4.4), the eigenvalues of A-DC can be assigned trivially
in a manner similar to that used in Section 4.5. Oth,~rwise it is
necessary to use the algorithms outlined in this subsection. The
results of Section 3.2.2, Section 3.4.1, and Appendi~cA.4 are
applied here to provide algorithms to:
i) ass ign the eigenvalues of A- DC associated with Rl' • •Rr'
ii) assign the remaining n-v.r eigenvalues of A-DC,
iii) choose D such that h. is output stationary wit11 f l - •. f , and1 r
iv) determine the unassignable eigenvalues of A-I)C if h.' is
1
output stationary with f 1. • · f r •
As in the previous subsection, it is assumed that fl' •• f
r
are output
separable and hI""' hq are candidates for output stations.rity.
The solution to the eigenvalue assignment problem depends on
the set of event vectors f 1••• f rl but it depends even marIe fundamentally
upon A and C. Assume for a'moment that it is des ired tel choose D
such that A-DC is equal to some chosen matrix AA' If C is invertible,
the unique choice of D is:
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If (; is not inve~tible, however, a solution to:
DC = A-AA
(4.2 0 37)
(4. 2. 38)
may- not exist -- Lenlma 3. 2.1 states necessary and sufficient
conditions for a D \1!hich satisfies (4.2.38) to exist" If A is the set
of n des ired eigenvalues of A- DC I these eigenvalues do not uniquely
specify a desired AI\.. Given A and a set of conditions to be discussed
later. the algorithms developed in Chapter 3 choose AI\. such that a
solution to (4. 2. 38) exists.
The bas ic result on eigenvalue ass ignment us ing output feedback
is Theorem 2. 4. 1. This theorem states that for any set of eigenvalues
A. a matrix AA wi-th-the desired eigenvalues can be c:l0sen such that
(4. 2. 38) has a solution D if and only if (A, C) is an observ-able reference
model. This is ·a well- known result in sys tern theory and does not
consider the constraints which fl ••• f
r
may place upon the permissible
choices of D. In the remainder of this subsection, it is assu med t~hat
(A, C) is observable. The generali~ationof detection theory to
unobservable reference models is discussed in Section 3. 2. 2.
The detection spaces R1•• -Rr are 11 1- •• • vr-dimensional
respectively. Because of the requirement that the failures associated
with each of f 1- •• f
r
must generate unid irectional output errors,
111 of the eigt:.nvalues of A-DC become uniquely associated withRl'
v2 with R2• etc. (Theorem 3. 3. 1). Let AI- __ Ar be the sets of des ired
eigenvalues associated with R1••• Rr· The elements of .A 1· • • Ar
are the rootJ of an associated set of polynomials If1(. ) • - • 'l'r(. ):
(4. 2. 39)
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wh.:re ).~ E Ak etc. These are the desired relative minimal polynomials
of RI ••• Rr with respect to A-DC (Section 2. 3). If vi is defined as:
L Vk = v; s: n
k= 1, r
then the union of .A- 1• • • A r :
A' = U A
'J k= 1, r 'k
(4. 2,40)
(4. 2. 41)
is a v,.. - element subs et of the des ired A.
S inc e fl .•• f
r
are ell t put separable (D efini t ion 3. 3. 2), Theorem
3. 3. 1 states that a D can be chosen such that:
i) the output errors generated by the failures associated with
fl. • • f
r
are unid irectional. and
ii) A~is a vi - element subset of the eigenvalues of A- DC.
A ~traightforward generalization of Lemma 3. 2. 7 provides an algorithm
for finding this D. With the detection genel·ators gl •. ' gr (Section
4.2.1). and with 1'1 (.) ••• '¥rt) written as polynomials in A. an n X r
matrix is formed:
(4.2.42)
D is then any solution to:
(4. 2. 43)
A solution to (4. 2. 43) is guaranteed and can be found us ing conventional
matrix analysis techniques (Gantmacher(1959) or Helmos(1958». The
difference between (4.2.38) and (4.2.43) is that (4.2.43) implicitly
contains the constraint that any solution D satisfies both cond itions i)
and ii) above.
If r equals rkC, (4.2.43) has a.unique solution. If not, the
algorithm developed in Appendix A.4 chases a particular solution.
In either case, if f 1- • _f
r
are mutually detectable (Definition 3. 3. 1),
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a solutlon of (4. 2. 43) is chosen such that the eigenvalues of A- nct
are the elements of A. If fl ••• f
r
are not mutually detectable,
however, for every solution of (4.2.43) certain eigenvalues of A-DC
are fix~ and unassignable. These are the Vo eigenvalues of nas
discussed in Section 4. 2. 2.
The remaining task is to define an eigenvalue ass ignment
algorithm when output stationarity is being utilized. As in Section
4. 2. 3. assume h. is to be made output stationary with h. and that
1 1
f 1e • ef.t is the smallest subset of fl ••• f
r
such that:
C F e C ChL Cl'L = ei i
has a solution where:
Q'~ :: [0'1 ••• O'.t]T
F~ = [fl ••• f.t]T
(4. 2. 24)
(4. 2. 25)
The eigenvalues of A-DC associated with R.t+ r eeRr are unaffected
by the output stationarity requirement. They can be assigned
as before by requiring D to satisfy the r-.t equations:
(4. 2. 44)
where It is the last r-.t column~ of F and 'l'FL(A) is the last r-.t
columns of 'l'F(A).
The effect of output stationarity is to restrict the freedom with
which the eigenvalues of A-DC assoctated withR1•• •R.t can be assigned.
If vJ is the dimension of Ji , a single vJ -element set AJ and an
associated polynomial YJ (e) can be freely chosen. Theorem 3. 4. 2
then requires that the elements of AJ be eigenvalues of A-DC associated
with each of R1- • •R.t. The net effect is that only VJ unique eigenvalues
can be chosen and each must be assi6ned a multiplicity of't. Corollary
1 of Theorem 3. 4. 2 provides an algorithm for assuring that an acce.ptab1e
D is chosen. The t linear equations from the corollary plus the r-t
linear equations implied by (4. 2. 44) together replace (4. 2. 43). A
228
solution of these el']uations is guaranteed and it is unique if r is equal
to rkC. Otherwise, the algorithrrl is Appendix A.4 can be used to finn,
a unique solution.
If vI" 'Vt are ~he dimensions ofR l •• •Rt , Theorem 3.4.2 states
that lJJ satisfies:
(4. 2. 45)
Whereas (-:2.43) permits all v; eigenvalues of A-DC associated
withR1•• • Rt to be assigned, the above discussion implies that output
stationarity of hi permits only tVrJ of the eigenvalues to be assigned.
The remaining V3- - t v:l eigenvalues are fixed for every acceptable
choice t:>f D. These unass ignable eigenvalues should not be confused
with those of II discussed earlier; these are a consequence of the des ire
to make h. output stationary with f l - .. f. Whether or not it is feasible1 r
to desigl1 a failure detection system to detect the failures associated
with eacll of f l _•• f and also the failure associated h. depends uponr l
the acceptability of these unassignable eigenvalues. An algorithm
for determining the unassignable eigenvalues. is presented in the
discussicln following Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 4. 2.
Generalization of the eigenvalue assignment algorithms to
hI ••• h follows the same line developed in Section 4. 2. 3. If h.q 1
and h. are two event vectors which satisfy (4.2.31), then Corollary 1
J
of Theoreln 3. 4. 2 can be applied independently for each of them.
If they sat/.sfy (4. 2. 35) and their normal subspaces;it and;ij are
equal, then the corollary need only be applied for one of h. and h .•
l .J
The general case is discussed in conjunction with Theorem 3. 4. 4.
·When used with the appropriate variation of (4. 2. 44), each of these
algorithms (iefines a set of r consistent equations which D must
satisfy.
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4. 3 A.'l Example
This section provides an application of the detection filter des ign
algorithm of Section 4. 2. To the extent that it is possible, an attempt
is rnade to motivate the design procedure physically. The satellite
example was chosen for its simplicity and because the subsystems
defined by the failure detection requirements are the same subsysterns
which would be defined for a particular decQupling problem. Although
the decoupling analogy is not generally useful, it is helpful in this
instance for generating a physical understanding of the solution.
Unfortunately, the satellite example is 8 imple enough that some results
of Chapter 3 are not required. The problem of unass igna.ble eigenvalues
is treated in Chapter 6 for the lateral autopilot example.
4. 3. 1 Satellite Orbit Perturbation Model
The failure detection system is to monitor the performance of
an orbital maneuvering system on a satellite in a near circular orbit.
Only the open loop systenl without the control law is to be modeled.
The satellite is assumed to have an autonomous navigation system and
to have onboard thrusters for orbit perturbation. To keep the analys is
simple, o~ly linearized equations of motion about a nominal circular
orbit are considered and all orbit perturbations are assumed to be
in the orbital plane. The geometry of the problenl is indicated in
Figure 4. 2.
The output of the navigation system is assumed to be an altitude
measurement r(t) and a true anomaly measurement ~(t). These
measurements uniquely determine the satellite's position in the
orbital plane. The measurements may be provided either by an altimeter,
a star tracker, and horizon indicators; or by an inertial navigation
system. The dynamics of the measurement system are assumed to
be negligible and the measurements to be noise free. It is assumed,
however, that the sensors providing r(t) and <p(t) may fail.
The thrusters are grouped as three sets of paired (oppos ite
polarity) thrusters. each set having its own fuel supply. If one of
a pair of thrusters fails. that pair is cons idered to have failed.
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rlt)
cp(t)
Figure 4. 2 Geometry for satellite orbital maneuvering system.
Thruster pairs are aligned along the tangent to the
orbit~u t (t)~ and along u2 (t) and u3(t).
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If a thruster fails in the "on" mocie and the failure is detected, the
failure is compensated for by the controller which switches on the
rernalning thruster of that set until the fuel supply is depleted. The
thruster pairs are aligned with one set along the velocity vector and
.the remaining two at angles of + y respectively to the veloc ity vector.
The attitude control system for the satellite is assumed to maintain
o
this alignment perfectly. As long as y -f 90 only one operational
thruster pair is necessary to effect an orbit change. This provides
an example of a triply redundant system as discussed in Section 3. 4~ 2 0
Under nominal operating conditions the controller lnay use any or all
of the thruster pairs to effect a maneuver.
The system failures to be monitored for the open loop system
are:
i) a failure of any thruster pair, and
ii) a failure of either sensor.
The output space is only two dimensional and sensor failures in general
produce planar output for failure detection systems. Because of
this. if an error signal occurs which is planar, it is not poss ible to
determine whether a sensor failure or some unknown and unmodeled
failure produced the error signal. Unan1.biguous detection of sensor
failures requires more than two sensors unless one can be constrained
to generate a unidirectional output error signal. With this ambiguity
accepted~ a single detection system can be designed which monitors
all of the above ~failure8.
The general planar equations of motion for a satellite can be
specified in polar coordinates:
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where K is the gravitat; anal cons tant and ul (t). u2 (t). and u3 (t) are
the accelerations due to the repective thruster pairs. The equations
are to be linearized about the circular orbit defined by the ra.dius a
and angular rate w:
r(t) = a
<p(t) = wt
3 2
a w = K
If a system is described by the nonlinear equation:
then the linearized rriodel is:
6 x(t) = A6x(t) + B6u(t)
The elements of A and B satisfy:
(4. 3. 3)
(4. 3. 5)
a.. =lJ
of i [x,u,t] I
~ x ,llJ 0 0
b ..lJ
= of i [x. u. t] I
aU. x ,uJ 0 0
(4. 3. 6)
where x (t), u (t) are the nominal state and control vectors respectively.
o 0
If A and B are to be time invariant, the solutions of (4.3.6) must
not be either explicit or implicit functions of time.
Equations (4. 3. 1) and (4. 3. 2) are linear in u l (t), u2 (t), and
u 3(t) and the variationa.l control vector can be defined by:
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&u(t) :I:
U 1(t)
u2(t)
L u3 (t)
(4 .. 3. 7)
The choice of 6x(t) is slightly more difficult. Define 6x(t) by:
6 X 1(t)1 r (t) - (J
6 x2 (t)
.
r (t)
6x(t) = = (4 0 3. 8)
ox 3 (t) J a (~(t) - wt)
6 x4(t)
•a (<p (t) - w)
The first two components are the satellite displacement in a radial
d.Lrection from the nominal trajectory and the rate of that displacement
respectively. The last two components are the displacement and
displacement rate from the nominal trajectory in a tangential direction.
Equation (4. 3. 8) allows the perturbation to be expressed in an ortho-
gonal coordinate system centered at the nominal state. Then the
triad (A. B. C) for the orbital maneuvering system is:
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
=[: 0 0 :] 3w2 0 0 2w 0 -siny sinyC A= 0 0 0 1 B= 0 0 00 1
0 ~,2w 0 0 0 cosy cosjI
(4. 3. 9)
The choice of 6x(t) yields the desired time invariant system model.
It is simple to show that the variational system (A. B. C) is
observable and controllable. In fact. the orbital state is completely
controllable by any of the thruster pairs and observable by the true
I
anomaly sensor. It is not observable by the altimeter.
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4.3.2 Detection Filter Design
The failure models for the satellite can be determined in accor-
dance with Section 4. 1. As suggested in Section 4. 2. 1, it is best to
determ ine tl1e detection spaces and failure models for failures with
known event vectors before considering the sensor failures.
Since the attitude control system of the satellite is assumed to
be perfect, thruster pair failures can be modeled as errors
~ul (t), ~u2(t). ~u3(t) respectively in the achieved thrust. A failure
in the first thruster set can then be modeled as an additional B~u(t)
term in (4.3.5). This is the control-dependent controller failure model
(Table 4. 1) with:
(4. 3. 10)
and the event vector is:
(4.3.11)
The failure could also be modeled as a control- independent failure
if ~ul (t) were a bias etc. The precise choice of the model is not
important since the event vector is the same for all models.
Failures in the second and third thruster pairs involve changes
in the second and fourth rows of BOu(t). For the second thruster pair:
o
BAu(t) = (4.3. 12)
Since the rows are linearly u~pendent for all t, the discussion in
conjunction with (4. 1. 10) implies that a 8 ingle event vector is necessary
for the failure model and the control-dependent controller failure model
is:
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(4. 3. 13)
The event vector is the constant vector in parerltheses:
(4 c 3. 14)
Similarly for a failure in the third thruster set the event vector is:
(4. 3. 15)
All three of the event vectors f 1,f2,f3 satisfy:
Cf. = 0
1
i = 1,2,3
Therefore, to determine the detection spaces us ing Df and C I from
(4. 2. 1). it is necessary to use M p Af2, Af3• With Df and C I,
the orthogonal reduction procedure of Appendix A can be used to find
first R I , R 2• and R 3 and then Rl' R 2, R3" It can also be used to
find the respective detection generators. In this case, the detection
generators are f l' :f2~ and f 3 respectively:
0 0
2w 0H1 = [Af1 f1] :I 1 0
0 1
-sin;, 0
[Af2 f 2]
2W cos i' -sin. y
R2 = =
cos y 0
2w sin y cos 'Y
sin y 0
[M3 (3]
2weos')I sin y
RS =
, ~
COS" 0
- 2w sini' cos y
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{4. 3. 16)
The detection spaces RI' R2' R3 are spanned by the columns of the
appropriate matrices in (4.3.16).
The physical importance of a detection space can be motivated
by considering R1 for the first thruster pair. This thruster pair is
tangential to the orbital path. Phys ieal reasoning suggests that a
firing of the tangential thr'usters first causes a change in the true
anomaly perturbation 6x 3(t) and that the ensuing perturbation
aX1(t) in the rad ius of the orbit requires a portion of an orbital
period to develop. The colurrLns of R1 are Af1 and f 1 respectively.
They satisfy the output relations:
Cf~ = 0
.L
(4. 3. 17)
Equation (4. 3. 17) and the discussion in Section 2. 1 verify the intuitive
notion that a failure in the tangential thrusters is first noticed as
an error in the true anomaly perturbation estima·..e 6x
m3 (t). A
detection filter chooses A- DC such that a failure in the tangential
thruster~ affects only 6xm3(t). If the satellite system had only a
pair of tangential thrusters and a pair o~ radial thrusters, the failure
detection system also would constrain the output estimat\on error due to
a radial thruster failure to 6x
m1(t). For this particular two thruster
pair system, the detection iilter would be the solution to th.e output
decoupling problem with output feedback. The decoupling analogy
is not directly appl·icable t~ arbitrary systems.
Mter R1, R2• R3 have been found, i) - iii) outlined in Section 4.2.1,
should be evaluated for the sensor failure models. The results are
not important s inee the output space is only two d i~ens ional but they
do illustrate the algorithm.
The failure model for the true anomaly sensor is a good
example of option i). From (,1. 3. 17) it follows that M 1 satisfies
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the requirement and the true anornaly sensor failure can be charac-
terized by the event vectors {MI , A
2f l }. The corresponding
detection spaces are defined by the set of matrices {HI'R4 }.
R4 is the detection space for A
2f 1:
1
o
o
o
1
o
"' ,
-2w 0
A failure of the altitude sensor cannot be satisfied by option
i) for any vector in RI , R2, or R3• The alternative requires use of
option iO. Af2 and Af3 fromR2 and R3 respectively satisfy:
C ( - esc Y Af + esc Y Af ) = [1] (4 3 19)
2 2 2 3 0 • •
If f 2 and f 3 are detected by D. then d 1 is completely specified and
an altitude sensor failure can be characterized by the t~lree event
vectors (f2, f 3, d l }. An obvious second alternative is to use option
iii) to find some arbitrar'y set (f, M) rather than the three event
vectors.
For the remainder of this section, only the thruster failures are
cons idered. Mutual detectability of the three failures can be in-
vestigated using the techniques of Section 4. 2. 2, although the results
are sirrlple. If F is defined for the thruster pair event vectors:
(4. 3. 20)
it is simple to show that rk CF < rk F and f l , f 2, f 3 are not output
separable (Definition 3. 3. 1). By Theorem 3. 5. 1, they are not
mutually detectable by a single detection filter.
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The next step is to attempt to find subsets of f l' f 2, f 3 which
are mutually detectable. f 2, f 3 are considered as an example.
If F 1 is defined by removing f 1 from F. RF 1 can be found us ing
(4.2.8), (4.2.9), and Appendix A. 2. In this case, however, since the
state space is four-dimensional and:
(4.3.21)
inspection of (4. 2. 11) verifies that:
(4. 3. 22)
By Tl'leorem 3. 3.1, f 2 and f 3 are mutually detectable. It is possl.ble
to show through similar reasoning that any two of f l , f 2, f 3 are
mutually detectable.
Since all three fr.ruster pair failures are to be monitored, one
solution is to design two failure detection systems-~ one for f 2 and f 3
and the other for f 1. A more acceptable alternative is to use only
a single failure detection system and make f 1 output stationary with
f 2 and f 3• In this context, f l and R1 correspond to hi and;}i of
Section 4.2.3. Since M 1 satisfies:
eM = seer eM + seer CAfg1 2 2 2
the index set II can be defined:
11 = (2,3}
(4.3. 23)
(4, 3. 24)
Theorem 3. 4. 1 requires that R1 satisfy (4. 2. 26) if f 1 is to
be a candidate for mutual output stationarity. In this case, since:
(4. 3. 25)
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RF1 is non-singular and a unique solution to (4. 2. 26) is guarante:ed.1
It follows immediately that f 1 can be made output stationary with f 2
and f S-
In general, it is necessary to apply Theorem 3. 4. 1 to determine
whether or not a vector h. can be mad~ output stationary with f l _•• f •1 r
For the satellite application, there is an intuitive reason to suspect
that f 1 can be made output stationary with f 2 and f 3- The three thruster
pairs are an example of parallel redundancy. Although each thruster
pair has a different effect on the satellite and its sensors, the effects
are dynamically similar" An intuitive agrument suggests that output
stationarity is often applicable in des igning failure detection systems
for refel"ence mode1s wi·tb parallel redundancy.
The remaining problem concerns eigenvalue assignment.
Since each of R1, R2 and R3 is two-dimensional, Theorem 3. 4. 2
guarantees that all four eigenvalues of A-DC can be assigned.
Because of the output stationarity constraint, however, the two
eige~alues associated with R2 must be the same as those associated
with R3• This requirement is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for output stationarity.
The eigenvalue assigrlment algorithm is given by Corbllary 1
of 'rheorem 3. 4. 2. The first step is to choose a set of des ired eigen-
values in terms of the polynomial Y1(. ):
and then to determ ine:
(4. 3. 26)
2W
o
o
2
-4w
o
2w
1
o
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u
o
o
1
= (4. 3. 27)
The nr~st step is to determ ine the bracketed quantity in the corollary.
Since Cf2 and Cf3 are both zero, Af2 and Afg must be replaced by
A2f 2 and A
2f 3 in the algorithm:
0 0
I et.A2f.] 2w 0[Y(A)g1 - = P2 + PI (4. 3. 28)J J 1 0j= 2,3
0 1
An evaluation of the projections of this vector on the range spaces of
R 2 and R 3 respectively then yields the two equations for D:
DCAf2 =
DCM3 = P2
- siny
2W cosy
cosy
2w siny
sin'Y
2W cosy
cosy
- 2W siny
+ P1
o
-siny
o
cosy
o
siny
o
cosy
(4. 3. 29)
D =
P2
2
-w +p 1
Equations (4. 3. 29) uniquely define the detection filter D:
2w
(4. 3. 30)
and the design algorithm is complete.
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T11e Rimplest check of the clesign procedure is to determine A-DC:
-p 1 -2w 02
A-DC 2
-
2WP2 2w (4.3.31)= 4w -PI 0
2w 0
- P2 1
2WP2 -2W
2
4w -PI 0
It is possible to verify that the characteristic equation of (4.3.31) is:
(4.3.32)
A simpler and equivalent test is to verify that each of f l' f 2 , f 3
satisfies the equation:
y 1(A-DC) gi = 0 i = 1,2,3 (4. 3. 33)
Equation (4.3.33) verifies that "'1' R2 and R3 are all invariant for
A-DC and that the eigenvalues associated with each are the roots of
y 1(. ).
This completes the design algorithm for the satellite example.
If there were more than two sensors, (4.3.29) would not assign all
n eigenvalues of A- DC. The remaining eigenva:ues could be ass igned
us ing Append ix A.4.
4. 4 Base Normal Form
.
The design algorithnls in Section 4. 2 were based upon the
derivation of failure detection theory presented in Chapter 3. The
development in Chapter 3 emphasized linear algebra techniques
which are analytically straightforward rather than computationally
efficient. In particular, the development did not l.ltilize a particular
coordinate system which can make the selection of a detection filter
trivial. A reference model expressed in this coordinate systetn is
defined to be in base normal canonical form. The base normal
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canonical form has a~ additional advantage in that it
perm its the reference model to be decoupled into a set of lower-
dimensioned subsystems. The properties of the base normal form for
deterministic systems and the transformation matrix to base norr.nal
form are developed in this section. The importance of the base normal
form for stochastic systems is developed in Chapter 5.
Assume that the event vectors fl ••• f
r
are output separable.
If D is a detection filter for fl .•• f
r
, then the failures associated
with fl ••• f
r
generate unidirectional output errors for (A-DC, C),
i. e. the detection spaces Rr . .Rr are invariant with respect to
A-DC (Lemma 3. 3. 1). If t is an arbitrary vector in R. for some
Jj ~ r, then invariance requires that (A-DC)~ be a linear combination
of the vectors which span R.. This suggests that if a coordinate
J
system for (jn is chosen such that the basis vectors for each of
R1•• •Rr are unit vectors, then A-DC is at least partially block
diagonal. This block diagona~itywhen the reference model is
expressed in the proper coordinate system is a general property
of invariant subspaces.
The crucial fact in the above discussion is that a coordinate
system in which A- DC is partially block diagonal is a function only
of R1•• •1(. The transformation to this coordinate system can ber -'---------------------------
constructed from the basis vectors for RI ••• Rr independent of any
chotce of the detection filter D. The basis defined in Lemma 3. 2. 4
for each of Rl • •• R is particularly useful. If g1 is the detection
_ r . . . -. 1)1- 1
generator for 1(1. the mdlcated baSiS for R1 is gp Ag1••• A gl;
similar bases exist for 1(2•• •R
r
• The base normal canonical form
is dE~fined in terms of these basis vectors.
The transformation matrix from the ~;'iven coordinate system
to base normal canonical form is defined to be T- 1. If r= m and
f 1••• f are mutually detectable. T- 1 is uniquely determined by ther _ _
bases for R1- • •1(r given in Lemma 3. 2. 4; otherwise an additional
set of vectors must be specified. The general structure for T- 1 is:
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v -1
A r 1- 1
···gr··· gr:To
(4.4.1)
where the principal constraint on the submatrix TO is that it be chosen
s uc h that T is nons ingular :
This particular TO is chosen such that z 1- .• z are a bas is for
- ~the excess subspace Rog associated with RIo 0 oKr , and the remaining
vectors are defined in Append ix A.4 0 1 All but m of the vectors
on the right- hand s ide of (4. 4. 1) are in the null space of C. These
m COlumns can be used to define a transformation of the output space
compatible with T- 1
v - 1 v-I
T~ 1 = [CA Igl ••• CArgr q - 1 q - 1 -1C;(A-I7C) r+lwr+ 1 0 o.Cf(A-D~C) m w m ]
(4~ 4. 2)
The transformation to base normal form is a s im ilarity trans-
- 1formation-- T transforms the state vector to base normal form
and T transforms it back to the original coordinate system. The
reference model and state vector in base normal form are denoted
by:
A
A
13
A
C
A
D
..
R.
1
X (t)
m
A (t)Ym
= T- 1 AT
= T- 1B
= T -1 CT
= Tl.!1. D T
m
-1 -
= T R.
_ 1 1
= Jr x (t)
m
= T -1 Y (t)
m m
(4.4. 3)
lHecal1 from Section 4. 2. 2 that
R3 =R1e...Rr E9Rog (4.2.13)
an~that R
og is zero if fl ••• f r are mutually detectable. The dimension
of R3 is denoted by V3 and the dimension of ~og is denoted by vo.
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An implementation of the reference model in base normal form is
shown in Figure 4. 3. The reference models (A- DC. C) and (A-"QC. C)
would be equivalent real izations of the same system if y (t) were in the
m
original coord inate system, i. e., if the output transformation
matrix T - 1 did not appear in (4. 4. 3). The advantage of the trans-
m
formed output space is demonstrated later. The disadvantage is
that the system output y(t) must be transformed before it is incorporated
into the reference mcxlel estimates.
With T- I and T- I defined. it is possible to begin a systematic
m
development of the ~tructure of A, C, and n. The system matrix
A is of the form:
A I A A
@;l
A ,
All A l2 ----- ~r r 1
"A A I
, I A A ,
"A 21 A 22
, I 82 f 2" I.... II " " .... ,
,
I
" "
I
"
...
, , ,
" "A J\
" 'A' A f /A = A - - - - -'- ® (4. 4. 4)rl rr r r
A A flA -----------A n01 Or 0
A -----------A A0 A rrfl rr
The submatrices Arr and ri... f;. fa' describe the dynarP ics of A
which are not associated with R.r (see previous footnote). Arr is
(n-v.r) X (n-v.:r) and r'l ... r; are dimensioned accordingly. The
matrix n is the.vO X va matrix associated with Rag in (4.2.15) -- this
can be verified by transforming (4. 2.15) to base normal form.
A jII\
Siro ilarly, (8)1- •• @r ar'e matrices which llave only one non- zero row
correspond ing to· a row of e as defined in (4. 2. 15):
. (4. 4. 5)
A
The remaining 8ubmatrices of A are related to the detection spaces
R1. - .R
r
- The purpose of the transformation is to place these
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A8ubmatrices in a standard form. The off-diagonal matrices A.. are
lJ
lJ. xv- matrices with only a single non-zero column:
1 J
A
"!. = f------f atjl = [0 iaii].:: ~:::~,o,r (4.4.6)
1] 0 - - - - - - 0 abV
i
i :f j
The diagonal submatrices are I). x tJ. matrices of the form:
1 1 ..
~ I
A .. =
1t
0-.....- -- - -- - - - - - - -0
.. I
1 I
...... I
0- -. .. "" ....... 6
I .....
I
I .....
0- - - - - - -- - ~-- - 0 - 1
I
- Pil
I,
I
•I
I
I
- Piv.
1
(4.4.7)
The structure of the submatricies in (4.4.6) and (4.4.7) can
~e motivated by considering A/llo As suggested earlier, a basis for
R1 in the base normal coord inate system is the first v 1 unit vectors
e 1- - - e _ The detection generator gl in base normal form is
n Dill
enl since gl is the first column of T:
gl = T en1
It follows s im ilarly that:
Ajgl = T en(j+l)
(4.4.8)
(4.4.9)
. .- 1
However, AJgl can be expressed recursively in terms of A
J gl:
(4. 4. 10)
and it follows that (4. 4. 9) and (4. 4. 10) then imply:
(4.4.11)
Premultiplication by T- 1 and substitution of Athen yields an expres-
sion for .A e .:
nJ
en(j+ 1) = A enj
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(4. 4. 12)
AThis requires that the first V 1-1 columns of A be zero, except that
the (j+ 1)th element of the /h column is 1 for j "V 1-I. BecausevI - thA g~ need not be contained in R1 (Lemma 3. 2. 4), the 11 1 column
A A A
of A is arbitrary. Hence, All and A 21 ... Ar1 are given by (4.4.6)
and (4.4.7) respectively. Equations (4.4.8) - (4.4.13) can be
- - ~generalized to R2... Rr and subsequent columns of .~.
The output matrix (; has a simpler structure than A:
0--------------------0
c =
o o--------------~
(4. 4 .. 13)
0--------------------0
where C1••• c
r
are unit vectors in v [ ••. V r - d imens ional subspaces:
41\ 41\ T [0c. = e = ••• 0
1 I).V-
i 1
1] i = 1.•• r
To verify (4. 4. 13), consider the basis e 1••• e for R1 again.
n nVl
From the definitions of C and T:
A -I j- 1 . _C enj = Tm CA gl J - 1. •• VI (4. 4. 14)
VC 2
Lemma 3.2.4 states that Cg1, CAg1••• CA gl are zero; therefore,
(4. 4. 14) requires that the first v1- 1 columns of C be zero. SinceIJI-lCA gl is the first column of T
m
, however, (4.4.14) yields:
c e
nv
= e
m1
(4. 4.15)
1
and the 111tb column of C is as defined in (4. 4. 13). Equations (4. 4. 14)
and (4. 4. 15) can be generalized to R2• • •Rr to complete the definltion
of ~.
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With A and Ccompletely s pee ified, attention can no\\' be directed
A ~
towB.rd an algorithm for selecting D. The matrix D is to be selected
as the sum of three terms:
(4.4. 16)
The first term is chosen such that A\ and R are invariant with respect
A A'" 1\ r
to A- DC, r. e. it is chose.n to insure that D is a detection filter for ..
_ _ A A
R1• • •R. The matrices D\l1 and Dr are then used to ass ign the eigen-r A A ~ T
values of A-DC in such a way that this invariant property is not
violated. (If the detection filter is being de8 igned to detect m output
separable failures, i. e., if r= m, then Dr is zero.) With a given
A
set of desired eigenvalues D is generally unique, however the component
A A A
m&.tricef' DFR, D't and Dr are g~nerally not unique.
A A
An acceptable choice for DFR would be D,j from (4. 2. 8). but
a preferable choice is:
0 A A 0 0a - - - - aIr12
A 0 A 0 0a 21 a 2r
A (4. 4. 17)DFR =
A
r1
A 0 0 0a
r2
8.01
A A 0 0aa2 aOr
A A A
arl ar2 arr 0 0
where the vectors ~2 etc. are defined in (4. 4. 6). The effect of
assigning t>FR using (4. 4. 17) is that A. - DFR C becomes nearly
block diagonal:
l
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" , "" f IAIl 0-------0 8 1...... 11,
0, A , ' '- 0 I IA 22 I II .......
..... t I
A A. A I ' .. .... A A r'A- DFR C = I ..... '-'A' @ (4. 4.18)
'"
rr r r
...... n
A /
"
rO.....
"
"
0- - - .- - - - - ------":..0 A IA rr
(4. 4. 19)
I 1\
P 1j enj
A A A AI(A-DFR C) e- nll l
A A '"
The block diagonality of A- DFR C is sufficient to guarantee that
R1••• Rr are invariant with respect to A- DFR C. As an example, the
unit vectors e 1- •• e 1 satisfy an equation similar to (4.4.12)
n nv -
and <A.-l)FR~) e
nll1 is tllinear comb iriat iQQ. .of en l ... envl :
en~j+ 1) = (A - DFR C) enj j s 111- 1
Vl
- - I
j= 1
where Pl1 ••• pi are the nonzero components of A11 in (4. 4. 7).
VI
Equation (4. 4. 19) satisfies the definition given in Section 2. 2 for
the invariance of R1•
A variation of the above argument can be used to show that the
- -
necessary and sufficient requirement for R1- • •Rr to be invariant
A. AA A AAI
with respect to A-DC is that A-DC exhibit the partial block diagonality
of (4. 4. 18). The matrlx 6'f can be chosen to assign the V.1- VO eigen-
A '" A _ -
values (see previous footnote) of A-D C associated with R1•• •R. r
A.
without violating this constraint. The general solution for D'f is:
d'fl
.,
o
0-------------- 0
dY2 0 - - - - - - - - 0
o
o
•
•
•--~------------~--CC---\J-
----------------- . 'i'r
-------------------------
O------.:~-------------O 0
(4. 4. 20)
0----------------------0 0
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\\Ihere the 1)1- •• • vr-dimensional vectors d\fl ••• d'fr satisfy:
-P~l + Pil
i = 1••• r (4.4.21)
-p! + P
1 v· iv.1 l
The coefficients P~l••• piv etc. are the elements of A/ll ·· .A~r
from (4. 4. 7); the coefficients Pll ••• Plv are the coefficients of
the desired relative minimal polynomial~ 1'1(·)••• 'f
r
(·):
v- 11.- 1
'f. (A) = A l+p. A 1 + ••• Pi2A+ P-l i=l ••• r1 lV- 11
(4. 4 0 22)
A 1\ A
where A-I- •• A- etc_ are the desired eigenvalues of A- DC. With
1 11) t.
the aid of (4. 4. 13) it is simple to verify that:
-'
@ll
A
All 0---- ---0 r'
...
, 1
" I
-'
A
-'
0 A 22 '"
I
@2 f 2"- II' ,
• I t
.........
.....t
" I
, ,
, .... 0 • I
-' A
"
I I
A - (D +f»c = , .....
•
" ~ l (4.4.23)FR 'if "- ".. A flI " A
rr ®,
.....
.... r rt ....
...... A
I
'n n r't 0I
0---------- - 0 0
A IA rr
where the diagonal 8ubmatrices are:
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0- - - - - - - - 0
, ~
'" I
(4. 4. 24)
- P il
I,
t
I
I
-p iV.
1
"
'1
, I
o
....
"'
"
" ,
,
"
"
"
,
1
I
t ""0- - - - --0
,
o '
" 'I " '-
-,,, "-
I
From (4.4. 24), it follows that the product '%'1(·) 1'2(-)••• 'f (,,) is
A. A A r A
a divisor of the characteristic equation of A- (DFR + Dy ) C and,
therefore, that each of AU ••• Aiv etc. is an eigenvalue of A-IDFR+Dy)C
associated with the appropriate d~tection space.
A-
If r= m, the specification of D is complete. Otherwise, the
final step in the choice of ~ is to choose Dr to ass ign the remaining
A A A " A- A
n-1).7 assignable eigenvalues of A - DC-- the 110 eigenvalues of A-DC
associated with RO are not assignable. The general solution forA g
Dr is:
A-0-----------------0 Dr!
---~--.-....-._.-..,--.---------..-A0-----------------0 Dr2
(4. 4. 25)
0-----------------0 brr
...-.--_..-.-------_.-..-.._----.-- ...... -
A0-----------------0 Dro
----------------------
o --- --- --- --- --- - 0 Dr m
A
where Drm is a (n-v.r) X (m-r) submatrix. The final expression for
A- D~ is then:
n
A
®1
A A A
A - DC =
A
All 0-----0
" I
" .A "I A
?...... A 22 '0 82
I" "" 1
I "' ..... A tEl
: " '"" rr l'
f ",
I ,
I ,
I '"
0- - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ 0
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(4. 4. 26)
where:
lit.
· r. =
1
{=al ••• r,O (4.4.27)
Because of the structure of ~, the only effect of Dr is to alter the last n-V:T
lit. lit. lit.
columns of A- DC. Therefore, its value affects only the n-v.1 eigen-
"" #It, lit. - -
values of A- DC not associated withR t · .. Rl , RO•
The computational usefulness of base normal form is evidenced
lit. A
by the ease with which D in (4. 4. 16) can be specified. ~R can be
chosen by inspection us ing (4. 4. 17). Once a set of des irable eigen-
values A-1 ... A- etc. has been chosen, all that is required to determ ioe
1 11).
Dv in (4. 4. 20) is
l to evaluate the polynomial coefficients in (4. 4. 22).
If the detection filter is being designed to detect m sutput separable
lit. lit.
failures, i~e. r= m, then Dr is zero. Otherwise, Dr is specified by
the .'algorithm in Appendix A.4. In essence, base normal form permits
J) to be chosen by inspection.
There is a second important advantage of base normal form.
Because of the partial block diagonality of A- DC and the corresponding
partitions of ~, the reference model (A- DC, C) can be decoupled
into a set of r + 2 subsystems of dimension vI •• • Vr ' VO' n-v,j
respectively. With x
m
(t), Y
m
(t), and 13 partitioned similarly to
(A- D~) and Cres pectively:
x (t) =
m
--I--
I
__L..__
x (t)
mr
---~-
xmO(t)
--..-.--
xmr(t)
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(4. 4. 28)
Y (t) •m ·•
·•
----"liTYmr
-------
Ymr(t)
(4.4.24)
A
B 1
--
A (4.4.30)B = .
-----
"B
r
....._--
B O
--~-
B r
then the deCDupled reference model satisfies the r equations:
y . (t) = c. x ·(t)
mL 1 ml i = 1••• r (4.4.31)
where x
mO (t) and xmr (t) are solutions to the equations:
• A
xmr(t) =~rimr(t) + Bru(t)
Ymr(t) =Crm t mr(t)
(4. 4. 32)
(4. 4. 33)
U the failures associated with fl ••. f
r
are mutually detectable. then
(4. 4. 32) disappears. If in addition, r=m, then (4. 4. 33) disappears
and only (4.4. 31) remains. The decoupling can result in a significant
decrease in the computational requirements for the reference model.
In addLtlon, Chapter 5 uses the decoupling property to opt~mize the
state esti.1natLon, properties of the reference model.
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4. 5 Fully Measurable Systems
The simplest failure detection problem is for systems in which
the complete state vector is measured. The open loop model for
the spinning cylinder given in Section 4. 1.2 is an example. Beard
referred to such systems as fully measurable systems. They are
characterized by the fact that rkC = n. The measurement matrix
can therefore be inverted to determine the system state directly.
Fully measurable systems are a degenerate example of the general
failure detection problem. The majority of the numerical algorithms
in the design process can be executed tri\rially. The considerations
pertinent to designing a failure detection system f01' a fully measurable
system are summarized in this section. The algorithm developed
in this section utilizes the base normal canonical form developed
in Section 4. 4.
Fully measurable systems were not analyzed per se in Chapter 3.
In Section 3. 1 it was suggested that every event vector is its own
detection space for fully measurable systems. Because of this,
the major results of Chapter 3 can be reduced to two rather simple
statements. To give credence to the discussion to follow, these
results are state formally, but without proof.
Recall from Section 3. 3. 1 that the E vent vectors f l - - · f r
are defined to be outEut separable if 6flo 0 0 ef
r
are mutually
independent. For fully measurable systems, independence of
flO 0 • f
r
implies output separability 0 The results of Sections
3. 2, 3. 3, and 3. 5 on mutually detectable failures can be sum-
marized for fully measurable systems by a single theorem.
Theorem 4. 1 If the event vectors fl ••• f
r
are linearly independent,
they are mutually detectable for any fully measurable system
<A. B. C).
The theorem states that the failures represented by the event
vectors fl ••• f
r
can be detected by a single failure detection system
if the event vectors are independent. Detectability is interpreted
as in Definition 2. 1. 1. Independence of f l - • _f r is sufficient to insure
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tha.t a D can be chosen such that the error signal llssociated with each
of the event V(~ctor8 is unidirectional along the cOl'responding Cfl' · . ef
r
and that the eigenvalues of A-DC can be freely ch()sen. The difficulty
of unassignable eigenvalues considered in Section 3. 3 does not exist
for fully measurable systems.
To complete the results, it is necessary to consider sets
of event vectors which are not mutually independent. This problem
corresponds to output stationarity as developed in Section 3.4"
Event vectors hI' .. hq which are linear combinations of fl' · · f r
can be added to fl' .. f
r
, but it is then necessary to assign some of
the eigenvalues of A-DC to have identical values. Output stationarity
for fully measurable systems is summarized in Theorem 4. 2.
Theorem 4. 2 Let fl ..• f
r
be mutually detectable for the fully
measurable system (A, B, C) and let ).1' • ').r be the eigenvalues
of A-DC associated with fl •• _f
r
respectively. Assume D is chosen
such that the error signal associated with each of f 1•.. f r is uni-
directional for (A-DC, C) and a subset A1- • _Ak of the r eigenvalues
are equal. Any failure with a~ event vector hI which is a linear
combination of fl ••. f k produces unidirectional output along Chi.
This is a restatement of a familiar matrix algebra property.
D is chosen such that fl •• _f
r
are eigenvectors of A-DC. Therefore:
(A-DC) f. = A.f.L L 1 i = 1... r (4.5.1)
and the arguments of Section 2. 1 show that the failures associated
with fl' • • fr produce unidirectional ou tput. If oX 1• • ').k are equal,
any linear combination h1 of fl' •• fk is also an eigenvector of A-DC
and the failure associated with it must generate unidirectional output
along Chl - If all n eigenvalues a~e chosen to be equal, every vector
is an eigenvector of A-DC and every failure which can be described
by a single event vector produces a unidirectional output error. Subject
to the comments in Section 4. 1, however, the output error produced
by sensor failures can only be constrained to a plane.
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With these two tt"teorems, all that is needed is a design
algorithm for choosLng D. A straightforward algorithm is presented
below. Each step Ls illustrated by the open loop model for the
spinning cylinder as given in (4.1.27).
Step 1 Choose a largest set of linearly independent event vectors
corresponding to failures of interest.
Obviously it is advantageous to choose as large a set of
failures as possible Assume the failures of interest in the example
are failures in:
i) the attitude sensor
ii) the rate sensor
iii) the torquing device
iv) the torque measuring device
It was shown in Section 4. 1. 2 that the first two failures can be
modeled adequately by the sets of event vectors {e31 , Oland
(e32, e 31 ) respectively. Since a failure in the torquing device
can be modeled as changes in the third row of A
o
and B
o
' that
failure is associated with the event vector e 33 . In a manner
similar to the analysis of the rate sensor failure, the torque
measuring device can be described by the set of event vectors
{e33 , e32}·
After t'his analysis, the event vectors for the four failures
can be summarized by the sets:
i) {e3 1' O}
ii) {e32, e 31 )
iii) e33
iv) (e33, e 32 )
From these entries, it is clear that if the set of event vectors
{e31, e 32, e33 } is chosen for Step 1, then all four failures can be
detected by a single detection systen1.. Each failure has a unique set
of directions in which the output error signal generated by that
failure appears and no ambiguity is involved.
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Step 2 U the set of event vectors is f 1· • • f
r
, define the coordinate
transformatLons to base normal canonical form:
(4.5.2)
and:
where Wr-f-le •• wn are chosen to make T invertible and define the
transformed system:
.A = T- 1AT
B = T-1B
C =T
m
-leT
]) =T- 1 DT
m
(4 _5 _3 )
A A A -1
The system (A .. B.. C) is input-output equivalent to (A, B, T C).
m
The salient properties of the base normal canonica.l form are that
the event vectors fl ... r are the new unit vectors e 1- •• e and
r n nr
that.. since ~ is diagonal.. Cfl ••• ~f equal e 1- •• e respectively. Inr n or
A
this canonical form the choice of D is trivial. D can then be found
from the inverse transformation.
For the general application, the transformation places the
system model in a coordinate system in which the elements of
the state vector are linear combinations of the original elements
and may not have apparent physical meaning. For the cylinder
A 1\ "-
example, T and T
m
are the identity matrix and (A, B, C) is the
same as (A, B, C).
A A A A
Step 3 D is t~ be c.?osen as DFR + D'i' ~he:e DJi'R m:kes the output
generated by f l : .....f unidirectional for A-DFRC and D'i' assigns the
eigenvalues of A-Dt without interferring with the unidirectionality.
DFR is chosen such that f l - - _fr are eigenvectors of A-DFRC. Since
f l - • ef are the unit vectors e Ie •• e , this requires:r n nr
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i = 1... r (4.5.4)
A
where C is the identity matr~. A satisfactory choice for DFR is
the off-diagonal elements of A. This choice allows all n eigenvalues
I'\. I'\. I'\.
of A-DC to be assigned in one step_
A
For the example, DFR can be written from (4.1.27):
o 1 o
= o o ex
r
(4.5.5)
o o o
and A-DFR C is diagonal as it should be:
0 0 0
A A A
A-Dlt'R C = 0 -e 0 (4.5.6)r
0 0 -8 f
Step 4 Let the diagonal elements of A-DFR C be ~ l' .. IJ. If theA AI'\. n
desired eigenvalues for A-DC are AII ,.A ,where the first r are to
A A n A
be associated with fl· • • f
r
respectively. then D'f must be:
(4.5.7)
O,--------i
""
'- I
'- ,
" I
" I
" I
'0
,
0, ..... ,""
I" "-
I ' .......
I ' ...... ,
I ""
I "" "I ' ,
0- - - - - - - - -" 0 '- #l -A
n n
=
A A I'\. "
Since A-DFR C is diagonal. this choice of D'f yields:
A A . A A A A"
A-(D +D )O=A-DC=FR 'f
0--------0
, ,
" I
, I
" I
" I
, I
'0
(4. 5. 8)
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and the eigenvalues of A-D~ have been assigned arbitrarily. The
detection filter D in the original system coordinates is:
-1
D = T(~FR + ~ 'f) T m (4.5.9)
For the example. D'f is:
A
D'i' =
-x 1
o
o
o
-a -A
r 2
o
o
o
-a -Af 3
(4.5. 10)
Step 5 Assume there are additional event vectors hI ... hq which
are linear combinations of fl ... f. If I is the smallest index set
. r
such :hat ...h l _.....hq are a linear combination of f i- i E I. At~en ea.-ch of
r1: " • f r : Ahl" " · hq produces ~nidirectionaloutput along Cf 1••• cfr •
Chi" "" Ch q respectively if n" of Step 4 is chosen such that the Ai'
i ti I, are equal.
This step constrains the choice of D'f to insure that hi ... It
are output st.:itionary with ~1 " • •~r' i. e.. that 61•.. It are also qA -A.. A q
eigenvectors of A-uC. The procedure is a direct application of
Theorem 4. 2. This completes the design algorithm.
4. 6 Extensions of Failure Detection Theory
The formulation of failure detection theory in Chapter 3 was
in an algebraic context. The motivation was a desire to detect
failures in continuous, linear, time invariant systems; but the results
are applicable to a broader range of problems. In particular. they
are directly applicable to discrete systems. They can also be used
effectively to design a failure detection system for sampled data
systems. Attention is restricted in this section tu deterministic
syste~s•. ·Stochastic systems and sampled data systems are con~idered
in Chapter 5.
The dynamics of a discrete system can be expressed by the
sequence:
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• .. t ........,
x(k+l) = AAx(k) +',B~ u(k)
y(k+l) = C x(k+l)
x(O) given
The inlportant feature of discrete systems is that the state is defined
only at the discrete times k. k+ 1. •. Sim ilarly to continuous systems,
-failures in discrete systems can be modeled as either a change in
dynamics (AA+ M& BA+ ABL1 C + AC) or an arbitrary additive
sequence fini(k) in (4. 6. 1). If the reference model is based upon
perfect knowledge of the state transition dynamics, then:
y (k+l) = C x (k+l)
m m
:X (0) given
m
(4.6.2)
With the errors defined in the normal manner, a state equation for
( (k) can be found for the nominal system:
E: (k+l) = (AA- DAC) £ (k) : E: (0) given
£ J(k+l) = C £ (k+l) (4.6.3)
It is simple to show that the estimation errors produced by failures
can be modeled similarly to (2. 1. 6):
( I (k+l) = C£ (k+l) + e . n .(k+l)
ml Cl (4.6.4)
The important similarity between continuous systems and dis-
crete systems is that failures in either can be character~zedby
event vectoI-S. The event vectors are determined by the associated
failure. but they are unique and independent of the particular
failure mode. Equations (4. 6. 1) - (4. 6. 4) are of the same form as
(2. 1. 1).- (2. 1.6)•.. ·:ae-::ause of this similarity, the results of
Chapter 3 can·b·e used directly for discrete systems.
l
The distinction between discrete systems and continuous systems
with discrete measurements (sampled data systems) is that in the
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latter case the state is defined as a continuous function of time arld a
failure must be also. Because of the discrete measurements, however.
only the estimation errors at the measurement tj.~es can be defined
meaningfully. For failure detection purposes, this requires that
aampled data systems be modeled in discrete form similar to
(4.6.1) - (4. 6e 4). Not surprisingly, the deficiency of measurements
means that the analytic results of Chapter 3 are only approximate
for sampled data systems.
The sampled data equivalent of (4.6.1) involves the state
transition matrix ~(t. ". ) for A. As an example of the difficulties
introdu.ced by discX'ete measurements, the state equation is written
in the case of a failure in the ith control element:
t+~t t+~t
x{l:+~t) = eJl(t+~t,t) x(t) + \ ~(t+~,T)Bu(T) d,. + \' ¢,(t+~IT)~b.u.(T) dT
t J tJ l 1
y(t+~t) = Cx(t+~t) (4. 6. 5)
The reference model is ag~jn defined for the nominal system:
t-\-D.t
x (t+At) =~ (t+~t .• t) x (t) + (' ~(t+At, T) Bu(,.) d.,. + D A(-r(t)-y (t»
m m J ~- mt
y (t+~t) = ex (t+~t)
m m
The error equations in this instance are driven by the failure:
t+~t
(t+~t) = (~(t+~t, t) - D~C)£ (t) + t S 4'(t+ ~t,.,.) Ab i Ui(T) dT
(/(t+~t) = C (t + 6t)
(4.6.6)
(4. 6. 7)
The reference model in (4. 6. 6) is not unique; DIi.(y(t) - Ym(t» could
be replaced by DA(y(t+At) - Ym (t». Both representations converge
to (2. 1. 2) as At approaches zero. Equation (4. 6. 6) is used here because
of the parallel with (4. 6. 2). The second representation is used in
Section 5. 2 for stochastic systems.
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The difference between discrete systems and sampled data
systems is evident in (4. 6. 7). It is possible to define an event vector
f i '(t+.6.t) and a function l'\(t+6.t) such that:
t+At
S ~ (t+A,t, T) ~b. U.(T) d,. = f./(t) n.·(t) (4.6.8)1 1 l' l
t
The difficulty is that the event vector is a function of u. (T) in the
1
interval t< ". < t+At. If u. (T) is not constant within every interval,
1
the event vector -'!i l{t) I changes from one interval to tb.~ next.
As indicated in (2. 1.19). f i ~(t) , is some linear canbination of
.6.b.• A.6.b .• A2.6.b.. •• . T~he sequence f.'(t). f. '(t+.6.t). f. '(t+26.t)...
1 1 1 1 1 1
are in general different linear combinations of t!lose vectors. Since
.6.b .• A.6.b .• A2 6.b ..•• are not necessarily in the same detection space.
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it is not likely that the event vectors are either. If they are not, it
is not possible to define a detection filter Which constrains the output
error generated by a failure in the ith controller to a single direction.
One possible solution for the sampled data problem is to constrain
the control vector to be piece-wise constant within each measurement
interval. (If the same measurements are used for failure detection
and for choosing the control, this is always true). If the magnitude
of .6.bi is not a function of time, - f('(t) as defined in (4. 6. 8) is then
a constant. If the controller failure is control-independent (Table
4. 1). the time function ni(t)must also be pIece-wise constant.
With these constraints, Chapter 3 can be used to define a detection
filter for controller and sensor failures. For changes in the state
matrix A, however, the equivalent of (4. 6. 8) involves state vector
components and unique event vectors cannot be found. It follows
that Chapter 3 cannot be used directly for such failures.
For small time~increments. f. '(t), f. '(t+l\t)••• lie approximately
1 1
along ab.. This suggests that a first order approximation of
1
(4. 6. 5) - (4. 6. 7) by a discrete system would place the failure detection
problem for sampled data systems in tractable form. With the
approxirn.ations:
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~(t+~t, t) ~ E + ~t A
n
(4. 6. D)
D ~.:i 6.t D
t::.
(4. 6. 5) - (4. 6. 7) can be written as the first ordel' equations:
x(t+ilt) = (E +~t A) x(t) + ~t Bu(t) + ~t Ab. u.(t)
n 1 1
y(t+At) = Cx(t+~t) (4.6.10)
x (t+llt):-: (E + ~t A) x (t) + ~t Bu(t) + ~t D(y(t) - y (t»)
m n m m
y (t+~t) = C x (t+~t)
m m
£ (t+~t) = (E + ~t A - ~t DC) f (t) + 6t ~b. u.(t)
n 1 1
£ I (t+~t) = C E" (t+~t)
(4.6. 11)
(4. 6. 12)
As desired, the event vectors for (4. 6. 12) are constant and independent
of the failure mode. The results of Chapter 3 can be applied directly
to the discrete system defined by (4. 6. 10) - (4. 6. 12). but with A, B,
C. andDreplacedbyEn+__6_t~A_,_~~tB~,_C_~~a_n_d_~_t_D~r_e_s~p~e~c_t_iv_e_l~y.
That detection filter can then be used with the sampled-data reference
model (4. 6. 6). If (4. 6. 10) - (4. 6. 12) are used to determine a detection
filter, the degree to which the filter satisfies the detection constraints
is a function of the validity of the first order approximations. If
it is sufficiently accurate, the detected output error signals will be
approximately unidirectional. Otherwise.. a failure detection
filter based upon Chapter 3 cannot be found. The possible effective-
ness of the linearization is illustrated in Chapter 6.
264
CHAPTER 5
DETECTION FILTER DESIGN -- STOCHASTIC
Two important issues relative to failure detection systems were
omitted in Chapter 4. The first concerns criteria for the selection of
eigenvalues for the error state matrix A-DC. The second is the
problem of differentiating between the output error produced by a
failure and that produced by measurement and dynamic uncertainties.
Unlike the analytical results of Chapter 3, there is not a s ingIe best
answer to either problem. The intent of this chapter is to present
reasonable solutions to both problems and discuss their advantages
and disadvantages viz-a-viz other approaches. The emphasis is on
solutions which are applicable to a broad range of design applications.
All of the discussions in this chapter rely upon the base normal form
of Section 4. 4.
The reference model approach to failure detection defines a
state estimator. If a particular application requires both state es-
timation and failure detection, a useful question is how good a state
estimator a failure detection system can be. If its accuracy is
acceptable, it can be used to perform the combined functions of failure
detection and state estimation. It is shown in Sections 5. 1 and 5. 2
that,witl! certain restrictions, the freedom to ass ign the eigenvalues
of A-DC can be used to optimize the detection filter as a state estimator.
Because of the detection constraints, the optimal detection filter-state
estimator does not provide the minimum variance estimate produced
by a Kalman filter, but it does enjoy certain advantages over a Kalman
filter. The relative merits of the two estimators are discussed quali-
tatively in this chapter and illustrated in Chapter 6.
If a state estimation capability is not needed, it is still reasonable
to suppose that an optimal detection filter- state estimator- would be a
good detection filter for many applications. If the output estimation
errors (residuals) are as small as possible in the absence of a failure,
the output errors due to a failure should be easy to detect. It is
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possible to define a simple threshold cl-ossing df\tection law to dis-
c riminate between output estimation errors due 1() stoc l1astic sources
and errors due to a coml)ination of stochastic sources and a failure.
']lhe implementation of StIch a law is discussed in Section 5. 3. The
pass ibility of us ing other criteria is discussed in Section 5. 4.
The optimal cletection filter-state estimator assumes no apriori
knowledge of failure mode. If specific failure mode information is
available, there is a trade- off between m inimiz ing the output errors
due to stochastic sources and enhancing those due to failures. The
detection problem is placed in a general framework in Section 5. 4.
5.1 Suboptimal State Estimation -- Steady State Statistics
If D is a detection filter for the failures associated with fl. \I. f
r
,
the base normal canonical form of Section 4. 4 allows (A-DC, C) to be
expressed as a set of r + 1 subsystems, r of which are interrelated only
in that they may be driven by the same or -s imilar inputs. It is shown
in this section that these r subsystems are decQupled for state estima-
tion purposes. If a large state estim.ation error arises in one subsystem,
that error does not degrade the state estimates associated with any
other subsystems. If a system failure occurs, the accuracy of the
state estimator is decreased only for the subsystem associated with
that failure. The other subsystems of the state estimator remain
completely functional.
The is()lation of the effect of system failures on the state estimates
is the principal difference between a failure detection system and a
minimum variance state estimator (Kalman filter). A Kalman filter
optimizes the state estimates for a system by making maximum use of
the dynamic interdependence of the state components of the system.
If a large error occurs in the estimate of one state component, that
error ultimately degrades the accuracy of the remaining state com-
ponent estimates. If a system failure occurs, the propagation of the
ensuing state estimation error may make the Kalman filter completely
useless. ~
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For state estimation purposes, the choice between a Kalman
filter and an optimal detection filter- state estimator is a trade- off
between three cons iderations:
i) the greater accuracy of a Kalman filter under nominal operating
conditions,
ii) the ability of an optimal detection filter- state estimator to
provide partial state estimation for a failed system, and
iii) the computational efficiency of the optimal detection filter-
state estinaator.
This last property is due to the decQupling of the reference model into
r + 1 lower dimensional subsystems. The autopilot example of
Chapter 6 is used to illustrate the difference in the behavior of the
two types of state estimators.
The failure detection constraints of Chapter 3 allow the n
eigenvalues of A-DC to be freely assigned by the choice of D. If
r = m, base normal form translates this freedom into a set of n
"freely assignable components of the transformed matrix D. If
f t ••• f m are mutually detectable. Section 5. 1.2 uses the Kalman ,
approach to optimize the choice of the n components. If fl ••• f
m
are not mutually detectable, it is necessary to apply the state space
augmentation technique discussed in Sections 3. 3. 4 and 4. 2. 3 to
obtain an ~-dimensionalreference m,pdel then optimize the resulting
~ assignable components of the new fl. The Kalman approach does
not yield an optimal detection filter-state estimator if r < m, but a
reasonable approximation can be made in order to obtain a suboptimal
t). In general this requires further state space augmentation:
When ou.tput stationarity is considered, i. e. when r > m, fewer
than n components of D can be assigned freely and there is not suf-
ficient freedom remaining to optimize ~ as a" state estimator. The
remaining,freedom -can be used to minim ize a scalar function of
the residuals. however. l'he utility of the parameter optimization
techniques of Section 2. 2 in this regard is illustrated, in·~Section.5. 1. 3.
The parameter optimization technique can also be used in lieu of the
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Kalm.an approach when the latter requires an unacceptable increase
in the d imens ion of the reference model. If r = m and fl ••• f
m
are mutually detectable, both approaches yield tlle same D.
Only stochastiG systems with continuous measurements and
stationary statistics are considered in this sectic)n. Nonstationary
statistics and sampled data systems are considered in Section 5. 2 0 The
results are all developed from the base normal canonical form.
5. 1. 1 Stochastic Error Model
The standard linear disturbance model is introduced in Section
2.2. The system is driven by a white, Gaussian system noise "1 (t) and
the measurements are corrupted by a white Gaussian m~asurement
noise 112 (t). The random processes 11 1(t) and 112 (t) are continuous with
zero means:
E[1lJt) ] = 0 k = 1,2
E["l(t) "l(T)T] = E O(t- r)n 1 (2 0 2. 2)
E["2 (t) "2 (T) T] = E 6(t- T)m 1
E[" 1(t) "2 (T) T] = G 12 6(t- T)
In many applications 11 1(t) and 11 2(t) are independent, but the general
treatment presented here assumes that they are not.
The nominal dynamics for the stochastic system are still defined
by (A, C), but the differential equations must include the disturbances:
•
x(t) = A x(t) + B u(t) + G 1 11 1(t)
y(t) = C x(t) + G2 112(t)
x(O) given
rrhe failure detection system is affected by the d is tuz·bances only through
the output feedback of yet):
x (t) = (A-DC) x (t) + Bu(t) + Dy(t)
m m
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Since the error sources are not included in the reference model, they
appear as dr LV ing terms for the error equations:
(t) = (A-DC) dt) + G1 11 1(t) - D G2 'rl2(t): E(O) given
(2.2.3)
In the event that there is a failure which can be modeled us ing the
controller failure model (2. 1. 7), an add it'ional driving term appears
in the error equations:
(t) = (A-DC) dt) + G1 11 1(t) - D G2 11 2 (t) + f i n(t): dO) given
E'(t) = C (t) + G2 112 (t) (5. 1. 1)
If the sensor failure model must be used, there is a failure - related
term in each of the error equations:
C £(t) + G2 11 2 (t) + e · n (t)rot c (5. 1. 2)
It if; assumed in this section that the techniques of Section 4. 2Ii have
been used to determine equivalent event vectors for sensor failures
where necessary and that (5. 1. 1) is the general stochastic error
model.
If the event vectors f l •.. f r are output separable, the state
estimator equations and the error equations can be ex-pressed
in base normal form. This requires the transformations T and T
m
from (4. 4. 1) and (4. 4. 2) respectively. If D is a detection filter
" '" #tofor f 1 ••• f r , then A-· DC is nearly block diagonal:
All " f\0--- - 0 ®1
.... '" I
"" "
I
A
"0 A0, A22 ~2 f2" ......I "- ,
"
...... A AA-])C=- f " , A'" 'A rr @ r (4.4. 26)I ", ........ r r
'"I ..... #to
I ...... IT fa
'"I .......
I
.........
......
"0-----------'0 Arr
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'"With £(t), r/(t), C I , and G2 dofined:
{I (t)
i (t)
r
- - - - --
EO (t)
-- ... - - -
Er(t)
(t) Z T- 1 (t) =
('/(t) = T- 1 (/(t) = (i(t)
- - - - --Gl = T-
1 G ·
m 1 - "A-. - --( '(t)G = T- 1 G -~~-
2 m 2 (r(Ef
the error equations in the absence of a failure become:
I(t) ~ (A.- DC) ret) + (;1 'Tl 1(t) - D G2 -'I1 2 (t) : (0) given
f/(t) =C '(t) + 62 'Tl 2 (t)
The base normal canonical form defines f> as the sam of
three matr ices:
(5~ 1. 3)
(5. 1. 4)
(4., 4. 16)
The non-zero elements of Dyand Dr can be freely chosen to optimize
~ as a detection filter-state estimator; DFR is completely specified.
AIn order to emphasize the fixed nature of DFR, it is convenient to
define a new system disturbance model for (5. 1.4):
nr1t )
!it~
'I11(t) = G1 '11 1(t)-D.FR(;2'112(t) = -)--_~ix.!t~
"\'&t)
-.-._----
~ft)
The random process '111(t) is not actually a system disturbance, but if
(4. 4. 16) is substitutea into (5. 1. 4), '111(t) does appear explicitly in the
i(t) equation in precisely the manner that a system disturbance would.
The covariance of 111(t) is:
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A A
G' -------·-G'101 lOr
A AG I - - - - - - - -G I1ft 1rr
"-
GilO
I
t
,
I
I
I
I
GirO
(5. 1. 6)
The matrix G1is n X m and the dimensions of the partitions are
identical to those of A - D~ in (4.4.26). The off-diagonal partitions
of G1are in general non-zero. but ~hey are of little importance to
failure detection theory. Even if 11 1(t) and 112(t) are not correlated,
it is clear that l1{(t) and 11 2(t) are correlated:
012:1 °1212 ". - - G 121r
I
I
G122 • G~222 :
.: ',I
, '
• '" II , I
G ' - - - - - - - - - '0"12rl 12rr
~20 1 - - - - - .. - - - - G120r
-,I AIUJ2r1 - - - - - - - _ .. - u 12rr
G121r
I
I
I
I
.
I
.1
I
G'12rr
G'120r
.U~2rr
(5. 1. 7)
The importance of defining 11 '(t) is that it allows (5. 1. 4) to be
expressed in the standard form of the estimation error for a set of
lower dimensional state estimators. The first step is to substitute
(4. 4. 16) and (5. 1. 5) into (5. 1. 4):
(5. 1. 8)
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The matrix A- DFR C has the same form as A- 13 C:
(4. 4.18)
A
r'
'"r'1
I
I
I
I
A
A rr
A
0- .
-·0 (8'1I
,.. I I
A22 " ~ ,6 rI
.....
"""- I
,'A' A...... e
"- rr r
.....
"~
"
,.. ,
All
0,
I ,
I
,
I
I
I
: IT
6--- ------ ---:::0
A
A - J\.R C =
With the partitions of D'V. C. and Dr as defined in Section 4. 4:
d'f 1 0----------0 o
o d y 2 0 - - - -:- - - - -0 o
-----~-----.-~----.-.._...-.~--
~---------~n---~---.n-
- - - - - - - - - - - -u U.I U
'l'r (4.4.20)
0----------------0----0
o- - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - -0 0
A
0--------------·-0 Dr!
---.----...-.~--_..-.-~.--._-~---_.-_-
A()'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0 D
r2
~-_.-.....--~~.-,-.--..-,---~----......-.-----
•.
I (4.4.25)
A0-------- ---- - - - - 0 D
rr
A
0- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 Dr 0
--------~------~----A--
0- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0 Drm
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AC =
o - - - - - .- - - - - - - - - .- 0
-----~---------~----~---~---AD C2 0-----------0
------- - ~ ... - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - _.....t
I
---------------------A------ (4. 4.13)o- - - _. - - - - - - -- 0 c
r
o
o- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0
A A A ""
the term D,¥ C + Dr C in (5. 1. 8) is:
~ A ~
d'i' 1 c 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 Dr 1 Crm
---.-._-------~--.........--.-..- ....... _-_.-..._----..-
"" A A
o d'i'2 C 2 0--- - -0 Dr2 Crm
--------_._----,-------------
,
A A A ~ ------------------A---:--A--
D'¥C+DrC= 0------··----·0 d'i'r C
r
D
rr
C
rm
-~~--~----~---~-~~~-~~~~-~--~
o - -. - - .. - - .. -- - .. - - - - - -0 Dro CrJD
------------.-----------:;;:---~-- J
0- ~ - - - - ... _.. ~ - - - - - - - -0 D
rm
C
rm
The partitions in (5. 1. 9) have the same d imens ion as those
of A-nC.
With the definitions in the previous paragrapll, and with
the partitions of (t) and (/(t) given in (5. 1. 3), (5. 1. 8) can be
stated as a set of r + 2 partially decoupled subsystems. The
first r subsystems are those ~LSSOC iated with fl ... fr :
i.(t) = (A.!. - d ur • ~.) £.(t) + ll'le(t>-d\lleG2 ·1l2(t) + e.€o<t)1 11 l' 1 1 1 1 III 1
(5.1. g)
f\
t!(t) =c. (.(t) + G2 - 'Tl2(t>1 1 1 1 i = 1 ••• r
A
£.(0) given
1
(5. 1. 10)
• A th A AI
where G2i is the i row of G2 and G2f is the last m-r rowsA
of G2• Equation (5. 1. 10) is the standard error equation for a
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state estimator with a scalar measurement. In addition to 11
1i
(t).
the estimator is driven by thE' colored random processes £() (t) anrl
ir(t). The proceHS (o(t) is defined by the dynamics of the pxces~
subspace:
.
£6(t) =n io(t) + ilIO(t) + fa ;r(t) - D
ro
G2r "2(t)
(5. l.11)
The second colored random process is defined by the (A rr' C
r
)
subsystem, i. e. the subsystem which is not directly associated
with the r failures:
(5.1.12)
From a failure detection vantage point, (5. 1. 11) and (5. 1. 12)
are important only to the extent that they are helpful in choos ing
A A A
Dyand Dr which minimize the variance of ( 1(t) ••• (r (t) in (5. 1. 10).
From a state estimation vantage point, it is des irable that the
A A
variance of (O(t) and (r(t) be minimized as well as that of
It(t) ••• (r(t). Sincedy1 ••• d'fr do not affect fO(t) or (r(t), no
. A A
conflict arises in the choice of Dy• The choice of Dr affects the
variance of all of (l(t) ••• (r(t), (O(t), (r(t); however, and an
A
optimal choice of Dr is not well defined. A reasonable choice of
Dr is suggested in the following subsection.
If a failure associated with one of f 1 ••• fr occurs, the corres-
ponding driving term i ·.n. (t) must be added to the equations des-It 1
cribing the subsystem for that i. (t) in (5. 1. lO)&J None of the .
1
additional terms appear in (5.1. 11) or (5.1. 12)g
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5. 1. 2 Time Domain Optimization
This subsection is concerned with the application of the time
domain approach of estimation theory to the selection of an optimal
detection filter- state estim~ltor. For the important case where
r equals m and· fl ••• f are mutually detectable, the Kalman filter
m A
equations can be used to specify an optimal D. Otherwise, a state
space augmentation is generally necessary before the Kalman al-
gorithm can be applied. The development presented here is
restricted to the steady state case; the extens ion to the nonstationary
case is deferred until Section 5. 2 in order to emphasi~e equivalence
to the frequency domain techniques in Section 5. 1. 3.
If m failures are to be detected by the failure detection system
and f 1 ••• fm are mutually detectable. (A-OC. C) is block diagonal.
The m subsystems of (5. 1. 4) are then spec ial cases of (5. 1. 10):
if(t) = ~. (.(t) + (}2· 112(t)
1 1 1 1
i = 1 ••• m
(5. 1. 13)
A A
The matrix Dr is zero for this case. D is uniquely specified if
the dy 1 ••• d'1'&n in the m subsystems described by (5. 1. 13) are
known. The suosystems are decoupled and each can be used to
optimize the particular d\l/e associated with it independently of the
1'1'
remaining subsystems.
The effect of the transformation to base normal form is to
replace a single nth-order state estimator with a set of m state
estimators of order vI ••• v
m
respectively. With the transformed
state estimates defined similarly to ret) and ('et) in (5. 1. 3):
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i: (t). 'f- 1 x (t) =
m m
Y (t) = T- 1 Y (t) =
m m m
I
r
I
.... -~----
A
X
mm
(t)
Y
m1 (t)
,
I
- --'- - _.-J (t)
mm
(5. 1. 14)
the decoupled state estimators can be expressed:
•A
X •(t) =
mt
A, A A A -1 "'"(A .. - d w • e.) x .(t) +[DT y(t)l .. x .(0) given11 1'l 1 mt m Jl· ml
A A
y .(t) =: e. x .(t)
ml 1 rot i = 1 ••• m (5. 1. 15)
[ " - 1 J 1where DTm yet) i is the appropriate rows of t>T~ yet). The total
computational requirements for these m state estimators is
considerably less than that for the single nth-order state estimator.
The decoupling is a consequence of the des ire to constrain the
output error produced by a system failure associated with one of
f t ••• f m to a single direction. If one of the failures occurs, only
the accuracy of the state estimator ass igned to the appropriate
A A A A
subsystem of (A-DC, C) is degraded -- the state estimates for the
remai~ingstate estimators are unaffected.
"" I A "" I A •Since each of (A 11' e l ) ••• (A , c ) has a scalarth mm m
measurement, t~e IIi - order vectors d" 1••• d'Ym are the general
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feedback filters for the state estimators. The choices of
d y l' •• d y m which minimize the steady- state variances of
€l(t) ••. £ (t) in (5.1.13) are the steady-state Kalman filters for
IT.
the appropriate subsystem. These filters are denoted by
dYKl"" dyKmand satisfy (2.2.6):
1 ••• m
(5. 1. 16)
where P . is the pas itive definite solutic!1 of:ClOt
'" A A A / T A I [A '\ T 1\ I 1 [ A 1\ T]- 1[ A 1\ "/ ] _A ~. p ·+ P · A.. + G.. - P. c · + G12 ·· tJ G2 ·G2 · c ·P ·+ G12 .. - 011 eo1 COL 11 11 001 1 11 1 1 1 0)1 11
(5.1.17)
With DYK defined by (4. 4. 20) for d YKl ••• dyKm ' the optimal
detection filter- state estimator is:
(5.1. 18)
~K minimizes the variance of the state estimation error (5. 1. 4)
subject to the failure detection constraints, but a failure detection
A
system based on D K is not a minimum variance state estimator.
That would require all nx m elements of DK to be optimized rather
than the n associated with dYKl ••• dO/Km' No general comparison
.of DK with a Kalman filter ls poss ible, but sever'al comparisons for
particular systems' are made in Chapter 6.
The closed form solution for the optimal detection filter-
state estimator given by (5. 1. 16), (4.4.20), and (5. 1. 18) is
valid only if r = m and fl ••• f
m
are mutually detectable. If
. fl ••• f
m
are not mutually detectable, the driving terms
®l £O(t) ••• ~m Eij<t) must be inclUded in (5. 1. 13) where:
(5. 1. 19)
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The error €O(t) appears in (5. 1. 13) as colored system noise. The
standard estimation theory procedure for dealing with colol'ed
system noi8e is to l1 whitentf the random process by modeling it as
the output ()f a shaping filter driven by white noise. If the <letection
filter is to be optilnized as a detection filter- state estimator, the
reference model may be augmented to include the dynamics and
state components of the shaping filter in each of the r subsystems:
£.(t)
1
€. (t) =
l
The new state matrices correspond ing to (5. 1. 20) are:
A I (;).
-;;: A ..
A~. = 11 1II
0 n
(5.1.20)
and (5. 1. 10) must be modified accordingly. The augmented Kalman
filters can then be found for each of the resulting (Vi + VO) - dimen-
sional subsystems.
In a failure detection s.ystem, the shaping filter approach may
lead to an unobservable reference model. The procedure for
avoiding this difficulty is to use the techniques developed in Section
4. 2. 3 to remove the excess subspace through state space augmenta-
tion. The net effecteis the same as in the .shapjng fiIte]" approach,
but the new subsystems are (Vi + vO) - dimensional or less.
A different approach is to write the steady-state covariance
" A
matrices Pl ••• P for (5. 1. 10) and determ ine,·s·ome 'Suboptimal
~ -m '
te~bnlq~ for ~hoostngd"r .. d tm• EquatiolJ. (5~ 1.lr7) oannot be
used to find the covariances in this instance. A set of coupled
differential equations for P.(t), P.O(t), and poet) must be integrated
1 1 A
for a specific choice of d \II- in order to determ ine P · (Jazwins ki~l ml
(1970»:
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.A () _ (""I A A A ~ I AT"" A A T A,P. t - A .. - d\1l. C.) P. (t) + r'. (t)(A .. - d\l1. C.) + s. P.O<t)+ P.O(t) 8. + G..
1 11 11 1 1 1 It Il 1 1 1 1 1 11
A A T T A, 1 T A IT A
+ d'i'iG2i G2i d'i'i - Gl2ii Q'i'i - d'i'i U l 2ii : Pi(O) given
(5. 1.22)
.
poet) = n poet) + poet) nT + GOO APO(O) given
A.
PlO(O) given
(50 1. 23)
(5. 1.24)
In :eneral.... d'i'l ••• d'i'm do not exist which minimize the v.ariance
of P=i • •• Pcern; but it is poss ible to minimize some scalar function
of the covariance. In particular, Section 5. 1, 3 develops a technique
for minimiz ing the steady state output covariance:
At. I _ • 9-.. I ) _ • A A A TP . - 11m r'. (t - 11m c.P.(t) c.
=1 t ttl L 1
.... co -t GO
i = 1 ••• m (5. 1.25)
Once d.'i'l ••• d~m have been chosen according to some criterion. the
state estimation error covariances can be ascertained from (5. 1. 22)
- (5. 1. 24).
A more difficult problem arises if r < m. In this case Dr is
not zero and (5. 1. 12) must be considered in the optimization along
with (5. 1. 10). Because of the coupling between f1(t) ••• fret) and
(r(t). a proper Kalman optimization cannot be formulated for both
a'f and Dr. A straightforward ap~lication of (2. 2. 5) and (2. 2. 6) can
be used to find the Kalman filter D
rKm for (5. 1. 12). but minimizing
the variance of (r(t) does not necessarily minimize the contribntion
of the r 1~(t) ••• r rir(t) terms to the variances of f 1(t) ••• fret).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that:
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0·-···· -. ····0 1
(5. 1 g 26)
0--------------·0
- 0-· --- -~- -~. -~O - n;-Km
is a reasonable selection. With D
rK given, a D'1'K which minimizes
the variance of €l(t) • •. £ (t) can be found us ing a technique similar
r .
to that used when (O(t) was considered. Before pursuing this possi-
bility, however. it is worthwhile to consider some simpler approaches
to implement.
The treatment of the r < m case which leads to the simplest
des ign procedure is to determine an add itional set of P1-1~ event vec-
tors sl..lch that the total of m event vectors are output separable. If
possible. it is desirable to make the selection such that the m:event
vectors are mutually detectable; in which case the optimization prob-
lem reduces immediately to (5. 1. 13). Otherwise, state space aug-
mentation must be used to eliminate the excess subspace. Because
they serve primarily as a computativnal artifice, the additional event
vectors need not corresond to phys ically meaningful failures. TIle
general approach for finding satisfactory event vectors is illustrated
in Section 6. 2. 2. If the design procedure does not lead to satisfactory
state estimation properties, a possible remedy is to keep the optimal
~ AD~'K based upon the m event vectors, but replace ~FR with the DFR
corresponUing tp the original r event vectors, i. e. remove the a(lded
A
event vectors from cons ideration. Because D'1'Kthen has terms which
should more correctly appear in DrK, it is possible to set DrK equal
to zero. The net effect of these manipulations is a suboptimization
similar to that based on (5. 1. 26).
A second alternative which requires no state space augmenta-
tion is to use the parameter optimizati.on techniques of Section 5. 1. 3
directly with the n-dimensional model. This approach does not have
a single best solution and it may require some trial and error. The
best implementation is to choose ~rK as (5. 1. 25) and then use the
parameter optimization techniques to select dyKl ••• d VKr• If this
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does not lead to acceptable state estimation properttes for some of
the r subsystems, a new optimization which includes the components
'"of Dr can be formulated for those subsystems.
The t~'o alternatives mentioned above have the advantage that
A
they define simple suboptimal algorithms for selecting both Dr and
A
Df • If. however. (5. 1. 26) is used. there is a somewhat lengthy pro-
cedure for optimizing ~1f conditioned on this choice of Dr. This pro-
cedure is outlined in the remainder of this subsection.
Equation (5. 1. 12) differs from (5. 1. 11) in that the (A rr. C r)
subsystem has measurements associated with it. This difference is
important from a failure detection vantage point. bilt the difficulties
it poses can be circumvented. With D
rK specified by (5. 1. 26). it is
necessary to define an augmented reference model which duplicates
the dynamics associated with; ret). but not the measurements:
Q-_··O
, .
" :
'6
f'
.1
.
T"
r
o
where:
6----· -- - -- - -.... .,:: .. 0
,....,
A
C =
D.FR
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;1\ A A
Arr-DrKmCrmJ
(5. 1. 27)
(5. 1. 28)
~ A A R"" ~
If the reference model (A - (DFR+ DrJ() C, C) defined by (5. 1. 27)
and (fl. 1.28) is not observablp, the unobservab10 portion of the allg-
ment(~d sub:-iystem can lIe renlc)ved.
The effect of the state spac(~ aug'mentatioll is to define a new
excess subspace. If the original excess subspace had already been
removed using state space augmentation, the state estimation erl'or
vector corresponding to (5. 1. 27) is:
€ (t) = ; r (t)
----- --
i ret)
.- ~ .. ~--.
(o(t)
(5.1.29)
The dynamics associated with Eo(t) by (5. L 27) are deterministic;
however, becaase (O(t) and (l.,(t) have the same dynamics, it is pos-
sible to assume that tr(t) is deterministic and that (oCt) is driven by
the random processes which appear in (5.1.12):
(5 • 1. 30)
The error io(t) can then be substituted for; ret) in (5. 1. 10) and the
algorithms discussed in conjunction with (5. 1. 11) can be applied to
eliminate the new excess subspace through further state space aug-
mentations. This procedure is circuitous and may lead to a reference
model with an unacceptably large dimension. but conditioned on
(5. 1. 26), it yields an optimal detection filter state estimator.
5. 1. 3 Frequency Domain Optimization
A
In order to specify DK , it is necessary to choose a set of filtersA A
dirt ••• d Vr• Dr. If DK is to be an optimal detection filter-state
estimator, the set of r+ 1 filters must be chosen optirrlal1y. This
subsection presents a frequency domain alternative to the time domain
solution of Section 5. 1. 2. In a des ign problem, differe~~ approaches
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""
may be used to select different elements of the set d 'Yl ••• d'1' ' Dr.
"" r
All that is required is that each of d 'fl ••• d't'!'. Dr be chosen optimal-
ly. For convenience, the optimal detection filter-state estimator is
"still denoted by DK; however, the solutions defined in this subsection
for dV1 ••• d'lr are denoted by d1fN1 ••• d mr'
If the Kalman approacll of Section 5. 1. 2 cannot be used to find a
d \lITE- which minimizes the variance of € .(t) for some subsystem of
I~t 1
(1-DC. C) without an unacceptable state space augmentation. or if
output stationarity has been used, an alternative is to find a function
of €.(t) which can be minimized. TIle most obvious choice from a
1
failure detection vantage poi nt is to minimize the variance of the out-
put error c.€~(~). This is a scalar minimization problem with sta-
t 1
tionary statistics and the parameter optimization technique of Ne\vton,
Gould, and Kaiser (1957) discussed in Section 2. 2 can be applied.
The parameter optimization yields a unique solution d\1lN.. If the
"" '" I 1
noise sources for a subsystem are white «(8). and f.' aY'e zero), d\llN. is
1 1 I 1
equal to the Kalman filter d'!'Ki for that subsystem and the parameter
optimization minimizes the variance of the error state vector i. (t) as
1
well as the output. It follows that all of dVNi • •• d"Nr can be deter-
mined in lieu of using the Kalman approach if desired.
... The steady-state output error variances c 1QCD1 c'[
C peT can be expressed as the integral of the corresponding powerr CDr r
spectral densities cl~l(s)c{ ••• cr~r(s)crT. These in turn can be
developed from (2. 2. 10) in terms of the transfer functions for c1£1(s)
••• C t (8) and the power spectral densities of the noise sources.
r r
THe Laplace transform for (5. 1. 10) with zero initial cond itions is:
(sE -A.~ +d .c.)i".(s) =III 1t V1 1 1
i = 1 ••• r (5.1.31)
The matrix on the left-hand side of (5. 1. 31) is invertible. By taking
the inverse, the equation can be solved for the transfer functions of
£l(a) ••• l (8) and then c1£l (s) ••• c l (s). First. however. it is
r r r AI
desirable to <smplify the expression using A.. from (4.4.-23):
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S, 0.:------0 Pil
- 1, .... ,
"
A A
sE .-A.. = sE .-A.'.+dw_c. =
Vl 11 III Ll It 1 o~ " ~o
...
....... '8
(
I ' ~0--- ---·:0 -'1
i= 1 ••. r
Pi(v:-l)
l
S+p.
LV-l
(5. 1. 32)
The coeffic ients p. l ••• p. for i = r are those of the des ired1 llli
minimal polynomials 'f 1( .) ••• '*'r<·) for the r subsystems in (5. 1. 10)
and are the parameters to be optimized. The filters d'fl •. 0 d'i'r can
then be determined from the coefficients us ing (4. 4. 21). Equatio!'l
(5. 1.. 32) is a standard form and tts inverse can be evaluated analyti- .
cally:
(sE
v.
i
" - 1A .. ) =
11
1
'f i (s)
x . - - - - -- - - _·x
J
•
•
x.--.. .. - ---x
IIi - 1
1 s ..• s
i= 1••. r
(5, 1. 33)
(5. 1. 34)
The XiS are not zero, but they are not important here. It is a simple
matter to ver ify that:
A A - 1 1 [ IIi - 1 , 1 T
c.(sE -A.. ) =__ 1 8 ••• S J tI -- Zt-(S)
l' IIi 11 'fi(a) 'fi(s)
The transfer functions for c1(i (s) •.• Cr(r(s) can be expressed in
terms of the YJ'ectors Zl (8) ••• Zr(S):
c.i.(s) = 1 z.(s)T {'Ill' .(s)- dw .G2. 1l2(s)+~€-(s)+r. €r(S)} i = 1 ••• r1 1 'f . (8 ) 1 l"l1 1 '1 -U 1
1
(5. 1. 35)
The power spectral densities of each of the noise sources in
(5. 1. 35) must be determined along with the cr-oss-power spectral
densities. The computation is straightforward but tedious (see
Section 2. 2). Ignoring the cross- power spectral dens ities. the
resulting power spectral densities for the output errors are:
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,. A T 1 ( ~,,- , A T A A TA TC.~.(S)C. = z. s ~111.(s)+d\U.e · G2G2 e .d\11.1. 1 1 ~(8)'¥..(-S) 1 1 ,.L ml mlIl
1 1
-
"A AT A AT)+ e.~O/(s)e. + f. cfL(S)r. Z.(-S)L 1 1 -1' 1 1 (5.1. 36)
where ~~1 is the power spectral dens ity of 11{ (t) etc. The integrals
f AA ( )A T A A ( )A T . A A A To c 1~1" sCI ••• c r ~r s cr are the output error vartances c 1Pool c 1
... c PeT. If each pair of cross- power spectral deas ities is com-
I' O'r r
bined in one term. every term of Cl~l(s)ClT ••• Cr~r(s)CrT can be
factored into a rational polynom ial of s and the same polynom ial of - s:
&.j.(s)c.T = v 1 .(s)v1 .(-s)+vq .(s)v2 .(-s) + ... i= 1 ••• r, r1 1... · 1 1 1 " 1 1
(5.1.37)
The variances can then be expressed:
A A ,. T
c.P .c. ~
1 001 1
jm
1 ~""'\ A 1t. ( )" T
-- c.w. s c. ds
2 . 1 1 11TJ .
- JO)
(5. 1. 38)
Tb.e .above' is a standard integral f'orm' and can be evaluated us ing the
tables in Append ix B.
Th · A pA AT" pA A T 1 b · ft· fe varlances c 1 001 c 1 •• ~r CX)r cr are a ge rate une lons 0
the appropriate coefficients P'l ••• p. , i = 1 ••• r, of d W1 ••• d\l/ •1 IV 1 I 1 r
If the optimal coefficients are denoted by PiNl ••• PiNi,Ji J i = 1 ••• r.
the)' must satisfy:
A; " c T ,," AT
c ·P · · (p. 1 -• •• P 1-' j •. ) ~ c ·P ·c · (P ·N 1 ••• p. N )1 =1 1 1 v 1 eol 1 1 . ., 1 lJ •
1 1
(5. 1. 39)
for all real coefficients Pil ••• Pilli. i = 1 ••• r. If the optimal co-
efficients are finite, they define a stationary point with ~os itive
second partial derivatives:
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A A ... TO(C.P .c. )1 0)1 1 0 j 1= = v.
op· . 11.1 i = 1 r
o2(c. f) oc.T)
1 col 1
> 0
op ..lJ
(5.1. 40)
(5.1.41)
For each subsystem, (5. 1.40) provides a set of Vi equations which
specify the optimal coefficients and hence d'¥Nl8 If Vi> 2, the equa-
tions are generally nonlinear and digital function minimization tech-
niques must be used to find PiNl ••• PtNll
t
'
If the event vectors h l 0'" hq are to be output stationary with
f l ••• f • Section 4.2.4 specifies p. 1 •.• p. , i == 1 ••• r. as fune-r 1 lVi
tions of the coeffic~ents of the des ired polynomials Y1( .) ••• y ( .)
-'. - q
associated with r/ 1 ••• II • For convenience, assume that only h.q J
is to be made output stationary with f .••• f and the index set I.
1 r J
exists for which:
13. Ch. = \' Ctk CfkJ . J ~ J
kEI.
J
(5. 1. 42)
where Q'kj- kE If are nonzero. The parameters Pu .". Pilli- i~ Ij _
are not affected by the output stationarity and can still be optimized
using either (5. 1. 40) or the Kalman approach. The only remaining
freedom in the choice of 0'1' is in the coefficients of Y1( .). If a set of
weighting functions Sk- k E: I j _ are selected, the coefficients of Y1( .)
can be constrained to minimize the cost function:
(5. 1. 43)
in a manner identical to (5. 1. 40). If the ~kI8, kE 1. , are equal to the
~ J
squares of the respective O'ki's, P col. is the covariance of the output
J
error associated with Ch.. Otherwise, they re:lect the relative cost
J
associated with output errors along each of Cf1 ••• Cfr " Equation
(5. 1. 43). together with (5. 1. 40) for i~ I., uniquely specify an
A J
optimal OK as a function of Sk- k EIf
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5.2 Suboptimal State Estlmation-- Time-varying Statistics
In certain applications, the steady state covariance matrices
A A
P 1••• P upon which Section 5. 1 was predicted do not exist. This
00 O)r
may be clue to the fact that the random processes in the stochastic
system [node! are nonstationary, or it may be due to the fact that
the resp()nse of the system before it reaches steady state is of
interest. The Kalman filter approach of Section 5. 1. 2 for the optimal
detection filter- state estimator is generalizable to nonstationary
problems:. The parameter optimizatiol~ technique of Section 5. 1. 3
cannot be~ applied rigorously, but acceptable approximations can
be made in many instances. The extension of both these subsections
to the nOJlstationary statistics case is developed in this subsectione
Because of their extens ive utilization in practice, attention is also
directed toward sampled-data systems.
Th1e Kalman filter for continuous systems with nonstationary
statisticEJ is time- varying. If the noise sources remain white and
zero mecln, the stochastic model of Section 5. 1. 1 can be modified by
making I\_ G12- Gp and G2 functions of time. Instead of the steady
state solution (5.1.16) and (5.1.17), the Kalman filter is a function
of ~.(t):
1
where P.(t) Aatisfies the differential equation:
1.
.t A At A A T A
P.(t) = A~. P.(t) + P.(t) A~. + G.'.(t)
1 11 L L 11 11
, - 1'~ A T A ] '" A T] A A A T
-[I i(t) c i + G12U(t) [G2i(t) G2i(t) [c i Pi(t) + G 12U(t) ]
i = 1••• r :P.(O) given
1
(5. 2.2)
If the nOJrlstationary Kalman filter is used, (5. 2. 2) and (5. 2. 1) must
either be precomputed and stored or. solved in real- time along with
the reference model equations in order to determine d'l'Kl(t) ••• d'l'Kr(t)
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as a function of time. Utilization of (G. 2.1) and (5.2.2) leads tC) a
tim(~-varying detection filter-stat(~ estimator, but this does not
affect the failure detection system properties.
An alternative te> (5.2.1) is a piece-wise stationary approxi-
mation to the system which would allow the parameter optimization
procedure of Section 5. 1. 3 to be applied. The techniql,e is useful
if pet), G12 (t), G1(t), and G2(t) can be approximated as r~ece-wise
constant over time intervals appreciably longer than the response
time of the system. Each time R. step change in the variances is
made, the algorithm of Section 5. 1.3 must be repeated to choose
new vectors d'i'Nl (t)••• d'i'Nr(t) as a function of the Hme. The per-
fornlance of the resulting detection filter-state estilnator depencls
on t11e rate of change of the noise variances relative to the system
response time and the magnitude of the steps.
The algorithms of the preceding paragraphs select different
vectors d'i'l ••• d'i'r when the noise processes for the system are
nonstatlonary. The Kalman algorithm has the advantage that it is
optimal, but it may require a large state space augmentation. The
selection between the two alternatives must be made subjectively
on the bas is of performance and computational requirements.
Section 4. 6 motivated the fact that failure detection theory
is not analytically valid for continuous deterministic systems with
discrete measurements (sampled-data systems). If a first ordf~r
expans ion of thE' state trans ition matrix ~(t, t+ At) is suffic iently
accurate, however, a detection filter can be specified for a discrete'
system approximation to the sampled- data system. The detection
filter chosen for the discrete system can be used with the sampled-
data system to c'onstrain the output errors produced by failures to
be approximately unidirectionalt. __A similar result is true for stochas-
tic sampled-data systems, but for state estimation purposes it is
des irable to modify the representation of the reference model given
in (4. 6.6) to be consistent with that commonly used for state
estimators. No analytical difficulties are introduced because the
representation given below and that in (4. 6. 6) both converge to the
continuous reference model as At approaches zero.
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The system equation for a continuous stochastic system with
discrete measurements and no failure is given by:
t +,6.t
x(t+ At) = CP(t+ .c:.\t, t) x(t) + S 4I<t + ~t, T)Bu(,.) d,. + G1A T1 1i t +At)
t
(5. 2.3)
where T1 1.c:.\(t) and T1 2.c:.\(t) are discrete, zero mean, white vector processes
with finite variances:
_1_ E
~t °1
A state estilnation system for a linear sampled-data system can
be defined as a two stage processor. The first stage involves the
propagation of the state estimate x (t) to time t+ 4t and the measure-
m
ment of the propagated estimate xm (t+ At) :
t+~t
x
m
(t+.t1t) = 4>(t+,6.t,t) xm(t) + S cp(t+,6.t,'T)BU(T)dT
t
y (t+at) = C x (t+~t)
m m
(5. 2.5)
Because of the stochastic ilature of tiie problem, x (t+ At) contains
m
an error even if the system has not failed. The standard state es-
timation technique for minimizing the state estimation error variance
is to use the new system measurement y(t+ 4t) to update the state
estimate:
x (t+ "'t) = x (t+ At) + D A(y(t+~t) - Y (-ti-.~ t»
m m '-1 m
(5. 2. 6)
The two stages of the state estimator make it necessary to defiIle
errors for the propagated state estimate as well as the updated
state estimate:
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( (t+ l\t) = x(t+ At) - X (t+ At)
m
£(t+~t) :I :x(t+at) - x (t+At)m .
(5. 2.7)
Tlle ITJ.easured error is a third quantity which is frequently :eferrecl
to as the measurement res idual:
£'(t+at> = y(t+~t) - ex (t+At)
m
Tl1e error equations follow from (5. 2. 4) - (5. 2. 7):
"(t+~t) = ep(t+~t,t) £(t) + G1A 1l1~(t+.o.t)
"('(t+At) = C "(t+At) + G2.A. 112.6.(t+at)
I
dt + ~ t) = "(t+ ~t) - D.6."( (t+ ,6t)
The covariances for £ (t+ ~t) and £ (t+ lit) respectively are:
(5.2.8)
(5. 2. 10)
P(t+ At) = ~(t+ .At, t) P(t}. ~(t'+ .at, t) T + _1_ G 1.6 G 111Tf:t
- T 1. T T
P(t+.A.t) = (En-D.aC ) P(t+At) (En-DAC) + ~t D,A.G2,A. G2A D.a
(5.2.11)
The variance of"( '(t+ At) differs from Cp(t+ ~t) C T in that it includes
the effect of the measurement uncertainty:
-' -- T 1 T
P (t+ ,A.t) = CP(t+ ,6t) C + At 92A G2.a (5. 2. 12)
Equations (5. 2. 5) and (5. 2. 6) have the standard forral of a
state estimator for ~ampled-data systems, tut it is not immediately
obvious that they have the form of a failure detection system. It
is also not apparent how DAshould be chosen if the equations do
define a failure detection system. These o:uestions can be answered
by considering a continuous system approximation of 'fi. 2. 3) - (5. 2. 10).
The necessary procedure is to first approximate (5. 2. 3) by a
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discrete system and then consider the discrete to continuous limit.
Lineariz ing the state trans ition matrix:
CZ»(t+ At, t) ~ E + Ii t A
n
and keeping only first order terms, (5. 2. 3) becomes:
x{t+at) = (En + at A) x{t) + a t B u{t) + G1a'T1 1a{t+ At)
(5. 2.13)
(5. 2. 14)
Equation (5.2.14) is the stochastic version of (4.6.11) with no failure.
The state equations for the failure detection system can be expanded
similarly:
x (t+ ~t) = (E + At A) x (t) + ~t B u(t)
m n m
x (t+ L\t) =x (t+ at) + D A(y(t+ At) - ex (t+ ~t»
m m ~ m
The error equations can be developed in the same manner.
(5. 2. 15)
(5. 2. 16)
From (5. 2. 13) - (5. 2. :5) it is possible to consider the
discrete-to-continuQllS limit and reduce (5.2.15) to a single equation.
With the substitutions:
G1A = ~t G1
G2~ :z G2
D A = ~.t D
(5. 2. 14) be.co.mes t~e standard continuous stochastic system of
Section 5. 1;
x{t) = Ax{t) + Bu{t) + G1 11 1(t)
y(t) = C x(t) + G2 11 2 (t)
Equation (5. 2. 15) can be ·placed in incremental form:
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(5. 2.17)
x (t+ At) - x (t)
m m
At
= A x
m
(t) + B u(t) + D(y(t+ .6t) - CX
m
(t+ ~t»
(5. :~. 18)
In the limit as A-t approaches zero, x (t+ At) approaches x (t) and
m m
(5. 2. 18) becomes the standard continuous reference model of
Chapter 3:
~ (t) = A x (t) + Bu(t) + D(y(t) - C x (t»
m m m
Y (t) = C x (t)
m m
The error equations become the stochastic err~r equations of
SE~ction 5. 1.
(5.2. 19)
Equations (5.2.16) and (5 0 2.19) say tha.t a detection filter can
be determine(j for the continuous approximat ion 01~~ (5. 2. 3) and then
used to specify D~: With the base normal form for (5. 2. 19) as
defined in (4. 4.3), this suggests that Section 5. 1 can be used to
determine a continuous optimal detection filter-state estimator
A
D
K
and that a reasonable choice for a suboptimal sampled-data
detection filter- state estimator is:
(5. 2. 20)
For many applications (5. 2. 20) is satisfactory. If the sampled-
data syste~1 has precise measurements and a large sampling period,
h()wever, (5. 2. 20) has a tendency to overweight the measurements
and x (t+ At) can become a poorer state estimate than x (t+ ~t).
m m
Improvement over (5. 2. 20) can be made by considering a new
approximation of (5. 2. 3), (5. 2. 5), and (5. 2. 6). The 8uboptinlal
detection filter- state extimator can be decomposed i.nto the sum of
A" A
three matrices be defining DAFR' DA'1'K' and DArK analogously
A" A
to DFR, D'1'K' and DrK:
A " A A
DAK = DAFR + DA 'fK + DArK
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(5. 2. 21)
oa\FR is uniquely specified as:
(5. 2. 22)
by the des ire to constrain the output error produced by failures
to be nearly unidirectional. DA.1fK and DA fK can be chosen to
improve the state estimation properties of (5. 2. 5) and (5. 2. 6).
Consider the transformation of the sampled-data system
(5. 2. 3) along with (5. 2. 5) and (5. 2. 6) into the coordinate system
of the base normal form defined for (5.2.19):
A
-1tIl(t, T) = T q>(t, T)T
A
-1 C TC = Tm
" - 1 (5.2.~3)DA.K = T - D AK T m
A "A A
Although A-DC may be upper block diagonal for some .::hoice of D,
in general ~(t.,.) is not upper block diagonal for any choice of D~:
~1l A A A Aq, ---~ <PI 0 «P 1f12 lr
I I
A A
. I I
«1>21 «1>22 II I I
I I ,
...
I I IA A A A A~(t, T) = ep --------- - ep ~rO 4>rr (5. 2. 24)rl rr
"
A
'00
Aq, -------- 4' cZ>orQl Or
~ -------- «$ A Acl>ro 4lrrfl fr
A A
. where ~11 is 111 x 111 etc. As long as DAK is chosen to satisfy
(5.2.21) and (5.2.22) and the continuous approximation (5.2.19)
is reasonable, a failure related to the first subsystem of the
continuous approximation (5. 2. 19) primarily. affects the accuracy
of only the first 111 ~omponents of the state estimat~ x
m
(t) in the
transformed sampled data system. The presence of cf»2l. • • ~rl
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in (5. 2. 24) means that estimation errors are generated in the remain-
ing n-1/1 components cfxm(t+At), but the output feedback due to the
~~FRcomponentof DA minim izes the growth of these errors components.
This error isolation property can be extrapolated to the first r sub-
systems of A-D~.
It follows from the preceding arguments that a reasonable
A A
procedure for choosing DA'i' and DAr in (5. 2. 22) is to replace
~(t,·r) by: .
A
~11 0------0
" .......
A
~lO
A
4>lr
I
I
o ----- -- ---0
o - -- - - - -- - ·0
A
~/(t,T)=
o
I
I
I
I
'-
-»22
"
"~
rr
A
l
A
4> rO tPrr
(5. 2. 25)
A
"
4>00 4>or
A A
4>ro 4>rr
The failure detection system can then be decomposed into a set of
r+2 subsystems precisely as was done in Section 5. 1. 1 for A-DC --
the base normal form for (5.2.25) is that of (5.2.19)0 The matrix
DArK can be chosen optimally using the discrete Kalman filter
for sampled data systems (Bryson and Ho (1969) or Jazwinski (1970))
rather than the continuous filter. Similarly, if DA'i'K is defined by
(4. 4.20):
A
D~'i'K =
IdA'i'Kl
o
I'
I
I
d l1'i'K2
....
...
. .
, 0
"
dA'i'Kr
0- . . ~O
I
I
t
I
(5.2.26)
o------- -0 . o
I
o o
the discrete Kalman filters dA'i'Kl" .dA'i'Kr which minimize the
variance of the block diagonalized system can be found using the
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AAn alternative to (5. 2. 25) is to replace ~(t, 7') by:
Although (5. 2.25) and {5. 2.28) are not identical.. they are nearly
A"
equal for small At. The state transition matrix ep (t.. T) is upper
A A
block diagonal and can be used to determine D~K and D~r using
either (5. 2. 26) or (5. 2. 27).
(5. 2. 28)
(5.2.27)
p.rocedure in Section 5.1& 2. If the Kalman approach is not used
th '" '" '" Afor the i subsyst,=m of (A- DC, C), the parameter optimization
technique can be used to define the optirnal d'i'Ni for the corresponding
subsystem in (5. 2. 19) and d~'YKi in (5. 2. 26) can be defined by:
In general (5. 2. 21) can be expected to yield a better state
estimator than (5. 2. 20). The valid ity of :6.0. K as a detection filter
is a function of the degree to which it constrains failure-indu(:ed
output errors to a single direction. The amount of acceptable
"leakage l1 of the error signal is a function of the strength of the
stochastic noise sources. The potential value as well as the
limitations of a failure detection system for a stochastic sampled
data system are illustr,ted in Chapter 6.
5. 3 Detection Law for Multiple Failure Detection Systems
If the number of failures to be monitored is large. two or
more failure detection systems may be required. The failure
detection systems can be implemented independently (Figure 5. 1).
One advantage which accrues from the use of multiple failure
detection systems is that each generates a state estimate. Al-
though the state estimates are not independent, they can be combined
to yield a Detter state estimate than any of the individual estimates.
A d:~a.dvantage is that failure isolation is more difficult when
multiple failure detection systems are used. If a failure occurs,
it affects the sttite estimates in all of th~ failure detection systems
and each inter·pl'eU: the -resulting output estirnation errors in terms
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of the failures it was des igned to detect. It is necessary to have a
detection law which resolves conflicts between the detection decisions
made by the individual failure detection systems.
Assume the two failure detection systems of Figure 5. 1 are
implemented and that (A- D1C, C) is des igned to detect the failure
associated with an event vector f.. If that failure occurs, the output
1
estimation error fo~ (A- DIe, C) is unid irectiol1al along Cf i and
(A-D1C,C) detects the failure correctly. An output error signal
is also generated by the second failure detection system and a second
failure detection decision is made. If (A-D 2C, C) is also designed
to detect the failure associated with f., it produces a unidirectional
L
output error along Cfi and identifies the failure correctly. If (A-D2, C, C)
is not designed for the failure associated with f., however, Corollary 1
L
of Theorem 3. 2. 1 (Detection Theorem) guarantees that f. does not
1
produce a unidirectional output for (A-D2C, C). The (A-DC 2, C)
failure detection system therefore determines that either a sensor
failure or some multiple failure has occurred. In this instance a
detection law makes the correct decision if it accepts the decision
of the failure detection system in which the output error was restricted
to the lowest dimensional subspace of the output space cr m •
The detection law stated in the preceding paragraph is general-
izable to sensor failures. If a sensor failure for which (A-D2C, C)
was designed occurs, the output error signal for (A-DIe, C) cannot
be -constrr.Ained to a two-dimensional subspace unless (A-Dte, C)
was also designed to detect the sensor failure. In the event of
a single failure, the detection law always identifies the failure
correctly. If several failures occur simultaneously, the detection
law may yield an arrblguous decision. If a failure occurs which
none of the failure detection systems is designed to detect, the
detection law can be expected to yield an ill-defined decision.
When designing a failure detection system, it is to the designer's
advantage to know how the failure detection system and the detection
law 'will respond in all possible situations. An orderly procedure
for developing and implementing this detection law is illustrated'
in Section 6. 3.
TIle detection law requires that each of the ind ividual failure
detection systems make detection decisions before a final decision
is rnadc. In the case of the failure associated with i., this requires
l
that (A-D1C. C) indicate the correct failure and (A- D2C. C) indicate
either a sensor failure or a multiple failure. A certain waiting
period must be allow(~d for each failure detection system to observe
the behavior of its output error signal. The length of the waiting
period is a function of the system, the failure, and the failure
detection system. It can only be determined through a trial and
error process.
The implementation of a detection law is con1plicated by the
presence of stochastic disturbances. It is necessary for each
failure detection system to differentiate between output errors
generated by stochastic sources and those generated by failures.
The simplest procedure is to establish a threshold criterion --
other criteria are discussed in Section 5. 4. A detection law based
up()n the threshold criterion is developed in this sectioll for systems
with continuous measuremer...ts. A similar la'" for sampled-date
systems is developed in Section 6. 3. To simplify the analys is,
it is assumed here that the estimation errors in the unfailed system
satisfy (5. 1. 13).
The stochastic model upon which Section 5. 1 is based assumes
that the measurement random process Tl 2(t) is white noise. In
many respects this model is a reasonable approximation of the un-
certainty in continuous measurements; but, unfortunately, the threshold
criterion makes its decision on the basis of the magnitude of the
residuals. Because of the additive white noise in the measurerrlent:
I
f: (t) = C£(t) + G2 T}2(t) (2.2.3)
I
the variance of ( (t) is infinite. In order to define a threshold
,
test. it is necessary to first smooth E' (t). The smoothing interval
can be made arbitrarily small so that it attenuates the high frequency
I
portion of ( (t) without altering C(t) appreciably. Although some
smoothing algorithms may yield better s ignal- to- noise ratios than
others~ their implementation is largely a function of how much is
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known about the expected nature of C ret). For present purposes
it is sufficient to restrict attention to a simple fil"st- order smoother
of the form:
i = 1••• m (5.3. 1)
where Ts is approximately the length of the smoothing interval.
The variance of ~J (t) can be used to define a 990/0 (3(1) likelihood
error ellipse centered at the origin in ~m. (If the variance of E" 1/ (t)
is not steady state, the ellipse is a function of time.) In the absence
of any failures, (" (t) is contained in the ellipse 990/0 of the time.
As long as £ II (t) is contained in the ellipse, its magnitude can
reasonable be attributed to the effect of the noise sources. If
(/I(t) is outside the ellipse it is reasonable to assume that the system
has failed. The remaining problera is to associate the direction
f. /1 (t) with the failures which the failure detection system is des igned
to detect.
Procedures for determining the direction of a vecto:' which
is the sum of a deterministic component and a random component
can become complicated. The simplest for £ ~/(t) is to transform
1
it into the coordinate system defined by Cf1- __ ef
r
(i. e. the base
normal canonical form) and define a separate threshold criterion
for each of the error components in the new coordinate system
(see Figure 5. 1). Although it is immaterial whether the trans-
formation is made before or after the smoothing operation, it is
notationally convenient to assume that it occurs before:
€' (t) = T- 1 (' (t)
m
•ii (t) ~ : (t)1 i = 1••• m (5. 3. 2)
II
A threshold crossing for i 1 (t) then ind icates that the failure
associated with the output direction Cf1 has occurred, etc.
Equation (5. 2. 2) defines an additional state for each of the
m subsystems and consequently state space augmentations are
necessary in order to determine the variances of ; 1N (t)••• i ~(t). Since
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(5.1. 13) and (5.3.2) together imply that the residual components satisfy:
(5.3.3)
the necessary augmentations are to add each of (t (t) ••. (11
m
(t) to
the correspond ing state es tirnation error vector:
A
£.(t) =
1
£.(t)
1
-- ... _-
£."(t)
1
i = 1..• m (5. 3. 4)
~
In order to write differential equations for ~ 1(t) • .. ; m (t) and their
variances, it is also necessary to define:
1••• m
(5.3. 5)
o
o
A~. - dw.c.. :
it 'Il 1 I
I 1- =
- - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - -
1 ... ~
- - c i :
Ts
1\
A.. =
11
rI d'i'i
t-~--
The manner in which TJ~(t) was defined insures that the covariances
of 1]11(t) " •• TJ 1m (t) are block diagonal:
A I I
G .. I 0
11 ~
= 6(t-T) -----:- ------- :I: G.'.6(t-T)fAT 11
o : G2 · (;2-J 1 1
(5.,3.6)
With (5. 3. 5) and (5. 3. 6J_ the differential equations for the
smoothed residuals satisfy:
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..
~
£ . (t) =
1
II
(.(t)
1
The covariances of : 1(t) ••• im (t) satisfy:
~ ~ * ~ T ~ I ~ A "' T~ T
= A. P.(t) + P. A. + G.. + d\ll. G2 · G21• d'i'L.L 1 1 1 11 yL 1
Finally the variances for the res idual components are the last
diagonal elements of the corres·ponding covariance matrices:
II 2 T ~ 2
E[£. (t) .l = e +1 +1 P.(t) e + +1 = [a':(t)]1 l)., v. 1 I). 1 V. 1
1 t 1 ' L
All A/I
If any of E' 1(t) • •• (m (t) satisfies:
(5. 3. 7)
(5.3.8)
(5. 3. 9)
All A 1/
£. > 3 (J. (t)
1 t i = 1••• m (5. 3. 10)
the threshold crossing infers that the failure associated with that
res idual component has failed.
Identification of the planar output error generated by a sensor
failure is more difficult. The output error plane associated with
a failure in the ith sensor is spanned by Cd. and e . (Section 4. 1).
1 ml
The threshold crossing law (5.3. 10) determines the components of
£/I (t) along Cd. and e . and then checks to determine whether or
1 ml
not either component exceeds the 3a threshold in that direction.
It is pass ible for i" (t) to be contained in the plane defined by Cd.
L
and e . and to be outside the 30- ellipse, but for its components
fit
along Cd. and e . to be inside the ellipse (if the magnitude of £" (t)
1 fil
is greater than 4. 25 C1 one of its components must be outside the
ellipse). If that sensor has failed, however, it is reasonable to
expect that the rotation of ~ 11 (t) in the plane would cause both of the
thresholds to be exceeded at various times. Nevertheless, when
applying the threshold crossing law for sensor failures, a conserva-
tive approach is to assume that at least a 40- failure- induced error
is required in order to insure a crossing of the 30- thresholds in (5. 3. 10)
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5.4 Output Estimation Error l\nalysis
The threshold detection law developed in Section 5. 3 is
predicated on the assumption tha~ a failure detection system has
a large error in its state estimate if the system which it is moni-
toring has failed. There are a nUIrlber of applications for which
this assumption is not valid. The purpose of this section is to
formulate the general problem of detecting a signal imbedded in
noise and to review techniques commonly used in its solution.
For convenience, attention is restricted to the case of a failure
detection system for m mutually detectable failures; however, the
algorithms of Section 5. 1. 2 allow the techniques discussed in this
section to be applied for any failure detection system for which
r s m.
One of the important contr ibutions of failure detection
theory is that it permits the decQupling of the error equations for
a state estimator (2. 3. 2) to a set of m scalar output subsystems.
~en the res idual smoothing introduced in Section 5. 3 is employed,
these subsystems are described by (5. 3. 7). If only one failure
detection system is used, each subsystem contains all the information
relevant to the occurrence of a particular failure. The problem
of interpreting that information can be formulated as a set of m
independent hypothes is tests. The hypothes is tests which require
the least amount of a priori knowledge of failure moeJes are the
urlary'tests on the null hypotheses HOt ••• HOm. The null hypotheses
are that the smoothed res idual for the subsystems are generated
solely by the stochastic sources modeled in those subsystems (5. 3. 7).
For zero initial conditions, they are denoted by:
HO.: £. /I (t) z eT1 1 v .. + 1, £1.+1
1 1
(5. 4. 1)
The null hypotheses st~.te that the residual components are
zero mean Gaussian random processes with variances [&i] ~•. [&:n] 2
respectively. The hypothesis tests can be conditioned on any
sufficient statistic of such processes, e. g. the threshold test in
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Section 5. 3 utilizes the fact that at any given time there is only a
1% probability that the res idual for a subsystem exceeds its 30-
threshold. Null hypothesis tests conditioned on samp~e means and
sample variances are outlined in the following paragraphs. To
the extent that failure mode knowledge of a general nature is available,
a general indication of the types of output errors the various
hypothes is tests are most sens itive to is given.
If~ is an optimal detection filter- state estimator. the unsmoothed
residuals (~(t)••• £~ (t) corresponding to the null hypotheses are white
noise. The only time correlation in the smoothed subsystem residuals
is that imposed by the smoothing operation. If the sample means
for the subsystem residuals are computed from a ~et of .t data points:
t-l
_II 1 \" /I
m.(t, t, ~t) =- / £.(t- k~t)
L t --J 1
k= 0
i = 1 ••• m (5.4.2)
then the sample means are random variables. If ~t»". (recall
s
that". can be chosen arbitrarily small), the null hypotheses state
s
that the data points in (5. 4. 2) are independent and that the sample
means are zero mean Gaussian random variables with variances:
(5. 4. 3)
Threshold- type hypothes is tests can be cond itioned on (5. 4. 2)
and (5.4.3). Such tests are most sensitive to failures which impart
a bias to the res iduals or which given them a correlation time
longer than ~ ~t. The sample mean does not provide a good
test for a particular subsystem if the failures related to that
subsystem generate res iduals with a correlation time significantly
shorter than tL\t, even if the residuals have large magnitudes.
The sample variance can be defined in a manner similar to
(5. 4. 2):
- 1/ 2[a.(t,t,~t)]
1
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i= 1••• m (5. 4. 4)
The sample variances are random variables. If L\t» ; , the null
hypotheses state that the sample variances have x2-dist:ibutions
with t - 1 degrees of freedom. The probability distribution for
x
2
-distributed random variables ca.n be used to define threshold-
type hypothesis tests for the sample variances. For a particular
subsystem, a sample variance test is most likely to be superiur
to the tests mentioned previously if the failure mode generates
residuals with small magnitudes and short correlation times.
There are a variety of other statistics on which null hypothes is
tests can be cond itioned. - - some of these are discussed by Mehra
and Peschon (1971). The usefulness of the various criteria is
a function of the particular application and the possible failure
modes. If there is reason to believe that for a particular subsystem
no single criterion can satisfactorily detect all possible failure
modes, it may be desirable to use several of the criteria concurrently
for the null hypothesis test on that subsystem.
The null hypothesis test is characterized by the fact that it
requires virtually no information about poss ibIe failure modes.
If the failure mode for a particular subsystem is known, this in-
formation can be incorporated into the detection law by defining a
second hypothesis which describes the system in the failed state.
The decision as to which hypothesis to accept is then based upon
the evaluation of a likelihood function. The general approach for
implementing this binary hypothesis test is detailed by Van Trees
(1968). The literature on the subject is extensive and cannot be
reviewed here, but it is worthwhile to relate the applicability of
t30me of the more important results to failure detection theory.
In the failed state. the ith subsystem of (5. 1. 13) is described
by:
~(t) = (A'- d\lt. c.) (.(t) + 71 1'.(t) - d\lt. °2 - 112 (t) + f .. ~(t)I 1 1 1 1 "l 1 1 11 ~L
(5. 4. 5)
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Because the evaluation of the likelihood function provides the necessary
sI'r'oothing of E"(t). the two hypotheses can be formulated in terms of the
solutions of (5.1.13) and (5.4.5):
11 (t)(
\vhere:
A.
A .. (t-,) A
e 11 f .. n.(T) dT + 11 (t)
tt 1 f
(5.4.6)
A .. = A~. - dy . C.11 11 1 t
and 11 (t) is the solution to (5.1.13) with zero initial conditions:
E'
t A
S
A .. (t-T) ,
T1£(t) = ci e It [Tl li (T) - d'i'i G2i T1 2 (T)] dT + G2i Tl 2 (t)
o (5. 4. 7)
If the likelihood function for the two hypotllesis is denoted by A(t),
the hypothesis test is based upon the threshold 11 :
H l~(t) ~ Tl (5. 4. 8)
HO
If A(t) is greater than il, the hypothesis that the failure described
by H 1 has occurred is accepted. Otherwise the hypothes is H 0 that
no failure has occurred is accepted.
The amount of processing required to determine A. (t) is
dependent upon the characteristics of n.(t) and 11 (t}o The simplest
l £
algo\"ithms result if 11 (t) is a white random process. Since T1 (t)
~ £ £
is white if D is required to be an optimal detection filter- state
estimator, it is convenient to restrict attention to this case.
Procedures for determing A(t) when Tl (t) is white and D. (t) has£ l
one of two special forms are reviewed in the remainder of this
section. More general algorithms are presented in the literature.
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The classic signal detection problem (Van Trees (1968»
assumes that n.(t) is a known waveform and that the integral in
L
(5.4. 6) is non-zero only in. the interval to ~ t ~ T. In this case
the hypothes is test is made at time T and A(T) is the output of
a matched filter. With w.(t) defined by:
t
t
wi(t) = ~S
to
A.. (t-T)A
11
e f .. n.(T) dT
11 L
(5. 4. g)
the likelihood function is:
A(T) (5.4. 10)
Computation of A(T) can be done in several different fashions. The
algori thm illustrated in Figure 5. 2a is consistent with (5. 4. 10)
and is frequently referl--ed to as a correlation receiver. Since
(.'(t) is the output of a lI.-dimensional subsystem, in general an
1 1
additional tI.-dimensional subsystem is required to compute w.(t).
1 1
An im.portant generalization of the signal detection problem
is the case where n. (t) .. and hence w. (t), is a Gauss ian randonl
, 1 1
process. In the context of failure detection theory, n.(t) could be
1
white noise, it could be an impulse of magnitude ~ at to:
(5. 4. 11)
where ~ is a Gaussian random variable, etc. The algorithm for
A(t) was first derived by Schweppe (1965) and is summarized in
A I
Van Trees (1970). It requires that £.(t) be passed through a Kalman
1
filter to estimate w. (t). The likelihood function then satisfies:
1
T T
~(T) = S [2;i'(")G~lWi('T)-Wi('T)TG(-lWi('r)Jd'T (5.4.12)
to
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E' (t)
i -{8~_X_(T_)__U:~f-__D_E_C_IS_IO_N~-.._
E;'(t)
Figure 5.2a Correlation receiver to detect presence of known
signal in detection system residuals
Figure 5.2b Correlation receiver to detect presence of gauss ian
signal in detection sys tern res iduals (assumes optimal
detection filter- state estimator) .
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where G~ is the variance of 11 (t) and w.(t) is the Kalman filter
~ £ 1
estimate of wi(t). T'his implementation is ind icated in I~"igure 5.2b.
Even though the Kalman filter is v.-dimensional, the C(lmputational
1
requirements are greater than in the deterministic case because
i.t is also necessary to compute the Kalman gains.
In addition to the computational requirements, the two binary
test algorithms presented in this section have three major dis-
advantages:
i) Their performance is uncertain if a failure mode other
than that described by HI occurs,
ii) the statistics of the hypothes is test are well- defined only
T- to seconds after the failure occurs, and "
iii) the statistics for the hypothes is test are often difficult
to compute.
The first difficulty is important only if the output error trajectories
correspond ing to the various failure modes are significantly different.
A number of approximate techniques have been developed to overcome
the last two difficulties. The genel,.-alized likelihood ratio test treated
by McAulay and Denlinger (1973) arid also by Willsky and Jones (1974)
eliminates these difficulties for a particular class of problems.
308
CHAPTER 6
FAIl.llJRE DETECTT()N FOR I.JATERAL MODE AlJTOPTLOT
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 summarize the thevretical aspects
of failure detection theory. The algorithms presented in those
chapters permit a failure detection system to be designed for any
given linear stoc'hastic system. A question which has not been ad-
dressed concerns the effectiveness of the resultant failure detection
system. No general answer to this question exists. For a wide range
of applications the theory provides a capability for real- time failure
detection where none had previously existed. For other applications,
use of the theory without supplemental error signal analys is cannot
be expected to completely satisfy the failure detection requirements.
The purpose of this chapter is to use a particular example to demon-
strate the validity of the theory and investigate the circumstances
undel' which it can be expected to yield useful failure detection
information.
The example used in this chapter is a failure detection system
for the roll mode autopilot in an aircraft. The simplest mathematical
model for the aircraft-autopilot combination is the closed loop
spinning cylinder example of Sections 3. 3. ~ and 4. 1. 2. A stochastic
version of this model is sufficiently complicated to exercise the algorithms
of Chapters 4 and 5 and is used in Section 6. 2 to des ign a pair of
optimal detection filter- state estimators for a prescribed set of failures.
The detection law necessary to interpret the output of the two failure
detection systems is developed in Section 6. 3. The performance
of the resulting failure detection systems when the nominal aircraft
response is also described by the simplified dynamics is analyzed
in Section 6. 4. 1. When the aircraft response satisfies the full
lateral equations of motion, the modeling error in the reference model
provides a source of state estimation errors in addition to those
associated with failures and stochastic sources. The sensitivity of
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the failure detection systems to the modeling errors and procedures
for re(iucing that sensitivity are discussed in Section 6.4.3.
rrhe emphasis in this chapter is uron the detection filter as an
optimal detection filter-state estimator. The failure detection systems
des igned in this chapter are compared with a Kalman filter in Section
6.4•.2. The aircraft-autop'ilot conlbination provides several examples
of instances in which the objectives of good failur-e detection and good
state estimation can conflict. These examples are discussed in Section
6. 4. 3 and nonoptimal detection filters which increase the detectability
of the failures are presented.
6. 1 Detection Filter Des ign - Deterministic
The lateral equations of motion for an aircraft consist of three
coupled equations for roll, yaw, and sideslip angle. The effective
control surfaces are the ailerons and the rudder. The dynamics
of the lateral mode are fourth-- order and can be roughly categorized
as:
1) The dutch roll mode which is a second- order oscillation
coupling yaw, roll, and sideslip. Characteristically, the
dutch roll mode is stable and lightly damped with a period
of several seconds.
2) The spiral divergence mode which is a coupling of yaw
angle and roll angle. The mode may be stable or unstable
with a slow divergence. If it is unstable, a roll angle results
in a broad spirally dive.
3) The roll subsidence mode which is first- order and is the
roll response of the aircraft to an aileron input.
A standard design procedure for lateral mode autopilots (see
Blakelock (1968» is to utilize the rudder to:
i) damp the dutch roll mode,
ii) malce the spiral divergence mode stable and negligible, and
iiI) minimize sideslip in turns.
The rudder control loop is the inner l~op of the autopilot an.d performs
all of the functions required of a lateral mode autopilot except head ing
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control and roll angle control (Figure 6. 1). The ailerons are then
used in a second (middle) loop of the autopilot to control roll angle.
Heading angle is controlled by defining a third (outer) loop to command
the roll sequence necessary to maintain head ing.
The dynamics of the rudder control system- aircraft combination
appear much simpler .than those of the aircraft alone. With the rudder
automatically damping sideslip and dutch roll, the dominant response
to an aileron input is the same second- order roll response exhibited
by the spinning cylinder of Sections 3. 3. 2 and 4. 1. 2. If the rudder
and the inner loop autopilot are operating nominally, the roll" response
of the aircraft can reasonably be approximated by this second- order
model. The failure detection systems designed in this section assume
that no failures occur in the inner loop and that the second- order model
is valid.
6. 1. 1 Second- order Roll Response Model
The bas ic vehicle configuration for the simplified roll dynamics
is indicated in Figure 6. 2. The autopilot consists of roll rate and
roll angle feedback with the appropriate gains. P",s an illustration
of parallel redundancy, the ailerons are assumed to be segmented
into inboard and outboard sections. The inboard ailerons respond
independently of the outboard ailerons and vice-versa. Either set
of control surfaces is capable of controlling the roll mode dynamics.
The measured quantities for the system are:
i) rate gyro output
ii) attitude gyro output
iii) inboard aileron deflection
iv) outboard aileron deflection
The aileron deflections are open loop in that the servos do not use
the deflection measurements to position the ailerons. The measure-
ments are used strictly for failure analysis. This open loop feature
is not typical for autopIlots, but it is useful for contrasting the difference
between detecting failures in sensors whose output is incorporated
into the control law and those whose output is not.
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The vehicle described in Figure 6. 2 can suffer a failure in any
of the system components and survive if that failure can be detected
and if the failed component can be removed from service. If one set
of ailerons fails. the remaining set can control the vehicle unless
the failed ailerons remain fully defle~ted. If either gyro fails, it
can be replaced by a standby or the pilot can assume control. The
important feature of the. system is that failure detection and isolation
is necessary in order to maintain system performance and that there
is not sufficient redundancy for a majority rule voting procedure to
be used. Voting could be used only if there were three sets of ailerons
with identical dynamics--but even then it could not discriminate be-
tween an aileron failure and a sensor failure. Failure detection
theory eliminates these restrictions as well as the ambiguity.
The reference model dynamics are those of Section 4. 1. 2.
The second-order differential equation approximating the aircraft
response to aileron deflections 0 .(t) and 6 (t) is:
al ao
;p (t) + e eP(t) = (x. Ii .(t) + (X Ii (t)Cf' 1 al 0 ao (6.1.1)
where lp(t) is the roll angle, -!..... is the roll time constant, and (x.
Blp 1
and Ci are the aileron effectivenesses. The aileron servomechanisms
o
are assumed to be first- order:
.
6 .(t) + 'r. 6 .(t) = k. 0 (t)
al 1 aile
6a (t) +.,. 0a (t) = k ac(t)o 0 0 0 (6. 1. 2)
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where 6 (t) is the deflection command supplied from the autopilot.
c
The time constants...L, -L and the proportionality constants k., k
". • ". 1 0
1 0
may be the same for the two ailerons or they may be different.
If the time constants are different. the aileron deflection measurements
cannot be compared directly to determine if their outputs are consistent--
but failure detection theory does not require that they be compal'ed.
The control1aw is an algebraic function of the measure roll angle
·and roll rate:
.5 (t ) = k (cp ( t) - CfJ (t » - k ~ (t )
cae a r r
(6. 1.3)
where cp (t) is the commanded roll angle from the outer loop of the
c
autopilot and (fla (t), ~r(t) are the roll angle and roll rate measurements.
In the unfailed system. CPa (t) and cp(t) are identical and so are
eP (t) and eP(t). This raises the poss ibility of modeling the autopilot-
r
aircraft system as a fourth- order system with I" (t) (or If\(t». <0 (t)~a ~~ . r
(or tP(t»,6.(t) and 6 (t) as the state vector components. The resulting
1 0
system model would by fully measurable in the sense of Section 4. 5
and detection filter design would appear to be a simple matter.
Unfortunately, a fourth- order model does not allow rate gyro failures
to be modeled properly. If the rate gyro fails, the model should
reflect the fact that the output of the attitude gyro continues to be the
true aircraft roll angle. On the other hand, the model should reflect
the fact that a rate gyro failure alters the autopilot- aircraft dynamics
significantly. These two requirements necessitate that both the
measured roll rate and the true roll rate be components of the state
vector:
CfJ (t)
a
.
cp (t)
x (t) .= <0 (t) (6. 1. 4)m r
6 .(t)
al
6 (t)
ao
A reference model based upon (6. 1. 4) is observable but not control-
able. The lack of controllability exists only because the control
law cannot control ~ (t) and ~ (t) independently and does not imply
r
that the aircraft is uncontrollable D The reference model based on
(6. 1. 4) is:
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0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0
-a 0 cx. Q' 0
0 0 1 0 0 cp L 0
C = A= 0 -e 0 Ct. a. B = 0
0 0 0 1 0 co L 0
- k. J-.: 0 -k.k -T. 0 k. k j0 0 0 0 1 1 a L r 1 1 a
-k k 0 -k k 0
- To k k0 a 0 r o a
(6. 1. 5)
Once the reference model is chosen, the next step is to define
the failures to be detected and their event vectors. As would have
been the case if a fourth order model had been chosen instead of
(6. 1. 5) this may involve changing the model. The failures to be
monitored by the failure detection systems designed in this section
are:
i) attitude gyro,
ii) rate gyro,
iii) inboard aileron servo,
iv) outboard aileron servo,
v) inboard aileron deflection sensor,
vi) outboard aileron deflection sensor,
vii) a change in the roll dynamics of the aircraft, and
viii) either amplifier (k
a
or k
r
).
If a system has m sensors, failure detection theory does not guarantee
that more than m failures can be detected by a single failure detection
system. Since the autopilot-aircraft system has only four ,~ensor8, it
is to be expected that more than one failure detection system is required
to monitor all eight failures. Because failure detection theory is inde-
pendent of the failure mode for a component, the event vector associated
with each failure is independent of any particular model for the failed
system. Nevertheless, in designing a failure detection system it is
useful to work with a particular failure model to insure that the refer-
ence model adequately reflects the manner in which the failure affects
the system. The failure models and the error equations developed in
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the remainder of this Rubsection are applications of the general error
models of Section 4. 1. 1.
Since the gyro outputs are used in the control law, a gyro failure
model must indicate a change in the value of the appropriate state vari-
able, etk(t) or ePr(t). If the failure mode for an attitude gyro failure
consists of a bias of magnitude s at time t I the failure model is:
a 0
.
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + sa fa O(t- to) : x(O) given
y(t) = Cx(t)
where 6(t-t ) is the unit impulse and f is the event vector:
o a
(6. 1.6)
(6. 1. 7)
Cf
a
Equation (6. 1. 6) is in the form of the controller failure model develop~
ed in Section 4.1. 1. Cf is the output direction associated with the
a
attitude gyro bias. The effect of the bias on the state f:stimates gen-
erated by the failure det,ection system is described by the correspond-
ing error equations:
(t) = (A-DC) (t) + e51 sa 6(t-to )
('(t) = C £(t)
£ (0) given (6. 1.8)
The error generated by the failure first appears in the state compon-
ent associated witt! e51,i. e., in the first component of the state vector.
This is the estimate of ClJ (t). If D is a detection f;lt~r for an attitude
-a
gyro failure, the estimates of the remaining components of the state
vector are not affected by the failure.
The attitude gyro may posse~ failure modes other than a bias,
but the corresponding failure model must have the same general
form as (6. 1. 6) and the event vector must be f as defined in (6. 1. 7).
a
For example, a total failure of the attitude gyro can be modeled by
the triad (A +,.M
a
, B, C) where:
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~al1 - 1 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0
~A =
a
o
o
o
o
o
o
000
000
000
(6. 1.9)
The - 1 element in /),. A means that cp (t) for the failed system
a a
(A + t:.A , B, C) is no longer related to the true aircraft attitude;
a
etk(t) is dependent solely upon its value at the time of the failure, the
new time constant -rf-, and whatever noise sources continue to be
~al1
present. Because the only non-zero elements in !1 A are in the first
a
row, application of the algorithms developed in Section 4. 1.1 yields
a failure model similar to (6. 1. 6):
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + e 5l (t. all CPa(t) - q,(t»: x(O) given
(6. 1. 10)
y(t) = Cx(t)
Equation (6. 1. 10) supports the assertion made in Section 4. 1. 1 that
frequently failure models which involve a change in A can be reduced
to the more manageable controller failure model.
A line of reasoning similar to that which lead to (6. 1. 9) allows
a complete failure of the rate gyro to be modeled by the triad
(A + J1A I B, C) where:
r
0 0 0 0 :l0 0 0 0
~Ar = 0 ~cP Aa33 - ()/. -C/ (6.1.11)1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
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The event vector corresponding to this failure model is the third unit
vector:
(6. 1. 12)
The failure model is similar to (6.1.10) in its dependence upon
the vehicle state. The estimation error equations follow ill a straight-
forward manner from the failure model:
e-(t) = (A-DC) £(t) + e 53 (Aa33eP (t) + ~ eP(t) - O!.() .(t) - ~ 0 (t»:r cp l at 0 ao
f (0) given (6. 1. 13)
(' (t) = C (t)
As was the case with the attitude gyro, failure models (such as a gyro
bias) exist for which the estimation error may not be a function of the
state variables -- but f is the ev~nt vector for all possible failure
r
models.
The gyro failure models can be contrasted to failures in sensors
whose output is not used in the control law by considering failures in
the aileron deflection sensors. These failures do not affect the state
of the aircraft - - only the failure detection system's knowledge of
that state. A reasonable failure model then includes changes only in
the measurement matrix (A. B. C + L\C). If the sensors are modeled
as having failed completely, t,.C for the inboard and outboard aileron
deflection sensors respectively is:
o 0 000 o 0 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0 00000
4C . =
81 o o o -1 o
llC =so o o o o o
(6. 1. 14)
00000
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o 0 0 0 -1
,Although event vectors do not exist per se for sensor failures,
~C . and ~C satisfy:
81 so
(6.1.15)
and the output directions e 43 and e44 are sufficient to cl1aracterize
the failures. The general estimation error equations for a state-
dependent sensor failure can again be determined from the general
failure model:
£(t) = (A-DC) E:(t) - DaC x(t)
E" I (t) = C E: (t) + /1C x(t)
(0) given (6. 1. 16)
Equation (6. 1. 16) is in the form of the sensor failure model developed
---------
in Section 4. 1. 1. The D ~C x(t) term appears in (6. 1. 16) because the
detection filter-state estimator D uses the outpui; feedback for failure
isolation and state estimation. If a sensor fails, the erroneous mea-
surement induces erroneous state estimates. In general this means
that the output estimation error generated by a sensor failure cannot
be constrained to a single direction. For an inboard aileron deflection
s€:nsor failure, (6. 1. 16) becomes:
i(t) = (A-DC) E: (t) + d 3 6 .(t)al (6.1.17)
where d 3 is the third column of D. For failure detection syEJtem
des ign it is desirable to replace (6. 1. 17) with a set of error equations
which do not involve colum~ of D, but this is best done when the actual
design is considered in Section 6. 1. 2.
The estimation error equations for the aileron deflection sensor
failures can be compared to the error equations if the ailf;rons them-
selves fail. If a f~iled aileron is assumed to return to the trim
320
position and remain there, a simple failure model can be developed.
Because the control law (6. 1. 3) requ ires the aileron to respond to
both the measured roll angle and roll rate as well as an externally
supplied roll angle command, the failure model must include a change
in dynamics and a change in the control matrix. A suitable model
for the inboard aileron is:
0 0 0 0 :10 0 0 0
~A. = 0 0 0 0 0
1
k. k 0 k. k 0 0
1 a L r
0 0 0 0 0
0
0
aB. = 0
1
-k. k
1 a
0 (6. 1. 18)
The inboard aileron for the system (A + 4A., B + ~B., C) is undriven
t 1
and any initial condition at the time of the failure decays to the trim
position at a rate determined by the time constant of the aileron servo.
The general error models of Section 4. 1. 1 indicate that the event
vector .associated with both ~Ai and ~Bi is e54 :
f. =
1
(6. 1. 19)
Cf.
1
The estimation error equations can then be written:
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£(t) = (A-DC) £(t) + e 54 (k.k (cp (t) - qJ (t» + k.k (p (t»: £(0) givenla a C lr r
(/(t) = C (t) (6.1.20)
The output error direction with an inboard aileron failure is the same
direction as the additive output error term e 43 6ai(t) if the corres-
ponding sensor fails; however, the presence of a single event vector
in (6.1.20) is sufficient for a failure detection system to distinguish
between the two failures. Similar equations to (6. 1. 17) - (6. 1. 20) can
be developed for the outboard aileron and its sensor.
The amplifiers are characterized by their gains k
r
and k
a
• If
either amplifier fails, the control law no longer functions properly.
Because the control law command 6 (t) is not directly measured. 1
C
the failure is first noted as an unexpected increase in the res iduals
of the inboard and the outboard aileron deflection estimates. The fact
that both aileron deflection estimates are affected in dynamically
related fashions is sufficient to allow the failure detection system to
determine that the control law has failed. A failure in the attitude
gyro amplifier can be modeled as a change in the gain k. If k
a a
becomes zero, the failure model requires changes in A and B:
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
aAka = 0 0 0 0 0 aBka = 0 (6.1.21)
k.k 0 0 0 0 -k.k
1 a 1 a
k k 0 0 0 0 -k k
o a o a
lIn practical applications. 6c (t) would generally be measured. A change
in 6
c
(t) which was not accompanied by corresponding changes in CPa(t)
and eP (t) would imply that either an amplifier had failed or the controlr .
law had changed. In order to illustrate one aspect of failure detection
theory, however, it is assu~ed that 6c (t) is not available.
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Because L\Aka has two non-zero rows, it would in general require two
event vectors. Since the rows are linear combinations of each other,
however, and:
0
0
a~a x(t) = 0 ka CPa (t)
k.
1
k
0
(6. 1.22)
a single event vector is adequate:
0
0
0
0
f ka = 0 Cfka = (6.1. 23)k.
k. 1
1 k
k 0
0
The vector f ka is also the event vector associated v.rith ABka• The
resulting error equations are:
£(t) = (A-DC) (t) + k fk (cp (t) - (0 (t»a a a . C
E:'(t) = C((t)
E(O) given (6. 1. 24)
The error model if k is zero is similar to (6.1.21) except that no
r
change in B is re.quired. The event vector is also f ka• As a conse-
quence. a failure detection system cannot determine which amplifier
failed on the basis of output error direction alone.
The last failure to be monitored is a change in aircraft roll
response dynamics. The change may be due to a variation in the roll
time constant or the fact that the dutch roll mode is not adequately
surpressed. It is not so much a component failure as it is a failure
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of the reference model to adeqtlately predict the aerodynamic response
of the aircraft to an aileron deflection. As such, it allows a check on
the validity of the reference model as well as on the performance of
the inner loop of the autopilot. For failure detection pur poses, it is
sufficient to assume that the failure is a change in the roll time
constant a :
cp
0 0 0 0 0
0 A~c,o 0 0 0
AA~ = 0 A~c,o 0 0 0 (6. 1. 25)
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
The event vector and output direction can be determined:
ol 0
1 1
f~ = 1 = e52 + e53 Cf13 = = e 42 (6.1.26)0
0 0
0
The state estimation error is a "function of aa and the true vehicle
<P
roll rate:
(t) = (A-DC) dt) + f 13 A13c,o (,O(t)
('(t) = C (t)
£(0) given (6. 1. 27)
A change in the aircraft dynamics causes an initial increase in the
error of the estimate of;P (t), and a related error in the estimate of
. r
CfJ (t). The output error first appears as an increase in the residual
•
associated with c,or(t).
6. 1. 2 Failure Detection System Design--Deterministic
Design of the failure detection system can be accomplished
in two stages. The first is a deterministic design stage and involves
the selection of a set of failures to be" monitored. The selection
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ts accc)m pl ishecj thrc)ugll C()US id ~rat. ion ()f the inter- relationsh ipH ()f the
detection spaces associated with th(~ failures. The second stage is
concerned with the actual selectioll of the detection filter, i. e. the
choice of D \vhich assigns A-DC the desired eigenvalues. The criteria
involved in selecting the .desired eigenvalues are very much a function
of the context in which the failure detection system is used, and in
particular ~ the noise environment in which the system is to operate.
For this reason, the second stage is referred to as the stochastic
design stage. This subsection and Section 6.2.2 apply the design al-
gorithms for the aircraft-a~topilotexample. The design procedure
is intended to be complimentary to that of Section 4.2. Algorithms
on which Section 4.2 focused are treated lightly in favor of concentra-
tiun on subsequent algorithms.
The deterministic design procedure begins with the selection of
a set of failures whose event vectors are output separable. The first
step is then to determine the assoc iated detection spaces (Section
4.2. 1. ) and investigate the mutual detectability of the failures (Section
4.2. 2.). If they are mutually detectable, the next step in the proce-
dm--e can be by-passed. If they are not mutually detectable, four
options are available to the designer:
i) des ign a failure d~tection system for the set of failures
and accept the resulting unassignable eigenvalues of A- DC,
ii) find a subset of the failures which are nlutual1y detectable,
iii) select a higher dimensional reference model for which the
set of failures is mutually detectable, or
iv) choose a different set of failures and re- initiate the design
procedure.
Typically, trial and error is required to choose the best option (or
options) for a particular application. Once a satisfactory set of
output separable event vectors is chosen, the final step is to determine
whether or not output stationarity can be used to add additional failures
to the set.
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The result of Section 6.1.1 and several additional results devel-
oped below are summarized in Table 6. 1 for the eight failures of
interest. A preliminary step of the design procedure is to replace
the column of D in (6. 1. 17) (and the correspond ing outboard aileron
sensor equation) with a suitable event vector. The output direction
associated with the inboard aileron deflection sensor is e 43 • The
algorithm of Section 4.2. 1 suggests that the event vectors associated
with the S LX non- sensor failures be inspected to determine if any
satisfy.:
(6. 1. 28)
f. for an inboard aileron failure clearly does. The arguments of
1
Section 4. 1 then indicate that d 3 and e 43 can be removed from (6. 1. 17)
in favor of tIle two event vectors f. and M. or by f. and M. + Ctl! ~.
1 1 1 l c; 1
where ~. is allY vector in the detection spac~ of f. and (Y~ can be chosen
1 1 ~
arbitrarily. The purpose in selecting ~i and Ci~ is to minimize the
total number of event vectors to be cons idered. Because Af. satisfies:
1
o
Af. =
1
- Ct. f g - T.f.1.... 1 1 (6. 1. 29)
it is convenient to let ~~ and ~. equal T. and f. respectively. The in-
~ 1 1 1
board aileron deflection sensor failure is then completely character-
ized by the set of event vectors (f., M. + T. f.). This set is the
1 1 1 1
same as {fi• f~}; Similar manipulations yield the set (fo. f~} for an
outboard aileron deflection sensor.
The sets of event vectors {fp fa} and {fo• f~} establish a con-
nection between the sensor failures and the failures for which the
event vectors were o~iginallydefined. If a failure detection system
is des igned to detect failures in:
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i) the inboard aileron,
ii) the outboard aileron, and
iii) a change in system dynamics
it also detects failures in:
r
iv) the inboard aileron deflection sensor, and
v) the outboard aileron deflection sensor.
The output estimation errors for i) - iii) are restricted to the single
directions Cf., Cf • and efg respectively. The sensor failures1 0 tJ
are differentiated from these failures by virtue of the fact that they
pr,Jduce output errors restricted to the planes defined by (Cfi , Cf13 }
and (Cf
o
' Cf~}. A certain ambiguity is introduced in that it is not
possible to differentiate between a failure of the inboard sensor and
the 8 imultaneous occurrence of i) and iii) above, etc. It is reasonable
to assume that this ambiguity is acceptable if the failures have a low
probability of occurrence and if they are reasonably independent.
With (fi, f 13 } and {fo' f 13 } associated with the sensor failures,
the failure detection problem is well formulated. It is then necessary
to determine the detection spaces for the failures using the algorithms
of Append ix A.2. The results are summarized in Table 6. 1. All of the
detection spaces are one-dimensional and are spanned by their re-
spective event vectors. The event vectors are also their own detection
generators. In order to detect all eight failures with only two failure
detection systems, however, it will be necessary to augment the
dimension of the reference model (6.1.5) in such a manner that some
of the detection spaces become higher dimensional.
The possibility of being able to detect all of i) -v) in Table 6. 1
with a single failure detection system makes it attractive to begin
the search for a set of mutually detectable failures with the event
vectors f., f , f'l. This is possible only because the three event
1 0 ~ .
vectors are output separable (Definition 3. 3. 1). Of the remaining
failures listed in Table 6. 1 the only event vector which is output
separable with f., f , f e is f since:loa
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F = [f. f fa f ]
L 0 ~ a
rkCF = rkF = 4
(6.1. 30)
This implies that f., f , f g , f is the largest set of output separable1 0 ~ a
event vectors which contains f .• f • f g. If a failure detection system
1 0 ...,
can be found for the event vectors in F, it detects i) - vi).
The detection space R F for F can l)e determined from Appendix A. 2.
Because CF spans the output space and (A, C) is observable, the desired
result is. that R F spans the state space:
The individual dete~ction spaces are one-dimensional and:
- -rkR. + rkR + rkRJg + rkR = 4
1 0 ~ a
(6.1.31)
(6.1. 32)
By Theorem 3. 3. 1, the difference in rank between (6. 1. 31) and (6. 1. 32)
means that i) - vi) are not mutually detectable with a 8 ingle failure
detection system. A failure detection system can be found for which
each of the non- SE~nsor failures produces a undirectional output error
signal, but one eiigenvalue of the closed loop state matrix A-DC is
unass ignable. Assuming this eigenvalue is stable. its acceptability
can only be deternlined from the stochastic design procedure of the
next subsection. The principal disadvantage of the unassignable
eigenvalue is that is restricts the freedom to tailor the failure detection
system to improve state estimation properties or to enhance the error
signals •.
The unassignab,le eigenvalue of A-DC is associated with the excess
subspace R Og of RF - RFocan be expressed in terms of the detection
spaces in (6~ 1. 32) and ROg:
HF = [Hi: R o : R a: Ra : ROg]
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(6. 1. 33)
Appendix A. 3 develops an algorHhm for Rag based upon the orthogonal
redu~tion procedure. In this case Rag corresponds to the true roll
rate Cf' (t) of the aircraft:
(6. 1.34)
Because the event vectors in F are their own detection generators:
G = [g. g gQ g ] = F
1 0 IJ a (6. 1. 35)
It is shown in Section 3. 3. 3 that R
og must satisfy the equation:
1
-~fP
-aco = Rogn + G @
o
o
(6. 1. 36)
nand (8 can be determined from (6. 1. 36) or Appendix ...l\..3:
n = 0
® =
o
o
-a([J
1
(6. 1. 37)
The unassignable eigenvalue of A-DC is the eigenvalue ofn, which in
this case is zero. If a fC\i1ure detection system is des igned for i) - vi),
.. .
(A-DC, C) must have at le~st one pure integration and marginal
stability.
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The excess subspace of RF is brought about by the presence of
the three coupled state variables cp (t). q,(t). and q, (t) 'in the state vector,
a r .
only two of which are measured. The unmeasured state variable <D(t) is
the derivative of CPa(t) and it is closely related to the .combination of
'state variables q,(t) + ePr(t) which is associated with f!3 and a dynamics
change. Because of this. it cannot be uniquely associated with either
Ra or RI'O The excess subspace and the unassignable eigenvalue can be
eliminated, but only by either removing f or f Q from the set f .• f ,f Q , fa..., 1 0 ~ a
or through a change in the dimension of (A. C). In general, both alterna-
tives should be tried to determine their impact on the failure detection
problem. In this instance. it is convenient to remgve fa and require the
second failure detection system to detect both gyro failures.
The fact that removal of fa or f!3 from the set of event vectors
eliminates the excess subspace can be verified by a simple application of
Theorem 3. 3. 3. Removing f from F requires that the fourth column ofa
G and fourth row of e be removed to define:
(6.1.38)
= [1]
If F is defined similarly:a
F = [f.f f Q ]a L 0 fJ
the theorem says that the excess subspace for RFa is then:
(6. 1. 39)
Since the rank of ROg is one. ~ is a column vector (in this case. a
scalar) which spans the null space of MOa where:
(6. 1. 40)
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M Oa is a scalar and has no null space. Therefore, both Band
Ito are zero and:ga
= 3 = rk!~.
l
(6.1.41)
Equation (6.1. 41) in turn implies that:
(6. 1. 42)
This ca.n be verified by applying the algorithm of Appendix A. 2 for RFa•
Theorem 3. 3.1 states that (6.1.41) is sufficient for the failures i) - v)
associated with i. , f , f g to be mutually detectable.l 0 ..,
. .
If a failure detection system is designed for i) - v), the last step
of the deterministic design procedure is to determine if any of the re-
maining failures listed in Table 6. 1 can be made output stationary with
i) - v) (Definition 4. 1. 1). The requirements for output stationarity
are proved in Theorem 3. 4. 1. and stated in matrix form in Section 4. 2. 3
as a set of two necessary and sufficient conditions. The first is that
the event vector associated with the failure under consideration cannot
be output separable with f., f , fa. This immediately rules out f and
1 0 tJ a
the attitude gyro failure. The second condition is tested below for f
r
and f ka and their corresponding failures. Because of the observation
in Section 6. 1. 1 that an amplifier failure produces an output error
similar to that generated by simulttaneous aileron failures, there is
prior reason to suspect that f ka satisfies both cond itions.
For an amplifier failure to be output stationary with i) - v). the
second condition of Theroem 3. 4. 1 requires that the non- zero coeffi-
cients in the expresp'on for Cfka be determined:
Cfk = Ct. Cf. + ex Cf + QlQ ef ga La l oa 0 I-' t-' (6. 1. 43)
Because f. , f , f Q are output separable and f., f , f Q • f k are not (thelOp lO.., a
first condition), the coefficients in (6. 1. 43) exist and they are unique:
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Ct. = k. (6. 1.44)la 1
Ct = k
oa. 0
Q'~a = 0
-c - - -If the matrix R. is formed from the subset of R., R , R Q for which10 1 0 tJ
the coefficients are non- zero:
R~ = [R. : R ]
10 1 0
(6. 1. 45)
then an amplifier failure can be made output stationary with i) - v) if
some ~-k exists which satisfies (4. 2. 26):la
- -cR = R ~ka io ka
In this case a unique, solution exists:
~ka =[ :~]
(6. 1. 46)
(6. 1. 47)
and an amplifier failure can be made output stationary with i) - v).
When the same test is repeated for a rate gyro failure, (4. 2. 26)
requires _(r to satisfy:
(6. 1.48)
and clearly no such ~ exists.
r
Even though f k can be made output stationary with f. and f , ita 1 0
will not be unless the eigenvalues of A- DC are ass igned properly.
Because R k satisfies (6. 1. 46), Theorem 3. 4. 2 requires that thea -
eigenvalues of A-DC associated with R. and R be equal in order to
L 0
insure output stationarity. An algorithm for satisfying this constraint
is illustrated in Section 6. 2. 2. The necessary procedure for discrim-
inating between an amplifier failure and aileron failures is developed
in Section 6. 3.
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The conclus ion of the analys is is that, with output st~tionarity, a
failure detection system can be desiglled to monitor i) - v) and viii)
from Table 6. 1. If it is assumed that no simultaneous failures occur,
the failure detection system can unambiguously detect the occurrence
of any of the six failures. The one exception is that it cannot determine
on the basis of output estimation error alone which amplifier has failed.
With state space augmentation, the failure detection system would
also be able to detect an attitude gyro failure. If this were done the
rate gyro failure would still violate the output stationarity require-
ments and a second failure detection system would be required. For
state estimation reasons discussed in Section 6.4, the second failure
detection system is required to detect both gyro failures.
The difficulties with detecting an attitude gyro failure and a
dynamics change with a 8 [ngle detection system pers ist if the dynamics
change is replaced by a rate gyro failure requirement. With F defined:
F = [f f ]
a r
RF can be computed from the algorithm of AppendixA. 2 and:
(6. 1. 49)
rk RF = 3 > rk Ra + rk Rr (6. 1. 50)
It follows that the gyro failures are not mutually detectable. The excess
.
subspace is again associated with tp (t):
= 1
but nand @ are different. Since Rand R are one-dimensional, G is
a r
equal to F as before:
G :: [g g] = F
a r
(6. 1. 52)
Both G and Fare different from the previous case. nand ® now must
satisfy:
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(6.1.53)
BeCatlSe G has changed, II and e are:
n = - fJ
<P
(6. 1.54)
This is an improvement over the earlier result in that the unassignable
eigenvalue of A-DC (i. e., the eigenvalue of n) is stable.- For this
particular application it is smaller than des ired for state estimation
purposes, however, and it is desirable to make the gyro failures
mutually detectable through state space augmentation.
The procedure for implementing the state space augmentation is
summarized in Section 4. 2. 3 and stated in matrix form in Lemma
3. 3. 10. The construction in the l\~mma l'equires quantities defined in
Theorem 3. 3. 3 and its Corollary. Assume f were to be removed from
a
the set.f , f. The proof of Theorem 3. 3. 3 defines a transformation
a r
[~: t:3]a on the excess subspace ROg such that:
(6. 1. 55)
R O is the new excess subspace if f is removed and R
C
O identifies thega a ga
portion of the excess subspace which is removed. But the only remain-
ing event vector in the set is f and the Detection Theorem (Theorem
. r
3. 2. 1) guarantees that f is detectable. Therefore the new excess
r
subspace is zero and the transformation in (6. 1. 55) is more correctly
defined in this case by:
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(6. 1. 56)
The partitions of n in the Corollary of Theorem 3. 3. 3 can then be
restated along the lines of (6. 1. 56):
(6. 1. 57)
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(6. 1. 58)
(6. 1. 59)
(6. 1. 60)
1
1cliar = II0 =
A f -g A f -e51.-. a
A = - -1- - = - -+--- (6. 1. 61)
0 f - a 0 I-~
I t.(J CfJ,
Lastly, the decrease in the dimension of Rag if fa is removed from
f , f is defined:
a r
The preceding arguments could have been made for the r'emoval
of f from f , f. In particular, f is detectable and tIle excess sub-
r a r a
space associated with f is zero; therefore:
a
Theorem 3.3. 4 then guarantees that f • f can be made mutually
a r All
detectable for a reference mOdel of dimension n:
Because ~ is greater than n, it is necessary to add a state component
to the state vector with a single application of Lemma 3. 3. 10. With
g and e given by Table 6. l' and (6. 1. 54) respectively. Lemrrla 3. 3. 10
a a . ~J!!1
yields the six-dimensional reference model (A, c) when applied for f :
a
~
Furthermore, the detection space for f in the augmented state space s.nd
a
its detection generator are:
It
a
t=::::f
[ f· "Ia· e G6 (6. 1. 62)
~
In the augmented state space .. the detection space for f is two-
a
dlmens ional.
When a failure detection system is being designed for more
than two failures .. the state space augmentation may increase the
d imens ions of the detection spaces of the remaining event vectors or
it may leave them unchanged. When only two failures are concerned,
however .. the dimensions of both detection spaces must be increased .
.8iit ~
The detection space R for f can be determined from Appendix A. 4 or
r r ..at
Lemma 3. 3. 11. Lemma 3. 3. 11 defines R by:
r
~ R I ]~ r ~R = ---- I R Zr 0 I D r (6. 1.63)
P:::J
where the 8ubstituti"on of [A1 for [A: ~] allows Rn to be defined:a a
Z spans the null space of Mo . Since «(8)) is (8) with both rowsr ar a r
removed .. it follows that MO is zero andar
= -
(6. 1. 65)
~
As a check on the state space augmentation procedure, RF can be
computed from Appendix A.2. For the six-dimensional reference model,
F must be replaced by:
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The result is that:
F =[ ~-] (6. 1. 66)
.at
rkRF
.ad .&
= 4 :: rk R + rk R
a r
(6. 1. 67)
~ ~ ~ ~
and f , f are mutually detectable for (A, C).
a r
Introduction of a six-dimensional reference model for detecting
gyro failures requires tha.t a s ix- component state vector be defined.
~
Because A is a diagonal submatrix of A, the first five components of
x(t) are the same as those of x(t) as defined in (6. 1. 4). The new
component is denoted by (,bO (t):
Cf' (t)
a
·tp (t)
•
FI::f
qJ (t)
x (t) = r (6. 1. 68)
6 .(t)
at
6 (t)
ao
·tfJ O( t)
The notation suggests that tPo (t) is in some way related to the true
roll rate q, (t). The time constant associated with cPo (t) is the roll
dynamics time constant _1_. The difference between q,o(t) and eP (t)
. ~~
is that ~o (t) is not driven by the ailerons and that it interacts with
<p (t) and cP (t) in a different planner than cP(t) does. For practical
a r • •
purposes, however, ~O(t) can be thought of as a duplication of <p (t)
which permits the reference model to decouple the relationship
between qJ (t) and eP (t) from that between eP (t) and eP(t).
a r
6. 2 Detection Filter Design - Stochastic
The deterministic design procedure requires a continuous,
linear, deterministic reference model. The reference model in
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Section 6. 1. 1 was chosen to satisfy this constraint. The stochastic
des 19n procedure chooses the failure detection systems to perform
state estimation as well as failure detection. Optimization of the
state estim.ation properties of the failure detection systems requires
li:nowledge of the stochastic environment in which the aircraft is to
operate and of the sensor accuracies. A stochastic model for the auto-
pilot-aircraft system is developed in Section 6.2 0 1. The model is
used in Section 6. 2. 2 to determine optimal detection filter-state es-
timators for the two failure detection systems of Section 6. 1. 2.
6. 2. 1 Stochastic Model of Autopilot - Aircraft System
The failure detection theory developed in Chapter 3 is analyti-
cally valid for continuous systems only if the systems have continuous
measurernents. Approximation procedures for applyi~g the theory
to sampled-data systems were developed in Section 5. 2. In order to
demonstrate the range of applicability of these procedures as completely
as possible, the autopilot for the stochastic reference model is chosen
to be a digital autopilot with a sampling period of • 01 seconds. This
is a shorter sampling period than commonly used in digital autopilots,
but it is useful for evaluating the ability of a failure detection system
to detect failures in sampled data systems. The measurements
available to the failure detection systems are discrete with a sampling
period which can be varied from. 01 seconds to . 2 seconds. With
measurements every. 01 seconds, the failure detection system has
complete knowledge of the autopilot inputs and outputs and it is reason-
able to expect the failure detection system to provide good failure
isolation. With a measurement sampling period of . 2 seconds, the
.01 seconds autopilot sampling period allows a system failure to
propagate through the control loop between measurements and makes
it difficult for the failure detection system to determine the source
of the failure.
The sampled-data formulation of the stochastic reference model
is developed in this subsection. An approximation of the autopilot-
aircraft system as a continuous stochastic system with continuous
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measurements is then made utilizing standard stochastic approximation
procedures. For a short measurement sampling period, the sampled-
data and continuous measurement reference models have nearly
equivalent statistics. The use of both reference models to define
optimal detection filter-state estimators is illustrated in Sec.tion 6.2.2.
,In the following, the measurement sampling period is denoted by ~t.
It is assumed to be some integer multiple L of the autopilot sa.mpling
period T:
At = LT (6.2.1)
For state £.:stimation purposes, the dynamic response of a
s:lmpled-data system can be characterized by the propagation of the
state from one measurerrlent to the next:
kAt
x(k~t) = cI» (k~t, (k-l).L\t) x«k-l)~t) + J ~(k.L\t.T) Bu(~ d'T'
(k- 1)~t
(5.2. 3)
G1A 11 1.L\(kAt) models the effect of system disturbances in the interval
(k-l)~t < t ~ k~t on the state at kL\t. The system disturbances may be
either- continuous or discrete. Gl~ and G2A are n x n 1 and m x m 1
matrices respectively. 111~(kAt) and 112A(k~t) are discrete, zero mean,
white Gaussian random processes with variances:
E [11 1A(kAt) 111A(k~t)T J = _1_ E~t n t
_1_ E
L\t w l
(5. 2. 4)
Figure 6. 3 is a math~matical b](1.ck diRgram for the nut«>ptlot-aircraft
system except that the measurements are not indicated. The system
disturbances to be modeled by 111~ (kAt) are:
i) a random aerodyriamic moment.
ii) an uncertainty iil the attitude gyro output, and
iii) an uncertainty in the rate gyro output.
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The gyro output uncertainties are system disturbances because they
appear as inputs to the respective amplifiers. Figure 6. 3 indicates
that they also appear as adclitive components in the measurements.
Therefore, the measurement uncertainties to be modeled by 112~(k~t)
include:
iv) a random uncertainty in the output of both aileron deflection
sensors, and
v) both gyro uncertainties.
It follows that 11 1A(kA t) and 112.&kAt) can be defined as three-dimension-
al and four-dimensional vector processes respectively. Because of the
. gyro uncertainties, they are not independent.
The aerodynamic moment is a consequence of wind gllSts and the
modeling errors attendant with the selection of simplified aircraft
dynamics. It can be represented as a continllOll8 white Gaussian random
process with a power spectral density W
a
• Because of the fact that
q,(t) and ePr(t) must experience the same aircraft dynamics, G1,A must
• •be chosen such that C(J (k~t) and tlJ (k~t) in (5. 2. 3) are driven by the
'r
random aerodynamic moment in identical manners. If the vector
gla is defined similarly to fa in (6. 1. 26):
o
Fa
glt3 = ~ (6. 2. 2)
0
0
and if 11 1a(t) is a continuous white Gaussian random process with zero
mean:
(6. 2. 3)
then gla\a(t) is a model of the continuous random aerodynamic moment.
The discrete process glaA. 'TJ1aA(k,At) necessary for (5. 2. 3) is the effect
342
of the random aerodynamic moment in the interval (k-l)~,t< t s: k~t on
x(k"t):
kat
gl~~ 111~~(k~t) = S ~(k~t, T) gl~ 111~(T) dr
(k-l ).ot
The var iance of this random process is:
k~t
E[gl~~.111~~kAt)2g1~J]=E[SS ~(kAt,T) gl~ 111~(T) 111~\(T/)
(k- l)~.t
(6. 2. 5)
If 111l:l.1k~t) is defined to have a variance of.-.!:...- :~a ~t
then (6. 2. 3) - (6. 2.5) imply that gl~~.must satisfy:
kAt
1 g g T = S~.t l~A la~
(k-l)~t
The attitude gyro and the rate gyro are interrogated b~, the auto-
pilot every T seconds. The gyro output uncertainties are clssllmed to
result from the addition of discrete white Gaussian random processes
to qJa (-l. T) and q,r (-l.T) and the quantization. of the resulting s ig!lals. If
the variances of the additive processes are O:aA for the attitude gyro
and a~r~ for the rate gyro, and the quantization intervals a.re qa and
q # the combined 9utput uncertainty for each gyro can be approximated
r . ·
1 'for error analysis purposes by discrete Gaussian ra,ndom }>rocesses
with variances:
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(6.2. 8)
Under the aS8umptioll that the, aircraft roll mode is sufficiently active
that the gyro outputs can be expected to change by at least one quantiza-
tion interval over the autopilot sampling period, these random processes
are approximately white. Because the uncertainties are additive at the
gyro outputs, they first appear in (5.2.3) as system disturbances
driving the ailerons. If glaA "and glrA are defined:
=
=
o
o
o
- k. k aI' A
1 a al.l
- k k I
o a ala~
o
o
a
- k. k aI' A
1 r r~
- k k I
o r alr~
along with the independent discrete white Gaussian noises ll{aa (t T)
and 11lr~\tT):
(6. 2. 10)
then g'la411 'laA (-t,T) and g'lr~.l1'lr~(tT) are acceptable models of the
gyro output uncertainties.
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(6. 2. 11)
The contribution of the gyro output uncertainties in the interval
(k- 1) At <. t s; kAt to x(kAt) can be determined in the same manner
used for the random aerodynamic moment. Let 11 1aA(kAt) and
'l\r~kAt) be discrete white Gaussian random processes derived from
11'laA (.(, T) and 11'lrA(.f,T):
E [111a~(kAt) 11 1aA(k~t)] = ~t
E[11 1rA(kAt) 'Tl1rA(kAt)] = ...!..at
and let gla~ and glrA satisfy:
(k- 1) ~.t+ (~+ l)T
s
.t= 0, L- 1
(k-l)~t+tT
(k- 1)At+ (t+ l)T
glrA'TllrA(kAt) = L S ~(kAt,.,.)gl' All'! A«k-l)~t+tT)dT
.t;: 0, L- 1 r '-l r ~.
(k-l)~.t+tT (6.2.12)
Because 'Tl'laA(tT) and 'Tl1rA(.(,T) are discrete random processes, the
covariance equations which define glal,\ and glr~differ from (6. 2. 7):
(k- l)~t+ (t+ l)'r
SS 4>(kJ1t,.,.) glaA gla~T4?(k~t,.,.')T d.,. d.,.'1 T \~ glaA glaA = L
t=O,L-l
(k-l)At+tT
(k-l)~t+ (t+l)T
it glr~ glr~ =_ ~ SS 4l(k~t,.,.) glrA girl 4) (kAt,.,.'ld.,. d'T'
to: 0, L- 1
. (k-l)At+tT (6.2.13)
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glaA 11 1aA (k~t) and glr~ "lr.A (k~t) are the desired gyro output uncertainty
mc)dcls for the attitude gyrc) and tIle rat(-~ gyro respectively. With
(6.2.4) and (6.2.7). they allow CIA and 1l1~(k~t) to he defined:
=
TJ I~A (kAt)
"laA (kAt)
"lrA (kAt)
(6. 2.14)
The model for tIle measurement uncertainties in (5. 2. 3) is cons ider-
ably simpler to arrive at. Gyro output measurements are made every
Lth autopilot sampling period. .Their variances are given in (6. 2. 8).
The gyro output uncertainties are the same uncertainties which appear
as new system disturbances at the measurement times. Let the random
processes" 2aA (k~t) and "2ra. (k~t) be defined in terms of every L th
sample of l1'1a.a(-l.T) and "lrAU,T):
"2aA(k~.t) 1="J7;.f "la.A(kLT)
(6. 2. 15)
From (6. 2. 10) it follows that "2a~(k~t) and 112rA (k~t) are independent
white Gaussian random processes. The measurement errors in the
aileron deflection sensors are modeled as white random processes with
variances of a~i~for the inboard sensor and a~o.6 for the outboard
sensor. These errors can'be modeled in terms of two additional zero
mean white Gaussian random processes 112iA(k"t) and" 20.6(kAt):
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E ["2iA (k~.t) "2i..\ (kAt)1 = 1
~t
(6.2. 16)
E [ 11 2 A (k~t) "2 A (kA t)] = --.!-o~ o~ At
The vector measurement uncertainty can be defined in terms of (6 0 2.15)
and (6. 2. 16):
"2at-(k~t)
1l 2rA (kAt)
"2iA(kAt)
"2o,A(kL\t)
I 0 0 0ala~.
0 I 0 0
G2A = [g2aAg2r~ g2iA g2oA] =JAt I alr~0 0 a2i~ 0 (6. 2.17)
0 0 a (T2oL\
As mentioned earlier. the random processes "l~(kAt) and 1l2A (kAt) as
defined in (6. 2. 14) and (6. 2. 17) are not independent. The measurement
noise G2A "2~(kAt) contains information regarding G1A "1~ «k+ 1) ,6,t).
The algebra is somewhat involved but the correlation can be developed
from (6. 2. 12) - (6. 2. 17):
k~t+T
E[G1A"14«k+1>'6t)112I(kAt)g2Il - ~ S4»«k+1)~t·7')(glaAg;a~+glrAgirA)d7"~m
k~t
(6. 2. 18)
If a reference model has continuous measurements, the standard
stochastic system model is.:
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yet) :I Cx(t) + G2 112(t) (2.2 • 1)
where G1 and G2 are n X 01 and m x m 1 matrices respectively and
11 1(t) and 1l 2(t) are continuous, zero mean, white Gaussian random
processes:
(2.2. 2)
An approximation of the sample data system in (5. 2. 3) hy a reference
model with continuous measurements can be made by defining:
G -2 - (6. 2. 19)
G2~ is a conveniently defined diagonal matrix. G1A is defined in
integral form by (6. 2. 7), (6. 2. 13), and (6. 2. 14). For small at, cP(kat6 r)
can be approximated by E and (6.2.13) becomes:
n
1
At
I I T A2 1 , / T
glaA g laA = ~t 2L gla,A g la,A'
G1 in (6. 2. 19) then becomes:
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/
0 0 0
JW~ 0 0
G J::.1 ~ 0 01
0 J l:J.:fOlL kika O'la~ J~ti Q'L kikr O'lrA
0 JAt' Q'L koka O'la~ J .(.\t' Q'Lkokr 0' lr~ (6.2.21)
where:
= (1 )21
2L
A similar approximation can be made in (6.2.18) to determine the
correlation between 11 1(t) and 112(t):
o
G l2 = E [TIl (t) Tl 2 (T)T] A:l6(t-T) 2Q'L
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o (6. 2. 22)
The acceptability of (2.2. 1), (2.2. 2), and (6. 2. 19) - (6. 2. 22) as
an approximation of the autopilot- airplane system is a function of the
relationship of At to the response time of the systerrl. The continuous
approximation represents in some sense the "average" stochastic
behavior of the system. If T and at are large enough that a single gyro
interrogation significantly alters either the system state or the estimate
of its state, the continuous measurement approximation does not aCCtlrate-
ly portray the stochastic pI'operties of the system.
6. 2. 2 Failure Detection System Design--Stochasii(;
Section 6. 1. 2 outlined the bas ic fU"lction of two failure detection
systems for the lateral mode autopilot- airc"raft combination. One system
is des igned to monitor failures in:
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i) the inboard aileron,
ii) the outboard aileron,
iii) roll dynamics changes,
iv) the inboard aileron deflection sensor,
v) the ou~board aileron deflection sensor,
viii) either amplifier, and
LX) (certain 8 imultaneolls, identical gyro failures).
The second is to monitor failures in:
vi) the attitude gyro,
vii) the rate gyro,
i) (the inboard aileron), and
ii) (the outboard aileron).
The failures in parentheses are added as a consequence of the analys is
in this subsection. With the stor has tic reference model of the previous
subsection, it is possible to use the design freedom available in the
selection of the detection filters to improve the state estimates generated
by the failure detection systems. Because the stochastic reference model
has discrete measurements, it is necessary to use one of the approxi-
mate algorithms of Section 5. 2 to define d.etection filter- state eS timators
for the failure detection systems. If the set of event vectors fl·.· f r
associated with the failure to be detected satisfies:
rk C :; m:; I rk C f k
k= 1, r
(6.2.23)
each of the algorithms of Section 5. 2 converges to a unique dete~tion
filter-state estimator. Neither of the failure detection systems to be
des igned satisfies (6. 2. 23), however, and it is necessary to further
constrain the optimization problem before applying the algorithms.
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A fltilure detection system for a sampled- (lata system is a t\\,O-
stage processor. 1'he first stclge inv()!ves a propagatic)n of the state
estimate x
m
( (k-l) ~t) to k~t and the measurement of the propagated
estimate x (kAt):
m
kAt
x (kat) = ~(k~J (k-l) ~t) x «k-l)~t) + S ep(t, T) BU(T) dr
m m
(l~- 1)~,t
y (k~t) = C x (k~t)
m m
The second stage uses the new measurement to update the state
estimate:
X
m
(k~ t) = xm (k~t) + D~(y(kL\t) - Ym (kAt))
(5.2.5)
(5.2. 6)
The algorithms of Section 5. 2 choose DDK. to provide as good a state
estimate as possible while satisfying the failure detection constraints.
Interpretation of these constraints requires that the deterministic
reference model (A, C) from Section 6.1. 1 be employed. Using the
appropriate base normal canonical form for each failure detection
A
system (Section 4.4), a matrix DFR is determined such that each of
the failures being monitored generates a unid irectional output error
for the continuou~ measurement system (A-DFR C,_ C). :6~JK is then
defined as the sum of three matr ices:
where:
A A A A
DAK = D~FR + D,6,1fK + D~rK (5.2.21)
(5.2.22)
Each element of 0~'fK and t>ArK is either constrained to be zero, or
is a freely assignable paramete'r. The algorithms of SectiLon 5. 2 differ
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only in the manner in which they assign these parameters. With bAK
completely specified, DAK is determined by a similarity transformation.
... Techniques for formulating a solvable optimization for D~'t'K and
DArK when (6. 2. 23) is not satisfied are discussed at the conclusion of
Section 5.1.2. No rigid criteria exist for choosing between the options.
The technique adopted in this subsection is to des ignate add itional failures
for each failure detection system to monitor so that (6. 2. 23) is satisfied.
In the case of the failure detection system for the gyro failures, the added
failures are physically meaningful and provide useful information; for
the other failure detection system they are only a computational artifice.
The advantage of adding the failures is that it eliminates DArK' it does
not require an increase in the d imens ion of the state space, and it s im-
plifies the detection law for isolating the failure. The disadvantage of
this technique relative to the others is illustrated in Section 6. 4. 2.
Section 6. 4. 3 discusses particular failure modes for which optimal or
near- optimal detection filter- state estimators may yield unsatisfactory
A
failure detection and demonstrates modifications in the choice of DAK
which can be expected to improve the failure detection properties.
The event vectors associated with faillJreS i) - ,,) and viii) in
Table 6.1 are f. , f I f Q • It was determined in Section 6. 1.. 2 that the1 0 ..,
only event vector in Table 6.1 which is output separable with f. , f I
1 0
fQl is f ; but that the failures associated with f., f , f Q1 f are notI-J a 1 0 ..., a
mutually detectable. The detection spaces for these event vectors
satisfy:
(6. 1.(32)
Theorem 3. 3. 1 rElquired the summation in (6. 1.32) to equal the dimension
of the state space in order for the failures to be mutually detectable. To
satisfy (6. 2. 23) for the first failure detection systerll and maintain
mutual detectability, it is necessary to find a new event vector f such
ar
that f.", f , fQ.t f are output separable and the failures associated with
l 0 to" ar
f. , f I f Q , f satisfy Theorem 3. 3. 1- - even though f may not correspond1 0 ..., ar ar
to a physically meaningful failure. The search is essentially trial and
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error. Equation (6. 1. 32) arId the requirement made by 'l'heorem 3. 3. 1
suggest that if R were two-dirr~ensional;f., f , f Q1 f might bear . 1 0 ~ ar
mutually detectable. By starting with the null space of C and defining:
~ar = e S2 = 7l (C)
1
f = A~ar =ar -~cp
-~cp
0
0 (6. 2. 24)
it is pass ible to show that f as defined in (6. 2. 24) has the des ired
ar
two-dimensional detection space:
R - [f g J = [far l!arJar - ar ar -; (6.2. 25)
Furthermore; f., f , f Q • f are output separable--which satisfieslOp ar
(6.2. 23)--and mutually detectable. It can be shown from the failure
modeling considerations in Section 4. 1.1 that f is the event vector for
ar
certain simultaneous, identical failures in the rate gyro and attitude
gyro. These failures are ind icated as failure ix) in the introduction to
this subsection, but the fact that sue h failures exist is not of great
importance. The first failure detection system is required to detect ix)
along with i) - v). viii) because the algorithms for selecting DAK are
simplified; not because ix) is a likely failure to occur.
The process of adding failures for the second failure detection
system is much simpler. Equation (6.2.23) is satisfied by requiring
the failure detection system to detect aileron failures in addition to the
gyro failures. The event vectors rand 7 corresponding to inboard
1 0
and outboard aileron failures can be defined for the augmented reference
model !1. ~) in the same manner in which R was determined:
r
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7. .at ~= ll. = g. = e641 1 I
'7 J!!1.. ~= ll. :: g() :::c e 65 (6.2. 26)0 ()
The event vectors 1 , 1 , 1., f are output separable and therefore
a r 1 0
satisfy (6. 2. 23). From the fact that the detection spaces satisfy:
~ Sf e2 ~
rk R + rk R + rk R. + rk R = 6
a r 1 0
(6.2.27)
it can be shown (Theorem 3. 3. 1) that the gyro failures and aileron
~
failures are detectable by a single failure detection system. Since f(.l
F:::4 ~ A:J P::I t-J
is not included in f , f , f., f ; the failure detection system cannot
a r 1 0
detect dynamics changes or aileron sensor failures.
The stochastic design procedure is detailed only for the failure
F:::s F::::J Ptd F:::S
detection system for f • f , f., f in the remainder of this subsection.
a r 1 0
The considerations involved for the remaining failure detection system
are similar to those discussed below.
The first step in the algorithms of Section 5. 2 is to find matrices
Pd I=Id
T and T which transform (A. C) into the base normal form for the
m AJ F:d A:::f F::f
failures associated with f , f , f., f. Equation (6. 2. 25) guarantees
a r 1 0
that T and T
m
can be defined without using t1.ppendix.A.4. From ~6. 1. 62),
(6. 1. 6 5), (6. 2. 26) and (4. 4. 1):
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
--
f3cp
I'l:1 ~ - ""'1'l:1 I'l:1 I'l:1 ] 0 0 0 1 0 0T = [ga Aga gr A~ gi go = 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
-1 ~tp 1 1 0 0-r
cp
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r
I3cp 1 0 0 0 - 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
- 1 0
-a acp 0 0 0T = fJ
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 ~
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
T T -1 [~ ~ P:dF::::j ~]= = Cg. =m m a gr 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
(6. 2. 28)
I , t
~ I I IA' 0 x x
_ ,!a~ _ _1__ L .__
o 'A' I x I x
- _ ~ -rr: ~ _ .L _ _
X I X IA.,. I 0
_ _ ...1 ._ _ 1_ l.! '_ __
x I x I 0 I A'
I I 00
I I
=
Ct
o
If the aileron failures had not been added to the set of failures to moni-
F:::::J
tor, Append ix A. 4 would have been needed to 'ietermine vector~ w 3 and
;4 to replace 'g. and g in (6. 2. 28). In this particular example, g.
F:d 1 a l
and g are the vectors which would have been selected by Append ix A.4
o
and the transformation matrices would not have changed. In general,
however, Appendix A.4 does not yield additional detection spaces.
Given T and T , the base normal canonical form for <X,~)
m
follows directly from (6. 2. 28):
i
o 0 tOO O'i
1 -~ I 0 0 0 I 0
tpl
_._- --,-------1--1--
o 00 0 0,0A= T- 1 AT = : I I
o 0 1 - ~ J rz. 01
0r ~ 1 J
._-------- - -~----
o - k k I 0 - k. k ,- T. I 0lal Lr 1r
-0 - -kok
a
'I 0 ':kk-:-0- r .. ;-
or I I 0
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, A I i I
:--l0 1 I 0 0 0 0 C I 0 0 I 0 Ia- - -- - - - .. -- - -,.- -I i I A I0 0 I a 1 0 0 0 0 1 C I 0
" - 1
I L r IC! ........... - -- - - - "- - - - -- _. -- - - -I -- _. -C = T T = t I I zc I A t
m 0 0 I 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 C. 0I I l I
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
_I
-
--
- -I I I AQ 0 0 0 0 i 1 0 0 0 0 I 0I I I CI 0
X (t)
rna
X (t)
mr
X (t) = T- 1 '){ (t) = -- - -
ITl no .
X .(t)
fil
X (t)
rno
=
~ (f) (t) + ~ (t) - <pmo(t)
cp rna m
CPma(t)
r:lcp(~mr(t) - ~m(t»
~mr(t)
c5 .(t)
ml
6 .(t)rna ..
(6.2.29)
A
The XiS in A denote non-zero off-diagonal submatrices. Because the
A
set of failures was increased to satisfy (6. 2. 23). Hie Arf subsystem
in (4.4.4) is missi~g from (6.2.29). Each of the partitions of x (t)
m
is associated with the detection space witll the same subscript.--
.S:f ~ £::S
<fJ (t) is the estimate of ~ (t) etc. The transformation of R , R , R.,
ma.B;;1 a a r L
a.nd R into base normal form results in:
o
~
- 1 .&f [" "I,,] ~(,O 1 AtR = T R = [fa ga] = e62 + S(f)e61 1e61 z :: f gaaa a 1 0 aa
Ao
.... .- ~ _.-..
- - - - .- -
R = T- 1 R = [ir gr] =[e64 + ~(f) e63 :e63 ] 0 0 0 0r r
JSJ -1~ A A 0 0 0 0R. f. ~= T R. = = g. = e 651 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
- 1 .8;1 A A AR = T R = f = go = e66 0 0 0 00 0 0
(6. 2. 30)
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The transformed detection ~ennrators g , g , g., and g are unit vectors.
I a r 1 0
'rh~ definition (If'r insur~8 tll:1t th0 ()utput directi()ns associated witl1
111
the event vectors r , f , f., and f at'e ahw unit vectors:
a r 1 ()
A A
'"Cf = e 41a
cf A= e 42r (6.2.31)A A AC f. = e431
A A
ACr = e 440
With the ba~e Dormal canonical form established, the next step in
A A
choosing D,6K is to determine ~R in (5.2. 22). A sufficient condition
for aileron and gyro failures to generate unidirectional output errors
A A A A A A A
for (A- DFR C, C) is for A - DFR C to be block diagonal. A satis-A
factorily ~R always exists and (4. 4. 17) expresses it in terms of the
elements in the last column of each of the off- diagonal submatrices of
'"A:
'"0 0 Ct. r:t DFa1 0
0 0 0 0 ----
A
- - - -- -- - - - - - DFr0 0 0 0A
--- -~R = = (6.2.32)0 0
'"Ct. 0'0 DFi1- - - - - - - - - - -
-k.k -k.k 0 0
.-.- --_.1 a 1 r
-
- - -
-_--..--.-
- - - A
-k k -k k 0 0 DFo0 a 0 r
A A "-With (6.2.32), the only non-zero elements of A - DF~ C are those of
A I A ,A Ithe block diagonal submatrices A , A , A ~., and A ; and these
aa rr 11 00
submatrices are unchanged:
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FE
(6.• 2. 33)
o..~I I 0
aa I
t
I " Io ,A
rrI
I 0
I
I I
I 0 I 0
I ,
~j - - - 1- - -1- - -
I I
OrO 'A.'. I 0t 11 I
1 I
---r---~- -----
1 I
, , I Ao
o I 0 lo,A'
I I 00
=
o
I
O II 0
I
010
I
- 0- - I - -0 T .- -
I r 0
I
o 011 -a to 10
t cp I I
-- - ------_ .. ~---
o 0 I 0 0 I - "'. I 0
I I '1 I
- - - - - - - - - .- - - ~ - -
o 0 10 0 I 0 1- T.I I J o.
o 0 10
I
1 - ~ 1 0~ __ 2~_
o 0 10
t
"To see that DFR satisfies the failure detection constraint, cons ider
an attitude gyro failure as modeled by (6.1.9). The state estimation
error due to the failure is:
~ (0) given
(6.2. 34)
The error generated by the driving term in (6. 2. 34) remains in the
A
controllable subspace of fa. This subspace is spanned by the columns
of:
[fa: (A- DFR C)fa :CA- ~R c)2ia .. ] =[e62 + Scp e6t: 0 o. · · ]
(6.2. 35)
Th(~ controllable subspace is ()ne- d imens ic)nal- r- an atti tude g-yro fail tIre
affects only the e9timate of the state C()mpOllent associated with the
direction e62 + ~tp e61 • A transformati.on back to the original coordinate
system using (6. 2.29) verifies that this is the estimate of <p (t). The
m
output estimation error is restricted to the output subspace defined by
~ and (6. 2. 3 5):
(6. 2. 36)
and is clearly unidirectional. Similar results follow for the remaining
failures.
A A A
The last step .in the choice of DAK is to choose DA '1'K an~ DAr.
The absence ofaxr(t) partition of x(t) in (6. 2. 29) means that DArK
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· -'. -: '. ~ :' -.~ .
A
is zero (Section 4.4). The only constraint on the choice of DI::. 'Y K is
that it must not alter the output error unid irectionality provided by
DFR• It is not necessary that DA'YK satisfy the same continuous-d iscrete
approximation defined for DA.FR in (5. 2.22), but this appr"oximation is
useful for interpreting the failure detection constraint on D I::. 'YK:
(6. 2.37)
Equation (4.4.20) defines D'YK to complement DFR • Where an element of DFR
is required to eqllal an element in one of the off- d iaganal submatrices
of A, the corresponding element of D'YK must be zero. Where an element
A A
of D FR was set arbitrarily equal to zero, that element in D'YK is freely
assignable:
0 0 0
d VKa 0 0 0 D'i'Ka
- - ---~-- - - -- ---
-----
A 0
d'i'Kr
0 0
D'¥KrD'i'K = = (6.2.38)
0 0 0
-_.- - -- -....-.---
- ---
- _.- ~-
0 0 d'YKi 0 D'fKi
--- ....------- .- -
- _...-
0 0 0 d'i'Ko
--- -
D'i'Ko
If the non-zero elements of D'YK are expressed as functions of the
coefficients in the last columns of AI AI, A~., and A' in (6.2.29):
aa~ rr 11 00
d'i'Kr =
dVKi =
d VKo =
d'!'Ka =
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(6. 2. 39)
.: >". --:.-.). '? ... :
A A A A
then A - (~R + D'Y K) C is block diagonal and express ible as a function of
the freely assignable coefficients Pal' Pa2' Prl' Pr2' Pil' and Pol:
o - Pal: 0 0 0 I 0
I I
1 -P '0 0 1 0 I 0_a~ 1_ _ _ _ _ -! _
o OIO-p 'a I 0
f rl I I
o OI1-P2 IO '0
r I
_____ J. 1_ - - - - .-
o 0 I 0 0 1- p. 1 I 0
I 1 I_ _ _ _ _ __ , L -_ _ _
o 0 rOO I 0 '- P
t I I 01
A . j 0 r 0 I 0
aa I I I
I f I
- - 1- - -,- -,--
o I A I 0 I 0
rr I
c L _
I I
I
t 'A~ Io I 0 I iii 0
--.1-_1.._1.._-
I I
O J 0 I a I ~I . A
I ~ I 00
(6.2.40)
Arguments sin... ;.lar to (6.2.35) and (6.2.36) verify that the rnonitored
failures generate unidirectional output errors for (A- (DFR+fJ'fI'K)~' C).
The characteristic equations of A- (DFR + DyK ) C'is :
= 'if (A) 'i' (A) 'if. (A) 'i' (X)
a rIO (6.2.4])
....." A Awher~ Y
a
(A) is the minimal polynomial of A - (DFR + DYK a associated
with R· etc. Equations (6. 2.39) and (6. 2.41) together guarantee the freedom to
a
select the eigenvalues of A- (~R + DyK)C.
A
Section 5. 2 provides three algorithms for selecting DAYK to minimize
the variance of the state estimates provided by (5. 2. 5) and (5. 2. 6). All
these involve approximations of the stochastic system rr...odel defined in
Section 6. 2. 1. Two of the algorithms are based on the continuous
measurement stochastic model developed in Section 6. 2. 1. The free
parameters of DYK in (6. 2. 38) are used in these algorithms to choose
DFR + ~YK as an optimal detection filter- state estimator lor the contin-
uous state estimator:
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.X (t) =
m
--------------------------er·........__••11
'" A A"""", ""A xm(t) + (J1t'll + D'i'K)(y(t) - ym(t))
= (A - (I~R -I- ()'!'K) (~) x
m
(t) + (6F H. + r)-.yK) yet)
-: CX (t)
m
(6.2.42)
A A A
Dli. '!'K is then approximated by .dtD'!'K and DAK becomes:
(6.2.43)
The only dis ~inction between the two algorithms is that one optimizes
d'!'Ka' d'i'Kr' dyKi' and d'i'Ko using the Kalman filter algorithm of
Section 5. 1. 2 and the other uses the paramet er optimization technique of
Section 5. 1. 3.
A
The third algorithm optimizes DIi '!'K by working directly with the
sampled-data stochastic model of Section 6.2.1 and the sampled-data
state estimatorE presented at the beginning of this subsection. Failure
A
detection constraints equivalent to (6.2. 38) are imposed on DA'!'K by
replacing «f,(t, T) in both the stochastic model and state estimator by the
A A A
state transition matrix for A - D.FR C:
(6. 2.44)
The above approximation results in a block diagonal state trans ition
matrix:
A
tl>'(t,,-) =
I
A~' t 0 I 0 I 0
aa t • I
- - "I ~; - t- - .- -1- - -
o I ~ I 0 I 0
rr I
-~-: -~ -:-i!.- r-0- -
!... __ t- _l~ ' _
I I I R.
o I 0, 0 I woo
I I I
(6. 2. 45)
where c£l {t 'T) has the same dimension as AI and is approximately the
aa ' aa
corresponding block of 4»(t,.,.) for small time increments etc. The general
A
form for DA'!'K is then the same as that of D'!'K in (6.2.38):
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Idli'fKa 0 0 00 0 0 D~~Ka
_._-~-
- - - -... - - - -----_.
0
cl a 'flKr
0 0
Dli'i'Kr0 0 0
~ ~ - -
- - - - - - -- ..... - - - - -
D~'i'K = =
0 0 d A'f Ki 0 Da'fKi
---.~ ~-
- - - - - --
~ - - ~-
-- --
0 0 0 dA,'I'Ko D.6'¥Ko
(6.2. 46)
The algorithm optimizes d~'i'Ka' d~'i'Kr; d~'i'Ki' and d~'i'Ko using the
discrete Kalman filter of Section 5.2.
The two algorithms based on the continuous measurement stochastic
model are illustrated in the remainder of this section. With (6. 2. 44) -
(6. 2. 46), the third algorit hm is procedurally analogous to the continuous
Kalman optimization but uses the discrete formulation. The effectiveness
of the detection filter-state estimates for the continuous and discrete
formulations is compared in Section 6. 4.
The two algorithms for optimiz ing D'i'K require that the express ions
for C t , G2, and G12 given in (6.2.19), (6.2.21). and (6'12.22) be restated
P:::J F::::1
for the augmented reference model (A, C). The added state component
has no physical counterpart and is not dr:'ven by system dynamics. It
~ P::1 fJ:j
follows that Gl is defined similarly to B; Li2 is unchanged:
G1 = lo~~- oJ
(6. 2. 47)
~ ~
The matrices G1 and G2 can be transformed into base normal canonical~
form; no transformation for G12 is necessary:
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(5. 1. 4)
JW 13' "0 0 CIa
0 0 0
-- -
- G1r0 0 0
" T- 1 GG = = JW13' =1 0 01 "
-
- - - -- --- -
- - - -
G Ii
0 JI::. t' Q'Lk i ka IT la.6 JM C\'L kikrCTlrA - - - ._-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -
- -
"0 J.At' Q'L kokaCT 'la.6 Jlit' Q'L kokrCT IrIi G 10
,.-
", 0 0 0 G2a(]la~
- - - - - - - - -- - .- '- - - - - -- - -.--.
I A0 O"lr~ 0 0 G2rA
-1 t=:::JG2 G2 J5 - -
_.
- - (6.2.48)= T = = "m 0 0 0"2iA 0 G2i
- - .- -
- -
A-
D 0 0 0"20 G20
With these definitions and the assumption that the continuous
measurement stochastic model is precise, the error in the state
es cimates provided by (6. 2. 42) satisfies (5. 1. 4):
•
;(t) = (A - (DFR + DVK) C) ;(t) - DVK 02 il2 (t) - DFR G2 il2 (t) + 01 ill (t)
i (t) = ~ (t) + G2 il2 (t)
Because DFR is independent of the choice of d VKa' d'i'Kr' d'i'KP and
dVKo; Section ? 1. 1 defines a new system noise from the last two terms
in (5. 1. 4):
•
ilIa
il 1r
TIl i
ilIa
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(6. 2. 49)
It is shown in Section 6. 4. 3 that the second term in (6. 2. 49) can become
the dominant system noise for the error equations. l1~(t) is a zero mean,
white Gauss ian random process with a correlation function:
2
• 2
I
aalo 0 I 0 °Blo I 0 0
I
0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0
- - - -
.... .-.
- - - I - - - - - -
• 6(t- or)
I
0' t X a I 0
aa ~ l t
--',,~T-l--
x I G I 0 1 0
I rr I I
- - 1- - 1_ - - - -
I I
o lOG.'. I X
1 I II
- - -; - - 1_ _ L _ _
I I I"
o 0 I x I G~o
• 6(t- T) G; 1
(6. 2. 50)
where:
2 Wa +
2 2 2 2
O"Sio = Ct. 0'2i~ + Ci a2o~1 0
2 A.t (k2 ,2 + k 2 /2. )(Tar = C1 1aA alr~.a r
Equation (6. 2. 48) implies that 111(t) and 1l2(t) are in general not independent.
Their covariance satisfies:
o 0 0 0
E[lJj (t) lJ2(t)T 02TI '" 6(t--r) ~ _ ~ _ -_£\~O'! a!14 _- ~l 0'_0 .a~o~ • 6(I-T)
o 0 0 0
xx
o
2
- 6 t oro a2ol\
o
_.~ - - - -
2o 0 -6to
1
0
21A
9__0 0
o 0 o o o o o
(6. 2. 51)
The block diagonal nature of A- (DFR + D'i'K)C in (6. 2. 40) and the
partitions in (6. 2. 29), (6. 2. 48), and (6. 2. 50) allow the error equations
(5. 1. 4) to be decQupled into four sets of equations. With let) partitioned
in the same manner as x (t) in (6. 2. 29):
m
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(t) =
€ (t)
a
- - - . '.
€ (t)
r
€. (t)
1
i (t)
o
(6. 2.52)
and (6. 2. 33) substituted for A.- DFR C. the four error equations become:
i a (t) =
€ I (t) =
a
.
i (t) =
r
i I (t) -
r
t.(t)
1
€~(t) =
1
.
;0(t) =
(" I (t) =
o
(A.' - d\l1K c) € (t) - dUlK G2 112 (t) + ill' (t)aa r a a a I a a a
,.. A A
C f: (t) + G2 Tl 2 (t)a a a
(A I .- dill K ~) € (t) - d l11 K G2 11 2 (t) + T} l' (t)rr I r r r I r r r
c € (t) + 02 112 (t)r r r
At , ,.. At A ,(A - d WK c) f: (t) - d'i'K G2 11 2 (t) + 11 1 (t)00 I 0 0 0 0 0 0
c i (t) + C2 11 2 (t)000
(6. 2. 53a)
(6. 2. 53ro )
(6. 2. 53i)
(6.2. 530)
These equations associate each of the vectors d'i'Ka' d'!'Kr' d'YKi'
and d yKo uniquely with the partition of i(t) with the appropriate subscript.
The fact that t~1e four equations are decQupled implies that the choice
of d'l'K affects the accuracy of x (t), but not of x (t) etc.
a rna mr
The four error equations are decQupled but they are not statisti-
cally independent. The non-diagonal form of GIl and °12 imply that
the residuals ('(t), ('et), {.'(t), and €'(t) are correlated. It follows that
a r 1 0
the error £' in the estimate of the nominal attitude gyro output contains
a
information about the errors in the estimates of the aileron deflections
etc. A true minimum variance state estimator would use this information
to improve the estimates of all of the state variables. An optimal detec-
tion filter-state estimator cannot do this because of the requirement to
properly isolate failures. if an attitude gyro failure modeled by (6. 1. 9)
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""
occurs, the partition of f in (6.2.30) implies that only the error equations
a
for '( (t) are driven by the failure:
a
-
.
(a (t) =
;'(t) =
a
CA ' - d'"K ~) ( (t) - d\llK 62 11 2 (t) + T1 1' (t) + i net)aa l' a a a l' a a a aa
c i (t) + G2 1l2 (t> (6.2.54)a a a '
If ('(t) were used to decrease the variances of i'(t), i.'(t), and €'(i); it
a r 1 0
would appear as a driving term in (6.2. 53r), (6.2. 53i), and (6.2.530).
The error in €' (t) resulting from the attitude gyro failure would then
a
propagate through the state estimates and the ~esired unidirectionality
of failure- induced output estimation errors would be lost. It follows
that in optimizing the state estimates produced by the failure detection
system, it is necessary to consider the four error equations (6.2. 53a) -
(6. 2. 530) to be decoupled and to disregard their cross- correlations.
Equations (6.2. 53a) - (6.2.530) are the classic error equations
for state estimators monitoring a system with a single continuous
measurement. The four systems can be denoted by (A I , c ), (A' , c ),
aa a rr r
(A~., c.). and (A' , c). The vectors d WK ' d WK ' d wK ., and d WK are11 1 00 0 I a 'I r 1 1 I 0
the general output feedback matrices for such systems. trhe state
estimates associated with each system are the components of the partition
of x (t) with the same subscript. The continuous Kalman filter and
m
parameter optimization techniques can be applied to each of the four
subscripts to determine the optimal choice of D1J.1K. Both algorithms are
illustrated in the following paragraphs for (A' , c ) and d\llK • Because
aa a I a
additional failures were selected in order to satisfy (6.2.23), the algorithms
yield identical results. When (6. 2. 23) is not satisfied, the Kalman
algorithm of Section 5. 1. 2 gen=ral1y requires a state space augmentation
and the Kalman and parameter optimization techniques yield different
results.
The continuous Kalman filter for (A' , c ) minimizes the variance
aa a 1\
of the state estimate x (t). The steady state covariance matrix P
rna A A =a
is the solution of (5. 1. 17). Because G;2a in (6. 2. 51) is zero. G2a 112 (t)
and 11'1 (t) in (6. 2. 53a) are uncorrelated and P satisfies:a ~a
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A A l' A A'r - 1 A A
I ) C r G2 02 I c I) = 000:1 a a a rt ooa
(6.2.55)
'"p :: ~.t
ooa
Substitution of the appropriate partitions from (6.2.33), (6.2.48), and
(6.2.50, yields:
O"fHO' O"{aA jacp2 + 20"~iO
ala~
The Kalman filter then satisfies (5.1. 16):
"= p(lOa
- 1
" T[ " " T ]c G2 G2a a a =
0" t3 io
---,
a1aa
j 2 I (6. 2. 57)_~ + ~ 2 + 0"13 LO
cp cp ,
C11a~
Comparison of dYKa with (6. 2. 39) indicates that the coefficients of the
minimal polynominal 'i' (.) are:
a
j 2 20"g. J= 13cp + ~LO
C11aA
Pal =
O"~io
, .
C11aA
(6. 2. 58)
The parameter optimization technique minimizes the variance of
the output c x (t). Because the noise sources drivirlg (A' • c ) are
a rna aa a
white. it yields the continoll8 Kalman filter and therefore minimizes the
variance of X
ma
(t). The t~chnique requires the Laplace transform of
c € (t)(, The general equation for the transform is given by (5. 1.35).
a a
Since R has a rank of two, z from (5. 1.34) is:
a
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z =[:J (6.2. SB)
Substituting the appropriate variables into (5. 1. 35) yields the scalar
equation:
All of the random processes in (6.2.60) are statistically independent and
(2.2.2) implies that th.eir power spectral densities are unity. The power
spectral dens ity of c £ (s) can then be found from (5. 1. 36):
a a
C ;.. () T 1 [W + A,t 2 2 + It. 2 2 +
'±" S C = Q IJ. Q'. 0'2· A .l.,t ex (j2 A
a aa a, 'f (8) 'Y (_ S) f.J l l~ 0 o~
a . a
(6.2.61)
This can be factored in polynomials of sand - s as irl (5. 1. 37):
(co + ctS) (co - cts)
=
'f (8) 'f (- s)
a a
(6. 2. 62)
where:
Equation (6. 2. 62) is in the form required for the tables in Appendix B.
12 in the tables, the steady state output covariance ca PeT is:coa a
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From
..
41\ ,. A ·,T
c P C =a ma a
A ,2 ( )2 (2 2 2 2 ,2 2~t C1 la.o ~0- Pa2 +W 13 + .6t O'i a2i.o + Cio a20A + ala~ Pal)
2~ 1.1 Pa 2
(6. 2. 63)
c peT is an explicit function of the coefficients p 1 and p 2. The
a =a a a a
optimal coefficients are the solution to the coupled algebraic equations:
o(e PeT)
a Ma a
------- = a (6. 2. 64)
The solutions obtained are the same as (6. 2. 57) for the Kalman algorithm.
In general, when output stationarity is involved, the vectors of
D.oK as defined in (6. 2. 38) or (6. 2. 46) cannot be optimized independently.
A suboptimal detection filter-state estimator can still be found but a
variation on the two algorithms presented above is necessary. The failure
detection system designed for the failures i) - v), viii). and ix) from
Table 6. 1 requires output stationarity in order to detect amplifier failures.
It was noted in Section 6. 1. 1 and again i~l conjunction with (6. 1. 44) -
(6. 1. 48) that the output error generated by an amplifier failure is similar
to that generated by simultaneous aileron failures of a particular type.
Because the failure detection system for the gyro failures has been
required to monitor aileron failures in order to satisfy (6. 2. 23), output
stationarity could be used to add amplifier failure monitoring to its
responsibilities. The effect of this constraint would be that d'i'Ki and
d'l'Ko could not be optimized independently. The necessary modification
of the parameter optimization procedure is illustrated below.
_ 1 ,8;1'
T R ka =
Equation (46. 2. 41) defines the des ired minimal polynomials Vi (A) and
.... _ A A 1\ A
'1
0
('\) of R i and R o with respect to A - (DFR+DyK)C ... Tl1e-.dctection sp::\ce for
an amplifier failure can be defined from Table 6.1 and the augmented
system (X. ~):
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The one-dimensionality of R k means that its desired minimal polynomial
A '" a
with respect to A - (DFR + ~'l'T<") C: must be first- order also:
Y ka (,\) = ,\ + Pkal (6. 2. 66)
Because Yk (X), '!'.(A), and 'f (A) are all first-order, the output stationarityat 1 0
cons tr"a int on d'l'K i and d YK0 is:
(6.2.67)
l'0 (,\) = ¥ ka(,\)
A A A
and the characteristic equation of A - (DFR + ~YK) C is required to have a
double eigenvalue:
(6.2. 68)
(6. 2. 69)
(6. 2. 71)
The optimization procedure suggested in Section 5. 1. 3 for assigning the'
A A AT A A Tdouble eigenvalue is to replace P.I and p 1 in c. P . c. and c P C
. 1 0 1 CDt 1 0 000 0
by Pkal and then optimize Pka1 according to a variation on (6. 2. 64):
2A A T 2A'" ATa (p. c. P . e. + pcP c )
__l__l__=_l_l O__O_Cl'_O__O__ = 0
a Pkal
The weighting factors p.2 and p 2 can be chosen by the designer. The
1 0
double eigenvalue in (6. 2. 41) is then defined by assigning:
(6. 2. 70)
Without the output stationarity requirement, Pi! and Pol could be
optim ized according to the two independent eqtlations:
A A ATo(c. P . c. )
L COl· 1 = 0
oP it
a (c peT)
o coo 0 = 0
oPol
Unless Pu and Pol in (6. 2. 70) coincidently satisfy (6. 2. 71) the addition
of the output stationarity requirement decreases the output estimate
accuracies of the failure detection system.
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6. 3 Detection Law
The use of multiple fa.ilure detection systems presents difficulties
in interpreting the output ()f the individual failure detecti()n systems. It
is necessary to avoid a situation where one failure detection s.ystenl indi-
cates a particular failure has occurred, a second ind icates a different
failure has occurred, and there is no means of determining which fail-
ure detection system to believe. Section 5. 3 presents a heuristically
derived detection'law for choosing between conflicting decisions made by
the individual failure detection systems. That detection law is developed
in this section for the autopilot ..· aircraft example.
A detection law must be implemented as a two- tiered structure.
The first tier specifies the manner in which the individual failure detec-
tion systems interpret the output error signals which they monitor. The
premise is that each failure detection system is to interpret its own
output signals (residuals) in the context of the failures which it is de-
signed todetect. The structure of this decision-making process consists
of three segments:
i) an analysis of the residuals to determine the presence of a
fa ilure- generated output error,
ii) a waiting period to determine the direction or hyperplane in
the output space to which that error signal is constrained, and
iii) an interpretation of the observed error signal in terms of the
failures which the failure detection system was designed to
detect.
The second tier in the detection law provides for the selection of one of
the failure detection system decisions as a correct identification of the
failure. If one failure detection system constrains the output error to a
single direction and the other constrains it to a plane, the decision of the
first failure detection system is to be accepted. A considerable amount
of freedom is available in implementing the two tiers of the detection law.
The algorithm used for the autopilot- aircraft is that developed in the
second half of Section 5. 3.
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In the absence of any failure, the estimation errors for the
Flamr)]ed-data Atate estimatc)r of (5.2.5) - (5.2.6) Ratisfy:
(5. 2. 9)
The res idual € '(kAt) is the difference between the measurement at kAt
and the predicted measurement; and E(kl.\ t) is the error in the state
estimate at kAt after being updated with the new measurement:
(5. 2. 10)
The covariance matrices are:
(5.2.11)
The variance of the residuals is CP C T +_1_ G G T
Q) at 2,d 2~'
The first step in the implementation of the detection law is to
resolve the residuals for each failure detection system into the base
normal coordinates associated with that failure detection system:
; , (k4t) :I: T - 1 "( '(k4t)
m
(6.3.1)
Each component of the transformed residual is then treated as the out-
put of an independent detection channel. The test for the presence of a
failure- generated component in the residual is a simple threshold cros-
sing test on the magnitude of the residual. A failure is assumed to have
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occurred if the magnitude of the res irlual in any detection cha~nel exceeds
the 30' projecti0n of CPmC T + ~\ G2~. G2~T onto that channel. As an example,
the four detection channels for the gyro- aileron fa ilure detection sys tern
A A 4Il\ "'"
are defined by the residuals E I (ka t), €' (k~t)J '€!(kA.t), and €/(k~t):
a r L 0
T =mg
1 000
o 100
o 0 1 0
000 1
'"£~(kAt)
"" -1-
€g'(k4t) I: T £ '(kL\t) =mg
f'\
7~(kAt)
""£ '(kat)
o
(6.3. 2)
where T g is the output transformation T defined in (6. 2. 28). A fail-
m m
ure is assumed to have occurred if any of the four inequalities is satis-
fied:
~/(kAt) > 3[ eT T -l(Cp C T +_1_ G G T) T ... ] 1/2
r 42 m m At 2A2A m e 42
(6. 3. 3)
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Once a failure detection sys tern has detected the existence of a fail-
ure~ ii) and iii) require that the failure be isolated and identified. As
implemented for ttle example, isolation requires a waiting period to deter-
mine which detection channels the failure- generated error signal appears
in. Tile fact that the gyro-aileron failure detection system cannot contain
the output error generated by a dynamics change to a single detection
channel does not imply that the threshold crossings due to a dynamics
change must appear in two detection caannels simultaneously. If a thresh-
old cross ing appears first in the rate gyro channel, the failure detection
system cannot identify the failure as a rate gyro failure until it is confident
that a threshold crossing will not subsequently appear in the attitude gyro
channel. With one exception discussed later, the number of channels in
which the threshold is exceeded defines the dimens ion of the output sub-
space to which the failure detection system constrains the error signal.
Because the second tier of the detection law requires this d imens ion in
ordel~ to accept the correct failure identification, it is important that
each failure detection system correctly isolate its failure- generated
residuals. The minimum length of the waiting period is a function of the
system, the failure mode, and the eigenvalues of A-DC.
Following the failure isolation by a failure detection system, the
failure identification is made in terms of the failures which the failure
detection system was designed to detect. If only a rate gyro channel
threshold crossing occurs, the gyro-aileron failure detection system
reports a rate gyro failure. If an attitude gyro threshold cross Lng occurs
also, the failure detection system reports that both gyros have failed --
even though the true failure may be a dynamics change. If a dynamics
change has in fact occurred, the other failure detection system will
report it as such. The second tier of the detection law is then responsible
for accepting the correct failure identification. Whe."l a failure detection
system is des igned to monitor sensor failures and a threshold cross ing
appears in two detection channels, the identified failure may be a single
sensor failure rather than two separate fai..lures. This possibility under-
scores the necess ity of correctly isolating the res iduals generated by a
failure before making a failure identification.
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If ()ul-put stali()n:lri1..y 1I:1H )p(\n lIH(~d t.() increase the nUlllhpr ()I"
failtlres which a failure cJ(~teeti()n RyRtetn is to m(lnitor, the fa.ilurp
identification problem hec()mes m()re complex. In effect, it is ne~essary'
to adopt two or more parallel failure identification algorithms for that
failure detection system and then require the second tier of the failure
detection law to accept the correct identification. This procedure can be
illustrated in the context of the failure detection system for the aileron
and aileron sensor failures.
Ignoring the amplifier failure for a moment, the event vectors
associated with the failure detection system are f., .f , f Q , f • The1 0 t-J ar
transformation to define the detection charulels for E' (kat), E~(k~t)..ar ,.,
"E! (k~t), and '(' (kAt) is the inverse of T s 1:
10m
1 0 0 0
-6 1 0 0
T = [Cf Cf
13
Cf. Cf ] = 'q)msl ar 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
A
£ I (k~t)
ar
A
T- 1 1 £/(k~t)
E~ (k~t)
(' (k~t) = = AfJ 1 rns 7!(kat)
1
E I (k~t)
0
(6. 3. 4)
The detection channel defined by E".'(kAt) monitors an inboard aileron
1
failure, etc. If either aileron fails. a threshold cross Lng appears in
the appropriate detection channel. The event vector f ka for an amplifier
failure is a linear comb ination of f. and f :
1 0
f k :I: +k. f. + k fall 0 0 (6. 1. 23)
Because DtJJ{ for this failure detection system is chosen such that f ka is
output stationary with f., f • f Q' f ; (6. 1. 23) implies that an amplifier
1 0 ,.., ar
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failure creates threshc)ld cross ings in both aileron detection channels.
()utput stationarity gua~antees that the output error generated by an
anlplifier is unidirectional along (~fka. The two threshold crossings
occur because T- 1 lefk is not in any single detection channel definedms a
by (6. 3. 4). This difficulty can be overcome by defining a new output
transformation with one of cr., Cf replaced by Cfk :loa
1 0 0 0
T = [ Cf Cf~ Cf. Cfka ]
-f3 1 0 0
ms2 = cpar 1 0 0 1 k.
l
0 0 0 k
0
,..
£"' (kdt)
ar
,..
T- 1 :..., (k.1t) ("~(kA:lt)~2(k~t) = =ms2 €
"€.'(kdt)
1
A
£ka(kAt) (6. 3. 5)
In the transformed output define,j by (6. 3. 5), an outboard aileron failure
is not associated with a single detection channel, but an amplifier fall-
ure is. As far as the second tier of the detection law is concerned, it is
as if a third failure detection system had been defined. An outboard
aileron failure causes a single threshold cross ing only for (6. 3. 4); an
amplifier failure causes a single threshold cross ing only for (6. 3. 5); and
an inboard aileron failure causes a single threshold crossing in both out-
put spaces. With both (6.3.4) and (6. 3. 5) providing failure identifications,
the detection law can then accept the correct identification.
The addition of a third coordinate transformation results in a set of
twelve detection channels tv be monitored. Figure 6. 4 defines three
detection systems based upon these detection channels .. - the Tmg, Tmsl '
and T 2 detection systems. With the aid of deterministic simulations
- me
with nearly continuous measurements, the threshold crossings generated
in each detection system fo~ every potential failure can be tabulated.
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These results are summarized in Table 6. 2 for the three detection
systems. The failure identification which each detection system makes
is also ind icated in the table. It can be verified from the table that the
correct failur(; identification is always made by the detection system
which experiences the least number of threshold crOSSil)gS. This further
justifies the choice of the second tier of the detection law.
6. 4 Simulation Results
The purpose of this section is to emphasize the potential value of
failure detection theory for providing real- time failure detection and
identification. The analysis is restricted to the autopilot-aircraft system,
but the intention is to provide ins ight into the class of applications for
which failure detection theory can be expected to yield useful information.
Particular attention is given to the possibility of a failure detection sys-
tem performing the dual functions of failure detection and state estimation.
Section 6.4.1 presents a series of simulation results which indicate
that the failure detection systems and detection law designed in Sections
6. 1 - F:. 3 can provide nearly instantaneous failure detection and ide~ltifica­
tion for a variety of fai.lures and failure modes. The emphasis in that
subsection is on failure modes which can significantly impair the short-
term stability. controllability. or observability of the autopilot- aircraft
system. It is always possible to find component degradations which do
not significantly alter the dynamic response of a vehicle, but which have
an important cumulative effect over a long period of time -- a bias in
one of the gyros in the autopilot is a typical example. Section 6. 4. 3
demonstrates that failure detection systems can also be used to detect
such degradations .. but that the detection filter- state estimators des igned
in Section 6. 2. 2 may not provide an adequate failure detection capability.
Several techniques for mod ifying the detection filters to improve the
failure detection properties are illustrated. Some of these techniques also
improve the accuracy of the state estimates; some do not.
The simulations in Section 6. 4. 1 are based upon a single measure-
ment sampling period (. 1 seconds) and a reasonable choice of G1A and
G in the stochastic system model. The sens itivity analys is in Section24
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6. 4. :3 demonstrates the dependence of good failure detection on a short
measurement sampling period. Section 6.4.2 also indicates that sub-
optimal detection filter-state estimat()rs can provide state estimates
c()mparable to those of a Kalman filter for short measurement sampling
periods, but that the accuracy of the state estimates may become un-
acceptable for long measurement sampling periods. The effectiveness
of the various optimization procedures of Section 5. 2 in find ing good
detection filter-state estimators is shown to be a function of G1A and
G2A as well as the measurement sampling period.
6. 4. 1 Failure Detection
The simulations presented ~n this subsection are based upon the
system parameters given in Table 6.3. The roll time constant (l/fJ )
<p
and totp.l aileron effectiveness (0'. + ex ) are those of the 040A Space
1 0
Shuttle Vehicle at Mach 2 and 70, 000 feet. The airframe has a roll
response time (3/ a,,,) of 8. 6 seconds. The amplifier gains (k and k )
..,., a r
are chosen to provide a closed-loop response time of 1. 8 seconds with
no overshoot. k
a
is sufficiently larg'e that the autopilot-aircraft system
is unstable without the damping provided by the rate gyro feedback. The
bas ic autopilot sampling period is .01 seconds. As ind icated in Section
6. 2. 1, the purpos,:: of the short autopilot sampling period is to evaluate
the ability of a failure detection system to use discrete measurements to
detect and identify failures in nearly continuous systems.
The measurement sampling period used in this subsection is .1
seconds. The measurement variances indicated in T'able 6. 3 are typical
of the measurement uncertainties in currently available instruments and
the strength of the random aerodynamic moment is representative of the
disturbances expected at Mach 2 for the 040A vehicle•. This information
permits the optimization algorithms outlined in Section 6. 2. 2 to be solved
for the optimal detection filter-state estimator DAK for each of the two
failure detection systems. The detection filters used for the simulation
were optimized using the par;lmeter optimization procedure based upon
the continuous measurement stochastic model of Section 6. 2. 1. As in-
dicated in Section 6. 2. 2, the parameter optimization technique yields the
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System parameters
~cp • 34912 sec- 1=
- 1k = l.sec
a
k :: • 85
r
k. = 5.1
k = 5.
0
-2Qt. = 1.081 sec
1
-2
0'0 = 1.622 sec
System disturbances
8 2 2W = 9 x 10- (rad/sec)a
-8 24 x 10 rad
2 2 -8 2q =,.. = 4 x 10 (rad/sec)r ulra
Measurement noise
2 2 -7 20'2o~ = 0'2iA = 6. 4 x 10 rad
Table 6. 3: Autopilot- aircraft parameters used in simulations
381
same detection filter as the continuous Kalma·n algorithm, but not the same
detection filter as the discrete Kalman algor ithm.
The detection law developed in Section 6. 3 defines three detection
systems, each of which lnust make a failure detection decision before the
second tier of the detection law can correctly identify a system fa ilure.
The T detection system is based upon the res iduals of the gyro- aileron
mg
failure detection system; both the T 1 and T 2 detection systems are
rns rns
based upon the res iduals of the a ileron- aileron sensor failure detection
system. For the failures analyzed in this subsection, the T 1 and T 2
rns rns
detection systems present redundant informoation. Because of thfs, only
the outputs of the T and T 1 detection systems are presented and d i8-
mg ms
cussed. Each detection system is required to wait • 3 seconds after a
threshold cross ing in one of its detection channels befo.t'e making a failure
identification. The • 3 second delay was determined through trial and
error to be the shortest waiting period within which the detection systeffis
~ould correctly isolate the res iduals generated by the fa ilure modes
analyzed in this subsection. Sections 6. 4. 2 and 6. 4. 3 discuss other
possible criteria involved in selecting a waiting period.
The nominal performance of the autopilot- aircraft system is illus-
trated in Figure 6. 5. This simulation is presented for future reference
and to demonstrate the state estimation capabilities of a failure detection
system in the absence of a failure. Figure 6. 5a presents the measured
aileron deflections (inboard and outboard), the rate gyro output, and the
attitude gyro output for a roll command of 2° (.034 radians) at 1.6 seconds.
Figures 6•. 5b and 6.5c present the T mg and T ms 1 detection system out-
puts resp~ctively. Because Tmg as defined in (6. 3. 2) is the identity
matrix. the outboard aileron detection channel residual l-~(kAt) is the
difference between the measured aileron deflection at kat and the esti-
mated aileron deflection at ~t, etc. The 3 a magnit\ldes for the res idual
components are indicated in Figures 6.5b and 6. 5c by upper and lower
bounds. Since no system failure occurs during the run, the residuals in
all four detection channels remain within the 3 a thresholds.
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Figure 6. 5a Sensor outputs for a roll command of 20
(.034 radians) at 1.6 seconds and no failures.
•
"
-t
-uz:s..
I
~. CD I •• '.WI 1. I.CD
....
a:
I~
~.
"
•.-
-~~
~.
I.
~ • '.CD
....
i;
....
;
•II
•II
0
Iff.I • ... I •• I.WI ..- ••aD ... I •• ..... 1•• l.aDTIt£ mm
'"IIl
•.,
..
•
•
"
~ ---_ .• - .. -----.
~~ • ... 1•• I •• I.. ... ... I.- ... 1•• ....TIll! IDEO
•
" 3R3
Figure 6. 5b T detection system output for simulation
mg
in Figure 6.5a.-I
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Figure 6.5c Tms 1 detection system output for
simulation in Figure 6.5a
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One of the more difficult failure detection problems is to discrim-
inate between the failure of a system component and the failure of the
sensor ,",~hich measures the ()utput varial>le assoc iatee) with that compo-
nent. lJnless the sensor is at least triply redundant, this discrimination
cannot be accomplished solely on the basis of the sensor output. The
only poss ibility for correctly identifying the failure is to capitalize upon
the fact that the component failure and tm sensor failure affect the sys-
tem performance in different manners. This difficulty and the solution
which failure detection theory provides are illustrated by the following
two simulations.
Figure 6. 6 presents the system measurement history and detection
channel outputs for a simulation which differs from Figure 6. 5 in that
an inboard aileron deflection sensor failure occurs at the time at which
the 2° command is applied (1.6 seconds). The failure mode is that
modeled by aC . in (6. 1.14) -- the sensor output consists only of the
81
white measurement noise. Because the sensor failure model does not
involve a change in the autopilot- aircraft system dynamics, the nominal
appearance of the gyro output histories and outboard aileron deflection
history suggests that a sensor failure has occurred.
The intuitive argument of the previous paragraph is verifie1 by
the detection system outputs. The T ms 1 detection system is designed to
detect an inboard aileron deflection sensor failure. Table 6. 2 indicates
that the failure should produce threshold crossings in the inboard aileron
~ ~
channel (£./(k~t» and the roll dynamics channel «(~ (kdt) ) for the
1 to'.
T 1 detection system. Figure 6. 6c verifies that these crossings occur
ms
at 1. 7 seconds and 1. 8 seconds respectively -- well within the. 3 second
waiting period - - and the T 1 detection system correctly identifies
rna .
the sensor failure at '2. 0 seconds. The T detection system is not
mg
designed to detect sensor failures, but its detection decision must be
made before the second tier of the detection law can make a final
failure identification. Three threshold crossings appear in Figure 6.6b;
A ,
the first at 1. 7 seconds in the inboard aileron channel «(. (kAt» and
,. I 1
the third at 2. 0 seconds in the at~itude channel «( (kAt». Table 6. 2
a
ind icates that at the end of the'. 3 second waiting period (2. 0 seconds)
the T
mg detection system reports that the inboard ailerons. the rate
386
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Figure 6.6a Sensor outputs for a roll command of 2° at 1. 6
seconds and an inboard aileron sensor failure
at 1. 6 seconds.
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Figure 6. 6b T detection systen1 output for simulation
mg
in Figure 6. 6a. Arrows ind icate tin1e of
thrcs h()lc) (~ross ings.
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Figure 6. 6c Tmsl detection system output for simulation
in Figure 6. 6a. -Arrows ind icate time of
thres hold cross ing.
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gyro, and the attitude gyro have all failed. By virtue of the fact that
only two threshold crossings occur in the T
ms1 detection system, the
.second tier of the detection law correctly accepts the:Tms 1 detection
system's identification of the inboard aileron deflection sensor failure.
The difference between an aileron failure and an aileron sensor
failure is illustrated by the simulation presented in Figure 6. 7. The
run differs from Figure 6. 6 in that an inboard aileron servo failure
occurs rather than the sensor failure. The failure mode is that modeled
by 4Ai and 6Bi in (6. 1. 18). The inboard aileroQ.s remain fixed in the
trim pos itioD and do not respond to the deflection commands generated
by the autopilot. Figure 6. 7a ind icates that the inboard aileron deflection
sensor output cons ists only of the white measurement process as it did in
Figure 6. 6a - - the difference is that in this instance the sensor is pro-
viding accurate deflection measurements. The only means of determining
that the ailerons rather than the s,ensor have failed is by analyzing the
output histories of the remaining sensors~ The ratio of cx. to a in Table
L 0
6. 3 ind icates that inoperative inboa~-:-d ailerons create a 400/0 reduction in
aileron effectiveness and a less responsive control system. Comparison
of Figure 6. 7a with Figure 6. 5a reveals that the roll response time for
the autopilot- aircraft system has increased from 1. 8 seconds to approx-
imately 5 seconds with some overshoot. Tllis ind icates that a closed-loop
dynamics change has occurred and that an illboard aileron failure is a
likely candidate as an explanation of the change.
The detection system outputs corroborate the subjective analysis
m the preceding paragraph. Both the T C1 and T 1 detection systemsm~ ms
experience threshold cross ings i~ the inboard aileron detection channels
at 1.7 seconds. No further threshold crossings occur in the. 3 second
waiting period and both detection systems report inboard aileron failures
at 2. 0 seconds. 1 The presence of a single threshold crossing in Figure
1 The small threshold crossing which appears in the t'r(k,41t) detection
channel in Figure 6. 7c is a consequence of the fact thaf failure detection
theory is not analytically precise for sampled-data systems. Such
cross ings are discussed in Section 6. 4. 3.
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Figure 6. 7a Sensor outputs for a roll command of 21)
at 1. 6 seconds and an inboard aileron
fatl'.1re at 1. 0 seconds.
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Figure 6. 7b T detection system output for simulationin~gure 6. 7a. 'Arrow indicates time of
threshold crossing.
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Figure 6. 7c T rns 1 detection system output for simulation
in Figure 6. 7a. Arrow indicates time of a
threshold cross Lng. Asterisk is discussed in
footnote in text.
-....
!I
til
*
•
393
6.7b indicates that an inboard aileron failure does not significantly
clegrade the estimates of the outboard aileron deflections, the roll ratE.',
()r tll~ r()]l ang]~. 'rIle al1ility t(l ,)r()vid(~ accur:lte eHtimates ()f HOOle
Rtaf.f' variH.llleH in ~l fa.iled HYHt(~n) iR unique t(> fr-lilurc d~tf~ct:ion H.YR1.PfllR.
It is interesting at this point to suppo~ ~ a statement made in the
previous paragraph by contrasting the simulation in Figure 6. 7 with a
similar run in which the detection filters DA1K in both failure detection
systems are replaced by Kalman filters. As demonstrated in Section
6. 4. 2, the Kalman filters provide better state estimation accuracies in
an unfailed system, but the simulation results in Figure 6.8 verify that
a Kalman filter cannot be expected to provide any failure detection in-
formation or any acceptable state estimates in a failed ~ystem. The
inboard aileron servo failure generates threshold crossings in all eight
detection channels in Figures 6. 8b and 6. Be. Neither detection system
output can readily be deciphered to determine the source of the unexpec-
tedly large residuals. Similarly, the fact that the residuals shown i,n
Figure 6. 8b for the outboard aileron deflection estimate, the roll rate
estimate, and the roll angle estimate are significantly greater than", the
correspond ing res iduals in Figure G. 7b ind icates that the failure detec-
tion system provides better estimates of these variables in the failed
system than the Kalman filtel ll does. Figures 6. 8b and 6. Be are typical
of the detection channel outputs generated by Kalman filters for any of
the failures listed in Table 6. 1.
Figures 6. 6 and 6. 7 demonstrate that the failure detection systems
can readily detect and identify failures in which the failure mode results
in a pass ively inoperative system component. It is worthwhile to demon-
s trate that the failure detection systems perform equally well for a Ilon-
passive failure. The following simulation illustrates an instance in
which real- time use of failure detection information can allow a system
to recover from an otherwise unstable configuration.
Figure 6.9 summarizes a simulation run in which no roll angle
command was given. At 1. 6 seconds the inboard aileron failed in an un-
stable manner a..nd began a hard-over deflection. The failure model is
similar to that in (6. 1. 18) except that the servo time constant becomes
unstable:
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Figure 6. 8a Kalman filter residuals transformed into
T coord inates for simulation in Figure 6. 7amg
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Figure 6. Bb Kalnlan filter residuals transformed into
T 1 coordinates for simulation in Figure 6. 7a.me
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Figure 6. 9a Sensor outputs for a simulation with no roll
command. The inboard ailerons entered a
hard- over failure mode at 1. 6 seconds. At
2. 0 seconds. the inboard ·ailerons were in-
activated and at 2. 4 seconds they had returned
to the trim position
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Figure 6. 9b Tmg detection system output for
simulation in Figure 6. 9a. Arrow
indicates time of threshold corssing.
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Figure 6. 9c. Tmg1 detection system output for
simulation in Figure 6.9a. Arrow indicates
time of threshold cross ing. Asterisk is discussed
in footnote following Figure 6. 7.
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0 (6. 4 0 1)
Figure 6. 9a depicts the inboard aileron divergence in the interval be-
tween 1. 6 seconds and 2. 0 seconds. At 2. 0 seconds the aileron deflec-
tion is approximately 10 • By this time the autopilot has begun to com-
mand negative aileron deflections to counteract the measured roll rate,
but only the unfailed outboard aileron responds to the co~nmand. Because
the outboard aileron effectiveness happens ~o be greater than the inboard
aileron effectiveness, the autopilot can ultimately regain control of the
aircraft once the inboard ailerons are fully deflected.
Figures 6. 9b and 6. 9c present the detection system responses to
the failure. At 1. 7 seconds, both the T and T 1 detection systems
mg ms
experience threshold crossings in the inboard aileron channel (i.'(kL\t).
. l
No subsequent threshold crossings occur in the. 3 second waiting period
and both detection systems correctly identify the inboard aileron failure
at 2. 0 seconds. The detection law decision based upon these identifica-
tions is used at 2. 0 seconds to inactivate the inboard ailerons. After a
• 4 seconds transient, they return to a trim position and the autopilot
uses the outboard aileron to return the aircraft to the commanded attitude.
The corrective action changes the aileron failure mode from active to
passive. As indicated by the threshold crossings in the inboard aileron
detection channels in the interval between 2. 0 and 4. 0 seconds, the in-
board ailerons are no longer responsive to autopilot commands. For
400
any subsequent autopilot command the threshold crossings would reappear.
The means for eliminating this pass ibility is to update k i to zero in A, B,
and D when the inboard ailerons are deactivated. The failure detection
systems would then no longer expect the inboard ailerons to respond to
autopilot commands and the threshold crossings would reappear only if
the inboard ailerons were somehow re- activated.
The last simulation in this subsection is concerned with a rate gyro
failure. One purpose is to contrast the detection of a sensor failure when
tIle sensor output is used in the control law (rate gyro) with the case when
the sensor output is not used in the control law (inboard aileron deflection
serlsor). In the latter instance, Figure 6. 6 verified that the sensor fail~
ure must generate threshold crossings in at least two detection channels
of each detection system. Because a rate gyro failure affects the dynam-
ics of the autopilot- aircraft system, its failure can be constrained to a
s iagle detection channel. The failure mode presented in the following
example is pass ive - - gyro drifts and gyro blases are analyzed in Section
6. 4. 3.
The simulation in Figure 6. 10 further illustrates the manner in
which real- time failure detection, identification, and correction can be
used to prevent a failure from disrupting the autopilot- aircraft system
performance. The aircraft is given a 2° cOlnmanded roll angle at 1. 6
seconds and a 4° commanded roll angle at 5.6 seconds. The rate gyro
fails in a null output mode at • 8 seconds. The failure model is A A
r
in
(6.1.11) with aa3S equal to zero. Because the rate gyro output does not
deviate from the nominal output until after a roll command is applied, no
threshold cross ings appear in the detection syBtems until after 1. 6
seconds. At 1. 7 seconds the T detection system detects a threshold
mg
crossing in the rate gyro channel (; '(k~t» and at 2.0 seconds correctly
r
identifies the rate gyro failure. The T ms 1 detection system experiences
threshold crossings in the roll dynamics channel < ;;<kat» at 1. 7 seconds
and the attitude-rate channel (t I (kat» at 1. 9 seconds. At 2. 0 seconds,
ar
the T 1 detection system reports that a series of simultaneous failures
ms
has occurred (Table 6. 2). but the second tier of the detection law correct-
ly accepts the T identification of a rate gyro failure because of the
mg
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Figure 6. lOa- Sensor outputs for a simulation with a 20
roll command at 1. 6 seconds and a 4°
roll command at 5. 6 seconds. The rate
gyro failed at • 8 seconds and was repaired
at 2. 0 seconds.
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Figure 6. lOb T 'detection system output for simulation inmg
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Figure 6. IOc Tme 1 detection system output for
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single threshold cross ing reported by that detection channel. In tile
simulation, a standby rate gyro is brought on-line at 2. 0 seconds and
the autopilot- aircra.ft system resumes nominal behavior. Compar ison
of the attitude gyro response to the 2° roll command with the response
to the 4° command or with Figure 6. 5a verifies that the rapid identifica-
tion and correction results in a nearly nominal roll respollse. The re-
placement of the rate gyro introduces transient threshold crossings at
2.1 seconds in seven of the eight detection channels in Figures 6" lOb
and 6. IOc, but all the transients decay by 2.4 seconds. This behavior
illustrates the failure detection system inability to constrain a residual
to the appropriate detection channel when the residual undergoes a large
change from one measurement to the next. In this case, the rate gyro
repair causes a 400- change in the rate gyro res idual t '(k!\ t) between
r
2.: 0 seconds and 2. 1 seconds. This phenomenon and its importance in
the design of failure detection systems for aampled-data systems is
discussed in Section 6.4.2.
6. 4. 2 State Estimation
The single run simulations in Section 6. 4. 1 ind icate that for a
measurement sampling period of • 1 seconds and the system parameters
of Table 6.3, the failure detection systems and detection law designed
in Sections 6. 1 - 6. 3 can provide useful failure detection information for
the autopilot- aircraft system. Although it was not verified in Section
6. 4. 1, in certain instances the failure detection systems can also provide
state estimates comparable to those produced by a Kalman filter. This
subsection is concerned with the accuracy of those state estimates as a
function of:
i) the measurement sampling period,
ii) the relative variances of the measurement and system noises,
iii) the failures which a failure detection system is des igned to
detect, and
iv) the failures which have occurred in the system.
The analysis presented is not complete; l\ut, along.with Section 6. 4 e 3, it
serves to focus attention on the critical factors in the des ign of a failure
405
detection system. ()nly the roll attitude an(] roll rate estimates gen-
erated by the gyro-aileron fallure detectioil system are considered in
detail.
The base normal form defined for the gyro- aileron failure detec-
tion system in (6.2.29) can be· used to partition the update equation for
the sampled-data state estimator defined by (5.2.5) and (5.2.6):
A ,.. A A A
= X m (k~i) + (,At DFR+ D~'1'K + D A fK) (/(k~t)
(5. 2. 6)
The partitions for the state estimates are similar to those defined for the
continuous estimator:
A
X (kAt) =
m
X (kat)
rna
x (k4t)
mr
""x .(k~t)
mt
A-
x (kat)
rno
=
.. ..~,,m (kAt) + cp (k~t) - cp O(kAt)
'jJrma m m
<P (k~t)
rna
j) «(p (kA t) - q, (k~ t»
CD mr m
..,.
cp (kat)
mr
"0 .(kAt)
mt
-0 (kat)
rno
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X (k~t) =
m
'X (k~t)
rna
X (k~t)
mr
x .(kL\t)
ml
x (kat)
rna
=
f3 cp (k~t) + ~ (k~t) - eP O(kli t )
<p rna m fn
- " At)
<,0 nla\K~
f3 (u,' (k~t) -;p (k~t»Cf)'mr m
;p (k~t)
mr
o .(k~t)
mt
o (kdt)
rno
(6.4.2)
I'" (kAt) is the estimate of the roll angle at k~t based only on measure-
""'ma
ments made befo:ree k~ t .. and CPma(k~t) is the updated estimate based on
both ;n (k~t) and the measurements at kAt etc. The measurement re-
"t"ma
siduals are those defined in (6.3.2) for the T detection system:
mg
"£ '(k~t)
a
£' (k~t)
"
r
E~(kAt) =
E./(k~t)
1
"( I (kAt) (6. 3. 2)
0
where £ I (k~t) is the difference between the attitude gyro output and its
a ~ ~
pred~cted output etc. With DArK equal to zero and the partitions of DFR
and DA'¥K as defined in (6. 2. 32} and (6. 2. 46) respectively; the first two
partitions of ,the update equation can be written:
" " A
xm!Jkat ) = zmr(kat ) + (at Dpr + DA'YKr) (~(kat)
(6. 4.3)
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Fu rthcr subs titution yields the des ired relationships:
A ~
X (kat) = x (kat) + d A f '(k~ t) -f-
rna rna '-l'i'Ka a
Ata.
L
o
£.' (k4t) +
l
lltQl
o
o
E '(k~t)
o
X (kAt) =
mr
o
x (kAt) + d A \1IK '( '(k~t) +
mr 611 r r ~tQ'.
1
£./(k~t) +
1
o
E I (kAt)
o
(6. 4. 4)
If DA'i'K were defined by (6.2.37) and (6.2.38), dA'i'Ka and dA'i'Kr in
(6. 4. 4) would be replaced by atd'i'Ka and Atd'i'Kr.
These equations show the difference between a detection filter- state
estimator and a Kalman filter. A Kalman filter would use the residuals
of the four measurements at kAt in an optimal sense to update the estimates.
A ~
In contraAt, only *£ '(k~t) in the first equation and £ '(k~t) in the second
a r
equation can be used optimally because d A'i'Ka and d Ii. 'i'Kr are the only
gains in (6. 4. 4) which can be varied to improve the state estimate8~
Itt. ~
The gains assoe iated with €"- '(kAt) and "£ '(k~t) are defined by the DFA A l
and DF parJ.i.tions of DFR and a.re fixed by the failure detection require-r ~ A A
ment that A- DFRC be block diagonal. In particular, they are fixed by
the requirement to detect aileron failures. Contrary to the case of a
Kalman filter J the use of the aileron deflection res iduals in (6. 4. 4) does
not necessarily improve the state estimates. For the measurement
accuracies presented in Table 6. 3, the ata. and ata gains are large
A A lOA
enough that "£.'(kAt) and '( '(kAt) increase the uncertainty in x (kat)lorn
for large lneasurement sampling period~. In the event t~lat an aileron
failure occurs, however, Figures 6. 7 and 6.8 verified that the roll angle
and roll rate estimates generated by a Kalman filter are severely
degraded, but those generated by the gyro- aileron failure detection sys-
tem are unaltered. The general rule- of- tJ :umb is that if a failure detec-
tion system is des igned to detect a particular failul'e, the only state
408
eRtinlat~s degradecl hy the occurrence of the failure are those directly
aS8()ciated with the failen comp()n~nt, e. g., if the inboard aileron fails,
the gyr()- ailcrc)n failure (letection system can estimate every Rtate
c()mponent except the inboard aileron deflection.
One procedure for improving the state estimates in the unfailed
system is to remove the requirement for detecting aileron failures --
although this makes the state estimates sens itive to aileron fa ilures.
The gyro aileron failure detection system was required to detect aileron
failures in order to satisfy (6. 2. 23) anc thereby make the algorithms in
Section 5. 2 eas ier to implement. The algorithms are still applicable if
the failure detection system is designed for the gyro failures only. }\.s
indicated in Section 6.2.2, definition of the base normal form for the
~ P::J
two event vectors fa and f
r
necess itates the use of Append LX A. 4, but for
this example the same transformations T and T are found. Frorll a
m
state estimation vantage point, the important difference in the failure
"""detection constraints on the choice of D~K is that (4.4. 17) and the discrete
equivalent of (4. 4.20) require the last two columns of DFR and DA'i'K to
be zero:
0 0 0 0 ~
0 0 0 0
D Fa
- - -
- - - -
,. 0 0 0 0 ~
~R = DFr=0 0 0 0
- - -
- - -
_.
"
- -
-k.k -k.k 0 0 D Fi1 a L r
- - -- - - -
.-
-k k -k k 0 0 ~D
0 a 0 r Fo J
0 0 0 A
dA'l'Ka 0 0 0 DA'i'Ka
- - - - - - -
.. -
-
.-
-
0 0 0 A
dA'l'Kr DA'i'Kr
i'\ 0 0 0 =
DA'i'K= - - .-., - - - -- -0 0
~
0 0
__~'!'Ki _
- - -- - -
0 0 0 0 DA'i'Ko J
(6. 4.5)
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The change in DFR from (6. 2. 32) eliminates the AtQ'i and AtQ'o terms
in the equivalent to (6. 4. 4). The increased freedom in the choice of
])6.1< which results from the decrease in the failure detection require-
ments is indieatcej by the fact that the discrete equivalent ()f (4.4.25)
no longer requires DarK to be zero:
0 0 ADAra0 0
.--
- -
"" 0 0 A0 AfK = 0 0
D
arr
-
~
- - - -
a a AD
0 0 ~r~ (6.4. 6)
D~ra' D~rr' and IS~rm are 2 x 2 matricer.; and can be chosen
arb i trar ily.
If the failure detection system is designed only to detect gyro
failures, the fact that DFa and DFr in (6. 4. 5) are zero implies that the
equivalent to (6.4.4) is:
A ~
X (k~t) =X (kAt) + d AlUK € I (kAt) ... DAf
rna rna "''1 a a ~ a
X (kAt) = x (k~t) + d A K € I (kAt) + DAf
mr mr ,-,1' r r ~ r
£./(k~t)
1
~
£ I (kL\t)
o
£.' (kAt)
L
€ I (k~t)
o
(6. 4. 7)
The difference between (6. 4. 4) and (6. 4. 7) is that the gain matrices
D.Ara and DArr are not fixed by failure detection constraints and can be
selected solely for the purpose of improving the accuracy of xma(kAt)
and x (kL\t). The new failure detection system is still not a Kalman
mr
filter because only three of the four res iduals at kAt can be used to up-
A A
date each of x (kAt) and x (k~t), but the freedom to choose the
rna mr
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A ,
gains for f.(k~t) and £" '(kAt) can l)e eApected to improve the value ()f
1 ()
the failure detection system as a state estimator. The one difficulty
i: that the algorithms provided in Section 5. 2 for choosing 6afa and
Darr cannot be stated in a dosed form unless the parameter optimiza-
tion procedure is used. For the measurement uncertainties given in
Table 6.3, the gyro outputs are significantly more accurate than the
aileron deflection sensors. As is verified in the analysis which follows,
a reasonable choice is to not use the aileron residuals at all:
(6. 4. 7) then becomes:
x (kat) = x (kat) + d A\11K E '(kAt)
rna rna '-IT a a
,. (kat) = x (k~t) + d AU! K "£' (k~t)xmr mr ,-,I r r (6. 4. 9)
Because (6. 4. 9) differs from (6. 4. 4). the optimal dA'l'Ka for the gyro
failure detection system in general differs from tIle op timal choice for
the gyro- aileron failure detection system, etc.
The second component of x (k~t) is cp (k~t) and the second
rna rna
component of x (kat) is I~ (kAt). In the unfailed system these cor-
mr "t'mr
respond to the roll angle and the roll rate estimates respectively.
Figure 6. 11 compares the standard deviation of cp (k~t) and t~ (k.o.t)
rna 't"mr
in the unfailed system for:
i) the gyro- aileron failure detection system
ii) the gyro failure detection system defined above, and
iii) a Kalman filter
as a function of the measurement samplirlg period. The measurement
variances and aerodynamic moment variances are those given in Table
411
6.3. J30th the discrete optimization procedure based on (6.2.45) and
th(-~ continuous optimi~ation procedure based on (6.2.37) and (6.2.38)
w(~re used tc> deter '11 ine filters for the gy~()-ailer()n f:lilure detection
sys tern; ()nly the discrete optim ization procedure was used for the gyre)
failure detection system.
F igl1re 6. l1a ind icates that the cp (kat) estimate from the gyro-
rna
aileron failure detection systern has approximately twice the standard
deviation of the estimate from the correspond ing Kalman filter. For a
measurement sampling period of .1 seconds, the gyro-aileron failure
detection system estimate has a (] of 1. 2 x 10- 4 radians and the Kalman
filter estimate has a (] of • 56 x 10- 4 radians. By comparison, the a for
a single attitude gyro measurement is 2.1 x 10- 4 radians.' The gyro
failure detection system offers a modest improvement in estimation
accuracy over the gyro- aileron failure detection system - - a a of
• 97 x 10- 4 rad ians at • 1 second - - but it does not approach the accuracy
,.. ...
of a Kalman filter. To some extent this is because D Afa and D Afr in
(6.4.8) were not chosen optimally. but the principal reason is that the
Kalman filter can use the relatively accurate rate gyro output to improve
the roll angle estimate and (6. 4. 9) states that the gyro failure detection
system cannot. The offsetting advantage of the gyro failure detection
system is that it can generate accurate roll angle estimates if the rate
gyro has failed. but a Kalman filter cannot.
The significant difference in the state estimation capabilities of
the two failure detection systems is ind icated in Figure 6. 11 b. With the
• 1 second measurement sampling period, the cpa (kAt) estimate from
mr
the gyro-aileron failure d(~ection system has a (] of 2.34 x 10- 4 radians/
second when the discrete optimization procedure is used to des ign the
failure detection filter. This uncertainty is greater than t'he C1 of
2.1 x 1\,,-4 radians/second if the rate gyro outputs were used directly for
the roll rate estimation without any measurement filtering at all. It
implies that the gyro- aileron failure detection system cannot be expected
to yield useful roll rat.e estimates for a measurement sampling period as
long as • 1 seconds. By contrast. the gyro failure detection system
generates a roll rate estimate of comparable accuracy to the Kalrnan
filter estimate. This accuracy justifies the reasonableness of the choice
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Figure 6. I1a Roll estimation accuracies for gyro-aileron
failure detection system, gyro failure detection
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measurement sampling period. Measurement
variances and aerodynam ic moment variance
are those of Table 6. 3
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" "
of D~ra and·n~rr in (6. 4.8). The large difference in the roll rate
eatimates generated by the two failure detection systems is attributable
A ~
to the fact that the b-ta.E".'(kAt) and Ata € '(kbt) terms add directly into
1 1 0 a
the ePmr(k~t) update por,tion of (6.4.4) and the magnitude of their gains is
disproportionate to their state estimation usefulness for large lueasure-
,
ment sampling periods. This difficulty is a general shortcoming of
sampled-data failure detection systems. Because it is not required to
detect aileron failures, the gyro failure detection system does not place
such heavy emphasis on the noisy aileron deflection residuals. On the
other hand, the gyro failure detection system, li~e the Kalman filter,
cannot generate useful roll rate estimates in the event of an aileron
failure.
Figure 6.12 indicates that t.he relative state estimation performance
of the gyro- aileron failure detection system in the unfailed system is im-
proved viz- a- viz the Kalman filter if the power of the random aero-
dynamic moment increases. The measurem.ent uncertainties used in the
comparison are those of Table 6. 3, but the power of the random aero-
dynamic moment is a factor of 10 greater. The roll angle and roll rate
estimates from both the Kalman filter and the gyro- aileron failure de-
tection system are worse than in the previous case; however, with the
detection filter des igned us ing the discrete optim ization procedure, the
gyro- aileron failure detection system estimates are less affected
than the Kalman filter estimates. An increase in the random aero-
dynam ic moment power or a 1ecrease in the gyro- aileron deflection
sensor variances has the effect of reducing the importance of the
~tO'. (.'(k~t) and ~to! i' (k~t) terms in (6.4.4) and thereby improving the
1 1 0 0
relative value of the gyro- aileron failure detection sys tern as a
state estimator.
Figure 6.12 also indicates that the discrete and continuous optimiza-
tion procedures can yield detection filters which produce state estimates
with significantly different accuracies. This single result cannot be
generalized to conclude that the discrete optimization procedure is always
superior. For large measurement sampling periods, both algorithms are
approximate and it is not poss ible to pred let which will yield the better ,de-
tection filter. For certain applications, both algorithms may be unac'"
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ceptable and it may be necessary to resort to a trial and error procedure
to choose D~'YK'
6. 4. 3 Sens itivity Analys is
Section 6. 4. 1 demons trated the ability of the T and T 1 detec-
mg rns
tion systems to perform nearly instantaneous failure detection and iden-
tification when the failure s ignificar.cly alters the short- term dynamics
of the autopilot- aircraft system. In conjunction with: Section 6. 4. 2, it
also demonstrated that the failure detection systems can be used to gen-
erate state estimates which are partially insensitive to system failures,
e. g. the roll angle and roll rate estimates produced"by the gyro-aileron
failure detection system are not affected by aileron failures. This s ub-
section is concerned with circumstances in which a failure detection
system using the threshold detection law may not yield satisfactory fail-
ure detection information. The specific areas discussed are:
i) an inability to constrain a failure- generated output error to the
appropriate detection channel,
ii) an inability to discriminate between failure- generated output
errors and those resulting from modeling errors. and
iii) a difficulty in detecting failure modes which do not significant-
ly alter the short- term dynamics of the system.
In each instance mod ifications to the failure detection system or the
detection law are suggested which may achieve the desired performance.
Particular attention is given to the effect of chaos ing a detection filter
which is not an optimal detection filter- state estimator.
It was mentioned in Section 50 2 that failure detection theory is not
A
analytically precise for sampled-data systems. D~.K as defined in
(5.2.20) and (5.2.21) can only constra~n the output error generated by a
failure to be approximately unidirectional. In the context of the T
mg
detection system, the residual generated by a rate gyro failure cannot be
constrained completely to the rate gyro detection channel, but must have
small projections into the attitude gyro detection channel, etc. The de-
A
tection system outputs in Figure 6.10 demonstrated that when €r(k6t ) un-
dergoes large changes from one sampling time to the next, the magnitudes
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of the projections can be sufficiently great to create extraneous
threstlold crossings in detection channels in which they should not
appear. In that simulation, the threshold cross ings were pred ictable
because they were a consequence of the rate gyro repair. The major
significance of the extraneous s.ignals in Figure 6.10 is that they indi-
cate that the failure detection systems may not provide reliable fail-
ure detection information immed iately after a system repair has been
made.
Figure 6.13 reveals that the approximate nature of failure detection
theory for sampled-data systems may have a more practical importance
than suggested by Figure 6.10 0 The only command in the simulation in
Figure 6.13 is a 2° roll command at 1 0 6 seconds. The failtlre is the
same rate gyro failure as ill Figllre 6. 10. The difference is that the de-
tection law used for Figure 6. 13 requires a waiting period of 2. 9 seconds
after a threshold cross ing before identifying the failure (only the T
mg
detection system output is presented). The measurement histories in
Figure 6. 13a show that the longer waiting period allows an unstable
asc illation to build up in the roll response, but that an identification and
correction of the rate gyro failure at 4. 6 seconds (2. 9 seconds after the
first threshold crossing appears) permits the system to recover. The
T detection system output in Figure 6. 13b indicates that the detection
mg
law developed in Section 6. 3 might have difficulty correctly identifying
the failure after the longer waiting period. A threshold cross ing appears
in the rate gyro detection channel at 1. 7 seconds, but a threshold cross-
ing aILo appears in the attitude gyro detection challnel at 3. 0 seconds.
Except for the transients which occur in response to the rate gyro re-
placement.. the res idual is almost completely constrained to the rate
gyro detection channel, but a comparative evaluation must be made in
order to properly interpret the T detection system output. The
mg
threshold cross ing detection law as developed in Section 6. 3 does not
make such an evaluation.
The possibility of extraneous threshold crossings is a function of
four parameters:
.418
Figure 6. ]:3a Sensor outputs for a s im ulation with a 2° roll con1 n1 and
at 1. 6 seconds. The rate gyro failed at • B seconds
and was repaired :It 4 n seconds.
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Figure 6. 13b T detection system output for s im ulation in
mg
Figure 6. 13a. Arrows ind icate time of threshold
A , A I
crossings. £ .(k~t) and ( (kAt) threshold crossings
l 0
are trans ients assop i::l.ted with rate gyro repair.
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i) the size and variation of the residual n1agnitnde,
ii) the threshold height,
iii) t.11e measurement sampl i ng interval, ann
tv) t.he n()tse statistics.
The noise statistics are accounted for by setting the thresholds at or
above the 3 (] noise level. If the thresholds were higher in the T de-
mg
tectifJn system, the extraneous threshold crossing in Figure 6. 13b would
not have appeared. The stochastic model and the choice of detection
filters define the 30' lower limit for the threshold, but the thres holds can
be placed above the 30' limit. On the other hand, if the roll command
issued at 1.6 seconds were 20° instead of 2°, the residual in the rate
gyro detection channel would be an order of magnitude greater and the
extraneous threshold cross ing i11 the attitude gyro detect ion channel
would quite likely cross a 50' or 60' threshold. Ttle extraneous threshold
crossing would also be worse if the measurement sampling period were
longer. The T
mg detection system output is shown in Figure 6. 14 for
the same simulation as Figure 6. 13a except that the failure detection sys-
tem is based upon a measurenlent sampling period of • 2 seconds. Com-
parison of Figure 6. 13b with Figure 6.14 verifies that the second failure
detection sys tern is COIlS iderably less effective in cons trai11ing the res id-
ual to the proper detection channel.
The most effective means of preventing extraneous threshold
crosstngs is to have a short measurement sampling period. Beyond
that, a short waiting per iad between the firs t threshold cross ing and the
failure det~ction decision is useful, but it is necessary to insure that
the waiting period is suffic iently long to allow accurate isolation of the
res idual. After these poss ibilities have been tried, and if rais irig tl1e
thresholds is not effective, it is necessary to consider more sophlsticated
algorithms for interpreting the failure detection system output. One
possibility is a comparison of the errors in each detection channel based
upon peak magnitudes, average power, or some other reasonable criteri-
on in order to determine the detection channel to which the output error
is primarily constrained. A more general statement of the necessary
conditions for isolating a failure is made in Section 5. 3.
421
Figure 6.14 T detection system output for simulaticn
mg ."
in Figure 6. 13a except that the measurement
sampling period is .2 seconds. Arrows indicate
time of thresllold crossings.
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All the analysis of this chapter has been made under the assumption
that the reference model defined in (6. 1. 5) is exact. The approximations
made in ignoring the inner loop of the autopilot mean that (6.1. 5) is not
exact. Although the failure detection sys terns could have been des igned
for the full system dynamics, the fact that tl1ey were not affords an oppor-
tunity to study their performance when the system is inaccurately mod-
eled. Figure 6. 15a presents the sensor outputs for a simulation in which
the full fourth- order aircraft dynamics and both the inner and middle
loops of the autopilot were used. The simulation is analogous to that
presented in Figure 6. 5a. There arc no failures and the only command
is a 2° roll command at 1.6 seconds. Comparison with Figure 6. 5a in-
d icates that the response tirtle has increased from 1. 6 seconds to 3. 5
seconds. The gains k and k could be modified to improve the response
a r
time, but that is not important here.
The T and T 1 detection system outp'uts correspond ing to
mg ms
Figure 6. 15a are presented in Figures 6. 15b and 6. 15c respectively. The
single threshold crossing in the roll dynamics detection channel of the
T 1 detection system indicates that the roll mode dynamics have
ms
changed, or more precisely, that the roll response of the aircraft to an
aileron deflection differs from the roll response defined in (6.1.5).
Reference to Table 6.2 indicates that the threshold crossings in the T
mg
detection channel are cons istent with this observation. Unfortunately,
this information is not useful s inee it is known a priori. Of more im-
portance is the possibility that the threshold crossings associated with
the modeling error might prevent the detection law from correctly
identifying a failure when it occurs. In essence, the problem is one of
the detection law's ability to detect simultaneous failures when a roll
dynamics change is one of the failures. Refererlce to Table 6.2 indicates
that a simultaneous roll dynamics change and rate gyro failure results in
threshold cross ings in the t '(kat) and i '(kAt) detection channels of the
a "'" r"
T detection system and the r-' (kat) and £:<kL.\t) detection channels oflng ar JJ
the T 1 detection system. The table also shows that a simultaneous
me
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Figur~ 6. 15a Sensor outputs for a simulation in which the autopilotaircraft system is described by the full lateral dynamicsequations and the autopilot of Figure 6. 2. A roll commandof 2° occurs at 1. 6 seconds. There are no failures.11
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Figure 6. 15b T detection system output for simulation
mg
in Figure 6. 15a. Arrows indicate time of threshold
crossings.
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Figure 6. 15c T 1 detection system output for sirnulation inmg
Figure 6. 15a. Arrow indicates time of threshold
cross ing.
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roll dynamics change and attitude gyro failure generate the same pattern
of threshold crossings. It follows that the detection. law has lost its
ability to discriminate between a rate gyro failure and an attitude g.yro
failure unless the threshold cr()ssings due to the modeling error can l)e
accomodated i.n scme way.
The most effective means of coping with the unwanted threshold
cross ings is to elim inate the modeling error. An alternative is to use
some special property of the output error generated by t,e modeling
error to distinguish it from the output error generated by a failure. In
this instance, the output error due to the simplified dynamics has a 6
A A
second period. In principle, the output errors Z '(kQ.t) and ('(kat)
. g s
denoted in Figure 6. 4 can be passed through a notch filter to remove
this component after they are transformed into the detection channels.
The delay introduced by the filter increases the length of time between
a failure and its detection, but it allows the threshold cross ing detection
law to be used.
A
An alternative similar to the notch filter is to choose the D I:i'llf K
segment of DAK to attenuate the Dutch roll components of the output
errors rather than to optim ize the detection filter as a state estimator.
With reference to the continuous approximations in (6. 2. 53·a) and
(6. 2. 53r), the minimal polynomials 'f (.) and 'Y (.) are the denom inators
a r
for the transfer functions:
1
1
=
= (6. 4. 10)
y (8) and '1' (8) are second-order polynomials which can be freely chosen.
a r
. To some extent, they can be chosen to attenuate the error equation
frequency responses to the Dutch roll frequency. Because they are of
such lo~ order, however, they are not as effective as the notch filter.
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'rh~ final example in this sul)seclic)n c()neerns the ability of the
failure (jetection systenl to detect a degraclation in a system component
wh~ch docs not significantly affect the short- term dynamics of the sys-
tem. Figure 6.16 presents a computer simulation in which a .002
radians/second rate gyro bias appears at 1.6 seconds and a 2° roll com-
mand is issued at 4.0 seconds. When the bias appears, the autopilot
responds by developing a roll angle offset. Other than the offset roll
angle, the dynamic response of the system is not affected, but the long-
term effect of the offs€~ roll angle is to cause the aircraft to drift from
its nominal flight path. The T mg detection system output in Figure 6. 16b
indicates that the bias. causes a threshold crossing in the rate gyro
cllannel and can theoretically be detected, but the threshold cross ing
occurs only at one sampling time and its magnitude is only 5ao
Unlike the majority of the failures studied in this section, the mag-
nitude of the threshold crossing for the bias is neither state-dependent
nor control dependent. If the failure detection system were to be designed
to detect gyro biases, it is reasonable to tailor the detection filter to en-
hance the detectability of biases. The result is presented graphically in
Figure 6. 17. Figure 6. 17 is the T detection system output correspond-
mg
ing to the simulation presented in Figure 6. 16a, but with two changes.
The first change is to replace the gyro- aileron failure detection system
with the gyro failure detection system. As shown in Figure 6. 11 b, this
increases the accuracy of the roll rate estimate. and therefore narrows
the thresholds. The second change is that d /:). 'l'Kr in (6. 4. 9) is chosen to
weight the residual more lightly than an optimal detection filter-state
estimator does. The result is to give the failure detection systenl a
slower time response and cause the threshold crossing generated by a
gyro bias to persist longer. Figure 6.17 indicates that the bias generates
A
threshold crossings at five sampling times and that the E:r'(k/:).t) detection
channel exhibits a definitive bias in the interval between 1. 6 seconds and
, A
5.2 seconds. A detection law which used a bias test on the £ '(kAt) de-
r
tection channel rather than the threshold crossing test could presumably
A
detect the \.'(k/:).t) bias and associate it with the rate gyro bias.
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Figure 6. 16a Sensor outputs for a simulation with a rate gyro bias
of • 002 radians/second at 1. 6 seconds and a 2° roll
command at 4. 0 seconds.
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Figure 6. I6b T detection system output for simulation in
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SlJM1VlAf-tY AND J{14~(~()MMlt~NDATI()NS
7.1 Summary
The reference model approach used in this thesis provides a
general capability for on-line detection of fc.. ilures in complex
dynamic systems. The theory is developed specifically for continuous,
deterministic, time invariant linear systems; but it is equally valid for
discrete systems. The addition of a simple detection law for inter-
preting the failure detection system output permits the theory to be
extended to stochastic systems. Ii procedure for applying the theory
to sampled-data systems has also been devised, but it is based upon
a d iscrete- to- continuous approximation and lacks the mathematical
preciseness of the previous results.
The basic analytical results of failure detection theory were
developed in Chapter 3. These results were converted to a design
algorithm in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also presented a general failure
model for linear systems (Section 4. 1) and the transformation matrix
to a canonical form for the reference model which greatly simplifies
the design algorithm (Section 4. 4). Extension of the theory to
stochastic systems was treated in Chapter 5- - of particular importance
was the discussion of detection laws in Section 5. 3. The simulation
results presented in Chapter 6 verify that failure detection systems
based upon the theory presented in this thes is can provide effective
real- time detection and identification of failures in stochastic systems.
A reference model consists of a model (A,B.C) of the nominal
system dynam ice and a feedback matrix D which uses the output
error (the difference between the system and model outputs) to
update the state vector estimate of the model. The general failure
model developed in Section 4. 1 expresses the failed system in terms
of the original model (A, B, C) and a set of additive vector terms
which drive the state and the output equations. The usefulness of
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the theory developed in this thesis is predicated on the fact that the
model for a component failure f.requently requires only one additive
terlT'.. All failures of a single control element or a single sensor
can be modeled with one such term. The additive term appears
in tr;.e state equation for control element failures and in tIle output
equation for sensor failures.
If the failure model for a particular system component is similar
to the failure model for a control element, and if the system is
observable, the algorithm presented in Section 4. 2 can be used to
chose D such that the output error generated by the failure is con-
strained to a s irlgle direction in the output space. Furthermore, that
direction is the same for every possible failure mode for the component.
Wi th the single exception noted below the unidirectional output error
is sufficient information to correctly identify the failure. This
ability to identify failures independently of the particular failure
mcxle is unique to failure detection theory. A D which yields a
unid irectional output error for a given fa.ilure is referred to as a
detection filter for that failure.
If more than one component is associated with the same output
direction it is· not possible to determine which of the components
has failed on the basis of the output error direction alone. Knowledge
of the possible failure modes for each component will generally
perm it a unique failure identification, but in certain cases no failure
detection algorithm can remove the ambiguity. Different components
are associated with the same output direction only if their ind ividual
failures have identical effects on the system output. This situation
can arise for a system with redundant (or dynamically similar)
components if the outputs of these components are not measured,
but it does not arise if the outputs are measured.
Component failures which cannot be mcxleled similarly to
control element failures cannot in general be constrained to generate
unidirectional output errors. The principal examples of such failures
are sensor failures. In most instances the output error generated
by a sensor failure can only be constrained to a two-dimensional
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plane. Although this implies that the output error genel'ated by a
sensor failure is more difficult to detect and identify than that generated
by a control element failure, it also implies that the reference model
approach offers a capability for distinguishing between the failure
of a control element and the failure of the sensor which measures
that control element's output. This capability is not present in many
failure detection algorithms.
A single failure detection system can detect and identify
failures in several d~fferent components. The precise number depends
upon the number of sensors in the system, the dynam ic relationships
between the various components, and the degree to which the available
design options are utilized. If the system has m sensors, a simple
algoritllm can be used to determ ine a set oJ: m components which
have "output separable 11 failures. It is possible to choose D such
that a failure of any of the components generates a unidirectional
output error along the appropriate direction. A number of design
options are available at this point, but D can be constrained to be a
detection filter for the m component failures and still retain sufficient
freedom in the choice of D to arbitrarily choose the closed loop
eigenvalues of the reference model. One of the des ign options
may increase the number of component failures for which D is the
detection filter. If a single failure detection system cannot detect
and identify failures in all system components, additional failure
detection systems Cg.fi be defined.
The structure of a failure detection system differs from that
of a Kalman filter only in that D is not chosen to minimize the
variance of the state estimates. Nevertheless. a failure detection
system is a state estimator. The algorithms developed in Sections.
5. 1 and 5.2 optimize the failure detection system as a state estimator
subject to the constraint that D must be a detection filter ior a speci-
fied set of component failures. The simulation results presented
in Chapter 6 verify that a failure detection system chosen to detect
a suitable set of failures can be a good state estimator.
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An important feature of the failure detection theory developed in this
thesiR iA that the algorithms enlploypd in ReJecting D are algt~hraic.
t J n] i.k (~ I(n] III :In fi 1t(~r thc\()r.y whf~re C( lIl11)utat. j()n ()f t.he' f (,prJ llac 1< III ~ltr i x
requires the solution to a nlatrix l{iccati equation, the detection filter
D is the solution of a set of linear, algebraic equations. As a conse-
quence, the total computation required to find D is considerably less
than that required to find a Kalman filter gain. In particular, if
the reference model is transformed to base normal canonical form
(Section 4. 4), D can be chosen by inspection.
The theory presented in this thesis is not entirely new. The
major theorems in Sections 3. 2, 3. 3. 1, and 3. 3. 3 were first derived
by Beard (1971) using matrix algebra techniques. The significance
of these sections is that they provide a geometric derivation of failure
detection theory which emphasizes the basic principles of control-
lability and observability upon which state space theory is founded.
The remairlder of the derivations in Chapter 3, the base normal
canonical form in Chapter 4, and the optimization techniques in
Chapter 5 are new re~ults.
7• 2 Recommendations for Further Study
In the course of this study, a number of areas for further
research have been identified. Those which appear to offer the
greatest potential yield are outlined in the following paragraphs.
The theorems derived in Chapter 3 provide the major results
needed to design failure detection systems for linear, time invariant,
deterministic systems. Although time-varying systems were not
specifically analyzed. there are classes of time-varying systems for
which the majority of the analytical results are applicable. In
particular. it appears that. with some minor restrictions, the theory
is applicable to the class of systems in which the time variation is
restricted to a small number of parameters. The poss ibility of
extending failure detection theory to large classes of time-varying
systems deserves attention. In this regard, a group- theoretic
generalization of the basic concepts discussed in Chapter 3 might
provide valuable insights.
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The general concept of output stationarity was introduced in
this the~ is and analytical results were developed which ind ~cate
that output stationarity can be used to significantly increase the
number of failures which can be detected by a single failure detection
system. Necessary and sufficient conditions for output stationarity
were developed-; but efforts to incorporate the concept into an efficient
computational algorithm were only partially successful. The algorithm
developed in Sections 3. 4 and 4. 2. 3 performs satisfactorily if a
single event vector is to be made output stationary, but it is cumbersome
in dealing with mutual output stationarity. Further study of output
stationarity should yield a more computationally satisfactory
algorithm.
The treatment of stochastic systems presented in Chapte~ 5
is valuable in that it defines algorithms by which failure detection
theory can be applied to stochastic systems, but it does not directly
address an important philosophical question: The theory permits
complete freedom in assigning the closed loop eigenvalues of the
reference model, but what values for the eigenvalues should be
selected? In ce~tain applications, the optimal detection filter-
state estimator developed in Section 5. 1 may be the best answer.
but the question deserves a more thorough exam ination.
The problem of detecting the presence of a failure- generated
error signal in a stochastt~ environment should also be investigated
further. Failure detection theory has an important property in that
it decouples a multid imens ional output error analys is problem into
a set of scalar output error analysis problems. As discussed in
Section 5. 4, this feature could potentially be used in conjunction with
existing hypothes is testing techniques to yield reliable detection and
identification of Haaft" component failures with a reasonable require-
ment for real- time computation. Utilization of hypothes is testing
techniques which yield minimum detection time, or maximum probability
of detection, etc., could increase the range of stochastic problems
for which the theory is applicable.
436
The most important single recommendation is that serious
cons ideration should be given to us ing the algorithm developed in
Chapters 4 and 5 to design a failure detection system for a real
system. The simulation results in Chapter 6 have verified the
important elements .of the theory and have demonstrated that a
failure detection system based 011 the theory can provide reliable
failure detection and identification performance. For C1 properly
chosen application, the algorithms should yield a reliable' failure
detection system with the ability to detect and identify cOQ\ponent
failures independent of the manner in which the components fail.
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APPENDIX A
NUMERIC AL ALGOllITT-fMS
The algorithms of this appendix are those required to implement a
failure detection system. As indicat~d in Chapter 3, they are not unique
and they are not necessarily the most direct solution to the des ign prob-
lem or the mos t computationally effie ient. Their primary attr ibute is
that a single artifice - - the orthogonal reduction procedure - - can be
used to analyze the basic characteris tics of a system (A, C) which deter-
mine its failure detection properties. The algorithms presented here
are a variation upon those proposed by Beard. Alternate algorithms are
discussed in the appropriate sections of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
A. 1 Orthogonal Reduction Procedure
Consider an n I X n matrix:
v =
T
vn '
(A. 1)
./
/'
/'
where the v -, j = 1 .•• n I, are arbitrary n- vectors. The orthogonal re-
J
duction procedure is an iterative process which generates an n X n sym-
metric, pos itive sem i-definite matrix O(n') whose range space coincides
witn'l(V). In the jth iteration the jth row of V is tested to determ ine if
it is orthogonal to the range space of a symmetric matrix. If it is not,
the range space of the matrix is reduced to insure o~thogonality. The
algorithm begins with an initial matrix 0(1) which is symmetric and
positive-definite. The removal is done in such a manner that the o(j),
j = 1 ••• n ~ remain symmetric and positive semi-definite. At the comple-
tion of the procedure, the range space of O(n') is the orthogonal comple-
, .
ment of the row space of V. ~. e .• it is ~(V). The algorithm is a general-
ization of the Gram-Schmidt r·rthogonalization procedure.
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(-1 )
o .
The algorithm begins with any symmetric, positive-definite matrix
The iteration is a two step procedure in terms of the auxiliary
° --
vector w.:
J
i) (A.2)
w. is the inner product of v. with the row space of O{j) -- which is also the
J . (.) J(O)
range space of 0 J since n J is symmetric o If wj is zero, v. is ortho-
gonal to the range space of O(j) and no mod ification of O(j) is rjqUired:
ii) (A.3)
i i)'
If w. ta not zero, 7l(0(j+ 1» is enlarged to include v.:
J J
T
O(j+ 1) = O{j) _ wj wj
Tw. v.
J J
(A. 4)
After a maximum of n I iterations, the row space 01 V is 7l(o(n '» and the
range space of O(n ') is 7l(V).
Each step of the reduction yields a symmetric, positive definite
matrix O(j). If 0(1) is positive defini~e, 7l(0(j» is spanned by v 100 0 v i _ 1.
If 0(1) is pos itive sem i-definite, 7l(o(J» is spanned by the sum of v 10 ~'o
v. 1 and any basis of 7l(0(1»0 This fact is useful in finding the detectionJ-
generator for f from Rfo The number of reductions made is rkV if
rk 0(1) = n, but will be less if 7l(0(1) is chosen to contain part of the
row space of V.
A. 2 A Detection Space and Its Detection Generator
If C ' and Df are defined as in Lemma 3. 2. 6' and (A, C) is observ-
able, Rf = 7l (Mn I) where:
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= (/\..5)
A, bas is for Rf can be determ ined as the range space of some matrix
o(n) by using the orthogonal reduction procedure on Mn '. The most
straightforward manner in which to initiate the algorithm is to let 0(1)
be the identity matrix. The matrix Rf can then be composed from the
largest number of independent columns of O(n). Obviously. rk O(n) = Vf.
A more efficient procedure can be developed to eliminate as much
repetition in the com putation as poss ible. If a set of event vectors
fl • •• f
r
is output separable, an investigation of the ir mutual detectability
ultimately requires thaf~,... A\ ... R
r
• and gl ..• gr all be determined.
Further, it might be des irable to add a set of output stationary vectors
h l •••. hq in the des ign of a detection filter. This would require that the
additional detection spaces ;}l .•• 7q and their generators be determined.
The algorithm presented below is segmented into four steps and the
circumstances under which the steps must be executed are discussed.
Step 1. Find 7l(C)
If detection spaces other than Rl ••. Rr are to be determined, their
computation is more effic ient if it is not necessary to initiate the ortho-
gonal reduction procedure with a positive definite 0(1). A more accept-
able approach is to start with a symmetric, positive semi-definite ,matrix
0c whose range space is '!l(C). This can be accomplished by applying
the orthogonal reduction procedure to C with 0(1) equal to the identity
matrix:
0c is then the terminating matrix from the algorithm:
o '= Oem)
c
440
(A. 6)
(A. 7)
Since rkC = m, a total of m reductions must be nlade using ii)' of the
orthogonal reduction procedure. It is only necessary to compute 0c
once.
Step 2. Compute R~
If ~ is the subspace s·panned by fl ••• f
r
, the mutual detectability
of f 1 ••• f r is governed by the detection space 12:r for ~ as specified in
Definition 3. 3. 3. R:r satisfies:
where R:r c n(C). Since ~ is known. R:r is known if R:r can be found. If
D:r and C; are defined as in Lemma 3. 3. 2 and MD ' is defined:
M I =D
C '(A-D C)n-lJ 3"
(A. 8)
then R:r can be found by applying the orthogonal reduction procedure to
MD I and starting with the initial matrix:
(A. 9)
From Lemma 3. 3. 2 it is clear that ?'l(C) c ?'l(C;) and therefore the row
space of C; is contained in the row space of C. If the reduction proced-
ure is applied to Mn ' with the initial matrix (A.. 9), the first m rows of
MD ' are contained in '1(0(1» and the reduction can start with the (m+ l)th
row of MD '. A total of n - in - J)~ + r reductions using ii)I are necessary.
Let 0.1 be the terminating matrix n,(nm-m + 1): .
(nm-m+ 1)o = nJ
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(A. 10)
T:tIe matrix RF can be composed from the maximum number of independent
columns of n,-and:
(A. 11)
A bas is for R:r is provided from the columns of RF • This computation
need occur only once unless event vectors are added to the set f 1 ... f r e
If an event vector fk is removed from the set or if the state space
is augmented, the algorithms of Theorem 3. 3. 3 (and Corollary 1) or
Lemmas 3.3.10, 3.3.11, and Appendix A. 3 can be used to determine
f"'oJ ••
R:Jk or R:r respectively. Both algorithms require use of the orthogonal
reduction procedure to find the null space of a matrix.
The matrices R1 ••• Rr • J 1 ••• J q C ?'lee) can be determined in a
manner s im ilar to Step 2 by an orthogonal reduction on Mn ' as defined
in (A. 5) with C ' and Df computed for the appropriate element of fl. · e f r ,
h1 ••• hq• In the case of Rl ••• Rr • the initial matrix for the reduction
should be:
(A. 12)
A total of V:r ~ r - Vi + 1 reductions using ii)' are necessary for each subspace
and the terminating matrices are denoted by 01 ..• Or:
(nm- m+ 1)0k= n k=l ... r (A. 13)
RJ ••• Rr are then-.:omposed from the independent columns of the appropri-
ate 01 ... Or and R1 ..• R r are constructed by:
(A. 14)
Since it may not be true that J 1 ••• J q C ~. the reduction for them
must be initiated with (A. 9). A total of n - m - II . + 1 reductions are necessary~l '
the terminating matrices are denoted by 0Jl ••. OJq:
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and Sl R are c()nstructed sinlil,lrly ttl (A .. 14).q
(A. 15)
If the state space is augmented, the new H1 •.. ffr can be found by
applying Lemmas 3.3.10 and 3.3.11. The latter requires a matrix[ 4: ~] to be determined where ~ spans the null space of the matrix MOk
as defined in Theorem 3. 3. 3, and b, spans the row space of Moke If the
orthogonal reduction procedure is applied to MOk with the initial matrix:
(A. 16)
then A is composed of the non-zero auxiliary vectors wj and ~ is composed
of the independent columns of the terminating matrix. A similar operation
is then required to determine Z. as the set of vectors which span the null
J
space of MOLj as defined in Lemma 3. 3. 1l.
In general, the computation leading to (A. 15) must be repeated for
,...., ,....., ,....., I""tJ
(A, C) in order to determine the new 8 1 ••. "Sq. For this reason, it may
be desirable to postpone computingS 1 ••• S until the state space aug-. q
mentation has been completed.
"Step 4. Compute detection generators
Once the detection spaces are determined, a moo ified reduction
procedure is needed to determine the detection generators gl · · e gr-
This time the reduction is on the observability matrix M:
M =
C
CA (A. 17)
The generator is contained in the range space of the appropriate 01 ••• Or
and the reduction should be initiated with that matrix.
k = 1 ••• r (A. 18)
Sine(~ R 1 .•. ,,~ ;lre ()bserva}lI0, e,lch r-educt.ion procednre tern) ina.t.cs on
t.h(~ ~cr() nl:lt.rix and for R-, II- - 1 rcclucf.i()n8 llsing ii)' are n(~eded. 'rhcL L . .
last vector to be removed from the range space of 0<.1) is a multiple of
the detection generator. Since rk 0(1) = rkR. = v. - 1, if the last non-
1 1
zero auxiliary w. from (A. 2) is denoted by W l' then:J v·-1
g. = ct· w 11 1 V.-
1
(A. 19)
where a- is an appropriate scale factor. The same algorithm is used to
1
find the detection generators for 7 1 ... Jq•
All the reduction procedures of this section can be simplified if
special attention is paid to the manner in which M and MD I are constructed.
Consider M as an example. A row of M can be immediately removed from
the reduction procedure without applying (A. 2) if it is known to be a linecir
combination of the rows above it in M - - previous reductions will have
modified O(j) such that the row is contained in 7l(0(j». If ckA.t is a linear
combination of the rows above it, ckA.t+i must be also for all i and the
reduction can be terminated for all subsequent rows of M in which c k
appears. Beard refers to the first zero auxiliary vector associated with
c k as the intermediate terminating point for that row of C.
If rk 0(1) < n, it is possible to show that the intermediate terminating
point may occur even if ckA is not a linear combination of the rows above
it. F'or the algorithms proposed in this appendix, that does not matter.
If the auxiliary vector for ckA.t is zero, it is zero for all ckAt+ i and the
reduction can be terminated for subsequent rows of M in which c k appears.
The same result holds for the reductions on Mn '. Once m intermediate
term inating points have been encountered, the reduction process its~lf can
be terminated. This occurs after at most rk 0(1) + m rows of M (or Mn I)
have been inspected.
After RF , H l ••• Hr have been determined, f l ••• fr can be in-
spected for mutual detectability. Theorem 3. 3. 3 assures mutual detecta-
bility if and only if
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(A. 20)
Standard nunlerical analys is techniques can be utilized to deternl ine
whether or not (A. 20) is an equality.
A. 3 Excess Subspace
The excess subspace associated with R:r is not unique, but the ex-
cess subspace ROg defined in Lemma 3. 3. 6 is. The algorithm defined
in this section for ROg is a variation upon the construction used in the
proof of Lemma 3. 3. 6. It is also a variation on the algorithm proposed
by Beard.
The procedure is to remove from R:r of Step 2 the subspaces
R1 ••• Rr in such a manner that only ROg remains. Assume the rows of
the following matrix are known:
C
1
(A. 21)
c
m
Since the matrix is a portion of the expression for Cj.. it is computed in
findmg R:r. Let the matrix MOI be defined in terms of these rows:
M I =o
c1(A- D:rC )lIt- 1
C2(A- D:rC ) .
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(A. 22)
If the ()rthc)gona] reduction procedure is applied to M O I with the initial
mat.r·ix ~)l) given by (A. 12). the term inating matrix can be designated by
UOg:
(IJ ')
"Og = " :r
The matrix ROg can then be defined:
ROg = [z 1 • •• zlI ]o
(A. 23)
(A o 24)
where Z 1 ••• zVO are the first V0 linearly independent columns of "Og'
This result can be motivated by considering C!t and MOI in detail.
It is easy to see that:
T -1 T[(CF) CF] (CF) Cf. = e .
1 mt (A.25)
The matrix is a transformation of the output space @m such that, if 7(. is
L
invariant. f. produces output only along the ith coord inate direction in the
L
output space. The observability of "R., or the manner in which some
1
arbitrary excess space RO maps into Ra can be determ ined from con-
sideration of only the ith row of (A. 25)~ Specifically. if ROg maps into
R., P- must satisfy:
1 '''Ug
C.
L
and:
IJ.- 1
- ( 1c i A-D.rC )
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R :;1 0Og
(A. 26)
(A. 27)
No vector in Ri satisfies (A. 26). Therefore, the reduction on MOI removes
R1 ••• R
r
from the range space of 0.7 to yield 0og. By construction 00g
satisfies (A.26>' Since R,.. is observable and 1(:1 is invariant with respect
to A- Df-. 00g also mus t satisfy (A. 27) for some subset of i = 1 •.. r.
Because:
(A. 28)
R0 g is uniquely determ ined by the range space of 00g.
With ROg determined•. the excess space system (n. s) as defined in
Lemma 3. 3. 8:
AROg = ROg n+ GS (A.29)
can be determined trivially. The ith row of @ is given by (A. 27):
since ROg satisfies (A. 27) and gi must satisfy:
_ Vi- 1
emi = ci(A-D,..C) gi
Once ® is known. ncan be found simply by solving (A.29):
(A. 31)
If a· vector fk is removed from the set fl ... f
r
, ~ is determ ined
by removing the kth row from @ and Corollary 1 of Theorem 3. 3. 3
provides an algorithm for Ok and ROgk• The matrix [A: 1:3 ] k used in
the corollary can be determined using the algorithm developed in
Appendix A.2.
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A special case for the excess subspace computation exists if the
state sp:lce augmentation algorithms of Section 3. 3. 4 are used. If the
excess subspaces in 8 n and 8nare denoted by RO and RO respectively,~ g g ~
the range space of .n
og is contained in the range space of the matrix RD
defined in Lemma 3. 3. 11:
RogA I RogaI
,-..J
I
RD
I (A. 32)= ---------r-------
I
E c I 0
vOk •
~ ~
ROg can be determ ined from R:r and R 1 .•• R r us ing the tec hn iques of
this section if 0:r is defined:
OJ I 0I
OJ
I (A. 33)= .... _---.,----
I
0 I EI
v1
but this involves a greater amount of computation than that used for R
og
originally.
A simpler procedure involves the matrix:
(A. 34)
On is symmetric, positive semi-definite and the range space of ~ is
equal to the range space of RD- If MO is defined as the (VO-1Io) x nmatrix:
~ T(Rn Zl)
~ .
MO =
. (A. 35)
eRn Zr)T
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with Z., j ;. k. given in Lemma 3. 3.11, the rows of MO are the rows whichJ ~ . ~
must be removed from the range space of Rn to det~ermine R O • If the
'" g
orthogonal reduction procedure is applied to MO with:
n(l) = % (A. 36)
the independent columns of the terminating matrix O(1I0-!:b) define RO •~ g
(B) and Ii can then be determined from (A. 30) and (A. 31) respectively.
A. 4 A Completion for the State Spac~
The orthogonal reduction procedure applied in Steps 1 and 2 in
Appendix A. 2 eliminated all vectors from the range space of O(j) which
were not elements of R3"' i. e. all vectors which were not in 'HMD '),
These vectors are not important in determining the detection space for
fl ••• f
r
, but they are important when assignment of the n - 11:/ eigen-
values of A- DC not associated with R3" is cons idered. Also, they define
a completion of the state space which is needed to determine the trans-
formation to base normal canonical form as defined in Section 4. 4. The
;releva~t Rfoperties of these vectors are discussed below.
Consider Steps i and 2 of Appendix A. 2. The orthogonal reduction
procedure was initiated v!ith:
and terminated with
E
n
(A.6)
o = n(nm-m+l)
'3 (A. 10)
A total of n - '113 reductions using iO I were necessary. Because of the
manner in which Ci was constructed, there were only m - r rows of C}
in (A. 8) for which i) yielded a non-zero auxiliary vector 1• Assume for
IIf rk C < m. m should be replaced by rk C in the discuss ion.
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convenience that these are the last m - r rows c;+ 1 ••• C~l of C!r.
l"or i = r+ 1 ... m. let q. be the largest iriieger such that all of e.
'
• .•q._ 1 1 . 1
c.'(A-D:f) I have non-zero auxiliary vectors and let w.' denote the
a~xiliary vector associated with c{ (A~DjC)qi-l. The in~plication of the
discuss in:l of intermed iate terminating points in Append ix A. 2 is that
there are n - VJ linearly independent vectors in the sequence
q -1 q -1
w;'+l'" (A-Dj<I) r+l w;+l ... (A-Dj C) m w:n
and that these vectors. in conjunction with a basis for Rj • define a basis
for the state space. Th1J.s. with z 1 ••. zVO defined in (A. 24). the matrix
TO required in Section 4. 4 is
(A. 37)
Section 4. 2. 4 states that the Vj ei.genvalues of A- DC associated with
i(; can be assigned almost arbitrarily by requiring D to be any solution to:
(4.2.43)
where:
(4 0 2. 42)
and '1'1(1) ••• 'i'r(l) are the desirE~d minimal polynomials associated with
Rl · •• R
r
• If r < r k C. the solution of (4. 2. 23) is not unique. A unique
solution is obtained. however. if the remaining n - Vj eigenvalues of A-tiC
are specified. The n:ost convenient manner to accomplish this is to use
the vectors w;+1 ... w.:n.
Lemma 3.2.8 provides the basis for the proposed algorithm. In
essence, the lemma states that W;-t1. .. !t w:n can be treated as detection
generators (mod R:r> and that (4. 2. 43> leaves sufficient freedom ~~ the
choice of 0 to make the spaces spanned by w;+l ••• (A-DC)qr+l w;+l'
etc. invariant (mod R:r>. Let 0 ~ be any solution of (4. 2. 43>-
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(A. 38)
(A. 41)
CA. 42)
(t\.40)
CA. 43)
i = r+ 1 ... m
D = D' + D
'l' r
qr+ 1-1 q -1
W = [(A-DyC) w:.+ 1 ••• (A-DyC) m w~J
q. q.-l
'if (A) = A 1 + piq.A l + ••• pi 1
1
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then a unique solution for D which assigns all n eigenvalues of A-DC to
the des ired values is:
If "1:'+1(-) ... 'i'~(.) are the desired relative minimal polynomials
assoc iated with these spaces:
where Dr is the solution .of: .
D C'W = 'i" (A-Die)r J W 'l'
and:
Regardless of the manner in which Dyis selected. (A. 39) provides a
unique representation for D. Thus, if base normal canonical form is used
to define D~ as:
where DF.R and DVare transforms of the solutions of (4. 4. 1 'n and (4. 4. 20).
then (A. 39) and (A. 40) can be used to determine Dr and complete the
selection of D.
APl')J~NI)IX II
The integral in (B o 1) can be writ~en in the general for111
( l~ " 1 I
n- 1
= C n- 1S + g g. + Coc(s)
JCD
I = _1_ (' ds c(s)c(-s)
n 21Tj ~ d(s)d(-s)
- JCJ)
Computation of the power spectral dens ity for the outplll of a I incur
system involves an integral of the form
joo
~O(s) = _1_ SR(s) ep.(s) H(-s)Tds21Tj 1
- j(X)
where ~.(s) and I-I(s) involve polynonl ials in the variable Su 'rllis iLJlegl'~.ttL
has been evaluated for polynom ials up te> tenth- order b.y Ncwt<Jl1, (T(Juld
and Kaiser (1957). The results for polynom ials up to s ixth- {)rder ar'e
reproduced in this append ix.
where
des) n= dnS. +."" + dO
The solution for In for n ~ 6 is expressed in Table Eo 1 as a functioll uf
the coefficients Co ••• cn_ 1 and dO 0 0 0 dno
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Table B. 1
2Co
2dOd 1
2 2
c1dO + c Od 2
2d Od 1d2
222
C 2dOd 1 + (c 1 - 2cOc2 )dOd3 + c Od2d313 = 2dOd 3(-dOd 3 + d t d2 )
where
where
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Table B o 1 (cont. )
m =2
454
Bibliography
1. Arbib, M. A." Kalnlan. l{. E. and Falb, P. L., Topics in Mathe-
matical Systems Theory, McGraw- Hill, 1969.
2. Baggeroer, A. B., State Variables in Communication Theory,
M. I. T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970.
3. Beard, R. V., Failure Accommodation in Linear Systems through
Self- Reorganization, Report No. MVT- 71-1, Man Vehicle Labora-
tory, M. I. T., Cambridge, Mass., February 197].
4. Blakelock, J. H., Automatic Control of Aircraft and Missiles,
Wiley, 1~65.
5. Brasch, F. M. Jr. and Pearson, J. B., "Pole Placement Using
Dynamic Compensators" IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
Vol 15 No.1, February 1970, pp 34- 43.
6. Brockett, R. W., Finite Dimensional Linear Systems, Wiley, 1970.
7. Bryson, A. E. Jr. and Ho, Y. C. Applied Optimal Control, Blaisdell,
Waltham, Mass., 1969.
8. Bucy, R. S. "Canonical Forms for Multivariable Systems" IEEE·
Transactions on Automatic Control, Vo113 No.5, October 1968,
pp 567- 569.
9. Buxbaum, P. J. and Haddad, R. A., "Recursive Optimal Estima-
tion for a Class of Nongaussian Processes, "Proc. of Symp. on
Computer Processing in Communications, Polytechnic Institue of
Brooklyn, April 8-10" 1969.
10. Chien, T. T., An Adaptive Technique for a Redundant Navigation
System, The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc., T- 560,
Cambridge, Mass., February 1972.
11. Davison, E. J. "On Pole Assignment in Linear Systems with In-
complete State Feedback" IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
Vol 15 No.3, June1970, pp 348-351.
455
12. Davison, E. J. and McI~ane. 1>., ,1., 11)1isturbanee J ..()c~l.lizati(Hl aL.. i
DecQupling in Stationary l .. inear IVl ultivariable Systems II I EE ~
Transactions on Automatic Control, Vo115 No~ 1, Februar.y 1870.
pp 33-134.
13. Davison, E. J. and Wang, S. H., 1IProperties of Linear Titlle-
Invariant Multivariable Systems Subject to A.rbitrar·y Output arId
State Feedback" IEEE Transactions on A.utomatic Control, \7011B
No.1. February 1970, pp 24- 32.
14. Ephgrave, J. T., "Redundant Adaptive Strapdown Inertial Naviga-
tion System, The Aerospace Corporation, TOR- 0066(5306)-10,
October 1969.
15. Falb. P. L. and Wolovich, W. A., "DecQupling in the Design and
Synthesis of Multivariable Control Systems" IEEE Transactions 011
Automatic Control, Vol12 No.6, December 1967, pp 65 -659 ..
16. Gantmacher, F. R., The Theory of Matrices (Vals. I and II),
Chelsea Publishing Co., 1959.
17. Gilbert, E. G. , lIThe DecQupling of Multivariate Systems b.y State
Feedback11 SIAM Journal of Control, Vol 7 No.1, February 19~68,
pp 50- 63.
18. Gilmore, J .. P. and McKern, R. A., itA Redundant 8trapdown Inertial
System Mechanization - SIRU',' M. I. T. C. S. Draper I.Jaboratory,
E-2527, August1970.
19. Halmos, P. R., Finite Dimensional Vector Space, D. Van Nostr"and
Co•• Princeton, N. J., 1958.
20. Heymann. M. "A Unique Canonical F'orm for Multivariable I.4inear
Systems" International Journal of Control, Vol 12 No.6, 1970, pp
913-927.
21. Hildebrand, F. B .• Methods of Applied Mathematics, Prelltiss- IIall,
1965.
456
22. Howze, J. W. and Pearson, J. B., "Decoupling and Arbitrary Pole
Placemen~ in Linear Systems Us ing Output Feedback" IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 15 No.6, December lQ70,
pp 660-663.
23. Jazwinski, A. H. ~ Stochastic Processes and Filtering Theory,
Academic Press, New York, 1970.
24. Kalman, R. E., "A New Approach to Llnear Filtering and Predic-
tion Problems", Trans. ASME~ Sere D, J. Basic Eng., Vol 82,
1960, pp 35- 45.
25. Kerr, T. H. ~ lIA Two Ellipsoid Overlap Test for Real-Time Fail-
ure Detection and Isolation by Confidence R.egions" presented at
Pittsburgh Conference on Modeling and Simulation, April 24- 26~
1974.
26. Lainiotis, D. G., "Joint Detection, Estimation and System Identi-
fication" Information and Control, Vol. 19, No. I, August 1971,
pp 75- 92.
27. Lee, R. C. K.• Optimal Estimation, Identification, and Control,
Cambridge, Mass., M. I. T. Press, 1964.
28. Leondes, C. T., and Novak, L. M., "Optimal Minimal-Dreier
Observers for Discrete-Time Systems -- A Unified Theory",
Proceedings at the 5th IFAC Congress, June 1972.
29. Luenberger. D. G., "Observing the State of a Linear System11,
IEEE Transactions on Military Electronics, Vol. MIL- 8, No.2:
Apri11964, pp 74- 80.
30. Luenberger, D. G. , "Canonical Forms for Linear Multivariable
Systems" IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control" Vo112 No.3,
June1967, pp290-293.
31. Luenberger, D. G., "An Introduction to Observers, 11 IEEE Trans.
Automatic Control, Vol t6 No.6, December 1971, pp 596- 602.
32. McAuley, R. J. and J?enlinger, E .• "A Decision-Directed Adaptive
Tracker", IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronic Systems,
Vol. AES-9, March1973, pp 229-236.
457
33. Mehra, R. K. and Peschon. tI .• "An Innovations Approach to
Fault Detection and Diagno8 is in Dynam ic Sys terns" I Autoll1atica,
Vol. 7, 1971, pp 637- 640.
34. Newton, G. C. Jr., Gould. L. A. and Kaiser. J. F., Analytical
Desigrl of Linear Feedback Controls, Wiley. 1957.
35. Ogata, K. I State Space Analysis of Control Systems, Prentice-
Hall, 1957.
36. Papoulis, A. Probability, Random Variables, and Stochastic
Processes, Me Gra\v- Hill, 1965.
37. Pejsa, A. J., 110pt imum Orientation and Accuracy of Redundant
Sensor Arrays~t Honeywell, Inc., 1971.
38. Potter, J. E. and Deckert, J. C., "Gyro and Accelerometer
Failure Detection and Identification in Redundant Systems',' M. I. T.
C. S. Draper LaboratJry, E- 2686. May 1972.
39. Sanyal, P. and Shen, C. N., "Bayes Decision Rule for Rjipid Detec-
tion and Adaptive Estimation Scheme with Space Applications, ,.
Preprints of the 4th JACC, Columbus. Ohio, June 1973, pp 23- 26.
40. Schweppe, F. C., "Evaluation of Likelihood Functions for Gauss ian
Signals " , IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. Vol] 1,
p 61-70, January 1966.
41. Tse, E., "Observer-Estimators for Discrete-time Systems", IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol 18 No.1 J February 1973,
pp 10-16.
42. Truxal, J. G.• Control System Synthesis, McGraw-Hill, 1955.
43. Van Tress, H. L., Detection, Estimation and Modula. tion Theory.
Part I, Wiley, 1968.
44. Van Tress, H. L., "Application of State- Variable Techniques in
Detection Theory". Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol 58 No.5, May
1970.
458
45. Willsky, A. S. and Jones. H. L., itA Generalized Likelihood Ratio
Approach to State Estinlation in Linear Systems Subject to Abrupt
Changes".. Froe. of the IEEE Com. on Decis ion and Control,
(Phoenix, Arizona) November 1974.
46. Wonham, W. M... "On Pole Assignment in Multi- Input Controllable
Linear Systems" .. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol 2
No.6, December 1967, pp 660-665.
47. Wonham.. W. M... IIDyna m ic Dbs ervers - Geometr ic Theory".. IEEE
Transactions on,·Automatic Control, Vol.15 No.2, April19'?O,
pp 258-259.
48. Wonhal:a.~.. '.,V. M. and Morse .. A. 84' "Decoupling and Pole Assign-
ment in Linear l\;~llltivariableSystems: A Geometric Approach ll ..
SIAM Journal of Coni:-o]" Vol 8 No.1. February 1970, pp 1-18.
49. Wonham, W. M. and Morse, A. S... tJDecQupling and Pole Assign-
ment by Dynamic Compensation" SIAM Journal of Control, Vol 8
No.3 .. August 1970, pp317-337.
50. Wonham, W. M., and Morse, A. S., "Status of Noninteracting
Control", IEEE Trans. Automatic Control. Voll6 No.6, December
1971, pp 568- 581.
459
BIOGRAPHY
Harold Lee Jones was born on May 13, 1945 in Great Bend,
Kansas. He attended public schools in Great Bend and graduated
from Great Bend High School in 1963. He rec.eived his B. S. and
M .. S. degrees from MIT in 1967 and 1969, respectively. As an
undergraduate" Mr. Jones held a National }VIerit Scholarship; as
a graduate student, he was supported in part by an AC Electronics
Fellowshtp.
Upon entering graduate school, Mr. Jones became a research
assistant with the Measurement Systems Laboratory. His subsequent
research activities included participation in the des ign of a hydrofoil-
based hyd.rographic survey system and of several satellite- based
experiments. In June 1971, he became a tull- time research
assistant with The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.
Mr. Jones lives in Reading, Mass. with his wife, the forn1er
Cheryl Bowen. He is a member of Tau Beta Pi, and Sigma Gamma
Tau honorary fraternities.
460
